NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 
1917-1919 




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COPYRIGHT DEPOSIT. 



NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

1917-1919 




MAJOK-GENERAL CLARENCE R. EDWARDS 



NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

1917-1919 

A HISTORY OF THE 
TWENTY-SIXTH DIVISION U.S.A. 

BY 
EMERSON GIFFORD TAYLOR 

MAJOR, INFANTRY, 26TH DI\^SION U. S. A. 
ACTING ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF 

With Maps and Illustrations 




BOSTON AND NEW YORK 

HOUGHTON MIFFLIN COMPANY 
1920 



^. 






COPYRIGHT, 1920, BY EMERSON GIFFORD TAYLOR 



ALL RIGHTS RESERVED 



vi> ^ 



NOV -I 1920 
©CI,A601256 



TO 
AMAURY DU BOISROUVRAY 

AND 

THE OFFICERS OF THE FRENCH MILITARY MISSION 



CONTENTS 

I. Origins ^ 

11. Organizing the Division 12 

III. Overseas ^^ 

IV. Settling Down in France 34 
V. The Chemin des Dames 63 

VI. On the March 86 

VII. The La Reine (Boucq) Sector 96 

VIII. The Fights at Bois Brul6 and Seicheprey UO 

IX. Day by Day in the La Reine Sector 134 

X. The Affairs of May and June 144 

XI. To THE Champagne-Marne Defensive 158 

XII. The Aisne-Marne Offensive — First Phase 168 

XIII. The Aisne-Marne Offensive — Epieds and 

Trugny 1^ 

XIV. The Aisne-Marne Offensive — Afterwards 203 
XV. The Saint-Mihiel Offensive 213 

XVI. In the Meuse-Argonne Offensive — Marche- 

VILLE / 232 

XVII. In the Meuse-Argonne Offensive — Verdun 242 

XVIII. Before the Armistice and After 264 

XIX. Reconstruction — The Montigny-le-Roi Area 280 

XX. Homeward — The Last Days 292 

Index 307 



ILLUSTRATIONS 

Major-General Clarence R. Edwards Frontispiece 

Remieres Trench and Remieres Wood 124 

Photograph by U.S. Air Service, Photographic Section 

Vaux 164 

Photograph by Signal Corps, U.S.A. 

Photograph taken at 4.30 a.m., July 18, 1918, showing 

MEMBERS of THE 103d InFANTRY JUMPING OFF 176 

Photograph by Signal Corps, U.S.A. 

Pill-Box, Saint-Remy Wood 220 

Photograph by U.S. Air Service, Photographic Section 

No Man's Land over which the Twenty-Sixth Division 
advanced near Les Eparges 224 

Photograph by Signal Corps, U.S.A. 

Hill south of Ormont Wood 252 

Photograph by U.S. Air Service, Photographic Section 

Major-General Harry C. Hale 282 

Photograph taken in France by Mr. Frank P. Sibley 

MAPS 

Neufchateau Area 34 

Chemin des Dames Sector 66 

La Reine (Boucq) Sector 106 

Advance of 26th Division, Aisnb-Marne Offensive 168 

Saint-Mihiel Offensive 216 

Meuse-Argonne Offensive 246 



NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

1917-1919 

CHAPTER I 
ORIGINS 

ANY account of an American combat division partici- 
pating in the late European war, written while the 
color of its life under fire is yet undimmed, inevitably must 
incur the danger of lapsing into mere reminiscence. One 
who has shared the life of a body of fighting troops in the 
field is like to record concerning it matters which are less 
the facts of history than the bases of the writer's own 
enthusiasm or prejudice. 

But there is vitality in a tale of events, the echoes of 
which are still sounding. There exists a certain value, for 
the historian of a later generation, in the fresh recollections 
and impressions of the men who played an active part in 
those events. And so, if only for these reasons, it may not 
be amiss to set down, at this time, the annals of such a 
division of the American Expeditionary Force as the 
Twenty-Sixth, which fought in France throughout the 
entire period of American participation in the World War, 
in 1918. 

For the record of the Twenty-Sixth is particularly in- 
teresting. The circumstances of its organization, its per- 
sonnel, its record as a fighting unit, are all singularly rich 
as reflecting not only national and sectional character- 
istics, but also the typical traits of American fighting 
troops in the field, on the march, in billets, or in the heat 
of battle. The story of the Twenty-Sixth is of American 
citizens, non-professional soldiery, who volunteered to 



2 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

take up arms in defense of their country's cause, and of 
the manner in which American citizens do bear themselves 
in action. And it is in this light, possibly, that the following 
pages may be read with clearest understanding. 

To one unacquainted with military matters, it appears 
perhaps unnecessary, oftentimes, to take such careful ac- 
count, as must the military historian, of elements in an 
organization which appear not directly related to its char- 
acter as a body of troops equipped and trained for giving 
battle. Numerical strength, the commander and his staff, 
proficiency, fighting spirit, physical condition, equipment 
and supplies, are, like the weather and the state of the 
roads, obviously important to consider in reviewing the 
work of any unit in action. But almost equally important, 
it may be said, for 'a clear understanding of an armed 
force's operations in the field, are such matters as its or- 
igin, character and identity of its personnel, and the cir- 
cumstances of its creation. To understand the nature of 
the French defense of Verdun in 1916, or that of the 
British retreat from Mons prior to the Battle of the Marne 
in 1914, one must accurately appraise the character of the 
forces engaged. Similarly, one cannot get a true approx- 
imation of the work of the subject of this history, w^ith- 
out showing what kind of men were brought together to 
form the Twenty-Sixth Division, from what environment 
they sprang, and under what circumstances tliey were 
organized. 

In accordance with plans for the organization of the 
national defense perfected after the entry of the United 
States into the war, April 6, 1917, the Twenty-Sixth Di- 
vision of the United States Army was created by a con- 
solidation and reorganization of the state troops of Maine, 
New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, 
and Connecticut.* A territorial scheme for the organization 

* Numerical designations of divisions in the land forces of the United States, 
created for participation in the European War in 1917, were assigned according 



ORIGINS 3 

of divisions of the new army already projected was being 
put into operation quite generally. Admirable in its con- 
ception, it was valuable as contributing to establish an 
esprit de corps among the troops to a degree perhaps not 
always appreciated in the earlier days of the Expeditionary 
Force's activities in France. Under its provisions, New 
England men brought into service under the selective 
draft were grouped together in the Seventy-Sixth Division; 
in the State of New York were raised the Twenty-Seventh 
(National Guard) and Seventy-Seventh (National Army) 
Divisions; and elsewhere, throughout the country, the 
effort was made to combine in divisions, with local terri- 
torial affiliations, state troops or the drafted men of the 
several States or neighboring localities. A notable excep- 
tion to this rule was the creation of the Forty-Second Di- 
vision out of National Guard troops from all sections of 
the country, for the purpose of emphasizing at the outset 
the national character of the new American armies. 

The New England National Guard of 1917 meant, as a 
fighting force, much or little according to the angle from 
which it was considered. A system by which troops re- 
cruited, organized, oflBcered, and maintained under the 
authority of the State, were at the same time equipped 
and trained under the supervision and direction of the War 
Department, which were partly dependent on the financial 
support of the State and partly on that of the federal 
authorities, was not calculated to produce uniformly good 
results as to discipline and proficiency. The danger of a 

to the following plan : To divisions of the Regular Army were given the numbers 
One to Twenty-Five inclusive; to divisions formed from the National Guard 
(state troops in federal service), the numbers Twenty-Six to Seventy-Five in- 
clusive; to divisions of the National Army (composed of men inducted into the 
army under the Selective Service Act), the numbers Seventy-Six to One Hun- 
dred inclusive. Numerical designations of infantry, artillery, and engineer units 
with the National Guard and National Army divisions commenced, by an exten- 
sion of this system, with 101 to 104 for infantry regiments in the Twenty-Sixth 
Division, 101 to 103 for artillery regiments, 101 for the engineer regiment. Simi- 
larly, the infantry regiments of the Seventy-Sixth Division, for example, were 
numbered 301 to 304 inclusive. 



4 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

clash between the controlling authorities was always 
present. On the one side, the War Department, properly 
intent on exercising such close control as it deemed vitally 
important in order to train and equip the state troops as 
effective fighting units of a national army, tended con- 
stantly to extend and impose its own regulations; on the 
other side, the States, appropriating large sums annually 
for the maintenance of the state forces, and jealous of 
federal control even while acknowledging its necessity, 
inclined inevitably to interpret the requirements of the 
War Department in accordance with local conditions or 
local military traditions. That the system did not break 
down is largely due to recognition by state authorities of 
the practical advantages to be derived from strict con- 
formity with federal requirements regarding drill, dis- 
cipline, and instruction if the troops were to be properly 
trained for active service. It became a point of pride in all 
the state military organizations to pass creditably the 
periodical inspections of the federal oflScers; hard and 
conscientious work was done at the prescribed drills, at 
the summer camps of instruction, and in the schools for 
officers and non-commissioned officers. In general, good 
care was taken that the arms and equipment issued by the 
War Department were maintained in serviceable condi- 
tion. Standards varied, even in companies of the same 
regiment, but a great amount of military knowledge was 
taught and learned. Good was accomplished furthermore 
by the officers and non-commissioned officers of the Reg- 
ular Army who were detailed to the several States for duty 
as Inspector-Instructors. They brought to the state troops 
the best ideals of the "old army" respecting discipline, 
training, care of property, and efficiency in the field; they 
were able to transmit to the federal authorities through 
the Militia Bureau, along with their routine reports, an 
accurate and intelligent interpretation of the spirit, quali- 
fications of officers, and the general attitude of both officers 



ORIGINS 5 

and men constituting the state units, which was of im- 
mense value. The work of these inspectors, extending 
through a period of years preceding the call of the state 
troops into federal service, was further of very great im- 
portance as interpreting the Regular Army and the New 
England National Guard to one another. 

But the conscientious work of those responsible for the 
efficiency of the local military units could not accomplish 
more than an approximation of the ideal of perfection. 
The too brief weekly drill periods, the annual field instruc- 
tion of but six days' duration, the impossibility of enforc- 
ing a uniform standard of discipline and proficiency for 
officers, were only a few of the difficulties against which 
headway had to be made under the existing system. 
Wrong in principle (in the light of present-day require- 
ments), exposed to all the dangers of a dual and divided 
control, admittedly faulty by many in the National Guard 
service itself, regarded as a most unsatisfactory makeshift 
by all those forces intent on building up, under federal 
control, a strong reserve for the Regular Army, it is sur- 
prising that the system did not break down altogether. To 
its opponents, it appeared incredible that the system was 
able to produce troops who, in the spring of 1917, were 
even approximately fit for consideration as the basis of 
a field force for active operations against the enemy. 

For other elements than the inherent defects of the 
National Guard system had tended for months to reduce 
the effectiveness of the New England troops. The period 
following their hard field service and training on the Mexi- 
can Bord'^T- in 1916 was one of disintegration. Scores of 
officers resigned their commissions in the autumn of that 
year; hundreds of enlisted men, as their terms expired, 
left the service at once. New enlistments were very rare. 
Throughout the winter of 1916-17 the effective force of 
units was reduced to a minimum; military interest was at 
a low ebb. The prospect, furthermore, of securing com- 



6 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

missions in the OjQScers' Reserve Corps by a three months' 
course of intensive study and work at Plattsburg or another 
of the newly established War Department training-camps, 
attracted away from the Guard organizations a large 
number of valuable junior company oflScers and sergeants. 
The determined drive made at this time to replace the 
existing system of national defense, such as it was, by 
another soundly based on the principle of universal serv- 
ice, militated strongly against the efficiency of the state 
troops. The federal inspections of the Guard, held in the 
late winter months, were far from being universally satis- 
factory. 

Judged by ordinary standards, viewed from the angle 
by which a fighting force is ordinarily estimated as effi- 
cient or the reverse in proportion as it can show numbers, 
discipline, long training, and high morale, the New Eng- 
land National Guard, in the spring of 1917, could not have 
presented a very reassuring sight to those who were anx- 
iously weighing the potential fighting value of each organ- 
ized unit of the meager national establishment. But ele- 
ments not appearing on the surface, qualities which only 
intimate knowledge of the state troops could discern, were 
present to lend strength, solidarity, a spirit of patriotism, 
and a foundation on which to build a division of fighting 
men, which are worth study. What was there, latent, in 
the ranks of the little companies and batteries, what in the 
headquarters of the regiments and brigades, which, under 
the red sun of war, came into bloom like unsuspected 
flowers.'^ 

In the first place, the men who were to compose the 
Twenty-Sixth Division, as they assembled in their camps 
for mobilization, were all volunteers, from highest ranking 
officer to lowliest raw recruit. They wanted to fight. Not a 
man who enlisted after January, 1917, but felt, clearly 
enough, the imminence of the call to active service, with 
all that service in the war then raging must mean. Hun- 



ORIGINS 7 

dreds joined the New England troops that spring because 
they felt, quite simply, that to enhst was their duty as 
good citizens; hundreds were touched by the spirit of the 
Great Adventure; other hundreds desired ardently to re- 
join the colors, now that real action was in sight instead 
of a round of armory drills. The rumor that the National 
Guard would be first overseas after the Regulars was the 
spur that pricked forward an ardent thousand; the fact 
that one's friends were going in the home-town company, 
proud of their new distinction, brought forward a thou- 
sand more. Young men of foreign blood enlisted for the 
sake of aiding their brothers already in the fight on the 
Allied side. Whatever the spring that gave the impetus, 
the young fellows who filled the ranks of the old regiments 
during the late spring and summer enlisted because they 
wished to be counted with the foremost. And that spirit — 
the spirit of the patriotic volunteer — was as gold in the 
crucible. It was the element which gave a precious value 
to the whole alloy. 

Another important contribution to the strength of the 
Guard regiments was the local affection and support which 
they all commanded. Units of the New England militia 
had had a long history. Many of them dated their organiza- 
tion back to the days of the Revolution or even earlier; 
they were lineal descendants of Colonial train-bands or 
of Washington's brigades. Many had played a gallant 
part in previous wars of the Nation. The fathers and grand- 
fathers of not a few company officers had been captains 
or lieutenants in the same company a generation or two 
before. For years the whole military spirit of a town had 
been expressed in the local company, troop, or battalion. 
A score of cities and towns, all over the area, had, each 
in its warm heart's care, the well-being and creditable 
record of a group of its own "boys." It is quite true that 
there had come periods when this community interest was 
lukewarm. Only a few short months before the declaration 



8 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

of war, as has been said, this interest was languid to the 
point of inanition. But once the imagination was touched, 
once active service was imminent, the heart of the com- 
munity overflowed in affection and practical assistance. 
Even obscurely, it was felt that the soldier could only be 
helped by knowing that his town was backing him. And 
what enormous value to morale this feeling was proved 
to possess, those can bear witness who knew, from inti- 
mate association, what the New England soldier was like 
in the field. Volunteers for war service, who feel them- 
selves sure of the support and love of their fellow towns- 
men, who feel responsible for the good name of their home- 
grown regiment, make good fighting material. 

A further asset on the side of esprit de corps was that 
the troops of every New England State were employed 
in making up the new organization. Not only was there 
a healthy rivalry between local units; but further, it soon 
became evident that the New Englanders, as a group, 
felt placed on their mettle to outshine the divisions from 
other parts of the country. From the very outset, a soh- 
darity was present, in the germ. It was a spirit which was 
of the greatest value when, in the active competition of 
the training areas in France and in the days of field serv- 
ice, the Twenty-Sixth found itself being judged by the 
same standards as the best divisions in the army, old and 
new. 

It will be asked: "What military knowledge and experi- 
ence did these troops possess.'* This varied greatly. The 
flood of recruits poured in larger measure into some regi- 
ments than others; the discharge of old men who had de- 
pendent relatives, or were of alien enemy parentage or 
birth, took from some a large proportion, while other 
units suffered only a little in this respect. The changing 
policy of the War Department in the spring of 1917, by 
which recruiting for the National Guard was ordered, 
then stopped, then ordered to be resumed with new energy. 



ORIGINS 9 

had the general effect of chilling enthusiasm in all quar- 
ters for that branch of the service. Drill and instruction 
were taken up with intelligent energy, however, from the 
moment the Guard units were called into federal service 
(at various dates following March 20). At once scattered 
as a protection against enemy sabotage on lines of com- 
munication and transportation, at centers of the produc- 
tion of munitions and supplies, and around public util- 
ities, the new men all obtained experience in guard duty, 
close-order drill, military courtesy, sanitation, care of 
government property, and a taste of life under conditions 
of active service. It was a duty of value in developing 
non-commissioned officers; it taught battalion and com- 
pany officers a great deal regarding the handling and 
supply of an organization the units of which are widely 
scattered. Of the older men the great majority had had 
months of field service in 1916 on the Border. The Guard 
included also an exceptionally large number of officers, 
both staff and line, who had been in the military service 
for years, for sheer love of it. Many of these had been in 
the Spanish War; they included scores of well-qualified 
rifle and pistol instructors; there were many experienced 
adjutants, ordnance officers, and quartermasters; the med- 
ical personnel was very strong. The officers knew the book, 
and they knew the men under their command. This last 
is worth emphasizing. Not only had the company, battal- 
ion, and regimental leaders successfully passed all the War 
Department efficiency tests; but also they were intimately 
acquainted with the characters, worth, and personality of 
the individuals over whom they had control. They came 
from the same town as their men; they often had brothers 
in the ranks. Now this may be objected to in a military 
organization. Indeed, it had been a favorite charge against 
the National Guard system that company officers were 
usually elected by the enlisted personnel. Higher authority 
might appoint them; but the designation to lead came 



10 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

from below, in most cases. It was argued that an officer 
so selected was hampered in his application of discipline, 
was apt to play favorites, could secure his start by meth- 
ods of the small politician. Troops should obey the orders 
of any officer. All this can hardly be denied ; but the fluent 
criticism failed oftentimes to take into account the many 
checks and balances which federal and state regulations 
placed about the elective system. And it was a fact that, 
even when a man had started on his commissioned career 
by methods not of the best, he was like to develop, under 
the pressure of new responsibi ities, quite beyond expec- 
tation. It is also true that, in the vast majority of cases, 
the National Guard officers in the Twenty-Sixth Division 
were such as any authority would have been glad to com- 
mission. It was one of the many paradoxes of the system — 
the thing worked, in spite of the many obvious reasons 
why it should not. A point, moreover, most important 
to observe, is that these National Guard officers appear to 
have done admirably in laboring to insure the comfort and 
well-being of the enlisted men. In procuring food, shelter, 
and clothing for their troops they were assiduous and effi- 
cient; they defended the rights and privileges of their 
fellows most tenaciously. If there was any danger to dis- 
ciphne, in that officers of such habits should get into the 
way of babying their men, or of seeking popularity by a 
cheap and easy means — which was a charge easier to 
draw than to prove — it is sure that this danger, if it ex- 
isted, was more than balanced by an increased devotion 
and a closer bond of mutual understanding. 

Such, then, were the men who made up the Yankee 
Division as first constituted. Excellent material physically; 
with a large proportion of men who had been in mili- 
tary service more than a year; with thousands of recruits 
who were still to learn the feel of a rifle against the shoulder; 
with remarkable solidarity and high morale ; representing 
every class of the New England social order; every man 



ORIGINS 11 

a volunteer; every unit backed solidly by the personal 
interest of its community; with a very large number of 
skilled mechanics and oflBce men in the ranks, it is not 
too much to say that the force in being, whatever its limi- 
tations of training, was one which afforded great promise 
of development into a representative combat unit of the 
highest type. 



CHAPTER II 
ORGANIZING THE DIVISION 

LET us trace the successive steps of the process by 
which these soldiers were brought together into an 
organization. Weeks were to pass before they were fused 
and welded and shaped into a finished machine; months 
were required to effect the magical change from a machine 
to a living organism with a soul and a character all its own. 
For the moment, during the anxious days of the summer, 
the men and oflScers were assembled, counted, and tested, 
as if they were so many elements intended for the melting 
furnace and the mould. 

Toward the end of July, withdrawn from guard duty, 
the troops were concentrated in the state camps of mobili- 
zation and training, or in other camps erected for the pur- 
pose.^ Intensive battle training commenced at once. Pa- 
rades and reviews fostered soldierly pride and smartness; 
incessant drill was held in close and extended order, with 
detailed instruction in camp and personal hygiene, first- 
aid methods, and care of equipment, together with con- 
siderable target practice for the riflemen. There were 
applied to all ranks a series of most searching tests, with 
purpose to insure a force as physically fit as possible. Other 
boards of medical oflScers examined for weaknesses of 
heart and lungs; venereal inspections were made weekly; 
slight physical deficiencies, which were no bar to service 

- Units were assembled as follows: In Boston, Massachusetts, Headquarters 
Twenty-Sixth Division, Headquarters Troop, 101st Engineers, 101st Field Sig- 
nal Battalion, at Framingham, Massachusetts, Headquarters 51st Infantry 
Brigade, 101st Infantry, 102d Machine-Gun Battalion; at Boxford, Massachu- 
setts, Headquarters 51st Field Artillery Brigade, 51st Field Artillery Brigade 
complete; at ^Vestfield, Massachusetts, Headquarters 52d Infantry Brigade, 52d 
Infantry Brigade complete; 101st Ammunition Train; at New Haven, Connecti- 
cut, 102d Infantry; at Niantic, Connecticut, 101st Machine-Gun Battalion; at 
Quonset Point, Rhode Island, 103d Machine-Gun Battalion. 



ORGANIZING THE DIVISION 13 

on a peace-time basis, now sufficed to discharge or trans- 
fer a man immediately. Severe, too, were the examina- 
tions of all officers' capacity. The whole efiFort was in the 
direction of weeding out the incompetent, the dead 
wood, the man who did not appear capable of pulling his 
weight. Unfair rejections were made; but they were in- 
evitable under the conditions. And the net result was to 
include in the new Division only those who were unques- 
tionably able to endure the strain of field service, judged 
from the angle of physical condition. 

Those officers and men of the New England National 
Guard who were not included in the Division at the time 
of its organization, or were subsequently transferred from 
it, were grouped together in a Depot Brigade, under the 
command of Brigadier-General E. L. Sweetser, of Massa- 
chusetts.^ To the skeleton regiments of this organization 
were sent many whom it was desired to retain in the serv- 
ice, even though tliey could not be numbered with the 
Twenty-Sixth. Reorganized later, after concentration in 
southern camps, into corps and army troops, a large pro- 
portion of these units found their way overseas as pioneer 
regiments and special service units; their original disap- 
pointment was largely compensated by the fine service 
they rendered to the common cause in other ways. 

It was a period of the greatest nervous tension. Just 
what was in store, even a day ahead, nobody knew. When 
would the state troops be finally organized into a division? 
WTien would the command of the new units be announced? 
Who would be left behind? Would proper equipment be 

1 Under G.O. No. 3, Headquarters Twenty-Sixth Division, August 30, 1917, 
the Depot Brigade was created and the following units assigned to it: 1st N.H. 
Infantry (35 officers, 596 men); 1st Vt. Infantry (29 officers, 284 men); 5th 
Mass. Infantry (37 officers, 503 men); 6th Mass. Infantry (18 officers, 360 men); 
8th Mass. Infantry (28 officers, 406 men) ; 1st Conn. Infantry (20 officers, 365 
men); 1st Maine Heavy Artillery (40 officers, 776 men); Co. B, N.H. F.S. Troops 
(3 officers, 62 men); Co. A, Conn. F.S. Troops (3 officers, 64 men); 1st Separate 
Co., Conn. Infantry (1 officer, 109 men); 1st Separate Co., Mass. Infantry (3 
officers, 149 men). 



14 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

forthcoming? That comprised one set of thoughts; and 
the other could be summed up in the question cried by 
every unit of the American Expeditionary Force when 
compelled to remain more than forty-eight hours in one 
place: "When do we go?" 

On August 5 the troops were drafted into the service of 
the United States. Already they had been mustered into 
it as organizations, immediately upon response to the call 
of the President on and after March 20. But the drafting 
process changed the soldier's status considerably. He was 
now individually in the United States Army, instead of 
being a member of a state organization temporarily in fed- 
eral service. His allegiance was pledged to the Nation; his 
pay, subsistence, and control were now regulated wholly 
by the War Department. His collar ornament was a bronze 
"U.S." in place of the familiar abbreviation of his State's 
name. The "U.S." of the officers was surcharged with the 
initials "N.G." (National Guard), for the purpose of dif- 
ferentiating, in outward signs at least, the non-profes- 
sional soldier from his Regular brother. Later, a single 
device was prescribed for all officers, whatever their 
military antecedents; but numbers of old National Guard 
officers had come by that time to feel a quaint pride in re- 
taining the badges which proclaimed their non-professional 
origin. 

The exact strength in men, animals, and material of a 
combat division was still a matter w^hich the authorities 
were working out in detail. They had enjoyed the advan- 
tage of the advice of French and British experts, and the 
opinions of the staff officers sent overseas as observers 
earlier in the year; but, even so, there were many difficul- 
ties to be settled before a scheme could be elaborated for 
an American divisional organization suitable for trench 
warfare (the war of position), yet easily adaptable for the 
needs of the warfare of movement. The secret Tables of 
Organization of August, 1917, were marked "Provisional." 



ORGANIZING THE DIVISION 15 

Radical indeed were the changes. One saw, for instance, 
the infantry regiment expanded from a war strength of 
2061 to about 3600 all ranks; its machine-gun equipment 
was increased from four guns to sixteen; its traditional 
rifle was supplemented by light mortars, rifle and hand 
grenades, one-pounder field pieces (37-millimeter quick- 
firers), and automatic rifles. The supply, ammunition, and 
engineer trains were to operate a veritable fleet of trucks. 
The machine-gun strength of the division, excluding that 
of the infantry regiments, now included ten companies, 
each of 175 men and 16 guns, grouped into three battal- 
ions. Changes in the artillery were also far-reaching, due 
to the abandonment of the American guns, light or heavy, 
and the adoption of the French (the 75-millimeter field piece 
for two regiments, the 155-millimeter howitzer for one re- 
giment). A battery of trench mortars was another novel 
divisional unit. More than one old-timer, after he had read 
down the page, breathed a sigh of relief on discovering 
that the authorities had found no substitute for the escort 
wagon and the army mule, without which, he beheved, no 
truly American fighting force could legally be substituted. 
Into this force were to be consolidated the infantry, 
cavalry, artillery, and machine-gun units of the state 
troops. The task would appear to have been difficult. For 
not only was the numerical strength of each unit a factor 
in the problem, but its record of eflSciency, geographical 
location, and kind of training, had also to be considered 
in determining which regiments should constitute basic 
units, intact, and which should be broken up to complete 
the new organizations. But actually the tentative plans 
drawn by the Militia Bureau were found easy of applica- 
tion; and, with only such slight modifications as the con- 
ditions of the moment necessitated, they were immedi- 
ately put in execution. Telegraphic instructions of the 
War Department, dated August 13, gave the necessary 
authority and impetus, and organization of the Twenty- 



16 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

Sixth Division "from units of the New England National 
Guard" proceeded forthwith. As leader of what was soon 
to be called the "Yankee Division," there was designated 
Major-General Clarence R. Edwards, at the time Com- 
manding General of the Northeastern Department.^ On 
August 22, by General Orders Numbers One and Two, 
under which the newly appointed leader assumed com- 
mand and announced his Staff, ^ together with the com- 
position of the new units, there was inaugurated that re- 
lationship between the General and his troops which, from 
the very beginning, was destined, as time went on, to take 
on a character far wider and deeper than the merely offi- 
cial. The make-up of the individual organizations of the 
Division is shown by the accompanying table: 

Unit and Commander Composition 

Headquarters Troop Troop B. Mass. Cavalry. 

Captain Oliver Wolcott 
51st Infantry Brigade Hdqrs. 
Brig. -Gen. Peter E. Traub 
101st Infantry Dth Mass. Infantry; 1400 en- 

Colonel Edward L. Logan listed men, 5th Mass. Infantry; 

175 enlisted men, 6th Mass. In- 
fantry. 
102d Infantry" 2d Conn. Infantry; 35 oflBcers, 

Colonel Ernest L. Isbell 1582 enlisted men, 1st Conn. In- 

fantry; 100 enlisted men, 6th 
Mass. Infantry; 50 enlisted men, 
1st Vt. Infantry. 

1 Assigned by G.O. 38, W.D., April 2, 1917. 

2 The staff included the following oflScers at first: Aide-de-camp — Captain 
John W. Hyatt, Infantry; Aide-de-camp — Lieutenant N. S. Simpkins, 101st 
Field Artillery; Chief of Staff — Lieutenant-Colonel George H. Shelton, General 
Staff; Assistant Chief of Staff — Major A. A. Maybach, General Staff; Adjutant 

— Lieutenant-Colonel George S. Simonds, Infantrj', National Army; Inspector 

— Lieutenant-Colonel Horace P. Hobbs, Infantry, National Army; Quarter- 
master — Lieutenant-Colonel Joseph W. Beacham, Jr., Infantry, National 
Army; Surgeon — Lieutenant-Colonel James L. Bevans, Medical Corps; Judge 
Advocate — Lieutenant-Colonel C. M. Dowell; Ordnance OflScer — Major E. E. 
Phillips; Signal Officer — Major H. G. Chase, Signal Corps (Massachusetts); 
Chief of Artillery — Brigadier-General W. Lassiter, Field Artillery, National 
Army; Chief of Engineers — Colonel George \Y. Bunnell, Engineering Corps 
(Massachusetts). 



ORGANIZING THE DIVISION 



17 



Unit and Commander 
52d Infantry Brigade Hdqrs. 

Brig.-Gen. Charles H. Cole 
103d Infantry 

Colonel Frank M. Hume 



104tli Infantry 
Colonel WiUiam C. Hayes 



51st F.A. Brigade Hdqrs. 

Brig.-Gen. W. Lassiter 
101st Field Artillery 

Colonel John H. Sherburne 

102d Field Artillery 

Colonel Morris E. Locke 

103d Field Artillery 

Colonel Emery T. Smith 



101st Maehine-Gun Battalion 
Major James L. Howard 

102d Machine-Gun Battalion 
Major John Perrins, Jr. 

103d Machine-Gun Battalion 
Major W. G. Gatchell . 



101st Trench Mortar Battery 
Captain Roger A. Greene 

101st Engineers 

Colonel George W. Bunnell 



101st Field Signal Battalion 
Major Harry G. Chase 

101st Train Headquarters and Mil- 
itary Police 
Colonel Warren M. Sweetser 



Composition 



2d Maine Infantry; 1630 en- 
listed men, 1st N.H. Infantry; 
detachments from Cos. F, H, K, 
M, 8th Mass. Infantry. 
2d Mass. Infantry; 12 officers, 
800 enlisted men, 6th Mass. In- 
fantry; 12 officers, 800 enlisted 
men, 8th Mass. Infantry; detach- 
ments Cos. F, H, K, M, 8th 
Mass. Infantry. 



1st Mass. Field Artillery; 180 en- 
listed men. New England Coast 
Artillery. 

2d Mass. Field Artillery; 150 en- 
listed men, New England Coast 
Artillery. 

Battery A, N.H. Field Artillery; 
3 Batteries R.I. Field Artillery; 
2 Batteries Conn. Field Artillery; 
Troop M, R.I. Cavalry; detach- 
ment New England Coast Artil- 
lery. 

Squadron Conn. Cavalry; 196 
enlisted men, 1st Vt. Infantry. 
Squadron Mass. Cavalry, less 
Troop B; 3 officers, 213 enlisted 
men, 1st Vt. Infantry. 
Squadron R.I. Cavalry, less 
Troops B and M; N.H. Machine- 
Gun Troop; detachment 1st Vt. 
Infantry. 

Detachment 1st Maine Heavy 
Field Artillery. 

1st Mass. Engineers; 100 en- 
listed men, 1st Maine Heavy 
Field Artillery; 479 enlisted men. 
New England Coast Artillery. 
1st Mass. Field Signal Battalion. 

826 enlisted men, 6th Mass. In- 
iautiy. 



18 



NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 



Unit and Commander 
101st i\mmunition Train 

Lieut.-Col. William J. Keville 

101st Supply Train 

Captain Davis G. Arnold 



101st Engineer Train 
1st Lieut. S. R. Waller 

101st Sanitary Train 
Lt.-Col. J. L. Bevans, M.C 



Composition 
13 officers, 700 enlisted men, 1st 
Vt. Infantry; 6 officers, 234 en- 
listed men, Mass. Coast Artillery. 
Troop B, R.I. Cavalry; 5 officers, 
359 enlisted men, 8th Mass. In- 
fantry; 62 enlisted men, Co. M. 
6tli Mass. Infantry. 
82 enlisted men, 6th Mass. In- 
fantry. 

1st, 2d Mass. Ambulance Cos. 
1st, 2d Mass. Field Hospitals; 
1st Conn. Ambulance Co.; 1st 
Conn. Field Hospital; 1st R.I. 
Ambulance Co.; 1st N.H. Field 
Hospital. 

Minor changes in some of the transfers took place — 
indeed, they were still in progress while the units were 
under orders to proceed to the embarkation port; addi- 
tions both of officers and men were made as needed; but 
deviations from the above table were inconsiderable. The 
composite nature of the divisional units is interesting. 
Every State in New England was represented; many of 
the units included troops from localities widely separated. 
Sorrow there was in the state regiments which were broken 
up to fill in the numerical strength of the fortunate ones 
which had been retained intact; there was required both 
tact and generosity on the part of all groups thus thrown 
together before the first jealousies and inevitable heart- 
burnings were quenched in a new spirit of service. But it 
is a fact well worth recording that, in a time far shorter 
than was expected, the old resentments, the ancient local 
rivalries, began to be forgotten; the new division went 
overseas not as a loose aggregation, but a closely welded 
whole. 

What of the men who had been chosen by higher author- 
ity to lead the Twenty-Sixth in battle? So much of the 
history of any organization is intimately bound up with 
the personality of its leaders, so curiously close, in the case 



ORGANIZING THE DIVISION 19 

of the Twenty-Sixth Division, was the connection between 
the character of any single unit and that of its commander, 
that no record of the Division's origins and organization 
would be complete that omitted a somewhat detailed refer- 
ence to the principal officers of the staff and the hne. 

The assignment of Major-General Edwards to command 
insured that the new organization would benefit by the 
leadership of a Regular officer of long and varied experi- 
ence, both in administrative, staff, and line branches. Born 
in Cleveland, Ohio, in 1860, he was graduated from the 
United States Military Academy in 1883. With his pro- 
motion to a captaincy in the Regular service in 1898, 
large responsibilities and rapid advancement fell to his 
lot. As Major (Assistant Adjutant-General) and Lieu- 
tenant-Colonel of Volunteers (47th Infantry), from 1899 
to 1901, he performed duty as Adjutant-General to General 
Lawton in active field service in the Philippine Islands, 
whither, in 1905, he accompanied Secretary of War Wil- 
liam H. Taft on the occasion of the latter's famous journey. 
Appointed Chief of the Bureau of Insular Affairs in 1902. 
he was promoted to the grade of Brigadier-General in 
1906; he was transferred to the line in 1912, and com- 
manded brigades on the Mexican Border (6th Brigade, 
Second Division) and in Hawaii (1st Hawaiian Brigade), 
until sent to the command of American troops in the Pan- 
ama Canal Zone in 1915. From this duty he was transferred 
(on April 2, 1917) to the command of the newly created 
Northeastern Department, with Headquarters in Boston, 
Massachusetts, in April, 1917, and attained the rank of 
Major-General in August of the same year. Thirty-four 
years of active and varied service, in all grades, meant 
that the new division commander was intimately ac- 
quainted with army men and methods, had been trained 
in accordance with army traditions, and shared the honor- 
able ideals of duty with which the Regular establishment 
has always been credited. Beyond the lot of the vast ma- 



20 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

jority of army officers, however, General Edwards had 
been fortunate in possessing a wide knowledge of men and 
events outside the army horizon; the bars which his life 
and duty, under our system, erect inevitably between the 
average Regular OflBcer and other classes in the American 
democracy, sharply limiting his experience and tending 
unhappily to segregate him from contact with the thought 
of his generation, were, in the case of General Edwards, 
early broken down. He enjoyed personal contact with men 
of many classes; from his varied activities he had become 
one of the most prominent figures of the army then in the 
public eye. From the day of his assumption of the duties 
of Department Commander, in Boston, his immediate 
hold on the imagination and esteem of the people at large 
was as marked as was the energy of his administration. 
His choice, as leader of the New England Division, was 
felicitous indeed, considering the excellent effect the selec- 
tion would have on the public from whose sons the Twenty)/ 
Sixth was recruited. ^ 

As Chief of Staff, Lieutenant-Colonel (later Brigadier- 
General) George H. Shelton brought to his duties twenty 
years of experience as an infantry officer of the Regular 
Army, the advantage of Connecticut birth and parentage, 
and the prestige of his position as a member for two years 
(1906-08) of the General Staff of the Army. In military 
circles he had won a wide reputation for fearless expres- 
sion of opinion and progressiveness through his editorship 
of the "Infantry Journal," perhaps the most influential 
of the various service magazines. Throughout the whole 
course of the Division's history, in which he served in va- 
rious capacities, no officer carried away a more perfect 
record for steely efficiency, broad human-kindness, and 
those qualities of humor, sympathy, and force (combined 
so rarely) which go to make up an ideal leader of troops 
in the field. 

The military record of the infantry brigade commanders, 



ORGANIZING THE DIVISION 21 

Brigadier-Generals Peter E. Traub (51st Infantry Bri- 
gade) and Charles H. Cole (52d Infantry Brigade), pre- 
sented a most interesting contrast. On the one side, Gen- 
eral Traub was a Regular of the Regulars, in education, 
experience, and point of view. Graduated from West Point 
in 1886 into the cavalry arm, he became a Major in 1911, 
and in 1914 Assistant Chief of Philippine Constabulary 
with rank of Colonel. A colonelcy in the Regular Army 
came in 1916; on August 5, 1917, he became a Brigadier 
in the National Army. For several years following 1904, 
he was professor of languages at West Point and in the 
Army Signal School ; his duty with troops as a young offi- 
cer of cavalry had gained him experience in Indian fight- 
ing. A man of indomitable energy and a keen student of 
warfare. General Traub proved a great strength to the 
Division through the early period of training in France, 
gaining the confidence of all those under his command. 

Similar natural qualities of leadership — such as en- 
ergy, inspiration, devotion to duty, and resourcefulness — 
were possessed by General Cole; but his military training 
had been received wholly in the service of his State (Massa- 
chusetts). An enlisted man and officer of the First Corps 
Cadets between 1890 and 1910 (Major of the battalion 
in the latter year), he was appointed Adjutant-General 
of the State of Massachusetts in 1914, retiring as Briga- 
dier-General in 1916; he served for several years, also, as 
a member of the National Board for the Promotion of 
Rifle Practice. All precedents to the contrary, General 
Cole vividly exemplified the fact that it is possible for an 
active politician to be a good soldier. He brought to his 
new duties in the Division a long experience in handling 
men, and the utmost energy in the performance of his 
work, coupled with a patriotism as ardent as it was sus- 
tained. At the time of the entry of the United States into 
the war, he was out of the service; but he promptly en- 
listed as a private in Headquarters Company, 9th Massa- 



22 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

chusetts Infantry, and presently, because of long previous 
service, knowledge of conditiorfs, and established reputa- 
tion as an organizer and administrator, he was rapidly ad- 
vanced to the rank of Brigadier-General in the state forces, 
with command of a brigade. Considered invaluable in any 
National Guard organization, as representing its best 
traditions, he was retained in his high rank by the War 
Department and given the command of a brigade of in- 
fantry in the new division. This, be it said, was contrary 
to the prevailing custom of the War Department, which 
relegated most of the state general officers to command 
of units not taken overseas, their place being taken by 
officers of the Regular establishment.^ 

The command of the 51st Field Artillery Brigade went 
to Brigadier-General William Lassiter, an acknowledged 
artillery expert of distinction, who brought to his branch of 
the Division's forces the very highest professional stand- 
ards, and who remained long enough with the brigade to 
impress it with abiding ideals of efficiency. At the time of 
his assignment to the Division, General Lassiter w^as per- 
forming duty as military attache at the United States 
Embassy in London.- 

Of the nine regimental commanders (four of infantry; 
three of artillery; one of engineers; one of the trains and 
military police), the majority were officers of the Maine, 
Massachusetts, and Connecticut National Guard. Colonel 
George W. Bunnell, 101st Engineers, had had the benefit 
of a West Point education ; others had been long identified 
with state troops and with their own units, serving in all 

^ Another case of an officer's resigning high command in his state troops, 
merely for the sake of taking an active part in service overseas, was that of 
Brigadier-General Albert Greenlaw, of Maine. At the very outset, when the 
Maine troops were called into service, he resigned as Adjutant-General, to accept 
appointment as Captain and Supply Officer of a Maine infantry regiment (later 
103d Infantry), going abroad in that capacity, and later being promoted to the 
Division Staff (General Staff Section, G-1). 

2 Colonel M. E. Locke was in command of 51st F.A. Brigade for some time 
after arrival in France. General Lassiter joined at Coetquidan, upon terminating 
his duty as military attache. 



ORGANIZING THE DIVISION 23 

grades. Chosen from all the regimental commanders in the 
New England Guard, they represented, in the judgment of 
the War Department, the best material available for the 
positions they occupied. For, apart from their military 
experience, there existed another set of considerations re- 
specting the fitness of these regimental commanders to 
take their men overseas, which not only possessed con- 
siderable interest, from various points of view, at the time 
of their selection, but was also to play a part, later, in de- 
termining the value of certain regiments as fighting units. 
In a peculiar sense the regimental commanders were looked 
upon by the thousands of good men and women whose 
boys were with the troops as the guardians and friends of 
those lads as well as their leaders in battle. In every case 
they were daily subjected to a very heavy and continual 
pressure, in the form of direct personal appeals, from their 
own intimate friends, from men of high position and in- 
fluence, as well as from pathetic hundreds of anxious, 
proud fathers and mothers, "to look out for my boy," 
"to bring Joe home safe," "to see that he behaves him- 
self," "to give Bill a chance," and so on. Whether they so 
willed or not, these colonels of local, territorial regiments 
were made to occupy a place in which they were compelled 
to carry the weight of a feeling of personal responsibility, 
not only for the military training, good discipline, physical 
condition, and fighting edge of their regiments, but also for 
the happiness and safety of hundreds of the individuals 
composing them. They were forced, moreover, by conditions 
to assume a position of responsibility to the community 
which was the home of their respective regiments, for their 
commands' creditable behavior and honorable achievement. 
A colonel was told, directly and emphatically, that he was 
expected to bring glory and renown to his home town ; he 
was reminded of the competition he would meet; he was 
showered with gifts to be held by him in trust for "the 
boys" — gifts in the shape of funds presented by veteran 



24 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

members of the organization or other groups of friends, 
reaching to very large amounts; he was importuned by 
rehef and patriotic societies, chambers of commerce, and 
scores of individuals, to express a wish for any conceivable 
article for the men's comfort or happiness, so that it might 
be provided at once. Encouraged, flattered, strengthened, 
heartened by the most prodigal expressions of devotion, 
actively supported in his work by the confidence of thou- 
sands of people in his own home town, the regimental com- 
mander was made to feel, at the same time, that he could 
not afford to let matters go wrong with his organization, 
if he cared for his future; that he had a very real duty to- 
ward the parents and friends of the lads over whom he ex- 
ercised control. On the face of it, the colonelcy of these 
community regiments afforded a great temptation in the 
direction of business, social, or political preferment. It 
is reasonable to suppose that a certain pressure was ex- 
ercised to award these colonelcies to officers of the Regular 
Army, who, because of their training and purely profes- 
sional attitude, would not be, people assumed, influenced 
by conditions tending to impair the value of the National 
Guard commanders. But as the debate proceeded, the 
question was decided in favor of the officers already in 
charge. The appointments were made; the Division was 
committed at the start to a character bearing birthmarks 
of its strictly community origin. For better, for worse, it 
was to be a militia organization. And such, through all the 
vicissitudes of its history, it remained; as such it must be 
always judged, with what verdict it will be interesting to 
discover. 



F 



CHAPTER III 
OVERSEAS 

EVERISHLY active were the times to follow. The 
new Division Staff was hard-pressed.^ The question 
of enlisted or commissioned strength would be paramount 
one day, only to be jostled aside by demands for equip- 
ment and clothing. Now field inspections must be held; 
transfers and discharges must be expedited ; training sched- 
ules must be prepared. The desire animated all ranks to 
be first overseas. There was eager speculation as to the 
progress in preparation for service of the Forty-Second 
("Rainbow") Division, then mobihzing on Long Island, 
New York, and quite publicly heralded as destined to be 
the first division of the citizen-army to go abroad. To ob- 
tain equipment and clothing, every agency was called on, 
from state authorities to private individuals, from gov- 
ernment arsenals to manufacturers' stocks — the work 
proceeding on the basis that all artillery, machine-gun, 
and other ordnance material of special application, to- 

* At various dates subsequent to the organization of the Division and prior to 
departure overseas, the following officers were added to the Staff in special or- 
ders: Assistants to Division Surgeon, Captain J. Glass, M.C., Captain K. B. 
Bailey, M.C., Lieutenant-Colonel F. P. Williams, M.C.; Assistants to Division 
Quartermaster, Major G. E. Cole, Captain C. E. Scorer, Captain O. G. Lager- 
quist, Captain E. H. Tandy, Captain H. H. Wheelock; Assistant to Division In- 
spector, Major R. P. Harbold; Assistants to Division Adjutant, Major L. W. Cass, 
Major C. A. Stevens; Division Ordnance Officer, Major E. T. Weisel; Assistant 
Ordnance Officer, Captain Aiken Simons; Aide-de-camp, Captain A. L. Pendleton, 
Jr.; Interpreter, Lieutenant J. P. King. 

Of these officers a large majority remained with the Division throughout its 
period of service abroad, a fact which contributed vastly to the smooth running 
of the staff machinery. Friendship and mutual understanding, together with 
devotion to the common cause of serving the troops, accomplished more than 
any set of staff regulations. While frequent changes in the personnel of the 
General Staff sections sometimes affected temporarily their effectiveness, the 
Quartermaster, Adjutant's, Ordnance, and Medical Staffs made continuous 
and notable records for helpful service of the Division, from beginning to end. 



26 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

gether with motor transport, animals, and mucli of the 
required quartermaster property, would be issued on ar- 
rival in France. In the matter of numerical strength, when 
it was found that discharges and transfers to the Depot 
Brigade were going to reduce it, for certain units, below 
what was prescribed, recourse was had to such other troops 
as were available in New England. From the New England 
Coast Artillery (National Guard in federal service), some 
hundreds were transferred into places where they were 
most needed; ^ of the newly drafted men of the Seventy- 

1 The following telegram from the Adjutant-General and the reply of the Di- 
vision Commander illustrate the necessarily summary methods employed, and 
the local conditions contended against, in the organization of the Division: 

(a) "Washington, D.C., Aug. 30. Maj.-Gen. C. R. Edwards, U.S. Army, Bos- 
ton, Mass. Secretary of War directs that neither Regular Coast Artillery nor 
Coast Artillery of the National Guard in service of United States shall, without 
special permission from the War Department in each case, be considered as 
available for use in organization of new mobile army units of National Guard 
and National Army for service abroad. McCain." (6) "Aug. 31, 1917. Adjutant- 
General, Washington, D.C. Number 115. Reference your telegram August 30th 
directing that no Coast Artillery be considered available for use in reorganization 
of National Guard without special permission of W^ar Department. I report that 
in the reorganization of the 26th Division I transferred from the National Guard 
Coast Artillery of this Department the following personnel: To the 51st Field 
Artillery Brigade, 9 officers and 846 enlisted men; to the 101st Engineers, 3 oflB- 
cers and 379 men; to the 101st Ammunition Train, 7 officers and 234 men, in all a 
total of 19 officers and 1459 enlisted men. This personnel has been absorbed into 
the new organizations and equipped, and the organizations are ready for service. 
Under my orders for the reorganization of the 26th Division . . . the necessity of 
hastening the reorganization and utilizing everything of the National Guard 
available here for the purpose appeared paramount and authorized. It was im- 
possible to complete the organization of the units named above from the person- 
nel available in this Division without using some of the Coast Artillery. I used no 
more than was absolutely necessary and used these only after consultation with 
the District Artillery commanders who stated that these troops could be spared 
and that those selected desired the transfer. . . . Furthermore, as precedents for 
my action, the use of Coast Artillery in the organization of the trench mortar 
battery was in the plan of reorganization suggested to me by the Militia Bureau 
and handed to Colonel Shelton before he left Washington; and my earlier in- 
structions, when it was contemplated to use New England units in the organiza- 
tion of the composite 42d Division, directed me to furnish the Headquarters 
Train and Military Police for that Division from the New England Coast Artil- 
lery. I request, therefore, that my action in this respect be approved To transfer 
these men back now to the Coast Artillery would interfere seriously with the 
organization and efficiency of my command, and create dissatisfaction among all 
concerned. Notwithstanding the few popular and political protests that have 
been made against the reorganization effected by me, I have been able to pre- 



OVERSEAS 27 

Sixth Division, then assembling at Camp Devens, Massa- 
chusetts, somewhat less than 1000 enlisted men were util- 
ized, at the last moment, as replacements in the infantry. 
From the OflScers' Reserve Corps were drawn about 179 
lieutenants, who were distributed to units of all arms. 

It was commonly rumored that, following the Division 
Commander's notification that organization had been ef- 
fected, the Division would be sent to Camp Greene, North 
Carolina, for training. Indeed, the arrangements for that 
movement progressed so far that a detail of enlisted men 
was sent to Camp Greene to prepare a Division Head- 
quarters; and up to the very last this impression was al- 
lowed to prevail. 

Over the preparations for actual departure overseas was 
hung a thick curtain of mystery. Such secrets as possible 
sailing dates, destinations, or possible routes, precious for 
the enemy to ascertain, were carefully guarded. The cen- 
sorship regarding news of war preparations, self-imposed 
by the New England press, was honorably observed; the 
news which every village in the region was most anxious 
to hear was never published. The departure of a unit, when 
it did occur, was unheralded and unattended. A battalion 
would be at drill of an afternoon; the next morning would 
find its camp empty and the troops vanished, nobody of 
the general public knew whither, and of those in the secret 
nobody would tell. But one by one the regiments and trains 
began to disappear, early in September. Their animal 
transport was packed off, under cover of darkness, to New- 
port News. Their equipment and baggage were slightly 
different from those to which they had been used, for the 
wall and pyramidal tents, the mosquito bars, and the cot- 
ton uniforms, long familiar to veterans of American camps 

serve generally an excellent spirit, and to develop, both within and without the 
Division, a willingness to make the sacriBce of pride and tradition involved by 
the reorganization. The use of some Coast Artillery has helped largely to obtain 
this result. To change the accomplished fact now would, I fear, react upon us and 
arouse new opposition to the reorganization. Edwabds." 



28 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

and campaigns, were left behind. Artillery and machine- 
gun material had long before been turned in. There was a 
great shortage of rifles, packs, carriers, pistols, and mess 
equipment, but such an abundance of articles provided by 
the relief agencies, from safety razors to knitted helmets, 
that not till months later was the balance between field 
kit and comfort kit contemplated by regulations even par- 
tially restored. 

The movement of the troops to the ports of embarka- 
tion at Hoboken and Montreal was regulated by a two- 
fold consideration — available tonnage and readiness of 
the units. From the moment of organization it had been 
the naturally ardent desire that the Twenty-Sixth should 
be the first complete American Division overseas. The 
prospect of having to undergo a long wait at a southern 
camp was not alluring; it made a far less insistent call on 
patriotism than did immediate service abroad. Local pride 
was touched to the quick by reports of the readiness of the 
Forty-Second Division; it spurred to the very greatest 
efforts all persons, military and civihan, on whom fell the 
duties of organizing and equipping the various units. As 
a result of ceaseless labor this task was accomplished by 
the first of September; but the successful issue of the enter- 
prise — the actual embarkation of the troops — was only 
accomplished after the expenditure of an equal amount 
of effort and ingenuity. While the initiative of the Di- 
vision Commander accomplished much, credit for the 
Division's winning the final lap of the race with its gen- 
erous rival and friend the Forty-Second, was largely due 
to Captain A. L. Pendleton, of the Division Commander's 
personal staff. Assigned to the task of securing the first 
available transportation for the Division, this oflBcer never 
rested till he accomplished his difficult mission. LTpon in- 
formation on a certain date that four ships would be avail- 
able within the next four days, and that the units for whom 
they were destined were not ready, it was less than an hour 



OVERSEAS 29 

after Captain Pendleton wired the news to Division Head- 
quarters before the Chief of Staff replied with the list of 
assignments, and the start was made. Because of priority 
schedules, however, which exactly prescribed the order in 
which all the American troops were to be embarked, there 
was a reluctance on the part of the shipping officers to 
allot to the Twenty-Sixth all the tonnage as it became 
available; but nothing was left undone to insure that the 
Division should have every chance. Again a list of ships 
available in the near future, with their passenger and 
cargo space, came into the hands of the indefatigable Pen- 
dleton, who promptly prepared complete embarkation 
assignments of troop units from the Division, showing how 
they could be shipped with most economy and least delay. 
This he placed in the hands of the embarkation author- 
ities with such good results that, when this next convoy 
was assembled, and the units officially scheduled to take 
it were again reported as not ready to go abroad, the units 
of the Twenty-Sixth once more received the preference, 
both at the port of Hoboken, New Jersey, and at Mon- 
treal, from which latter port, by arrangement with the 
Canadian Government, American troops also sailed. In 
convoys (usually collected at Halifax), or by single steam- 
ers, in ships of all sorts from first-class Atlantic liners like 
the Adriatic, Celtic, or Saxonia, down to hastily impressed 
coastwise fruit boats, the troops made the journey. Civil- 
ian passengers, in many cases, were on the same ship with 
the troops; the service of transport, afterwards so per- 
fected through experience, was still in embrj^'o. But what- 
ever the minor discomforts or occasional hardships of the 
voyage, happiness reigned in every heart, for at length the 
Division was on its way to the Great Adventure. And com- 
placency was added when presently it became known that 
of all the combat forces in the United States, Regulars, 
National Guard, or National Army, the Twenty-Sixth 
Division was the first to be organized, fitted out, and sent 



so 



NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 



abroad as a division. It is true that the splendid First Di- 
vision had preceded it by some weeks, but this was lacking 
in many of its prescribed units, and it went in detachments. 
Other troops also, such as some Marine, engineer, or quar- 
termaster detachments, and the 14th Railway Engineers, 
were also on the other side by September 1, engaged in 
organizing, policing, and construction work around the 
base ports, travel routes, and principal headquarters.^ But 
of the citizen-army's combat divisions, the Twenty-Sixth 
had unquestionably the good fortune to be the first ready 
and the first across the water. It even preceded all combat 
troops of the Regular Army, but the units named above. ^ 

^ The first American unit landed in France on June 25, 1917. 
2 The sailing and arrival list is here appended: An advance party of 17 officers 
sailed from New York August 25, and arrived at Liverpool September 15: 
Unit Departed from U.S. Arrived 

1. 51st Inf. Brig. Hdqrs September 7, 1917 September 21, 1917 

2. 101st Infantry September 7 September 21 

3. 101st Ambulance Co September 7 September 20 

4. 101st Field Hospital September 7 September 20 

5. 101st Field Artillery September 9 September 23 

6. 103d Ambulance Co September 16 October 2 

7. 103d Field Hospital September 16 October 2 

8. 102d Infantry September 19 October 9 

9. 104th Field Hospital September 22 October 7 

10. 51st F. A. Brig. Hdqrs September 23 October 5 

11. lO^d Field Artillery September 23 October 5 

12. 101st Signal Battalion September 23 October 5 

13. 102d Machine-Gun Btn September 23 October 5 

14. 103d Infantry September 25 October 17 

15. 101st Supply Train September 25 October 9 

16. 101st Engineers September 26 October 9 

17. 102d Ambulance Co September 26 October 17 

18. 104th Ambulance Co September 26 October 17 

19. 52d Inf. Brig. Hdqrs September 27 October 17 

20. 104th Infantry September 27 October 10 

21. 101st Ammunition Train October 3 October 17 

22. 103d Machine-Gun Btn October 3 October 17 

23. 102d Field Hospital October 4 October 17 

24. Division Headquarters October 9 October 23 

25. Headquarters Troop October 9 October 23 

26. 101st Machine-Gun Btn October 9 October 23 

27. 101st Tn. Hq. and Military 

Police October 9 October 24 

28. 103d Field Artillery October 9 October 23 

29. 101st Trench Mortar October 9 October 23 



y 



OVERSEAS SI 

The only untoward incident of the movement of the 
Division overseas was that occurring on the voyage of the 
2d Battahon, 102d Infantry. And this is worth recording 
only as illustrating the remarkable good fortune attending 
the convoys, at a time when German submarine activity 
was very marked and provisions for the protection of 
troops on Atlantic passages not yet perfected. Embarked 
September 23 on S.S. Lenape, the troops had accompHshed 
some three hundred miles of the voyage, when the break- 
ing of a piston pinion, during rough weather, compelled 
the return of the ship to New York for repairs. Until 
October 27, the battahon encamped at Fort Totten, New 
York, on which date it sailed on S.S. Adriatic, in convoy, 
arriving at Liverpool November 9. 

From the incidents of the voyages of the several regi- 
ments, battahons, and other units, of their arrival on for- 
eign soil, and of their transportation to ultimate desti- 
nations, one impression was outstanding in the minds of 
officers and men alike. Plain to see it was, that any division 
was no more than a cog in the huge war-machine. A week 
before embarkation an infantry regiment had seemed an 
enormous body of troops; to visualize a new division of 
27,000 all ranks was difficult even for the active imagina- 
tion; a division commander appeared as remote and all- 
powerful as a demigod. But the jaws of the great troop- 
movement machinery closed on the Twenty-Sixth, and 
the Division wilted. Strange British and French staff 
officers, who represented hitherto unheard-of powers, with 
an efficiency all their own, and irritating because its meth- 
ods were not at first understood, laid firm hands on stoutly 
protesting colonels and the puzzled, weary httle staffs of 
the brigade and division commanders, directing this and 
that, insisting on the other, in a manner which made all 
ranks aware that their beloved organization was no more 
than a trifling pawn on a gigantic chessboard. For a while 
the Division did not function as such at all. Battahons 



32 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

moved separately, oftentimes; a regimental commander 
was at no time sure of the location of his units. The ex- 
perience of one Regimental Headquarters, which crossed 
the ocean with one battalion of the regiment, the supply 
company, a strange company of army bakers, Canadian 
aviators, and civilians, nurses and little children, may be 
taken as fairly typical. From Montreal the troops pro- 
ceeded to Halifax, where the ship lay at anchor for a week 
awaiting the rest of the convoy. The third battalion and 
the machine-gun company, be it said, had preceded Head- 
quarters into the unknown by about a week; the second 
battalion was left behind in camp, to follow nobody knew 
when. At Liverpool, the ship was boarded by American 
staff officers, who informed the Colonel that they knew 
nothing, and had no authority beyond collecting the per- 
sonnel records and passenger lists. Everything governing 
debarkation and transportation was in the hands of the 
British. The latter soon appeared, with explicit orders that 
the troops should entrain at once, without rations, without 
field ranges, without baggage of any description save what 
was in the men's packs. To leave his rations and baggage 
was something unheard of by the American Colonel; it 
promised infinity of discomfort for his men; there seemed 
only the most dubious guarantees that either would ever 
be forwarded or recovered. He made emphatic representa- 
tions; but all to no purpose. Bewildered, deeply solicitous 
both for his men and for his own good impression on the 
British authorities, he felt swept along on an irresistible 
current. Unknown forces took him to Southampton; some 
remote power sent him and his men to a filthy camp of 
flimsy tentage and black, sticky mud, where the rain (for 
which the new arrivals were inclined to blame the British 
Staff) was endless for five days; nobody apparently had the 
authority to make the men comfortable; "it was always 
done that way, and quite all right." Here a pause was made 
while all-powerful, unseen hands prepared a ship to ferry 



OVERSEAS 33 

the troops to La Havre across the Channel. One must wait; 
one must keep the men strictly in hand ; one must not seek 
diligently to improve living conditions. 

It was hard for commanding officers in those bleak, first 
days. They laid down the strictest orders to check any 
tendency to stray away sight-seeing; they were desper- 
ately anxious for their draggled men to be at all times 
smart, prompt, soldierly, creditable to their country; they 
were sick at heart over the wretched condition of the sod- 
den, stinking camp; they were worried by the lads who 
overstayed their three-hour leaves, while sympathizing 
with the spirit of adventure and curiosity which led the 
youthful feet into byways of exploration. Cut off from all 
connection with home, perfectly ignorant of the where- 
abouts of other parts of the Division, not knowing a half- 
day ahead what was in store, they were truly unhappy. 
Whether at the Southampton camp, or the Oxney camp 
near Borden, in Saint-Nazaire, the La Havre rest camp, or 
marooned in the slums of Liverpool seeking baggage and 
equipage, the story was quite the same. But it was good 
medicine — that first bitter, salutary taste of inferiority 
and powerlessness. It gave our officers a great lesson in 
the direction of subordination to authority, in patience; 
they were taught to have confidence in those impersonal, 
higher powers, unseen and unknown, which, from an un- 
guessed place at the end of a telegraph wire, were directing 
the destiny of the new arrivals behind the firing-line. 



CHAPTER IV 



SETTLING DOWN IN FRANCE 

AFTER a very brief delay, in view of the depleted con- 
dition of the French railway rolling stock, the vari- 
ous units of the Division were moved to the two areas as- 
signed for their training. That occupied by all elements 
except the artillery and ammunition train lay adjacent to 
the market town of Neufchateau, along steep, wooded 
slopes and broad valleys, dotted with gray, stone villages.^ 
It was in Lorraine. It was in the heart of ancient France. 
It was the stark, austere region which had cradled Joan 
of Arc — a land of meager, stony soil, under a sky of dull- 
est gray. One wonders how many of the new arrivals — 
vigorous, active lads — were touched at all by the spell of 
the quaint old country. Surely to some of them — per- 

^ Division Headquarters opened in Neufchateau October 31. Units of the 
Division, less artillery and ammunition train, were billeted in the following 
villages: 
51st Infantry Brig. Headquarters Rebeuville 



101st Infantry 

lOid Infantry 

102d Machine-Gun Battalion 

52(1 Infantry Brig. Headquarters 
103(1 Infantry 
10-lth Infantry 

103d Machine-Gun Battalion 
101st Engineers 

Headquarters Trains and M.P. 
101st Field Signal Battalion 
101st Machine-Gun Battalion 
101st Supply Train 
101st Sanitary Train 

Railhead 



Neufchateau — Rouceux — Circourt — 
Villars — Brechaiucourt — Rebeuville 

Landaville — Certilleux — Rouvres-le- 
Chetive 

Rebeuville — Brechaincourt — Rouvres- 
le-Chetive 

Liffol-le-Grand 

Liffol-le-Grand — Villouxel 

Harreville — Pompierre — Sartes — Cha- 
tenois — Giroucourt 

Liffol-le-Grand — Sartes — Villouxel 

Rolampont — Bazoilles — Mont-les- 
Neufchateau 

Neufchateau 

Noncourt 

Neufchateau — Certilleux 

Neufchateau — Harreville 

Neufchateau — Bazoilles — Liffol-le- 
Grand 

Certilleux 



Vav<ioulc.uila 



jC^oma'n.g.cooigT 



Scale »•• 240,ooo(Approximatei.y) 



-L 



l-E,5 - litUi-r^ J 



DoMEr,Kf^ 



^°"'^'^"'^ /M HI.UFCH ATEL AU 




SETTLING DOWN IN FRANCE 35 

haps to more than one would fancy — there was an appeal 
in the fact that they were preparing for war within sight 
of the village whence the Maid of Orleans rode away to 
war's adventures years before; that here the Roman le- 
gionary, Gothic raider, great Dukes of Burgundy, mighty 
Prince-Bishops of forgotten sees, all with their men-at- 
arms, had marched to battle. It was a land dull and dreary 
to the eye, but rich in tradition, populous with bygone 
figures of French history. In the days before the war the 
venerable towns in the American area, like Langres with 
its quaint dwellings and tortuous streets, induced the vis- 
itor and student to linger and return. But in the autumn 
of 1917 there was no time and little inclination to enjoy 
these centers of old French provincial life. Pressing prob- 
lems weighed on every American commander, from highest 
to the least important, such as providing shelter, food, 
clothing, and arms for thousands of men. Imperative was 
the necessity of fitting them for battle in the shortest pos- 
sible time, under conditions to chill the heart and tax one's 
greatest ingenuity. 

The artillery brigade and the ammunition train were 
sent to a training area at Camp Coetquidan, in Brittany, 
not far from the French artillery center at Rennes, within 
easy reach of the famous school of equitation at Saumur. 
The Camp itself lay at the eastern end of the training 
area — a broad, even, treeless moor which stretched away 
for about three miles, dropped precipitously into a valley, 
and rose again into a series of wooded hills; a country 
singularly appropriate for range purposes, in that it gave 
almost every variety of target that would be likely to be 
met in actual warfare. Beside the moor, the valley, and 
the hills, there were also roads, farms, mills, and even two 
villages, long since abandoned, the prey of the practicing 
batteries. When the French were informed that American 
artillery was to use Coetquidan, their first move was to 
install some five thousand German prisoners along with 



36 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

their guard and a regiment of French engineers, in order 
to expand the camp into something hke adequacy for 
American uses. It was at first designed for one brigade, but 
hardly had the 51st Brigade been installed when the first 
units of the C7th Brigade of the Forty-Second Division 
began to arrive, and thereafter there was never a time when 
there were not two brigades and toward the end three 
occupying the Camp. In large measure the problems con- 
fronting the gunners and men of the train were identical 
with those before the other troops of the Division; and 
they were solved in the same manner, by sheer grit and 
ingenuity. And since the w^ork done by the Twenty-Sixth 
was typical of what was done, that first winter, by all 
American combat troops in France, it will be profitable to 
note its salient aspects in detail. 

The task of the pioneer divisions of the Expeditionary 
Force was one of the most interesting, as well as difficult, 
which had ever fallen to American troops. To the First, 
Twenty-Sixth, Forty-Second, and Second Divisions, later 
grouped into the First Corps, there fell the good fortune 
to act as advance party of the army, which, in the months 
to follow^ w^as to flow into all corners of France. On them 
lay the duty of creating that first impression of American 
troops in the minds of both the French military author- 
ities and the civilian population. Here were two divisions 
of the Regular Army (including a Marine brigade) offered 
as representative of our professional soldiery, but whose 
traditions of efficiency and thorough military knowledge 
were hard to impress on the average onlooker because of 
thousands of recruits untouched by the Regular Army 
spirit, whose company officers included scores of lieuten- 
ants fresh from civilian training-camps. Here again were 
two divisions of the citizen-army. Their enlisted per- 
sonnel averaged better than that of the Regular divisions; 
they included a good many Regular officers on their ros- 
ters, mainly in staff and higher line positions; but their 



SETTLING DOWN IN FRANCE 37 

battalion and company officers were entirely non-profes- 
sional. In general, therefore, while persons well acquainted 
with the American soldier might note some differences 
between the four first divisions, their outward appearance, 
discipline, and the salient characteristics of both officers 
and men showed no distinguishing marks whatever to the 
stranger. 

And just as the general impression they made was the 
same, practically, so all had the same tasks to do immedi- 
ately on reaching France. What the Twenty-Sixth Divi- 
sion did in the way of training and work, and in making the 
French acquainted with Americans, was precisely that 
which was accomplished or attempted, neglected or per- 
fected, by their very good friends and rivals, the First and 
the Forty-Second. And as the work progressed, as the 
divisions drank deep of the same cup of experience, old 
differences grew less evident; the common American traits 
grew more distinct, a certain fellowship commenced to 
show evidence of bloom, in place of that mutually sincere 
disparagement and jealousy, which had graced the atti- 
tude of the Regular and citizen soldier, for years before. 

All accounts agree as to the general impression produced 
by our troops on the French civilians. Their advent was 
hailed with mingled feehngs. Profoundly depressed in the 
autumn of 1917 by the only half -successful and fearfully 
costly efforts their armies had put forth in the spring and 
summer, wishing nothing so much as a quick conclusion of 
the national agony of sorrow, deprivation, and apparently 
futile effort, a large minority, seeing in the advent of the 
Americans only a promise of the war's prolongation, was 
much inclined to regret it. The propaganda of dejaitisme — 
"Since we cannot win, why fight further?" — had gained 
many adherents. A people which cHngs devotedly to its 
household and lands, heartily weary of war, could only 
sigh at the prospect of the coming of more legions, how- 
ever friendly, to occupy the land and use it as they saw fit. 



88 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

The vast majority, on tlio contrary, welcomed the Ameri- 
cans as saviors. They looked on our men as crusaders, who 
had left their homes to fii;ht for an ideal, as the foree which 
was destined to cause the triumph of riglit and justice. 
The slow-moving, hard-fisted Lorraine peasant did not 
commit himself as to the wider aspects of the Americans' 
peaceful invasion. He was principally concerned over the 
broken windows and farm tools, the unceremonious clean- 
ing of his filthy villages, the lamentable way in which his 
firewood was burned, the free-and-easy fashion in which 
the broad-backed lads from the West sprawled riotously 
over his house and stables, as they set up their housekeep- 
ing. He uttered shrill wails over impending ruin; but he 
stood ruin off by the comfortably large damages he col- 
lected for every goose feather, handful of hay, or inch of 
bark on a fruit-tree which he believed his sturdy lodgers 
had appropriated or destroyed. But his women -folk hked 
the Yankees well. They approved whole-heartedly of tlie 
manner in which they tossed about their money in the 
little shops and dark cafes. No attempt was made to under- 
stand the workings of the American soldier's mind; his 
irreverent, contentious, patient, hell-raising, self-confident, 
insatiably curious, oddly gentle nature was accepted as it 
was, with a mixture of immense admiration and reluctant 
dismay. "if5 Amhicaius soiit fous'' was the formula tliat 
sinnmed up everything. They were so young anil lusty, so 
buoyant, so amazingly impudent! Private Bill Jones was 
so careless about breaking or spoiling things — and paid 
for the damage so royally ! Quarrelsome in his drink, none 
too mindful of even the strictest orders, he was sturdily 
patient in discomfort and hardship. He ate enormously. 
He was tremendously energetic and direct in getting a 
task done. The people among whom he came to live had 
seen their own dogged poihis, greedy Russians, the black 
Turcos, and weather-cock Italians — all war-weary. Small 
wonder that they smiled their friendship on these boyish, 



SETTLING DOWN IN FRANCE 39 

eager fellows, even if, in some hearts, there lurked a shadow 
of regret that their efforts and their youth were doomed, 
as cried the defaiiistes, to be thrown away in a cause al- 
ready lost. 

The French military authorities observed the Division 
from another angle. And, oVjserving, they were content. 
They could make soldiers out of material like this — as- 
sault troops, reckless, fierce, hardy. *'A day will come," 
said one of tfie French instructors of the Twenty-Sixth, 
*'when your men will forget that they ever were civilians. 
They will be warrwrsf^ and his tone, his gesture, evoked 
a picture of such fighting men as followed Bonaparte or 
Marlborough. "To-day," said another critic of the Divi- 
sion's men, "your fellows appear an enthusiastic mob. But 
wait a little — !" 

The programme and detailed schedules of training were 
prompt in making their appearance. Based on the as- 
sumption that the Division was to prepare for the warfare 
of position, but was to consider always the possibility that 
the dogged duel of the trenches must give place to open 
warfare, there was laid down by the training section of 
the General Staff the most carefully progressive scheme of 
instruction imaginable. It was characteristic of the ability 
and methods of the men who, at our own army's advanced 
schools, had absorbed the best of the accepted theories 
about warfare, had heard the advice of the best Allied 
commanders, and adapted what they learned to the im- 
mediate requirements of the situation, and to the capabil- 
ities of the American soldier. True to its conviction that 
the American army in the war would not do well to adopt 
in their entirety either French or British ideals, but must 
retain the native, the framers of the programme empha- 
sized those parts of the training which, perfected, have 
always marked our soldiers. Skill wuth the rifle, initiative, 
adaptability, nervous energy, were the good quahties 
which the programme sought to develop. The native faults 



40 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

of the American soldier, such as lack of obedience, untidi- 
ness, waste, extravagance, and casual attitude, it was 
sought to suppress or reform by the splendidly framed 
series of general orders on conduct, bearing, courtesy, and 
discipline, published at various dates between autumn and 
spring. Drill and instruction were to be given for thirty- 
six hours a week, extending to March 13; the field covered 
was practically the whole range of the Infantry Drill Regu- 
lations, with supplemental practice in the novel infantry 
arms — grenade, Stokes mortar, 37-millimeter field gun, 
automatic rifle. There was to be rifle antl pistol practice on 
the range; extensive maneuvers and terrain exercises, up 
to include divisional problems of attack and defense, for 
both trench and open warfare, were prescribed in detail. 
It must have given the French and British authorities a 
feeling of great confidence in the knowledge and technical 
grasp of the American Staff which produced so thorough 
and well-balanced a scheme of instruction. Published 
early in November, the programme was put into immediate 
operation throughout the Division's infantry and machine- 
gun units. For the artillery brigade a similar set of instruc- 
tions was drawn up, applicable to its own requirements. 
Planned to cover six weeks, from the first of November to 
the middle of December, the artillery programme was ex- 
tended six weeks longer, to equalize the instruction peri- 
ods of all arms. Officers and chosen non-coms attended 
schools in the morning while the batteries had mounted 
drill, usually under the First Sergeant. In the afternoon 
was target practice, in which all took part, the batteries 
and a few oflScers in the firing positions, the rest of the 
oflScers at the observatories for practice in conduct of fire. 
At night the French instructors would hold lectures or 
schools in the regimental mess halls, to drive in what had 
been learned during the day or to explain the knotty 
points. In the latter part of the training the officers were 
allowed to give more time to their commands; hikes and 



SETTLING DOWN IN FRANCE 41 

cross-country position marches were indulged in; much 
practice was had in occupying positions both by day and 
by night, in haste and at leisure; and several tactical bri- 
gade problems were undertaken, including the firing of a 
skeleton barrage. In all arms the regimental and battalion 
oflScers issued the appropriate orders to dovetail their 
programme's requirements into the many other demands 
which daily pressed for attention. 

For, while it was realized by oflScers and men alike that 
the more quickly they were taught, the quicker would 
come the coveted honor of entering the firing-line, it was 
borne in upon them every day that a pioneer division 
must perform a score of tasks other than drill and maneu- 
ver. Problems of food, shelter, clothing, and sanitation 
had to be solved. Transport and communications had to 
be organized. Hundreds of men and dozens of officers 
were busy from dawn to dusk on work other than training 
for battle. The villages had to be cleaned and organized 
as billets; where accommodations were lacking, it was 
necessary to erect the so-called "Adrian" barracks — a 
kind of portable, knock-down bunk-house, designed to 
shelter about one hundred men. Much labor was required 
to make habitable the lofts, stables, and outhouses where 
the men were lodged. Every day large details went to the 
woods, under guidance of the French forest service, to cut 
firewood; and it was a curious sight to see the men come 
in at nightfall, each carrying a long branch or sapling to be 
split into logs at the company kitchens. The roads in the 
area, hammered by the heavy traffic of the camions, had 
begun to break down a little, and repairs to these vital 
arteries required the service of many hands. To store, 
handle, and issue supplies at the congested railhead in 
Certilleux was task enough for a company each day; a 
telephone system for the entire divisional area had to be 
organized and set in operation independent, as far as pos- 
sible, of the existing French civilian system. At Bazoilles, 



42 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

where a vast system of hospital building was under way, 
there was need of large details for construction work. To 
handle the increasing volume of correspondence, reports, 
and records at all headquarters, drafts had to be made on 
every unit to obtain competent clerks, orderlies, and ste- 
nographers. A considerable interior guard was required in 
each village, to watch the water-supply, the meager wood- 
pile, the tempting cafe, the local storehouse. Typical was 
the experience of the ammunition train, which, in Novem- 
ber and December, had to detail between 750 and 875 
daily as labor troops. It needed the best ingenuity of com- 
manding officers and their adjutants to insure the attend- 
ance at drill or instruction, on some days, of even a min- 
imum enlisted strength, so large were the details required 
for other duties. 

Another set of circumstances prevented obtaining full 
value from the programme or strict conformity with its 
requirements. These were the weather and the physical 
condition of the troops. Throughout the autumn and early 
winter rain was continuous. The drill fields were ankle- 
deep in mud, the roads like river-beds. The dim November 
and December daylight hardly sufficed that the troops, 
moving out for drill at an hour just after sunrise, should 
return before the dusk of early evening. The men were 
always wet and cold ; their barracks, mess-houses, latrines, 
were all deep in a miry clay which made cleanliness of 
person or good condition of arms and equipment an ideal 
almost impossible to realize. The men had only the most 
scanty provision of light in their poor lodgings. No fires 
were allowable in the lofts and stables, even if stoves and 
firewood had been attainable. Their clothes were shock- 
ingly ragged ; their shoes were fast giving way, since it was 
almost impossible to dry, clean, or grease them; their ra- 
tions were none too abundant or regular. It was not long, 
therefore, before many of the men were rendered physi- 
cally incapable of regular attendance at the drill ground 



SETTLING DOW^ IN FRANCE 43 

or target range. More than once an entire platoon had to 
be excused from drill because of the condition of its shoes. 
The fight against vermin and the diseases resultant from 
uncleanliness of person took on a somewhat serious turn; 
laryngitis and an occasional pneumonia made their ap- 
pearance. The inevitable danger to morale from home- 
sickness, lack of any amusement or diversion, and physical 
hardship was a factor in the men's condition which gave 
commanding officers some anxious hours, as they saw the 
days and weeks pass with the requirements of the ironclad 
training programmes not fully carried out in this or that 
company or battalion. 

No description of the first winter spent in France by the 
Twenty-Sixth and the other pioneer divisions would be 
complete without a mention of the immense difficulty of 
obtaining supplies and transport. It illustrates \^vidly the 
tremendous tasks thrust on the various American head- 
quarters, whether at Chaumont, Paris, the base ports. 
Tours (where the Service of Supply came to be centered), 
or at the divisions themselves. Where an entire system of 
distribution had to be built up, not only for the few troops 
already in France, but for the hundreds of thousands still 
to come; where the main base of supplies was three thou- 
sand miles away across a sea not secure against enemy 
marauders; where dock and warehouse facilities were 
meager, the railroad system already congested, and ocean 
tonnage scarce; when expert advice was divided, and 
counsels even as to the most advantageous way of em- 
ploying the American troops still far from unanimous; 
where the resources of the Allies in matters of munitions, 
food, and forage were strictly limited, can it be wondered 
that the machinery of supply failed to work with speed 
or regularity? The result, however, was great hardship. 
It was toward the end of November that ordnance supplies 
for the infantry of the Twenty-Sixth began to arrive in 
any quantity. From French sources were received Hotch- 



44 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

kiss machine guns (model 1914), Chauehat automatic 
rifles, Vivan-Bessieres rifle grenades, hand grenades of both 
the offensive and defensive t^'pes, and gas masks which 
later were supplanted by the British "box respirators." 
Enough ammunition was issued to afford practical train- 
ing with the infantry weapons; so at length the anxiety of 
the brigadiers in this regard was somewhat allayed. But 
delay in the issue of these utilities seriously interfered with 
systematic instruction; and such minor but necessary 
articles of equipment as trench knives, entrenching tools, 
pistols, compasses, wire-cutters, and Very signal pistols 
were not available until a date considerably later. The ar- 
tillery in the Coetquidan area was less badly off, for the 
brigade received its allotment of field pieces and all neces- 
sary equipment from French sources at various dates early 
in October.^ 

The transport situation, to complete the tale of woe, 
was, during the first weeks after the Division was settled 
in its area, well-nigh desperate. To send rations, forage, 
and supplies from the railhead or quartermaster's stores- 
house to the various regimental distributing points by 
truck, and thence to the smaller units by wagon, in accord- 

* The arrangement by which the American artillery was to be armed with the 
French field piece assured that there would be brought into action on the Allied 
lines a preponderance of the best field artillery in existence. 

The "soixante-quinze," or "75," named from its caliber of 75 millimeters, de- 
serves in any record of Allied endeavor a more than passing reference. Introduced 
in 1898, often copied but never equaled, the new weapon solved one of the prin- 
cipal problems of field artillery. By ingenious mechanical devices which took up 
the shock of recoil and prevented any disarrangement of aim, the rate of fire was 
enormously increased. Previously, a field piece had to be relaid after each aimed 
shot; but this requirement was now ob^^ated. Chief among the innovations was 
that the gun was not attached to the axle-tree, but to a buffer in a cradle which 
ran the gun back automatically, the recoil being taken up by a cylinder below 
the gun, in which there was a secret combination of springs, compressed air of a 
certain density, and glycerine. Increased range was secured by lengthening the 
gun to nearly nine feet, and by giving it a slow-burning propelling charge. Muz- 
zle velocities were 1739 foot-seconds (for IG-iJound shrapnel) and 2050 foot-sec- 
onds (for 12-pound high-explo.sive shell). The "75" was capable of rapid fire as 
high as twenty-five aimed shots a minute, and developed a most extraordinary 
accuracy. 



SETTLING DOWT^ IN FRANCE 45 

ance with regulations and the prescribed system, would 
have required the full amount of supply material in the 
tables of organization. The Neufehateau area covered 
many square miles; the steep hills, slippery with mud and 
ice, made hauling slow and difficult. But at first there were 
only three trucks available for the use of all the troops in 
the region. Later, eleven French camions were secured, 
and then some thirty, from the same source. Toward the 
middle of November authority was secured to make use 
of fifty-six cargo trucks which were found available at 
Saint-Nazaire. Two truck companies were sent from the 
101st Supply Train to bring this windfall home over the 
road; and presently they arrived, loaded down with mis- 
cellaneous quartermaster and ordnance supplies, from 
canned tomatoes to horseshoes and shovels. How gleefully 
were the trucks received ! How great was the sorrow when 
the enjoyment of these riches was curtailed a few days 
after their reception! But the Forty-Second Division, 
billeted not far away, was in far worse condition than even 
the Yankees, and so twenty-eight of the new trucks were 
sent away to these less fortunate neighbors, whose bar- 
racks had been in part erected by the 101st Engineers. 
The First Division was also in a bad plight, with respect 
to transport, and so one truck company of the Twenty- 
Sixth was transferred from the 101st Supply Train to the 
First Di\nsion permanently. From the artillery also, away 
by itself in Brittany, came similar reports of a crippling 
shortage in power vehicles and animal transport. For a 
long time the 101st Ammunition Train, which was at- 
tached, for training, to the artillerj^ had no trucks what- 
ever on which the drivers could be instructed. On October 
29 twenty trucks were brought from Saint-Nazaire by a 
detail from the train, and were employed not only for 
demonstration purposes, but also to haul supplies and 
ammunition for the other troops at Coetquidan. On De- 
cember 19 the ammunition train of the First Division 



46 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

turned over to the 101st some twenty two-ton trucks, of 
which only three were serviceable; but Yankee ingenuity 
was brought into play with such good effect that, with 
only one broken-down French forge available for repair 
work, fourteen trucks were rendered serviceable within 
three days. It is not hard to imagine the variety of uses 
to which were put the assorted passenger cars assigned 
to the brigade and regimental commanders ! A motor am- 
bulance was kept as busy as an interurban trolley express 
car. 

November 6 the first consignment of animals for the 
infantry was received at Rebeuville — some 400 French 
draft horses. But these were in such a weakened condition, 
from disease and emaciation, that the great majority were 
fit only for the hospital, and many died almost at once. 
Later in the month, the Division received from Saint- 
Nazaire 665 mules and 230 horses, American stock. These 
animals were in good condition, and ultimately were dis- 
tributed to the infantry units, though distribution was 
delayed somewhat owing to the prevailing shortage of 
trucks in which to haul forage. The artillery, at Coetqui- 
dan, received numerous issues of horses from the French 
remount service, so that by January it had on hand some 
3000 horses and 200 mules, mostly in poor condition. 

Mention is made of these many physical difficulties with 
which the Division had to contend between November and 
February inclusive, not to paint any lurid tale of hard- 
ships. These matters are of interest in a military history 
because they have a direct bearing on morale. The soldier 
who is cold, wet, half-sick, badly nourished, badly lodged, 
and short of necessary equipment, is by just so much inca- 
pacitated from deriving full benefit from military training 
and instruction. But, on the other side, the discomforts 
and hardships of the first winter in France proved in more 
ways than one a decided benefit. The hardships helped to 
discover and form the likely oflficers as nothing else could. 



SETTLING DOWN IN FRANCE 47 

The platoon, company, or battalion officer, who worked 
every day to better the condition of his men's billets and 
general Hving conditions, who retained his cheeriness and 
devotion to duty throughout the days of continual rain 
and frost and mud, who set an example of patience and 
grit, was the officer whom the men trusted, whose little 
unit was conspicuous for good discipline and good spirit. 
Under hard conditions of hving and weather, the lazy and 
incompetent were also quickly discovered. Characters 
were developed. The good and the bad took on a higher 
relief. The promising material for the non-commissioned 
grades came quickly to the surface; the incompetent ser- 
geant also found his place — usually two grades or so 
lower down the scale. Another positive advantage derived 
from the experience was that the troops were early taught 
lessons on the subject of making the best of things. The 
sum of the hardships was, actually, to season and toughen 
the Division very promptly. 

Two factors in the generally rapid and satisfactory prog- 
ress of the troops in military knowledge, at this period, 
were due to the tireless and intelligent assistance of the 
French. 

The first of these was the work of the French INiilitary 
Mission. This was composed of a number of officers and 
non-commissioned officers of the French establishment, 
both staff and line, selected for their experience in warfare, 
their knowledge of English, exceptional qualities of mind 
and personal character. Their duties were manifold. At- 
tached to the headquarters of the Division, brigades and 
regiments, they served as points of contact between the 
troops and the French both military and civilian. They 
gave suggestions and instruction in methods of warfare, 
of administration, supply, and other staff work. They 
opened all avenues by which could be secured the supplies 
required for the equipment and comfort of the troops; they 
contributed most painstaking critiques on the discipHne, 



48 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

drill, and military efficiency of the units to which they were 
accredited; they made frequent reports to the French 
authorities; they assisted most effectively in smoothing 
out difficulties between the civilian population and the 
troops — settling claims, advising, interpreting. Their 
work in helping the Division through its first difficult weeks 
in France, and their later skillful assistance in the field, is 
part of the Division's permanent history. Long after the 
period of mere reminiscence is past; when all parts of the 
history will take on their proper proportion, one believes 
that an outstanding, enduring fact of record will be the 
work of these French soldiers in guiding the steps of our 
officers and men in warfare. At every turn of the Divi- 
sion's life there is apparent the influence of the French 
adviser; at all crises the assistance and guidance of the 
French, while never obtruded, were always to be had by a- 
commanding officer of whatever rank.^ 

A second factor in the early training of the troops of 
prime importance was the work of Colonel (later general 
de brigade) Bertrand, commanding the 162d Infantry 
Regiment, who in the eyes of the admiring Americans em- 
bodied all the traits of the beau sahreur of romantic tradi- 
tion. Of distinguished reputation as a cavalry commander 
in Africa, alert, elegant, a fearless leader in desperate 
actions, he gave his very best to aid in the instruction of 
the new American troops. His mere physical presence on 
the maneuver field, his infectious high spirits, his soldierly 
courtesy, and heavy-handed discipline had an effect ab- 
solutely electrical on all those Am.ericans with whom he 
came in contact, at this time or later. From his head- 
quarters in Frebecourt, a village just to the north of Neuf- 

^ To name those officers of the mission militaire who were longest on duty with 
the Division, whose work was perhaps the most conspicuous, one should include 
Major Amaury du Boisrouvray; Captain Westphalen Le Maltre; Captain Ma- 
lick (all at Division Headquarters); Captain De St.-Croix (51st Infantry Bri- 
gade); Captain Le Meitour (52d Infantry Brigade); Captain L. E. Ney; Lieuten- 
ant L. Cheippe; Lieutenant J. Toulouse; Lieutenant Henriot; Lieutenant C. de 
Beooist d'Azy and Lieutenant Masselin (both with 61st Field Artillery Brigade). 



SETTLING DOWN IN FRANCE 49 

chateau. Colonel Bertrand directed daily a series of dem- 
onstrations by his seasoned veterans of the approved 
French formations for attack or defense, movement on 
the field, the proper handling of grenades (of which at the 
time the French were making great use), the bayonet, and 
the machine gun. Beginning with demonstrations by 
squads of grenadiers and machine-gunners in Frebecourt, 
conducted for the benefit of regimental and battalion 
officers, the work was soon greatly extended. In trucks 
provided by the French a battalion of infantry at a time 
would be taken to the drill ground, kept there for the day, 
and minutely instructed by a battalion of the 162d in this 
or that tactical movement or method. Platoon and com- 
pany officers were shown how to deploy and maneuver 
their commands to meet varying conditions; the relative 
value and tactical worth of all the infantry utilities were 
taught to small groups. When it is understood that, at this 
time, not a battalion or company officer in the entire Ex- 
peditionary Force had ever handled one of the new weap- 
ons, had ever seen a modern company in combat forma- 
tion, and was only beginning to receive copies of hastily 
compiled provisional drill manuals translated from the 
French or adapted from the British, it will be appreciated 
how valuable were these practical demonstrations of the 
veteran battalions of the 162d in the field. This regiment 
had just been relieved from a long tour of duty on the 
Verdun front, where it had suffered severely. Of its original 
officers only two had survived the three years of continual 
warfare. Colonel Bertrand was the fourth regimental com- 
mander since 1914, all his predecessors having been battle 
casualties. As a combat unit the 162d had won an enviable 
reputation.^ Thus the American troops were brought into 

^ The complete battle record of this splendid French regiment follows. It is of 
interest, from the standpoint of the military historian, as showing how continu- 
ously our French allies were compelled to employ their units; the record illus- 
trates also very vividly the devotion of the French poilu in the defense of his 
country. The 162d, before the war, formed part of the garrison of the Verdun 



50 • NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

daily contact with battalions who did not perform a drill 
to illustrate principles taught in a book, but who repro- 
duced actual conditions, formations, methods which they 
had experienced or employed time and again in fierce at- 
tack and stubborn defense. The worth to the new men was 
consequently very great. Not only did they learn meth- 
ods, but they learned what real fighting men, some of the 
toughest French infantry, were like. 

It must not be understood, however, that the Division 
accepted the gospel of tactics as preached by the poilu and 
his chiefs without reservations. Yankee fashion, the Amer- 
ican listened, and then made his own decision. It was that 
period in the evolution of tactical theory — changed so 
often in the course of the war — when the cry was all for 
"speciaHsts." Almost the first point upon which the in- 
structors from the 162d insisted was that the American 
companies should be at once divided into permanent 
groups of riflemen, bombers, rifle grenadiers, automatic 
riflemen, signalmen, and agents of liaison. The training 
was all in the direction of training each group to become 
proficient in one branch only, and rather to neglect the 
rifle in favor of the other infantry weapons. Protracted 

fortress. On August 22, 1914, it first gained contact with the enemy in the vicin- 
ity of Pierrepont, where its stubborn resistance, under the command of Colonel 
Trouchand, cost 700 men and 30 officers. During the First Battle of the Marne, 
as a unit of the Forty-Second Division, it won a victory at Soisy-aux-Bois and 
Saint-Prix, on September 8, 1914. From October 21 till December 10, it was 
posted in the line along the river Yser; from January 2 till July 15, 1915, it was 
continually in the line in the region of the Argonne; on September 25, under the 
command of Colonel Chaudon, it attacked, in Champagne. From March 10 till 
May 23, 1916, it assisted actively in the heroic defense of Verdun. In September 
of the same year, it participated in the gigantic battle on the Somme, under Col- 
onel de Mattarel. In April, 1917, on the Aisne, it gained a success against the 
fortified Mauchamp Farm; and then returned, in August, to a position before 
Verdun, where it fought in Caurieres Wood and Chaunie Wood. Transferred to 
duty before Compiegne, in June of 1918, it checked the German advance on the 
Aronde, thanks to a heroic resistance at Porte Farm, in an action which cost the 
regiment some 30 officers and 1000 men, casualties in four days of desperate 
fighting (June 10-13). On August 2 it took part in the relief of Soissons; between 
August 28 and September 5 it was continuously engaged in a series of savage at- 
tacks which drove back the Germans across the heights near Crouy and the fa- 
mous Laffaux iNiill, on the Chemin des Dames. 



SETTLING DOWN IN FRANCE 51 

trench warfare had caused rehance to be placed mainly on 
weapons delivering a plunging fire at short range (the 
grenade) and on the rapid fire of the machine gun or auto- 
matic. True, the rifleman of exceptional proficiency was 
accepted as valuable for long-range sharpshooting or "snip- 
ing"; but he was merely one of still another class of spe- 
cialists, requiring his own equipment (telescopic sight, dis- 
guises, shields, what-not), together with intensive training 
at a special school. To this theory of tactical organization 
of the small unit of infantry was opposed the well-grounded 
belief of American Headquarters in the value of the Ameri- 
can rifleman as such. It was deemed best to adopt French 
practice with such modifications as suited the character- 
istic qualities of our troops; and this was done in the 
Twenty-Sixth Division. It was one of the points of train- 
ing on which the Division Commander insisted from the 
outset. As much range practice as possible, with the piti- 
fully meager facilities at hand, was given to all troops 
armed with the rifle; and the effort was made to acquaint 
all the infantry with all the infantry utilities, instead of 
creating groups each trained to be expert with only a single 
weapon. 

Other influences were at work, moreover, which bore 
directly on the Division's preparation for war. Nor can one 
omit the schools at Bazoilles, Gondrecourt, and Langres, 
to take them in the order in which they were opened. 

At Bazoilles there was established a school for teaching 
selected officers and non-commissioned officers the British 
manual of the bayonet — at this time judged the best, as 
tested by battle. For, along with the motions of thrust 
and cut and parry, there was instilled by the British bay- 
onet instructors a curiously vivid fighting spirit, which 
urged the soldier to get to grips with his adversary and 
kill him hand-to-hand. To watch this instruction was like 
witnessing a drill in murder; there was a grim fascination 
in the way the instructors spurred their pupils past the 



52 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

point of simulated ferocity, to a veritable lust-to-kill, 
which often proved dangerous enough, even at drill. Sav- 
age and primitive, this exercise gave the still easy-going 
lads a new point of view; it taught them what real in-fight- 
ing meant. At Bazoilles were also taught the British set- 
ting-up and suppling drills, which had remarkable results 
in teaching agility, smartness, and good carriage. 

Gondrecourt, the station of the First Corps Schools, 
claimed a large and continuous attendance of oflBcers, to 
whom were taught modern infantry tactics, in courses of 
three to six weeks, intensively; and the work was prose- 
cuted under such conditions of weather, inadequate hous- 
ing, hasty organization, and mud, as made the discom- 
forts of the billeting area fade away. Here again, however, 
as throughout the history of all the first American organi- 
zations in France, it was grit and the desire to play the 
game, on the part of all concerned, that won the day. OjE- 
cers were here from all the combat units of the Expedi- 
tionary Force; and here, too, as at Bazoilles, instruction 
was largely tinctured with British preferences and preju- 
dices in tactical methods and theory. If a certain confu- 
sion of mind resulted, for the student officer, who had 
begun by accepting the French doctrine as orthodox, only 
to be told that the French, with all their excellent warlike 
virtues, were not quite abreast of the times, no great harm 
was done. The student simply endeavored to sift out from 
both schools that residuum which was plainly of use to an 
American. And it was most desirable for our people, also, 
to catch early in their training a reflection of British pluck 
and recklessness as an offset to French caution and strict 
economy of forces. Hastening back to their platoons and 
companies, these officers in turn became teachers, as did 
those sent to Bazoilles. 

The personal teaching and example of the Division 
Commander was widely exerted among all ranks. That his 
men should be smart and alert under all circumstances — 



SETTLING DOWN IN FRANCE 53 

doing their best to keep themselves and their equipment 
clean — carrying out their orders briskly — with a smile 
— "playing the game" with a will — these principles he 
taught tirelessly. Continually he visited battalions, and 
talked to the men in the most informal, personal manner. 
Pride in themselves, pride in the service, pride in their 
Division, he instilled in officers and men alike, with the 
result that, long before the troops went to the line, there 
had grown up an esprit de corps, no longer of individual 
units, but of the whole Division, which was to endure 
rather remarkably all through the Division's history. 

But one discordant note was struck in the general con- 
cert of earnest w^ork and mutual dependence. From a 
source quite impossible to discover at the time, perplexing 
even now in its obscurity, there spread a rumor that Na- 
tional Guard troops, such as composed the Forty-Second 
and Twenty-Sixth Divisions, were to be made of small 
account in the composition of the American fighting forces. 
One heard parroted the insistence that our divisions must 
be national, not local, in character — that it was greater 
*'to belong to the Nation than to a State." The charge was 
even made that a campaign of aspersion, disparagement, 
and neglect had been set in motion, under which the Na- 
tional Guard in France would dwindle and disappear. 

These harmful rumors received wide circulation and 
credence. They were rife at all officers' schools; they were 
heard very early in the Staff College at Langres. As to the 
truth of such allegations — would it not appear superflu- 
ous to deny it? It must be confessed that the personal 
bearing of more than a few officers of the Regular estab- 
lishment gave weight to a behef in their ill-will; and the 
opposition of the responsible military authorities to the 
National Guard system was as open and of as long a stand- 
ing as their rooted belief in the incompetence of the Guard 
troops. But it would seem incredible, nevertheless, that 
even the dullest of the class would countenance a delib- 



54 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

erate sabotage of any regiments or divisions, of whatever 
origin or descent, when these were in the heat of prepara- 
tion for immediate service in the field. 

But the effect of these rumors was unfortunate. A cer- 
tain rancor was aroused in a body of officers who might 
feel that they were marked for discrimination. The great 
majority accepted this as a challenge; they set out to prove 
that they were apt to learn as they were keen to fight; they 
would prove that they could master the new tactics as 
quickly as any Regular; they would prove that they could 
lead troops as troops deserve to be led. Resentment spurred 
them to redoubled efforts. An inconsiderable number, 
feeling that, while they would do their duty loyally, it was 
idle to expect any recognition, let their interest sag per- 
ceptibly. And the wisest treatment was required in the 
months to come before this cancer could be eradicated.^ 

On November 11 the Division received a visit from the 
Commander-in-Chief of the Expeditionary Force. With a 
view to inspecting living conditions General Pershing 
traversed the entire divisional area, personally exploring 
typical dwelling-places, kitchens, horse lines, and head- 
quarters offices. No effort was made to inspect the troops, 
who were paraded in groups and detachments outside 
their respective billets without equipment. But a thorough 
examination was made of their quarters; many points were 
brought to the attention of commanding officers whereby 
living conditions might be bettered; and the situation, as 
known to officers on the spot, was thoroughly inquired 
into. 

Of the scores of officers and men detached for study at 
other schools than those already mentioned, a brief word 

1 Later, when the 26th, 27th, 28th, 29th, 30th, 32d, 33(1, 34th, 35th, 3Gth, and 
42d Divisions, to name the more conspicuous of the National Guard Divisions in 
France, were being actively employed on the smoking battle line, the citizen- 
soldiers felt better. They might have been rated low, in years past, by the effi- 
ciency tests of peace-times; but when the guns began to pound, the militia was 
certainly entrusted with lots of room "up front." 



SETTLING DOWN IN FRANCE 55 

will suflBce. It is enough to indicate the variety of instruc- 
tion by the very best teachers which it was the fortune of 
the Division, like the other pioneer divisions, to enjoy. 
Teaching which later became a bit perfunctory was at first 
most vigorous and alive. The effort put forth by the in- 
structors was immense; and all testimony unites in com- 
mending the keenness of the students. Even the general 
officers received a tour of instruction under French or 
British auspices. To the Division Commander (October 
31 to November 10) was demonstrated the organization of 
sectors and methods of attack, on the British front before 
Cambrai and on the French front north of Soissons. The 
brigadiers and selected field officers from the infantry also 
made similar trips, each lasting ten days or more. Officers 
and men of the machine-gun units were sent to school at 
Camiers or other centers; artillerymen took courses at 
Saumur or Fontainebleau; the signalmen were taught the 
intricacies of wireless, earth telegraphy (T.P.S.), blinker 
operation, or pigeon flying, in short courses at Gondre- 
court or Neufchateau. 

Of very great importance for the Division was the Army 
General Staff College. The influence of its teaching was 
carried early and directly to the Division Staff's organiza- 
tion and operation. Not fewer than fourteen officers per- 
forming duty on the Staff, at one time or another, were 
graduates of the College. Conducted by some of the ablest 
military students and educators of the Regular estab- 
lishment, with lecturers carefully selected from the Brit- 
ish and French Staffs, with stiff courses, the College rises 
inevitably to the notice of any historian who attempts 
to trace the life of any division, corps, or army in France. 
It was the Division's good fortune to be able to send to the 
College, as early as November 25, a group of some fifteen 
student officers, to be entered in the first course with 
groups from the First, Forty-Second, and Second Divi- 
sions (including several Marine officers), and from General 



56 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

Headquarters. The interest of the study of General Staff 
work itself; the keen competition for good ratings; the dog- 
ged, and often successful, efforts of officers newly from ci- 
vilian life to catch and excel those of the Regular establish- 
ment, who, with a better grounding, might be supposed to 
have a start too great to overcome; the inspiring teaching 
of the French and British, headed by Colonel Koechlin- 
Schwartz and Lieutenant-Colonel Needham respectively; 
the whole atmosphere of efficiency which pervaded the 
first course at Langres, combined to impress the student 
officers very deeply. No effort was spared by the college 
authorities to make much of the importance which, in 
their eyes, should inhere in the position of an officer of the 
General Staff; the student officers at the College were al- 
lowed privileges which caused a little discontent among 
the officers attending other near-by schools; there was 
danger that an officer would acquire as much self-conceit 
as knowledge of staff duties — that he would catch the 
air but not the substance of authority. But on the whole 
the course was all profit. The Staff College method and 
technique was accepted as the standard of all staff work of 
the Expeditionary Force. \Miat the War College and Leav- 
enworth had been for the Regular Army, Langres was to 
the Expeditionary Force. The best practice of the most 
successful staffs in the Allied armies was put at the dis- 
posal of our men. Troop movements by rail or march or 
bus; billeting; organization of a sector in the line or of a 
rest area; supply in all its aspects; methods of relieving 
troops in the line; proper forms of orders; the service of 
intelligence; tactical employment of infantry and artillery 
aeroplanes, tanks, light railways; aerostatics, road repair 
— these are only some of the subjects given careful ex- 
position. There was constant emphasis on the cardinal 
qualities of a staff officer — loyalty, foresight, tact, effort 
to anticipate the needs of the troops; energy. The old mis- 
conception of a staff officer as an "office man," or a kind 



SETTLING DOWN IN FRANCE 57 

of ornamental secretary to a commanding general, was 
swept clean away. A new respect was built up for the tire- 
less work, shrewd intelligence, and scientific method ex- 
emplified by the officers whom the Staff College called as 
instructors. To those who completed the course in Febru- 
ary there was given a further opportunity for receiving 
instruction of value. After a three days' survey of the or- 
ganization of General Headquarters in Chaumont, officers 
were sent to various French and British corps and divi- 
sions, for personal observation of staff methods in the field, 
lasting ten days or two weeks. A course of instruction, 
which tended later to become conventionalized, was for 
the first group of officers from the earhest arrived divisions 
an illuminating experience. 

So, then, passed the early winter. Under daily instruc- 
tion and ceaseless drill a steady improvement became 
evident. Shoulders straightened; discipline tightened; sick- 
ness (never a menace) grew less prevalent; supply, hous- 
ing, and transport (always serious problems) came to give 
less concern. The welfare agencies (first, the Red Cross) 
began to function a little; mail began to be received from 
home; fewer men went absent without leave. 

This last breach of discipline, a constant and one of the 
most serious weaknesses of the American soldier in France, 
could be profitably studied with relation to the soldier's 
feeling that he was or was not required for fighting. Let 
him scent a battle in the air and he stayed with the colors; 
let a period of inaction or tedious routine of drill be or- 
dered and promptly his youth and restless curiosity took 
him far afield. Authorized leaves, during the training 
period, were out of the question; the daily grind was hard; 
the fascination of the strange, new land was irresistible. 
Whatever the reason, there were many American soldiers 
absent from their station and duties between October and 
February, from the Twenty-Sixth as from the other divi- 
sions. The number, while never reaching the scandalous 



58 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

proportion that absented itself during the month following 
the armistice, a year later, was nevertheless disquieting. 
But with the rumor that the Division was to follow the 
First to a place on the firing-line the men flocked back 
and stayed. 

In many other respects, too, one noticed a change for 
the better in the look of the Division. OflScers gained in 
authority. The habit of command grew apace. Earlier mis- 
givings in regard to the abihty of platoon and company 
commanders to enforce discipline, in view of their militia 
antecedents or sketchy, training-camp education, were 
largely assuaged. The eager spirit in which the National 
Guard and Reserve officers had attacked and absorbed 
the instruction at Gondrecourt or Camiers or Langres had 
surprised the authorities; they learned, as a matter of fact, 
faster than the Regular student officer, and worked no 
less conscientiously. And as much of the knowledge taught 
was perfectly strange to all Americans, the initial gap 
between the professional equipment of the Regular and 
militia branches tended rapidly to close. 

An awakening to a kind of divisional consciousness ran 
through the scattered units. Officers and men got to know 
each other; common duties and troubles united them. 
The Division Commander's presence daily with one or 
another of the battalions was of great value in pulling 
them together. Officers and men got the conviction that, 
while he was exacting, content only with their best, he 
was always working for their good. Remote as most di- 
vision commanders must be, still, when the General fell 
seriously ill, in November, his danger woke a genuine con- 
cern in all corners of the area. His insistence on the unity, 
the special character, of the "Yankee Division" had an 
undoubted effect in awakening that very quality. 

To this end also a contribution was made by the work 
performed by all units, in building a model system of 
trenches, which by the first of December streaked the 



SETTLING DOWN IN FRANCE 59 

stony plateau southwest of Neufchateau, west of Rebeu- 
ville. In large working parties, under French supervision, 
the engineers and infantry laid out and constructed a com- 
plete battalion sector of fire, cover, and support trenches, 
with communications, posts of command and of observa- 
tion, machine-gun emplacements, snipers' posts, signal 
system, shelters, and wire. Enemy trenches were traced 
also. And here, night after night in the snow and cold of 
December and January, the troops were led through a 
number of battalion maneuvers — attack, defense, raid, 
patrol. These were made as realistic as possible; and oflS- 
cers and men profited enormously. A battalion at a time 
would occupy this "Noncourt Sector," so called, so that all 
had the opportunity of learning, not only the details of 
trench routine, but also the main aspects of trench war- 
fare. Principles of the textbooks were abundantly illus- 
trated by actual conditions; detailed critiques by superior 
officers, both American and French, showed the regimental 
and battalion officers those things which they had done 
rightly or wrongly, on the spot. The experience of the 
"Noncourt Sector" had a further value, in that those 
dreary nights in the trenches brought home to the dullest 
lad in the ranks the realization that, in all likelihood, be- 
fore many days, he would be shifted from his post on the 
make-believe fire-step to another overlooking a bit of the 
real No Man's Land, where the tireless enemy was wait- 
ing. 

The list of changes among commanding officers, and 
officers of the Division Staff, which occurred at intervals 
during the period November 1 to February 1, is rather 
extensive and, from certain angles, rather suggestive. First 
to be relieved were two of the original colonels together 
with two or three field officers. Their services were re- 
quired by General Headquarters in another field than the 
field of battle; they were chosen to assist in the organiza- 
tion and administration of the Provost Marshal's depart- 



60 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

ment, of the projected leave areas in the south of France, 
or elsewhere in the Service of Supply. January 2, 1918, 
Colonel "William C. Flayes was transferred from command 
of the 104th Infantry to provost duty, and later was 
allowed to resign and return to the United States. Janu- 
ary 11 Colonel E. L. Isbell, of the 102d Infantry, was sent 
to duty at Tours and later to a leave area. These officers 
were succeeded respectively by Colonel George H. Shelton, 
transferred from duty as the Division's Chief of Staff, and 
by Colonel John H. Parker, who had achieved a wide dis- 
tinction as an exponent of advanced ideas on the tactical 
employment of machine guns. The assignment of these 
two veteran officers of the Regular Army to important 
positions of command was, as events turned out, of great 
importance in shaping the history of the Division in its 
field operations. To Major W. S. Gatchell, 103d Machine- 
Gun Battalion, succeeded Major A. Ashworth; in the 101st 
Field Signal Battalion, Major H. G. Chase was succeeded 
by Major O. S. Albright (January 10). Major T. C. Baker 
took command of the 101st Supply Train on January 21, 
while in Headquarters Troop Captain Wolcott was suc- 
ceeded by Captain B. L. Ashby, the former becoming aide- 
de-camp to the Division Commander. Field officers sent to 
duty away from the Division included Lieutenant-Colonel 
Edwin E. Lamb, to provost duty; Lieutenant-Colonel T. 
Howe, 102d Field Artillery, to duty in the postal service; 
Lieutenant- Colonel R. K. Hale, 101st Field Artillery, to 
duty at General Headquarters; Major Harold Estey, 101st 
Engineers, to duty as railhead officer in Soissons. The list 
is not complete, and is set forth to illustrate how far the 
Twenty-Sixth and other pioneer divisions in France were 
drawn upon, from necessity, to furnish officers for a multi- 
plicity of duties away from troops. Officers were required 
for a great variety of administrative work all over France 
and in England. The supply first to hand was composed of 
officers from civilian occupations and antecedents, profes- 



SETTLING DOWN IN FRANCE 61 

sional or business. Quite unknown in army circles as prop- 
erly qualified regimental or battalion commanders of com- 
bat groups, in some cases, perhaps, not giving an entirely 
good impression when judged as field officers, but possess- 
ing ascertained good records as men of legal or business 
ability, it was wholly natural to make use of such men in 
ports, bases of supply, railheads, or leave and school areas, 
or with the police, for example, where they could be very 
useful. Thus a large number of Reserve and National 
Guard ofiicers of field rank were transferred away from 
combat divisions for this, if for no other reason. Their 
places were filled, more often than not, by officers of the 
Regular establishment, whose West Point training or 
years of service as non-commissioned oflScers appeared to 
guarantee their ability as troop leaders. 

In the Division Staff also many changes took place about 
this time. To duty as Chief of Staff, in place of Colonel 
Shelton, there was assigned Lieutenant-Colonel C. M. 
Dowell, who till then had been the Division Judge-Advo- 
cate. Colonel Beacham, Division Quartermaster, was 
transferred to the Forty-Second Division, and was suc- 
ceeded by Captain (later Lieutenant-Colonel) A. L. 
Pendleton ; Lieutenant-Colonel G. H. Simonds (later Brig- 
adier-General and Chief of Staff, Third Corps) was suc- 
ceeded as Division Adjutant by Major L. W. Cass, who 
in turn gave place, upon transfer away from the Division, 
to Major (later Lieutenant-Colonel) Charles A. Stevens. 
A considerable number of company and battery oflScers 
also left the Division at this time for other duties. Avia- 
tion, Ordnance, and the Service of Supply took many of 
them; not a few were retained at the schools as instructors 
or in administrative work. Later, when the artillery was 
on the march to relieve the gunners of the First Division, 
with no warning whatsoever, six of the twelve light battery 
commanders and twelve more of the most valuable oflScers 
in the brigade were summarily detailed by name to pro- 



62 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

ceed as instructors to various artillery centers. And as all 
their places could not be filled, since the replacement sys- 
tem was not yet functioning, the various units approached 
the conclusion of their training somewhat undermanned 
in officer personnel. The final month of the period, when 
the instruction of the troops was being rounded off and 
perfected, saw six of the more important units pass into 
the hands of new commanders. 



CHAPTER V 

THE CHEMIN DES DAMES 

THE programme of training prescribed courses ex- 
tending into the month of March. Late in January, 
however, it was decided by General Headquarters, in ac- 
cordance with the expressed desires of the French High 
Command, to effect a change in the scheme of preparation 
of the troops for warfare. It appeared that, in spite of all 
difficulties, such satisfactory progress had been made in 
training as to warrant giving the Twenty-Sixth the ex- 
perience which had fallen to the lot of the First Division 
in January. This was, briefly, to supplement the work 
of the drill and maneuver ground, school, and target range 
with a tour of duty in a so-called quiet sector, so as to ac- 
custom the troops to the methods of trench warfare and 
routine, and to exercise the officers in the duties of main- 
taining and administering a front-line trench system. 
Supervision and tactical control of the troops would rest 
with the French. 

The original plan appears to have contemplated sending 
only two battalions of infantry at a time for this new duty. 
But on the urgent representation of the Division Com- 
mander, this was so far altered as to permit the entire Divi- 
sion to proceed to the line at one time. In consequence, 
the artillery brigade and the ammunition train, then ex- 
pected in the Neufchateau area from Coetquidan, had its 
destination changed to Soissons. And thither the gunners 
proceeded, by rail, the movement starting on January 31 
with Guer as the entraining point. On the first days of 
February also the other troops moved by rail to their new 
scene of activity. 

Reconnaissance parties preceded their units by a day or 



64 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

two. For the artillery, Brigadier-General Lassiter, accom- 
panied by his aides, the three regimental commanders, 
and billeting officers, made the preliminary arrangements, 
arriving in Soissons on January 31. To prepare the way 
for the infantry and other units Brigadier-General Traub 
was sent ahead with a suitable detail. And so, when the 
troops began to arrive, it was possible for them to proceed 
w^ithout delay to the posts which the French had assigned. 
The movement to a new area followed close on the re- 
organization of the Staff on lines adapted, in part, from 
European practice. Hitherto deficiencies of staff organi- 
zation had been marked in all the wars of the United 
States. How fatal they were to the proper working-out 
of the plans of field commanders the history of the Civil 
War campaigns abundantly proves. To insure for the 
future, therefore, proper division of staff duties the Field 
Service Regulations prescribed, and Langres explained, a 
system practically identical with that of the French or 
British establishments. This provided for General Staff 
sections in each army, corps, and division, consisting of 
three departments ^ each under an Assistant Chief of 
Staff, each with a distinct responsibility and duty in con- 
nection with supply and administration (G-1); intelli- 
gence (G-2) ; operations and training (G-3). The xAdjutant 
became the officer in charge of records and personnel; 
staff departments, such as the Inspector, Quartermaster, 
Signals, Judge-Advocate, and Surgeon, tended to be 
brought under the coordinating and administrative First 
Section. Every detail by which the will of the Command- 
ing General was worked out being thus apportioned to one 
or another of the three General Staff Section heads, the 
system was well planned to simplify and energize all staff 
work. Not that it worked perfectly from its inception. 
The efficiency of a good French staff was far to seek. The 

1 In the armies, and the army corps, other sections were created; but the divi- 
sioQ organization included only tlircc sections at any time. 



THE CHEMIN DES DAMES 65 

whole conception was novel in practice in the American 
army. There were misunderstandings, cross-purposes, a 
certain resentment on the part of long-established staff de- 
partments at their partial subordination to the new ad- 
ministrative section. It took time to make the machine 
''function," to employ a term most dear to all staff men. 
But the essential soundness of the system was abundantly 
proved in the course of the Division's duty in the field. 
And it was aided to perform its work in great part — as 
must always be the case — by the fact that the personnel 
of the Division Staff was a long time associated and gen- 
erally good friends. The danger of the system lay, obvi- 
ously, in that an ambitious or over-confident or disloyal 
Chief of Staff, or one of his assistants, might be carried 
away by his special knowledge of a given situation into 
preparing and issuing orders, in the name of the Division 
Commander, which the latter might not approve or had 
not directed. The corresponding advantage, however, was 
very great — namely, that as the heads of the General 
Staff sections made part of the General's household, en- 
joyed his confidence, and knew his mind, they were able 
to frame orders intelHgently, exactly expressing the com- 
mander's desires, without his being obliged to concern 
himself with details. Later, when the staff machine was in 
steady operation, day and night, its action was far differ- 
ent from that of the somewhat creaky apparatus which 
piloted and pushed the Division away from the Neuf- 
chateau area to the famous sector of the Chemin des 
Dames during the first days of February, 1918. 

For it was on the Chemin des Dames, some five miles 
north of Soissons and southwest of Laon, that the Divi- 
sion received its baptism of fire. The position had been 
hotly contested from the beginning of the war.^ Its high 
plateaux, rough, steep scarps, and ragged forest land 

^ Notably by the British Second Corps, on September 12-13, 1914; and by 
the French imder Nivelle in April and October, 1917. 



66 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

formed a veritable bastion of the German defensive line. 
Its quaint name was derived from that of an ancient high- 
road running east and west along its principal ridge, close 
to the demolished fort of Malmaison. The line was com- 
posed of a series of strong points or centers of resistance 
organized with machine guns or automatic rifles to pro- 
vide mutually flanking fire in all forward parts of the area. 
Defining the front of the position, separating the Allied 
and German outpost lines, w^hich ran on an average about 
five hundred yards apart, was an unfordable stretch of 
the Oise-Aisne canal, curving from east to west through 
north, through the marshy valley of the little Ailette, to 
which the high ridges of the Chemin des Dames plateau 
descended by fairly easy slopes. Of further tactical interest 
were the extensive tract of woodland known as the Foret 
de Pinon, which extended over all the west, or left, flank, 
and the ruined hamlets of Pinon, Chavignon, Pargny, and 
Pargny-Filain along the front slopes and in the low land of 
the valley toward the center. Remarkable limestone quar- 
ries were scattered through the whole area. Worked for 
centuries, tunneled out of the chalky hills in vast galleries 
and grottoes, they constituted a series of important tacti- 
cal features, both as affording places for the concentration 
and secure shelter of large bodies of troops, and as ad- 
vantageously placed posts of command. Less extensive 
surface cuttings were utilized as units in the chain of strong 
points, transformed into miniature fortresses, or as shelters 
for kitchens, aid stations, or forward munition depots. The 
general conformation of the ground can hardly be defined, 
so irregular and confused was the tangle of spurs and ridges 
branching off from the principal Malmaison plateau sep- 
arating the Aisne valley on the south, in the rear, from 
that of the Ailette, along the front. The entire terrain was 
deeply pitted with shell craters and scored with sections 
of abandoned trenches, relics of the fierce contests of pre- 
vious years. The road system was fairly extensive, and its 






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il-E. 



CHLMIK DL^ DaML5 6LCT015, 

Scale i: 153,000 (^Approkimatcuy ) 
Troht or Z6I!. DwisioM ^^^Miii^HB 



THE CHEMIN DES DAMES 67 

principal axes were in fair repair. The villages of Jouy, 
Vailly, Missy-Conde, and a half-dozen others, were uti- 
lized as assembly places for battalions in support or re- 
serve, while the whole of the rear area, along the Aisne 
valley as far as Soissons (the railhead) or Couvrelles (the 
location of Division Headquarters), was thoroughly or- 
ganized for the service of supply and evacuation. 

For the moment the sector was quiet. The fierce attacks 
of the French in the autumn of 1917, supplementing the 
only partially successful offensive along the Aisne and in 
Champagne during the spring of the same year, had been 
followed by a protracted period of stabilization. Local 
activities might continue to the north and east, as part of 
the wearing-down of the enemy's manhood strength; but 
on the Chemin des Dames reigned a calm nearly as pro- 
found as that along the right of the Allied line between 
Pont-a-Mousson and the Swiss border. A somewhat per- 
functory daily harassing fire, occasional patrols, a little 
raid to get prisoners, comprised about the sum of the 
region's warfare at the time the Twenty-Sixth went in. 

Hither, then, in accordance with arrangements per- 
fected between the French authorities and General Head- 
quarters, came the troops of the Division. Placed under 
the tactical command of the French Eleventh Army Corps 
(General de Maud'huy), the Division was to perform duty 
for about thirty days, "for training" (so ran Field Order 
No. 1) "in trench warfare of all divisional elements in 
units smaller than a brigade." ^ The movement was made 
by rail, the troops obtaining a new experience in loading 
themselves and their equipage into the standard French 
military trains, each of which was made up of seventeen 
flat-cars for guns or vehicles, thirty freight cars for enlisted 

* The Eleventh Corps d'Armee was one of the original twenty-one corps of 
the French regular establishment, having Nantes as its territorial headquarters. 
At the time that the Twenty-Sixth was attached to it, the Eleventh Corps in- 
cluded three infantry divisions and attached divisional artillery, together with 
its own heavy artillery, trains, and other units. 



68 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

men or horses (each car containing thirty-six men or eight 
horses), two coaches for oflBcers, and one baggage van for 
the train crew, a total of fifty cars for each infantry battal- 
ion or its equivalent (1000 men). Some things cannot be 
taught in camp, among them the art of entraining and de- 
training. The experience of the artillery is illustrative. 
WTien the brigade left for the front, between January 31 
and February 2, six hours were allowed for each battery 
to load, and in some instances this was scarcely too much. 
In the neighborhood of two and one half hours was the 
best record attained by any unit; and even that time was 
far too fast for most. But in the months to come, when 
moving as well as fighting had become second nature, rec- 
ords for entraining — to speak now only of the artillery — 
were made which were remarkable, indeed. The problem 
of loading a battery consists of stowing four guns, twelve 
caissons, and many miscellaneous vehicles, together with 
about 200 men and between 160 and 200 horses, as well 
as harness, food and forage, and equipment. This opera- 
tion was performed by "E" Battery, 103d Field Artillery 
(heavy), on one occasion, in fourteen minutes, thirty 
seconds. "F" Battery of the same regiment made a record 
of twenty-one minutes, while most of the light batteries 
could load, later in their experience, in thirty or forty 
minutes at any time. But how considerable even on this 
first entrainment was the improvement of the Division 
at large in train discipline, as tested by the smart hand- 
ling of baggage, animals, and equipment, and control of 
the men by their officers, only those can testify who had 
a hand in moving the first American arrivals from the 
base ports to the training areas. The memory of those 
riotous, cheerful, enthusiastic tourist parties was merci- 
fully blotted out. The roadside raids at every halt, the men 
riding on the tops of the cars and the running-boards, the 
hilarious disorder, were less and less to be feared. Perhaps 
the men, even the most thoughtless, were sobered by the 



THE CHEMIN DES DAMES 69 

knowledge that they were really going to the line. They 
were intensely curious and eager, commenting on all the 
signs of war in the countryside; but they were too much 
afraid of being left behind to stray even a little; and they 
were very orderly. 

The artillery preceded the infantry by a little. On Feb- 
ruary 5 all units jBrst to enter the battery positions w^ere 
there, the guns having been put in place the night previous. 
On the same date Division Headquarters was opened in 
the chateau at Couvrelles, in the Aisne valley, east of 
Soissons. Undamaged in spite of German occupancy, with 
the swans still in the moat, and the gardener at work, its 
state presented a marked contrast to that of the country- 
seat of the Prince de Monaco, a few miles away, at Pinon. 
Here a blasted, shattered park, a mansion, stables, fai- 
sanderie, and plaisances, all reduced to smoke-stained 
ruins, afforded the Americans a vivid picture of what war 
had done to a part of the world's beauty. WTiat the war 
was still to do was borne in upon the divisional machine- 
gunners daily, in the neighborhood of that same estate; 
if they tried to draw water from the chateau pond by day- 
light, how quickly did they have to dart to cover before 
the enemy's sniping "77s" would drop shells among them! 

"The relief," in the prosaic terms of the day's opera- 
tions report, "was accomplished without incident." But 
what drama was ever so thrilling for those new troops, 
as in little columns, groups, and by individuals, guided 
by the veteran French, they felt their way, in the black 
night, along the shell-torn trails and zigzag hoyaux up 
toward that eerie region lighted by the white and ghostly 
flares! The whining, crescendo whistle and rending crash 
of a shell, the distant tack-a-tack-a-tack of a nervous ma- 
chine gun, the crowded confusion of the narrow, muddy 
trenches, the final arrival in some rudely fortified quarry, 
half discerned in the darkness, or the descent into a fetid 
dugout, where the odor of death lingered, and the fat rats 



70 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

ran riot — to mention these first impressions, with their 
attendant reflexes of awe, fear, curiosity, puzzlement, 
weariness, resolution, is merely to chronicle some of the 
influences which went to make soldiers out of lads-in- 
khaki. 

The troops entered the line, at the outset, in small 
numbers. A platoon of each infantry regiment took over 
a little stretch of a sub-sector, with French to right and 
left; a portion of a battery or a machine-gun company re- 
lieved a corresponding French section or two. A httle later, 
as the Americans learned the routine and proved depend- 
able, the original platoon front was enlarged to a company 
front; a whole battery took over the position and duties 
of a French unit. Later still, the Division was allowed 
further responsibility, whole battalions and regiments 
taking over their appropriate subdivisions of the general 
line. 

But before this ideal of every unit commander could 
be realized, before the Major or the Colonel could be happy 
in the prideful thought that the defense of a part of the 
real battle line was his own, undivided responsibility, there 
was much for him still to learn, much for him to teach his 
men. Previous training had inculcated general principles. 
Now was to begin a training from a book writ large on the 
scarred and battered land, where the punctuation was 
furnished by enemy shells, and comment by the whine of 
machine-gun bullets or sigh of the gas shells. The mul- 
tiple duties connected with the repair, improvement, and 
extension of the defensive works (trench, wire, gas pro- 
tection, shelters) — how best to get supplies forward over 
the shelled roads — methods of observing the enemy and 
getting information about him — the practice of artillery 
and machine-gun fire, in all their aspects — the tactical 
disposition and emplo;yTnent of infantry, from outposts to 
the garrisons of the strong points — defense of the ligne de 
surveillance and the ligne de resistance principale — these 



THE CHEMIN DES DAMES 71 

and a dozen other subjects were made a matter of con- 
tinuous study by officers of all grades, section leaders, and 
soldiers. Instruction was wholly in the hands of the French. 
There was assigned to the Division a flock of officers and 
non-commissioned officers drawn from the French divisions 
in the Eleventh Corps; and these were distributed among 
all units down to including a platoon of infantry or a sec- 
tion of artillery and machine-gunners. Tirelessly they 
taught the newcomers all they knew of the grim trade; 
watchfully they observed all that the apprentice Ameri- 
cans did and were, from calculating fire data to burying 
garbage, from cookery to colonels. For a while the com- 
manders and staffs of the higher units practically lived at 
the various French headquarters. The artillery staff, for 
instance, was sent to the corps artillery, to be instructed 
in the services of information, signals, or munitions; and 
there it remained for nearly two weeks. It was not till Feb- 
ruary 13 that the artillery set up its own Brigade Head- 
quarters at Crouy. Even though the artillery commander 
did not exercise control, it was assumed that he did so, for 
the purpose of experience; and there were given to him and 
his Staff all the problems which naturally would arise in 
organizing the artillery defense of the sector, the solutions 
being subjected to painstaking criticism by the command- 
ers and staffs of the various French artillery headquarters. 
In addition every American artillery staff officer spent two 
days with a battery in active operation at the front. 
Similar advantages were given to officers of the infantry, 
machine-gun, and medical units. The ammunition train 
was attached to the corps artillery park, whose command- 
ing officer, Major de Bacquencourt, was tireless in his in- 
struction. And so, interspersed between experienced 
French units, living with the French in closest intimacy, 
it was inevitable that the American troops should learn 
rapidly and well. 

To this new duty they brought qualities and attributes 



72 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

which interested their teachers vastly. Their recklessness, 
their ignorance of danger, their youth, ruggedness, intel- 
ligence, and aptness, were all wonderful in the eyes of 
the dogged but very weary poiliis. Their still imperfect 
discipline, their carelessness with property, their often 
slovenly dress and bearing, all gave grounds for a certain 
apprehension. But their rifles were clean; the spirit of the 
men was aggressive; and it was acknowledged, as a matter 
of course, that time would bring about a gradual change in 
the direction of smartness, improved courtesy, and disci- 
pline. That these newcomers were fighting men was evi- 
dent from the outset. They were compared to the Cana- 
dians or Australians. 

On the other side the impressions which the Americans 
got of their French associates were equally varied.. French 
meticulousness of method, infinite care for detail, slowness 
in accomplishing a stint of work, were incomprehensible 
to the more rough-and-ready Yankee, even while he ad- 
mired French thoroughness, tenacity, and good cooking. 
It was evident that there were few points in the game of 
war that Jacques Bonhomme did not know; but the Ameri- 
can felt that, somehow, when his turn came to play, he 
would go at the game a little differently. It is of importance, 
however, that the men of the Twenty-Sixth never felt or 
assumed any air of impatience or superiority with the 
worn and stubborn fellows in horizon-blue — the latter 
were friends and companions, never "Frogs." The point 
is worth stressing, when one recalls the attitude, arrogant 
and patronizing, of many American troops, who, arriving 
in France at later dates, never had the honor and priv- 
ilege of seeing a "Frog" in battle. 

The exact extent of the line held by the Division during 
its stay on the Chemin des Dames is diflScult to reconsti- 
tute in detail. Continuous were the changes, as sub- 
sectors, battery positions, centers of resistance, or head- 
quarters, now occupied by the French, would be taken 



THE CHEMIN DES DAMES 73 

over in constantly increasing proportion by the Americans. 
In general, however, the forward battalions of the in- 
fantry, from right to left, occupied ground as follows: 
101st Infantry, from where the Oise-Aisne canal entered 
the tunnel in the hill, at Les Vaumaires, to Filain inclusive, 
with regimental Headquarters in Vailly; 102d Infantry, in 
and about Pargny-Filain, Bois d'Entre Deux Monts, and 
Chavignon, with Headquarters in a quarry above Aizy; 
103d Infantry, next in line, had Headquarters at Vaudes- 
son; on the left, 104th Infantry occupied positions in 
Quincy Basse, Quincy Wood, with Headquarters near 
Vauxaillon. Near Juvigny was the Headquarters of the 
52d Infantry Brigade. The 101st Machine-Gun Battalion 
had its posts mainly in Pinon Wood; 101st Engineers, 
with Headquarters at Missy, could be found at work, in 
detachments, all over the area. The artillery was disposed 
along the reverse slopes and in the glens of the southern 
side of the principal plateau ; the brigade machine-gun bat- 
talions were interspersed with the infantry units. 

If accurate plotting of the positions held by all units pre- 
sents some difficulty, so it is hard to record the dates which 
mark the periods of duty in line of all troops of the Divi- 
sion. But certain initial dates appear exceedingly interest- 
ing to note with care, since they are part of the history, 
not only of this Division, but also of he whole Expedi- 
tionary Force. Thus: 

The first shot from troops of the National Guard or 
National Army against the Germans was fired on Febru- 
ary 5, 1918, by Number One piece. Battery "A," 101st 
Field Artillery, at 3.45 p.m. The shell case was forwarded 
to the Massachusetts state authorities, for permanent 
preservation. 

The first infantry units of the National Guard or Na- 
tional Army to take a position on the front line was a 
platoon of the 101st Infantry (Massachusetts), on the 
night of February 7-8. 



74 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

The first death from hostile fire in the Division occurred 
on February 14, 1918 — Private Ralph R. Spaulding, 
103d Infantry. 

The first German prisoner taken by troops of the Na- 
tional Guard or National Army was secured on the night 
of February 14-15. 

A few days suflSced to accustom the troops to trench 
routine. They persisted in exposing themselves, their eager 
curiosity numing ahead of their discretion. It would have 
been obvious to a far less watchful enemy than the one 
who crouched along the hillsides north of the Ailette, that 
he had new troops opposite him. A shell from the German 
batteries had the effect merely of bringing together a group 
of the Americans on the run, "to see where she landed.'* 
It was not till sniping artillery and riflemen had taken toll 
of some of the careless ones that they learned to keep out 
of sight between dawn and dusk. But they learned how to 
occupy a trench or a machine-gun post promptly and well; 
the gunners won golden opinions; the supply and medical 
services functioned in a manner which was more than sat- 
isfactory ; the military police already had won a reputation 
for intelligence and efficiency. In a week's time, indeed, 
the French were ready to commence a series of lessons in 
the more advanced chapters of trench lore and trench 
warfare. 

First to come was experience in patrolling, building 
wire entanglements and other works, intelligence and 
liaison dut3^ Then, on February 14, arrangements were 
made for a patrol which should have some of the charac- 
teristics of a small raid on a limited objective. The mission 
was to reconnoiter some new work which the enemy had 
been doing opposite the lines of the 104th Infantry, but 
not to attempt a passage of the German wire. It was a little 
enterprise identical with scores of others along the front 
that night; it would be not worth noting were it not for 



THE CHEMIN DES DAMES 75 

the fact that, for the Division, the affair was a first close 
encounter with the enemy. For the twenty men selected 
from the 104th Infantry to go on the expedition, how much 
the night held of mystery, anxiety, and exultation! When 
volunteers had been asked for, a whole company responded 
— which was in itself a satisfaction. Lieutenant (later 
Major) J. W. Brown was in command, but the American 
party as a whole acted under the orders of a French lieu- 
tenant, who, with twenty of his own men, was to direct 
the newcomers. 

Taking the prescribed formation, equipped with rifles, 
grenades, and pistols (though the French inclined to dis- 
favor the rifle on raiding parties), the group made its way 
across the flat valley cautiously; it reached the German 
wire without any untoward adventures, in spite of the 
flares that lighted up the marshy waste of No Man's Land 
in their ghostly fashion; the men completed their recon- 
naissance without interference, and then, on signal from 
their French leader, commenced the return trip. They had 
not gone far, however, creeping over the shell craters, be- 
fore they were brought to an abrupt halt. An unexpected 
sight had caught the eyes of the advanced group — a 
glimpse of figures moving along the dim sky-line between 
themselves and their own lines. Taking position in shell 
holes, they awaited developments, ready for action, un- 
certain what to expect. But only for an instant were they 
left in doubt, for, with a crackle and flash, the enemy rifles 
opened on them briskly. Instantly the fire was returned. 
Broken up into small groups in the darkness and because 
of the torn-up ground, the Americans sought none the less 
to come to grips with their opponents, employing their 
pistols and grenades, while the French also moved up, 
firing at the flashes. For a half-hour the duel continued, 
when the Germans suddenly drew off in the darkness. 
Advancing, the raiding party found a wounded man, 
abandoned, together with a quantity of equipment; and 



76 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

so, carrying their prisoner, who died soon after being 
brought in, Brown's men reached their hnes in safety, 
only to find, at roll-call, that Sergeant L. Letzing and eight 
soldiers were missing. Daylight was at hand. To be caught 
between the lines after dawn meant probable death; but 
Brown did not hesitate for an instant. Hardly had the 
absence of his men been verified before he was out again, 
crawling to the scene of the skirmish, to recover them. 
Fired on by enemy machine guns he persisted in his search, 
but in vain. He was on the point of regretfully abandoning 
his quest, when quite by chance his eyes were attracted 
to the movement of a little group crawling from one shell 
crater to another, toward our lines; and he guessed that 
Letzing had found his way to safety after all. This, indeed, 
proved to be the case. Separating in the darkness from the 
rest of the patrol during the return journey, Letzing per- 
ceived a German just disappearing in the gloom, pursued 
him promptly, came to grips, and made the fellow a pris- 
oner. A moment later the white light of a flare showed him 
a group of Americans near by, lost like himself; and so, 
taking command of the party, he led it with commendable 
skill to a safe return, fetching in his prisoner. For their 
behavior on this occasion. Brown and Letzing were awarded 
the Croix de Guerre the following day, being thus the first 
men of the Division to receive that decoration. 

Four nights later (February 18-19) the Germans at- 
tempted their first raid on the American lines, doubtless 
for the purpose of securing prisoners. By this means they 
would identify the troops in the unfamiliar uniforms whom 
thej" had noticed in the sector for the week past. At a dis- 
tance, to judge from their saucer-hke helmets and olive- 
brown clothing, they might have been British — and what 
were British units doing so far from the Flanders front? 
Or were newly arrived Americans actually taking a place 
on the line, troops other than the First Division, which 
had been identified through prisoners taken the November 



THE CHEMIN DES DAMES 77 

previous? An effort to solve these questions on the part of 
the enemy had been expected by the French any night. 

When it came, the effort was developed along lines 
which were to become familiar enough to the Twenty- 
Sixth. A preliminary bombardment of the portion of the 
hnes to be raided, with object to drive the occupants to 
cover, stunned and disordered, was increased in intensity 
up to the moment the raiding party moved forward; and 
the attackers were covered, as they advanced, by a moving 
curtain of artillery fire, which was finally to box in the 
survivors of the preliminary bombardment, prevent their 
reinforcement, and make their capture easier. 

The line chosen for attack was held by units of the 104th 
Infantry (western Massachusetts) — Company "D" and 
the regiment's machine-gunners; but, however eagerly 
the attack was delivered, nothing was accomplished 
against these troops, so new that this was their very first 
night in the fire trenches. The artillery, on signal, laid 
down an effective barrier; and the infantry, unterrified by 
the enemy's bombardment, made such effective use of 
their rifles and machine guns that the German advance 
was stopped short. Patrols, sent out immediately upon 
the enemy's withdrawal, found eloquent testimony of the 
Americans' good shooting in the numerous dead and 
wounded which the Germans had not been able to carry 
away. 

Compliments quickly followed from the French. The 
behavior of his men under fire for the first time might well 
have encouraged the Division Commander, who had al- 
ways believed so fervently in the quality of the troops 
under him. He telegraphed an account of the action to 
General Headquarters which glowed. He intimated in the 
same message that, so content were the French with the 
work of the Americans, that there was every likelihood of 
the Division's being allowed to take over more of the front 
than had been originally intended. The answer was chilling. 



78 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

indeed. General Headquarters admonished that there must 
be no deviation from the plan of training already laid down, 
and that, in addition, one must not write telegrams which 
dealt with more than one subject! The great gulf between 
the spirit animating one message and the other was deep, 
indeed — here, the generous enthusiasm of a field com- 
mander for the good behavior of his lads in action; there, 
utterly praiseworthy resolve of the "brains of the army" 
not to deviate a hair's breadth, for any reason, from the 
path to efficiency and the way of good order, as blazed bj- 
the T.S.G.S. So slight an incident as this, however, was 
not to be without significance in the development of rela- 
tions between those principally concerned, so delicate are 
some of the adjustments of the very human machine that 
makes war. 

A few days later the Germans' attentions were repaid in 
kind. It was discovered that certain of their observation 
posts were located on the far side of the Ailette stream, 
close to the bank, not far from where the parallel Oise- 
Aisne canal branched off to the southeast, to enter the tun- 
nel east of Filain. It was decided to reconnoiter and destroy 
them, at the same time making prisoners, after effecting 
a crossing of the canal by means of portable foot-bridges. 
The raiding party was much stronger than on the first oc- 
casion, being composed of some twenty-six men from Com- 
panies "E" and "H," 101st Infantry, under Lieutenants 
W. L. Koob and G. H. Davis, accompanying a force of 
eighty men from the 64th Infantry (French) and a detach- 
ment of French engineers. Divided into two groups, pro- 
tected by the dense and well-sustained barrage of the Amer- 
ican artillery and machine guns, the raiders penetrated the 
German lines after the engineers had coolly overcome some 
resistance to their efforts to lay their bridges. They bombed 
dugouts, inflicted losses, and returned without a scratch 
(so far as the Americans were concerned), fetching pris- 
oners with them. Noteworthy in this affair were the facts 



THE CHEMIN DES DAMES 79 

that for the first time, so far as is known, American artil- 
lery fired a rolling and a box barrage to cover an infantry 
advance, while a machine-gun battalion laid down a box 
barrage, employing indirect fire.^ 

It was next the turn of the Connecticut regiment (102d 
Infantry) to get involved, and, while the affair resulted in 
one sense less happily than had the others, it demonstrated 
anew various things about these troops which were of the 
utmost importance to ascertain and prove. The 28th was 
the night of a battalion relief; the second detachment of 
this regiment to enter the line was just going to its desig- 
nated position. At the same hour a working party from 
Company "A" of the same regiment, under the command 
of Lieutenant R. Bishop, comprising thirty-two men, pro- 
ceeded in the direction of the canal from the ruined village 
of Chavignon, to build entanglements, each man carrying 
a roll of barbed wire. Hardly had this party started work, 
however, spread out over a hundred yards of ground, with 
French detachments guarding its flanks, when suddenly 
down dropped an enemy barrage fire, directly on them. 
The French drew back at once; but Bishop, having re- 
ceived no orders to that effect, assumed that he was ex- 
pected to hold his ground — and did so, organizing a kind 
of defense from the shell craters in which he had grouped 
his small army. 

But close behind the moving barrier came the enemy. 
Before Bishop could dispose his men there stormed over 
two large parties of German infantry, overcoming or ig- 
noring the resistance of the little working party without 
a pause in their stride. Gathering up some ten or eleven 
of Bishop's men the Germans swept past the remainder 
of the party in the darkness, making for the sandbagged 
breastworks of the Chavignon ravine. Here the new battal- 
ion (2d BattaHon, 102d Infantry) was waiting for them, 
just arrived in the unfamiliar trenches, under fire for the 

^ 51st Field Artillery Brigade; 101st Machine-Gun Battalion. 



80 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

first time. And the Germans could not reach them. They 
were stopped dead. The Americans used their rifles, then 
their grenades — and when these gave out, they hurled 
stones at their assailants; by every kind of means, they 
beat back the raiders before these latter got to the wire 
entanglements before the trenches, and there a number of 
the Germans were found hanging next morning, dead. 
Retiring, the raiders were again covered by their own pro- 
tective artillery fire; to cut them off the American bat- 
teries laid down a curtain between the lines. And through 
this double rain of shell did Lieutenant Bishop come and 
go three times, accompanied by two enlisted men, search- 
ing for his wounded and missing. 

Prisoners were lost, which was unfortunate, since their 
capture would identify the Division. But of incomparable 
worth was the assurance that a new set of newcomers, in 
their baptism of fire, were steady and fierce in the defense 
of their positions. Once more was the fighting quality of 
these New England fellows firmly established. This was a 
small affair, but it had an importance out of all proportion 
to its dimensions. Like the little affairs in the Bois Quincy 
and at Albia, across the canal, it helped teach war. All 
were blows of the hammer on the red-hot iron, shaping it, 
giving temper to the rough-cast metal. 

One week later a detachment of the same regiment 
undertook a raid, in conjunction with the French, of a 
character precisely like its predecessors. But this time the 
French artillery support was not effective, owing to a mis- 
understanding as to the time-table; it was not possible to 
lay the foot-bridges across the canal near the reservoir, 
as had been planned, owing to machine-gun fire; and the 
party was forced to return without having accomplished its 
mission. 

For some days after these exchanges of courtesies the 
sector was quiet. Only the daily harassing fire of the ar- 
tillery of both sides broke the calm. But the troops were 



THE CHEMIN DES DAMES 81 

soon to undergo an uninvited experience which was pain- 
ful and costly, even though it possessed, like all hard les- 
sons, a value as a bit of education. On March 16, at 6.30 
o'clock in the afternoon, the enemy suddenly loosed a 
storm of gas shells, mainly directed on the area occupied 
by the 102d Infantry in Pargny-Filain and the quarries 
above Aizy and Jouy such as the so-called "Pantheon," 
on the battery positions, and over part of the area, to the 
right, occupied by the 101st Infantry. For a full twenty- 
four hours, the choking, burning, poisonous rain descended 
without a respite. All varieties of gas — mustard, phos- 
gene, hyperite — were employed, and the use of a new 
arsenical preparation was suspected, with a mingling of 
ordinary high-explosive. And the troops suffered. The gas 
defense of the sector, like its other accessory defenses, had 
been neglected by the French; nor had the energetic and 
constant work of the Americans quite sufficed to assure, 
in all places, the protection of dugouts and shelters, by 
means of the approved blanket curtains, ventilator stops, 
and vermorel spraying. As a consequence the deadly fumes, 
loosed over the area in vast volumes, seeped quickly into 
many of the pockets and excavations used for company 
kitchens or assembly points in the forward areas. Gas 
masks were used, of course; but cases occurred where men, 
half suffocated and choked by having worn their masks 
for hours, believing the danger to be past, would remove 
the respirator for a breath of air, only to inhale a whiff that 
seared their lungs or scorched their eyeballs. Brave fel- 
lows such as runners or signal agents, tearing off their 
masks to see better, fell victims to the deadly fog. Many 
received bad surface burns from accidental contact with 
clothing, tools, or equipment, which had been exposed to 
the gas; the high-explosive shells, moreover, took toll of 
not a few wounded. 

The character of the bombardment gave the authorities 
much occasion for thought. Some 20,000 gas shells were 



82 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE ' 

estimated by the Corps gas oflScer to have been directed on 
the area occupied mainly by one regiment in twenty-four 
hours — an intense and protracted bombardment — which 
gave the attack a certain novelty of design and scope which 
was puzzling. In retrospect it suggests the form of prepara- 
tion for attack, or one aspect of it, which the Germans 
employed with such success against the British three days 
later at the inception of their tremendous drive in Flan- 
ders. But in this case no gas was thrown on the back areas 
nor was the attack followed up. The German infantry made 
no move whatever. It is possible that their plans were 
slightly altered by the violent counter-battery work of 
our own artillery, which gave back to the enemy his own 
measure of gas heaped up and running over throughout 
the anxious, painful day. 

Anxious the day was, too, to the French High Command, 
which was aware of the great German effort in prepara- 
tion — the " Kaiserschlacht," the "battle without a mor- 
row " — but was still in doubt as to where on the western 
battle front the blow would fall. The continuous demands 
to be kept constantly informed of every phase of the en- 
emy's activity, the minute care with which the develop- 
ment of every slowly dragging hour was analyzed and 
studied, were intimation enough of the concern felt over 
the somewhat unusual phenomenon of the gas bombard- 
ment — granting that it might have some other motive 
than the intimidation and dismay of the new American 
troops. Anxious the day was also for the brigade and regi- 
mental commanders, since here was the first extensive test 
of their troops' discipline under gas, the first test of their 
own success in providing for the instruction and drill of 
their units in gas defense. But while the casualties were 
considerable, the examination and analysis of all the re- 
ports showed that death and disablement resulted either 
from an occasional deliberate disobedience of explicit 
orders by individual soldiers who neglected to put their 



THE CHEMIN DES DAMES 83 

masks on when so directed, from a few who neglected 
precautions in order to work faster and better on signal 
wires or in runners' relays, or from accidental body burns 
against which there was practically no protection possible. 
And, hke many another mishap in war, this first enemy 
gas concentration, with its resultant casualties, taught to 
the still careless troops a stern, hard lesson of caution and 
obedience. 

With the events of Saint Patrick's Day ended the ex- 
periences of the Division in its first sector. The time had 
come for its relief. Originally, its stay on the Chemin des 
Dames was scheduled to terminate March 7; but now it 
was to move out, giving place to the Twenty-First Divi- 
sion (French). The additional ten days of sector work had 
been arranged, partly to satisfy the French (who wished 
the Division to make an even longer stay, for reasons of 
their own), and also for the sake of extending the expe- 
rience of the regimental commanders in the exercise of 
command over a regimental sector. But, in the opinion 
of the best qualified judges, the tour of instruction had 
lasted quite long enough. The troops had acquired expe- 
rience in combat; officers had absorbed all the instruction 
possible regarding the warfare of position; all ranks had 
taken part in patrols and work; had learned about infor- 
mation and signal duty, supply service, forms of reports, 
observation of the enemy, the methods of making a relief 
in the line, regulation of ammunition supply. Casualties 
had been suffered, prisoners made, attacks repulsed, raids 
made handsomely. Life in the front line was understood. 
Further, in the opinion of the regimental commanders, 
there existed a possible source of danger to the troops in 
deriving from their more experienced French associates a 
certain slackness regarding detail. The example of some of 
the seasoned old poilus was not always the best, good 
teachers though they were. There had arisen the specter 
of divided command, and consequent divided responsi- 



84 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

bility, which might develop into a situation fraught with 
peril, despite the unbroken good-will and friendship of 
the French and American officers "up front." And the 
men needed rest. They needed new clothing, shoes, addi- 
tional equipment. They were weary and dirty from weeks 
of fife in the broken-down, miry trenches and dank chalk- 
pits of their first sector.^ 

Casualties, strangely enough considering the lapse of 
time and steady, harassing fire, had been very few. Killed 
by hostile fire were one officer and nine enlisted men; dead 
by accident, two enlisted men; from disease, seven en- 
listed men. Some fifty-five had been wounded; some three 
hundred had been gassed (mainly during the attack of 
March 16-17). The sector had not relinquished its title as 
a quiet one — not yet, though another week was to see it 
turned into a hell indeed. Of the deaths from disease, be 
it noted, three occurred from cerebro-spinal meningitis, 
on March 5 and 6; there existed a few isolated cases of 
scarlet fever; scabies had a certain prevalence in some 
units; and so, while there was hardly enough contagious 
disease present in the command to give ground for any 

^ The letter of compliment from the French Corps Commander, the first to be 
received by the Division, conveyed under its official phrases a very real and per- 
sonal affectionate regard. Too much emphasis cannot be placed on the mutual 
cordiality and esteem which from the very beginning marked the relations of the 
Division's officers and men with their French associates. The letter follows: 

Eleventh Army Corps, Staff 
Headquarters, March 15, 191S 
No. 9114 B-1 
S.C. No. 4817 
General Orders No. 7 

We regret that our comrades of the Twenty-Sixth Division should leave us in 
order to fulfill their tasks elsewhere. 

We have been able to appreciate their bravery, their sense of duty and dis- 
cipline, also their frank comradeship; they carry away our unanimous regrets. 

General Edwards has been pleased to consider the Eleventh Corps as god- 
father to the Twenty-Sixth Division. The Eleventh Corps feels proud of the 
awarded honor, being sure that, wherever he may be sent, the godson shall do 
credit to the godfather. 

General de Maud'hfy 
Commanding Eleventh Army Corps 



THE CHEMIN DES DAjVIES 85 

apprehension of an epidemic, the fact had weight, cer- 
tainly, in deciding General Headquarters to order the re- 
lief of the Division on March 18. 

Within three daj^s after that date, therefore, in accord- 
ance with orders issued by the First Corps, under whose 
administrative command the Division operated, the re- 
Hef by units of a French division was completed, and the 
schooling of the Twenty-Sixth on the Chemin des Dames 
was over. 



CHAPTER VI 
ON THE MARCH 

NO change could have benefited the Division more 
than that which followed its withdrawal from the 
line. The inspectors of the First Corps and from General 
Headquarters, who had kept watch of the Division through 
its tour of duty, may have received an unfavorable im- 
pression of the men's physical condition, notwithstanding 
their uniformly excellent record as fighters. And so, if only 
for the purpose of effecting an improvement in the former 
respect, the four days' road march, directed by General 
Headquarters, to follow the relief of the Division from the 
Chemin des Dames, was an ideal arrangement. Since the 
movement was begun by a twenty-four hours' railroad 
journey (to Brienne-le-Chateau and Bar-sur-Aube), ex- 
perience in troop handling under varying conditions was 
afforded the General Staff sections at Division Head- 
quarters; an unequaled opportunity was given command- 
ing officers, from the Division Commander down, criti- 
cally to observe their men with respect to march disci- 
phne and condition. And if, as was generally understood, 
the Division during its march should engage in maneuver 
problems, there would be a chance for training and testing 
all officers in handling troops under conditions of open 
warfare. 

Entraining was carried on at Braisne, a town on the 
Vesle River just above its junction with the Aisne, at 
Mercin-Pommiers, and at Soissons. Nothing remained to 
tell the story of that blood-stained valley to the young 
troops; but one can fancy their interest had it been pos- 
sible to remind them of the fearful work between the Brit- 
ish and the Germans, which marked the passage of the 
sluggish, marshy Vesle by the former, in the aftermath of 



ON THE MARCH 87 

the First Battle of the Marne, in September, 1914. Per- 
haps there was needed no reminder of days past to tell our 
men that they were still in a battle area. 

The departure of the battalions was not without in- 
cident, for the enemy, perhaps advised of the American 
troop movement by its air service which operated in this 
region with little molestation, took the railway station 
and yards under long-range artillery fire, as also Soissons, 
which was subjected to severe concentrations during the 
time our men were moving away. No casualties resulted, 
but the loading and movement of the trains, especially at 
Soissons, was a little hampered. The conduct of the troops, 
under trying conditions, was admirable; and two officers. 
Major H. B. Estey, 101st Engineers, and Lieutenant E. G. 
Hopkins, 101st Ammunition Train, won the Croix de 
Guerre for coolness and courage under heavy fire, in res- 
cuing some French soldiers who had been imprisoned in a 
burning building. A couple of days later the Division was 
concentrated in the vicinity of its detraining points, and 
the march began. 

The days of the relief and the rail movement were heavy 
with interest. By night the horizon to the northeast was 
alight with the rosy glare of intense artillery fire, and in 
more ways than one even the man in the ranks was aware 
that events of more than slight importance were in progress 
not many miles away. But of their real magnitude he had 
no true conception; he was merely puzzled, intensely in- 
trigued by the fact that suddenly his own neighborhood, 
quiet for so long, had wakened to the sound of the guns. 
On the night of March 21 indeed, the infernal fire and 
thunder in the distant sky of Rheims and Champagne was 
storming with tenfold violence at Ypres, Messines, Arras, 
La Bassee, and on the Somme, until, at five in the morn- 
ing of the 21st — that fateful day when the enemy came 
close to forcing a final decision in his favor — Von Below, 
under cover of a heavy fog, unleashed an assault wave 



88 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

of thirty-seven divisions backed by uncounted artillery 
against the British in Picardy. More than one officer of the 
Division Staff, or organization commander, halted his 
motor-car as he sped through the silent night along the 
Chalons-Epernay road, to watch that northern sky, and 
to wonder what it might mean for him and for the lads 
of his command, rumbling along light-heartedly in their 
troop trains to Brienne. And his hope was that the Twenty- 
Sixth might soon come to grips with the invader, for not 
a lad of it but knew that he was better than the Prus- 
sian, man for man. 

Brienne-le-Chateau, with its famous old school on the 
hill, where Napoleon studied and dreamed; Bar-sur-Aube, 
most lovely of ancient towns, were for the Division naught 
but detraining points. One drew up alongside the broad 
stone quay, usually in the chilly darkness that just pre- 
cedes the dawn; one debarked sleepily the length of the 
long train, the sills of which were just level with the sur- 
face of the platform; one policed the "side-door Pull- 
mans " groping for lost articles of equipment in the scanty 
straw, tugged and lifted at the rolling kitchens, wagons, 
and other horse-drawn vehicles, till they were clear, slung 
equipment and rifle, wondered when the next meal would 
be forthcoming, and marched away in column up the road 
out of town under the weight of one's heavy pack. One 
heard excited tales of a train having been bombed by an 
aeroplane — wished to be in the platoon of each company 
designated to open on an air-raider with its rifles, if at- 
tacked en route — was glad that the weather was clear — 
enjoyed seeing not only the majors, but the brigade and 
regimental commanders, tramping along with a full kit, 
just like so many buck privates.^ Easterly, along smooth 
roads, through a smiling farm country of rolling plains 
and little, clean rivers, with patches of ancient woodland, 
with nowhere a sign of war and everywhere the signs 

^ Brigadier-General Peter E. Traub, commanding 51st Infantry Brigade, re- 
quired all officers to make the march afoot, and himself set the example. 



ON THE MARCH 89 

of tender spring, past sleepy little towns of venerable age 
— Doulevant-le-Chateau, Soulaines, Andelot, Vignory, 
Joinville-sur-Marne, making daily marches of no more 
than comfortable length, the column marched, with 
spirits ever rising as cramped muscles got stretched and 
the warm sun sent down its blessing. It was a good war, 
just then, grinned the cheerful soldiers. 

Faults of march discipline developed early, as was to be 
expected. There was some straggling by individual in- 
corrigibles. The duty of staying in ranks with one's pla- 
toon under all conditions — perhaps the duty hammered 
with most difficulty into all parts of the Expeditionary 
Force — had not yet been learned by the Division's men. 
Not till months later did they catch the idea. It seemed 
a small thing to slip away, just for an instant, as the col- 
umn passed through a village, to buy something to eat or 
drink, to say how-d'ye-do to the brown eyes that smiled 
from a doorway; it seemed very easy to catch up with the 
column at the next halt; it was hard to keep up when one's 
shoes hurt and the pack was sagging — one would be there 
when the fighting began all right, but this tramping along 
the road — nothing to it! So whispered the tempter to the 
young, still ignorant soldier. And hence a provost guard, 
quick of eye and firm of grip, was needed, to march at the 
tail of some battalions. Very difficult to check — that ten- 
dency to independent action of the American soldier, often 
valuable in an emergency, often disastrous to the coherence 
and strength of the unit. If it could be proved that it im- 
paired his value as a fighting man, it would be easier to sub- 
due the weakness; but that many a straggler on the march 
was quickest to get into action, and longest to stay when the 
columns deployed into line of skirmishers, was certainly the 
case. "A fighting man — yes," is the answer; "but there 
is a difference between a fighting man and a disciplined 
soldier; and it is the latter who is needed to win battles." 

All the incidents of the march were of the greatest value 



90 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

in point of training. Billeting methods; the dispatch of an 
officer and detachment in advance of the battalion to ap- 
portion quarters in the halting-place for the night; the 
arrival after dark, and consequent search for the desig- 
nated lofts and garrets, horse lines, wagon parks, head- 
quarters, oflBcers' messes, place for the kitchens; posting 
the guard; the departure in the frosty morning, with an 
officer left behind at the mairie to receive claims of the 
inhabitants for damages done by the troops (such remark- 
able claims!) — all these were new experiences; but they 
had become part of the daily routine in the life of each 
battalion before the march was over. And what work for 
the Division Staff, trying to remember, as it drafted the 
daily march orders under assumed conditions of war, all 
the wisdom of the Staff Manual regarding road spaces, 
traffic control, billeting spaces, location for railhead and 
distributing points! What a day was that when for hours 
the supply train was apparently lost for good, while the 
regimental supply officers and their details waited at the 
designated place, in vain, for their rations and forage! 

The Division Commander lived in his motor-car, tire- 
lessly, up and down the columns, a watchful eye out for 
every failing, for every point of improvement in the lads 
he had come to trust and love, for whose reputation he 
was so loyally jealous. The overloaded packs are hung 
too low; some of the men carry extra shoes, contrary to 
orders; overcoats are rolled and slung in accordance with 
individual fancy; slackers are stealing rides on the wagons 
and rolling kitchens; horses and mules are not packed uni- 
formly; too slow a march cadence is being maintained; 
columns are not always hugging the right side of the road; 
proper distance is not observed. And all these breaches 
of discipline or deficiencies of instruction, unit command- 
ers were directed by the Commanding General to remedy, 
*'by correcting derelictions on the spot." ^ 

1 Memorandum. Headquarters Twenty-Sixth Division, 25 March, 1918. 



ON THE MARCH 91 

OfBcers from the Corps and from General Headquarters, 
who were present during the march from day to day to 
note the Division's condition from all angles, appeared 
generally content. Not that the battalions were thoroughly 
disciplined yet — for that was not the case. There re- 
mained also the problem of instilling the spirit of personal 
responsibility. There was too much carelessness and waste 
in handling equipment and property. One saw, too, about 
this time, the beginning of the feeling, common to the 
majority of American combat units, that only officers 
and men on the ground could accurately estimate condi- 
tions and regulate conduct accordingly. The conviction 
never quite died out in the line organizations that the 
Staffs were lacking in good sense; while the Staffs, pre- 
paring plans with the utmost care and full knowledge of 
wider conditions — plans for the comfort as well as the 
efficiency of the troops — would bitterly complain (often 
with justice) that their plans came to naught, and the men 
consequently suffered through an organization command- 
er's habit of independent judgment. Not that any differ- 
ences existed, in the Twenty-Sixth Division at least, re- 
garding matters of importance. That was far from the case. 
In battle, and in times of stress, the cooperation of the 
Staff and the line was admirable. But there were differ- 
ences over minor matters. One recalls, for example, an 
order respecting reserve rations, which issued while the 
Division was in sector. The order required that the men 
should carry the prescribed reserve ration at all times with 
them in the pack — the idea being that, in case of an 
attack, or other circumstances that might result in iso- 
lating the soldier for a while, he would have some food 
with him, a surely thoughtful and provident idea. But it 
happened that the containers of the reserve ration were 
of material easily wet through and easily got at by the rats, 
or else were so bulky that they were exceedingly difficult 
to pack in any part of the equipment. Consequently, com- 



92 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

pany commanders believed they were complying with the 
order if they arranged to have reserve rations stored under 
guard in the kitchen or other central location, easily ac- 
cessible for all their men when needed. A procedure which 
utterly annulled the usefulness of the order — which was, 
as we have seen, the expression of an entirely sound mili- 
tary idea; and a deadlock resulted which took time to re- 
solve. Thus, again, on this march, the colonel or major, di- 
rected sharply to take measures to stop straggling, felt 
that his general in a moment of impatience had overlooked 
the fact that some of the laggard lads were reputed to be 
delayed gas cases ( ! ) just beginning to develop, or plain- 
tive sufferers from "trench feet"; he detailed his provost 
guard, as ordered, but in sorrow that so ruthless an order 
should issue from so enlightened a commander. Officers 
of the Corps or from General Headquarters, present with 
the Division, desirous of asserting a proper authority, zeal- 
ous to hasten the Division's efficiency, perhaps made 
caustic comments on what they believed was a lack of 
discipline should one of their impeccable plans miscarry; 
whereupon the Division tended, outraged that its excel- 
lence should be even lightly called in question, to request 
that actual conditions be ascertained before conclusions 
were drawn and comments made. At no time, probably, 
did any American Staff enjoy the authority of the French 
— perhaps did not deserve to; certainl}^ in the earlier 
stages of the development of the Twenty-Sixth and all 
other American divisions, the Staffs were made to demon- 
strate their practical efficiency before being accepted as 
either guides or managers. But it equally' is the case that, 
with time, fuller knowledge, and a more perfectly defined 
interdependence, the Staff and line, of the Twenty-Sixth, 
at least, came to work effectively together for the common 
good. 

Four or five days of marching through a countryside 
unscarred by war — a multitude of minor happenings. 



ON THE ]\LVRCH 93 

grave and gay, which all went to education — and the 
Division found itself between the Maine and Gondre- 
court, in a training area which touched the western bound- 
ary of that which they had inhabited all winter. The 
maneuver was abandoned. It had been planned to arrange 
an encounter action with the Forty-Second Division, the 
Twenty-Sixth opposing a resistance to an enemy approach- 
ing the line of the Marne. The march, indeed, with respect 
to its routes and daily distances, had been planned to 
effect the proper concentrations for this purpose; the in- 
telligence officers and the regimental commanders had 
gone forward to reconnoiter defensive positions and to 
gain information of the "enemy." But presently it ap- 
peared that other considerations than the benefits of a 
maneuver problem must prevail. The troops went into 
billets in villages roundabout Grand and Reynel, in which 
latter town Division Headquarters was established on 
March 26. All through the regiments slipped the rumor 
that they were in for a period of rest and refitting. Rest 
was the order of the day. But at more than one head- 
quarters it was felt that the leisure period was not to be 
for long. 

Two happenings which occurred upon arrival in the 
new area had their importance as being the first of a series. 
Toward the conclusion of the stay on the Chemin des 
Dames orders were received by each regimental and sep- 
arate battalion commander to select a number of officers 
and non-commissioned officers for return to the United 
States as instructors in the training-camps — men who 
had had the benefit of a course at Gondrecourt or some 
specialists' school, as "well as front-line experience, and 
who were otherwise qualified by good records and per- 
sonal character to carry weight with the new battalions 
forming at home. Did ever an order produce, in those 
called to obey it, more contradictory emotions .^^ Since one 
wishes to paint in full color the Hf e and soul of the Division, 



94 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

as representative of those first in France, it is worth while 
to pause, in the actual chronicle of events, to take note of 
this or that happening, rumor, belief, emotion even, which 
brightened or shaded some moment of the Division's ex- 
perience. So with this order to send men home. Fancy the 
state of mind of the unit commander. On the one hand, he 
had toiled for months to train and discipline his troops, 
and for this purpose he had leaned heavily on his lieu- 
tenants and sergeants working away with their platoons 
till each little group seemed dependent for its life and 
value, in large measure, on the personality of its energetic 
leader. And now the work of these invaluable assistants 
would have to be done all over again. For a moment it 
seemed as if one were directed to sacrifice a unit's strength 
almost in the presence of the enemy. Already, during the 
training period, good men had been lost. They had been 
taken to recruit the permanent officer personnel at schools, 
or headquarters, or services. The colonel saw his regi- 
ment's value seriously compromised, at a critical time, by 
this latest order, and he mourned bitterly. Then, on the 
other hand, perhaps he perceived that, after all, the greater 
interest must always prevail; perhaps he learned that les- 
son of sacrifice of self which every commander has borne 
in upon him sooner or later. Doubtless, too, in spite of the 
loss to his command, he was glad of an opportunity to 
reward the good services of some officer or sergeant by 
the gift of a journey home, where promotion was prom- 
ised. At any rate, here was an order; and it must be carried 
out. And so during the last week of march, the draft of 
home-going officers and section leaders was completed, 
and the Division, for the moment, felt so much the poorer. 
But the remedy for the hurt was alread^^ at hand. 
Hardly had the trucks rumbled away with the homeward- 
bound before there arrived a large contingent of replace- 
ment officers. From many sources they were derived — 
training-camps in the United States, schools in France. 



ON THE MARCH 95 

Of various antecedents, they ranged from grizzled former 
non-commissioned oflScers of the old Regular Army to 
spirited young college lads of only three months' training, 
but quick intelligence and high ideals; from those who 
sought to avoid the unpleasantness of being drafted as 
privates by obtaining a heutenant's commission via the 
quick route of a training-camp, to those who had volun- 
teered for service from motives of purest patriotism. 
Welcome, indeed, they were to prove in the weeks that 
followed. Happy would the Division have been had the 
replacement system ever been able, later, to furnish it with 
drafts as promptly as on this first occasion. 



I 



CIIArXER VII 
THE LA REINE (BOUCQ) SECTOR 

F all droains aiv notoriously unsubstantial, the soKlior's 
dream of rest, when in the tiold, is loss than gossanuT. 
Forty-eight hours after ai'rivaJ in the Rimancourt training- 
area, upon the conelusion of its five days' niareh, the 
Twenty-Sixth ^Yas on its way to more duty on the firing- 
line. 

Properly to understand tJiis abrupt change of })lan, it 
will be advantageous to siu-vey sunnnarily the general 
situation on the Western 1^-ont during the last week of 
March. AVhile the Twenty-Sixth was quietly proceeding 
to its training-area, tlie long-anticipated storm had broken 
in all its concentrated fury. The enemy was dealing blows 
as from a battering-ram against tJie lines in Fieardy. On 
March 21, while feints in the vicinity of Arras, Yin-es, 
and Rheims had the etTect of pinning the Allied troops in 
those regions in their places, he attacked at dawn, on a 
fifty-mile front, from Croisilles to Ventleuil, between the 
rivers Scarpe and Oise, along the line of the British Third 
and Fifth Armies. And by noon of that desjierate day he 
had penetrated to the second and third line of defense in 
more than one locality.^ Shrewdly taking advantage of 
ideal weather conditions to effect a complete surprise — 
for a heavy two days' fog masked his concentration and 
approach and rendered impotent the British observation 
and long-range artillery fire — he poured in divisions in 
prodigal strength, each hour and day widening the walls 
of the initial salients and driving deeper. Hopelessly out- 

^ German forces engaged in the initial stages of the great attack were the 
X^ II Army (^"on Helow). of five corps or twenty-three divisions; II Army (\ on 
der Marwilz). of identical strength; X\'lli Army (A'on Ilutier), of four corps. A 
part of the MI -Vrmy (\'ou Boehu) was also engaged. 



THE LA REINE (BOUCQ) SECTOR 97 

numbered, surprised, with prepared defenses only in the 
two forward zones, the British were driven in at vital 
points. The gallant resistance of isolated units could avail 
nothing against the relentless pressure, the furious as- 
saults, and the brilhantly employed new tactics of the 
Germans, led by some of the greatest field commanders 
of the war.^ Conceived by the genius of Von Ludendorff, 
taught sedulously on the quiescent Russian front in 1917, 
the new tactics had been used for the first time to assist 
in accomplishing the disastrous defeat of the Italians in 
October of that year, between Caporetto and the Piave. 
Dependent for their success upon high training and per- 
fect coordination between all infantry utilities and the 
artillery, Ludendorff's methods of attack, afterwards 
named "infiltration," required the use of very superior 
troops. And these he had. Two days of sustained attacks, 
though Von Below was a little behind his schedule, had ac- 
complished for the enemy a resounding success. He had 
driven a broad wedge between the two British armies to 
a depth of nine miles; his opponents were in disorderly 
retirement; he claimed to have captured 400 guns and 
25,000 prisoners. As if to announce his victory he opened 
fire that day on Paris, from a distance of nearly seventy 
miles, with the battery of 8.4-inch guns, afterwards chris- 
tened derisively "Big Berthas." Vainly did two French 
divisions of infantry and one of cavalry, hastily summoned 
to stiffen the British, strive to stem the onward rush. The 
next day the Germans forced the crossings of the Somme, 
the British Third Army falling back in confusion; on the 
25th the line of the river south of Peronne was taken; 
Noyon and Nesle were captured ; by evening the Germans 
appeared to have every prospect of separating not only 

1 Some evidence of the weight of the attack may be gathered from the fact 
that in the initial wave of assault alone there were employed no less than thirty- 
seven divisions. In all, on March 21, some sixty-four German divisions took 
part in the battle, a number exceeding the total number of British divisions in 
France on that date. 



98 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

the two British armies, but also of effecting a breach be- 
tween the British and the French, in the vicinity of Roye. 
It was a time of the gravest peril to the Allied arms. If the 
Germans could capture Montdidier, with its vital railway 
and road center, they could probably prevent, or certainly 
hinder, the advance of the French reserves from the south; 
and to this purpose the enemy bent his greatest efforts. 
On this day Marshal Foch was appointed to the supreme 
command. On this day, also, American engineers employed 
in railroad construction were gathered up as part of a 
scratch force to help block the road to Amiens — the sole 
available reserves in the region, and they fought man- 
fully.^ The next few hours brought no reassurance. Still 
wider grew the gap between the two British armies; and 
the enemy showed great skill in finding lesser gaps in the 
line, of which he took full advantage. Time and again 
British rear-guard detachments had to fight their way 
through German parties who, slipping through every 
opening, were in their rear before they knew it. Lassigny 
fell to Von Hutier; on March 28 the Germans were in 
position for a direct attack on all-important Amiens and 
the heights of the Avre, possession of which would go far 
toward a complete realization of the general strategic 
plan. Could he cut the Paris-Amiens line, either at Mont- 
didier, or better still by obtaining possession of Amiens 
itself, whose heights dominated all rail connections be- 
tween the French and British, Von Hutier could hold the 
Allies apart and beat the reeling British in detail. Time 
was the important element. He must make good his initial 
gains without delay or his diflSculties would increase every 
hour as the troop trains brought the French nearer. But 
on March 28, a week after the opening of the gigantic 
struggle, the German captains seemed very Hke to realize 
their fondest hopes. 

^ A battalion of United States Engineers were also engaged on March 28, on 
the Avre. 



THE LA REINE (BOUCQ) SECTOR 99 

To meet this imminent peril Marshal Foch was collect- 
ing troops from every source as a "mass of maneuver" — 
available for use in any part of the battle-field. The First 
Division (U.S.) was summoned to the active battle front 
from the sector it had been occupying. And that is why the 
Twenty-Sixth did not enjoy its hoped-for rest, but went 
straight back to work, as its brothers of the First were 
hurried to a task which was to prove stern indeed. Its 
friends of the Forty-Second Division, at this same time, 
were placed in the Baccarat Sector, northeast of Nancy, 
relieving a French division for duty in the west.^ 

The part of the line which the Division was about to 
enter was an interesting one. At the risk of again diverg- 
ing momentarily from the chronicle of events, it may be 
well to consider the principal characteristics of the terrain, 
and the main points in the history of the contest which 
had left the enemy in possession of the so-called Saint- 
IVIihiel salient. For it was on the southeasterly face of this 
famous triangle that the Twenty-Sixth was posted at this 
time. 

Like all salients this was the relic of an unsuccessful 
offensive. In 1914, at the time of the general German ad- 
vance which was checked definitely at the First Battle of 
the Marne, the plan of the invaders had included an en- 
veloping movement by way of the Heights of the Meuse. 
Following an advance across the plain of the Woevre, 
between Pont-a-Mousson and Verdun, it was intended 
to pierce the line of the Toul- Verdun barrier forts which 
covered the Meuse line on the east, and effect a junction 

^ The communiques of the Commander-in-Chief to the War Department on 
these movements read: 

"March 27, 1918. Twenty-Sixth and Forty-Second divisions, which have just 
completed a month's torn- at the front, are being returned to the trenches to as- 
sist in present emergency. . . . This puts all four combat divisions now here in 
the line." 

"March 28, 1918. Have made all our resources available and our divisions will 
be used if and when needed. Twenty-Sixth and Forty-Second are to relieve 
French divisions in Lorraine." 



100 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

with the forces (under the Imperial Crown Prince) oper- 
ating in the vicinity of Vienne, Varennes, and Sainte- 
Menehoiild. But the movement was not pressed to its con- 
chision. The eastern crests of the Heights of the JNIense 
about Combres, Les Eparges, Hattonchatel, and the Gap 
of Spada were secured; a murderous thrust was made at 
Fort Troyon, midway of the Toul- Verdun Hne, but was 
not followed up. By occupying Camp des Romains, a 
strong bridgehead was created at Saint-Mihiel on the 
Meuse, and thence the German line stretched away north- 
easterly, past the forest land of Apremont, and along the 
valley of the Rupt de INIad, to a point on the Moselle north 
of Pont-a-Mousson. Deficient in interior communications, 
the salient still served a useful purpose offensively, by 
erecting a perpetual threat to Verdun in reverse and 
greatly hampering communication to that fortress and 
entrenched camp (by securing the Meuse, the Meuse canal, 
and the Saint-Mihiel- Verdun railway). It also threat- 
ened Toul and hence the whole right of the Allied line. 
Defensively the salient was of value to the Germans, in 
that it assisted in covering Metz, the Briey iron mines, 
and the important Montmedy-INIezieres line of rail 
communications. 

Some effort was made by the French to reduce the 
salient in the spring of 1915. Just prior to the Artois 
offensive, they attacked under appalling conditions of 
weather and terrain, at the heights of Les Eparges and 
Combres. After terrible losses success was attained; the 
salient was threatened at its western hinge. And other at- 
tacks, launched at Flirey and Bois-le-Pretre, had for their 
object to loosen the enemy's hold on the eastern angle. 
But, only locally successful, these attempts were, after 
all, little more than episodes in the prevailing war of attri- 
tion. A kind of stalemate followed them. Neither side at- 
tempted anything more serious than local raids for months 
previous to the entrance of the Americans on the scene, 



THE LA REINE (BOUCQ) SECTOR 101 

which occurred early in 1918.^ One of those tacit truces 
had prevailed — a strange but no uncommon happening 
along the front, at different times and places. Troops in 
need of a rest or refitting were sent in by both sides as 
garrisons of the sahent; the defenses were not well kept 
up; a considerable proportion of the artillery was com- 
posed of "pieces of position" — guns of old or obsoles- 
cent pattern, not suitable for use in sectors where heavy 
fighting was to be expected. 

The general character of the sector taken over by the 
Twenty-Sixth was in marked contrast with that of the 
Chemin des Dames. Its principal tactical feature was an 
east-west ridge, with gentle slopes toward the valley of the 
little Rupt de Mad, extending from Apremont, at the foot 
of the Heights of the Meuse, to the vicinity of FKrey. 
Along this ridge ran an important lateral highway. The 
front fine was pivoted on the villages of Xi\Tay-Marvoisin 
and Seicheprey, and on Remieres Wood, from which latter 
point the line was refused, to connect with the French 
lines in Jury Wood. On the ridge lay the villages of Ram- 
bucourt and Beaumont, both of which were connected 
by an excellent road system to the rear. On the extreme 
left, about Apremont, the fine ran over high ground in the 
rough and ragged Bois Brule (Burned Wood), but, gen- 
erally speaking, the sector extended over gently rolling 
grassland, swampy in the broad hollows, with occasional 
large ponds — features common to all the Woe\'Te plain. 
A deep ravine and a quarry, in front of Beaumont, were 
of tactical importance in organizing the defense of the 
principal line of resistance. The enemy positions lay gen- 
erally along the farther (north) bank of the Rupt de Mad, 
through the ^^llages of Richecourt, Lahayville, and Saint- 
Baussant. Extensive forest tracts, such as Sonnard Wood, 

^ The Second Division occupied a sector near Spada, on the western side of the 
salient, as the First Division had taken over the sector (front of one brigade) on 
the southeast side, which the Twenty-Sixth was to occupy later. 



v^ 



102 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

Nonsard Wood, Creue Wood, and Mort Mare Wood, af- 
forded well-concealed artillery positions and facilities for 
concentration of troops, secure from observation. The iso- 
lated hill of Mont Sec, standing midway of the German 
lines, and elevated high above the plain, gave unequaled 
facility for extended observation over all the American 
sector. Interior communications, with Thiaucourt and 
Vigneulles as centers, had been improved by the con- 
struction of several hght railway Hues. The tactical ad- 
vantage lay with the enemy. Our own lines formed a num- 
ber of awkward salients, difficult of defense; the front was 
entered by several shallow ravines which could afford 
cover to an attacking force, while, as has been said, he had 
every advantage of observation. The trenches taken over 
by the Twenty-Sixth were in a very poor condition of re- 
paii:; shelters were in no wise shell-proof; and the marshy 
character of the ground made trench drainage very diffi- 
cult, notwithstanding the efforts of the First Division to 
effect some improvement. A new railhead, munition de- 
pots, and a road through the La Reine Forest, were under 
construction. 

The entire length of the front taken over by the Twenty- 
Sixth was not less than 18,000 meters. The infantry re- 
lieved not only the single brigade which the First Division 
had in the line, but also a French division and regiment 
of infantry. Its artillery took over some "batteries of 
position," in addition to all the divisional artillery work of 
both the French and Americans there before the Twenty- 
Sixth arrived. For the first time an entire American divi- 
sion was entrusted with a divisional sector, for the Twenty- 
Sixth entered the La Reine Sector functioning in all its 
branches complete. 

The relief of the First and the French division began on 
March 28. The Secretary of War, the Honorable Newton 
D. Baker, had paid a flying visit to the Division, followed 
by a legislative commission from Massachusetts, charged 



THE LA REINE (BOUCQ) SECTOR 103 

with the duty of establishing a club-room and information 
office for troops from that State in Paris. ^ Hardly had the 
visitors departed before the movement began, as orders, 
counter-orders, and yet further sets of instructions, both 
written and verbal, poured in on Division Headquarters 
from the French Headquarters directing the operation. 

In later days the custom was established of having the 
Staff of the unit in sector prepare the orders and all de- 
tailed arrangements for the relief, after conference between 
the two commanders concerned. Higher authority simply 
ordered the relief to be made on a certain day, told the out- 
going unit where it should proceed and how, and left the 
rest to the two units involved. An attempt was made to 
follow this method now; but the First Division's orders 
were not received until after the Twenty-Sixth had started 
its movement, in compliance with directions from the 
French Corps, which exercised supreme control. What 
followed was not an uncommon experience in the early 
days. When staff work was still to be perfected, when 
everybody was anxious to do the correct thing, yet a bit 
in doubt as to how to set about it; when the French po- 
litely prodded, and commanding generals worried; when 
lesser commanders felt that they only knew what could 
and should be done; when everybody felt that somebody 
higher up was taking notes — though possessing not a 
whit more practical experience — of course there was 
misunderstanding. 

The artillery moved over the roads; the infantry was 
taken in French trucks to points just in rear of the sector. 
And it was not easy. The Division passed from the com- 
mand of the First Corps (U.S.) to that of the French 
Thirty-Second corps d'armee, and this made for confusion. 
At Toul, Menil-la-Tour, or Royaumeix, where regimental 

^ Headed by the Honorable Louis Frothingham and Dr. Morton Prince, of 
Boston, this commission performed an admirable task in its Massachusetts club- 
room enterprise, through which agency the troops from that State were kept in 
close touch with home interests, and their welfare looked after most effectively. 



104 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

commanders stopped on their wanderings toward the 
front to obtain instructions or orders, they were baffled by 
a flood of contradictions. The Division Staff had estab- 
Hshed an advanced echelon in Toul, to facihtate and ex- 
pedite the movement of the troops; but this office, promptly 
reduced to bewilderment by delays in the receipt of orders 
and by the swift changes of plan directed by higher au- 
tliority, accomplished very little. Guides did not know 
the way. The sole clue which one infantry regimental com- 
mander received as to the destination of his unit was ob- 
tained from the French subaltern in charge of a section of 
the truck train — and the latter knew no more than the 
place where the regiment was to disembark from the ca- 
mions. Another infantry regiment actually completed its 
rehef and took position on the line, without having re- 
ceived a definite order at all. Without appreciation of the 
great discomfort sure to follow, one order, issued by the 
operations officer detailed from the First Corps to assist 
in the movement, prescribed that each company's rolling 
kitchens should be towed behind a truck en route. Of course, 
as should have been foreseen, many of the kitchens, racked 
and wrenched by the rough journey, were badly damaged; 
and some, with frozen axles, had to be abandoned alto- 
gether. The net result was that manj^ units had to impro- 
vise what cooking arrangements they could, for days. The 
whole tissue of misunderstandings and cross-purposes 
vividly illustrates the necessity for trained staffs, in all 
units from the army corps to the platoon. The Division 
incurred some criticism on account of the mistakes of this 
movement; and so did the Headquarters of the First Di- 
vision, for the same reason. \^^iile responsibility rested 
mainly on the outgoing division, both felt that the French 
Headquarters was principally to blame. The reports of 
the inspectors supervising the movement were afterwards 
reproduced in a memorandum published at the Staff Col- 
lege, with purpose to illustrate, by the mistakes of both 



THE LA REINE (BOUCQ) SECTORi ).05 

the First and Twenty-Sixth, some of the "things not to 
do" in a rehef movement. It is doubtless true that much 
was learned of great value from this practical, hard ex- 
perience; but the hardships which some of the troops were 
called upon to undergo, without sufiScient reason, gave 
point to the adage that experience keeps a dear school. 

Command of the sector passed to General Edwards on 
April 3, and Headquarters was opened at Boucq. Infantry 
on the line, from left to right, were: 104th in the Bois Brule 
sub-sector; 101st in and about Xivray and Rambucourt; 
102d in Seicheprey and Remieres Wood, with Headquar- 
ters at Beaumont. On our left was a regiment of the 10th 
Colonial Division (French); on the right, in Jury Wood, 
was the 162d Regiment, the Division's old friends of the 
Neuf chateau area. The artillery was disposed in two group- 
ings, east and west, the machine guns were disposed in 
a similar manner, each brigade's battalion being closely 
united with its own infantry. It was just prior to this time 
that a change had been made in the divisional machine- 
gun organization, two companies having been taken from 
the divisional battalion (101st) and added one to each of 
the brigade battalions (102d, 103d). The engineers were 
distributed at once through the area for work on accessory 
defenses; the signal battalion, in addition to detailing a 
platoon to each infantry regiment, began work immedi- 
ately in simphfying and extending the existing telephone 
system. One infantry regiment (103d) was retained in 
reserve. The railhead and rear echelon of Division Head- 
quarters were in Menil-la-Tour. It has been already noted 
that the Division became one of the units of the Thirty- 
Second corps d'armee, at the time under the command of 
General Passaga. 

One after another the platoons moved up to the front 
and support positions, and took over the trench stores, 
munition depots, and miscellaneous front-line property — 
along with the duties of the sector. Two inheritances from 



106 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

the First Division were unexpected. The first was a large 
quantity of equipment and other property, in good con- 
dition, which departing units had left behind. The second 
odd legacy was a group of twenty American prisoners, 
convicted of various offenses in summary and special 
courts, who were working out their sentences by laboring 
at the upkeep of the Seicheprey trenches. In a wretched 
state they were. Their service records and trial papers 
were missing; no provision had been made for their cus- 
tody, transfer, or other care; they lacked clothing and 
other suitable equipment. A curious addition to the 
strength of the Division — most informallj^ adopted like 
so many foundlings — these fellows ultimately became 
soldiers of the Twenty-Sixth in good standing, in a rather 
singular fashion, as will be seen. 

This was a livelier front than the Chemin des Dames. 
Officially designated "quiet," it was very far from deserv- 
ing that name in actual experience, as even the hardy First 
Division was eager" to testify. From the very outset all 
ranks were impressed with two absolute necessities — that 
of keeping under cover during daylight, and of observing 
extreme care in the matter of communications, lest in- 
formation should get to the enemy, who proved, as was 
told by the outgoing division, to be both alert and aggres- 
sive. From his watch-towers on Mont Sec, as from his 
drachcfi balloons, he kept a vigilant eye on every corner 
of the forward area. And it needed but a hint from his ob- 
servers to his "sniping batteries," hidden in the dells of 
Sonnard Wood, to bring a shower of shells on this or that 
most insignificant target. The half-hearted attentions of 
the enemy artillery on the Chemin des Dames had scarcely 
prepared the troops for this activity. It was a fact that, 
for days at a time, a motor-car, a group of three or four 
soldiers in the open, a thread of smoke from a kitchen, for 
instance, was nearly sure to draw fire from the "seventy- 
sevens," or, from what was especially dreaded, the so- 






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THE LA REINE (BOUCQ) SECTOR 107 

called "Austrian eighty-eights," a gun of uncanny pre- 
cision and very high velocity. Harassing fire was of daily 
occurrence. Out of a clear sky there would drop on a 
cross-roads, a battery position, a regimental headquar- 
ters in some village, a volley of thunderbolts — just enough 
to make Hfe in that place somewhat of a problem. Occu- 
pants of the trenches received continual attention from 
snipers and machine guns. It was hazardous, indeed, to be 
abroad "up front" at any hour between daybreak and 
dusk. The casualties suffered by the infantry on the very 
first day the Division was in the sector went far to prove 
that. And by night there were frequent concentrations 
of gas or high-explosive, directed especially on Mandres, 
Rambucourt, and Beaumont. At all times our men were 
made aware that the war was still going on. 

As they learned caution so they learned secrecy. From 
the First Division, and also from French sources, there 
were passed along amazing tales of the enemy's skill in 
picking up information of our movements, positions, and 
activities of all descriptions. Nor was the Division long 
in confirming the truth of these assertions. Let the relief 
of a battalion be ordered for a certain night, and almost 
surely, no matter with what precautions the movement 
was covered, the roads over which the troops must pass 
were shelled with unusual persistency. Let a wagon or 
ammunition train section form the habit of passing over a 
given cross-road at a certain hour of the night, and in- 
variably it would have to drive for its life. Let it be whis- 
pered over the telephone that an important officer was 
going "up front" on inspection, and the chances were more 
than even that his car would have to run a gantlet of 
"seventy-sevens" either at the north exit of Mandres or 
near Bouconville. 

To neutralize this danger practically all communica- 
tions between units or headquarters were in code. Numer- 
ical designations, those of commanding officers, and geo- 



IDS NEW ENGIAM) IN FRANCE 

i;ni]>liioal nninos, wore all oxchanjrod for arhilniry codo 
ilosii;iialit>ns. iuHiuoully alliMH^l. Aiul t"i>r llio windless ap- 
paraliis. Tor rcpiM-ls ol' casualties, ami tMuor^rncy, special 
cculos of both plirasos aiul idler ri)ml)inalii>iis ucn^ 
adopUnl. (ural otVorts wore made, also, to diseoiirage llie 
natural Aiuerieau leiuleuey io employ the telej)lioiie for 
all purposes of iiuick couunuiiieatitMi. not only l\>r tlu* sake 
(.>f wonliuj;" oilleers to llu* use of otluM* nutans, but to ob- 
viate llu" danger that the eueni,\- \vt>uKl ta]) a line and 
listtMi. IneriMsin^ th'piMidiMUH^ N\as i)laeed on relays of 
runners, ami bieyclo or molor-cyele couriers, for the (|uick 
couNcyance of mossai::t\s; freciuent use was maile also of 
the T.P.S. (earth telegraphy) apparatus, for brief com- 
nunui'alions up to about one thousand yards. 

As to NN hether tlua-i* wen* disloyal ci\ilians in the sector, 
some (K>nbt remains. Hut strain;'!^ things did hapi)en. It is 
certain that, mon^ than once, lights which Hashed a dot- 
dash signal toward the cMicmy wtM-c delected; and other 
tMVorls to send information to the (lernians by one or 
another of the wretched civilians, who were allowed by the 
Freni'h lo dray; i>ut a tln^idful (^xisliMici^ in such villai,'es 
as Ansauville, JMandrcs, or Uaulecourt. were susi)ectetl. 
The ilisappearancc of several of these into permanent 
French custody apparently conlirmcd the suspicions con- 
cerning' them. In any cast> it is doubtl(\ss the fact that 
there was a certain lcaka,i;e. The (uMMuau lines and the 
(icrman frontier were both very near; llu^ (lerman in- 
telligence service was wt>ll ma unci! ; anil the local com- 
manders made use of their inlV>rmation to excellent ad- 
vantaice. It is ]>robably true, also, that the loose-ton^uctl 
babble prevaleiU at many Amerii'an centers, as far back 
as the base j)orts, <h>l'yini;' ctMisorship and heedless of 
orders, facilitated the enemy's desire for knowledge re- 
specting American identities .ind plans, not only at this 
time, but later. 

But only a few ilays after the Twcnty-Si.xtli arrived 



THE LA REINE (BOUCQ) SECTOR 109 

in the La Reine (Boucq) Sector, the enemy attempted one 
of the accepted and often most satisfactory means both 
of discovering' tiie newcomers' names, and of testing their 
quahly as fighting men. 



y 



CHAPTER VIII 

THE FIGHTS AT BOIS BRULfi AND SEICHEPREY 

IT will be remembered that the left of the La Reine 
(Boueq) Sector, as the Division took it over, was lo- 
cated in the vicinity of the village and important highway 
junction of Apremont. Directly to the north and west of 
the tiny town rose abruptly the wooded scarp of the 
Heights of the Meuse, the tableland between the Woevre 
plain and the Meuse valley; and here, in a stretch of shat- 
tered forest, called Bois Brule (Burned Wood), were the 
trench lines held by the western Massachusetts troops 
(104th Infantry). Linked to the Americans on the left 
were units of a French Colonial division — the Tenth — 
commanded by General Marchand of Fashoda fame, whom 
the Twenty-Sixth was to have again for neighbors in the 
bitter fighting before Verdun, some seven months later. 
The position was difficult to organize and defend". The 
forward lines were composed of short sections of trench 
organized as resistance centers by small groups with the 
support of automatics or machine guns — outposts, so to 
call them. Their mission was to delay any attack by resist- 
ance to the last. They were to expect no reinforcements 
from the principal line of resistance; and their task was 
rendered more difficult by the fact that the regiment's 
sub-sector formed a narrow salient, very open to attack; 
the outpost positions were confused with a tangle of aban- 
doned trenches, saps, and hoyaux, some of which led in the 
direction of the enemy; the whole imperfectly wired. The 
Mangers of this little salient were pointed out to General 
Edwards by the Corps Commander, immediately upon 
the arrival of the Division in the sector. The French Divis- 
ion Commander had said it was a place where the Germans 



BOIS BRULE AND SEICHEPREY ill 

could come and take prisoners almost at will — an enter- 
prise he had carried out on several occasions. Plans were 
immediately made, therefore, to change the disposition of 
the outposts and to construct improved defensive lines; 
but hardly had this work been commenced, before the 
Germans undertook to repeat on the Americans the treat- 
ment which had proved so profitable when applied to the 
French. 

Command of the sector passed, as has been seen, on 
April 3. From April 5 to 8 a heavy artillery fire was di- 
rected on the junction of the French and American lines 
in Bois Brule. Early in the morning of the 10th this fire 
increased in intensity, taking on the character of a regular 
"preparation," as the formidable minenwerfer commenced 
hurling their huge projectiles into our forward trenches; 
and presently, in the gray of the dawn, the German in- 
fantry appeared on the front of the left battalion (III) of 
the 104th Infantry, which was posted on a hill crest, on 
the left side of the local salient, at the same time attacking 
the adjoining sub-sector held by the French. But the waves 
of assault were checked almost at once. At the first hint 
that the enemy infantry were coming over — a hint given 
by the changed character of the supporting artillery fire, 
our own guns, ^ without waiting for the infantry's signal, 
dropped a barrage across the threatened front, which 
broke up effectually the leading lines of the German assail- 
ants. But their supports were close behind, nor did they 
lack determination. In little groups, widely spaced, they 
pushed forward their advance across the narrow waste of 
No Man's Land, and not till the Americans had laid down 
a heavy protective fire from. hand grenades did the enemy 
falter and fall back through the curtain of shells our artil- 
lery placed behind them. Instead of making prisoners the 
Germans left some of their own men in our hands, wounded, 
and collected by our stretcher-bearers as the fight dwin- 
1 Il/lOlst F.A.; "F" Battery, 103d F.A. 



112 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

died and died down. And very useful some of these fel- 
lows were to prove, for not only did they reveal what en- 
emy troops were opposite the American lines/ but also 
they told that a renewal of the attack was intended for the 
following day. 

As it happened, however, there was given the Americans 
an opportunity to catch their breath and to effect some 
reorganization. On the 11th there occurred no activity 
on the enemy's part, save a very heavy and sustained ar- 
tillery bombardment, over the same Bois Brule area. 
Severe though it was, this fire was not sufficient to inter- 
fere with the relief, that same night, of the battalion which 
had fought on the 10th, by another battalion of the same 
regiment (11/ 104th Infantry), the remaining battalion 
retaining its position on the right of the regimental sub- 
sector. Damage was done to the wire communications by 
the enemy bombardment, but no more than could be re- 
paired by the indefatigable signalmen, whose work at 
this time, as always under fire, was very admirable. 

Not till the next day was the attack resumed. But this 
time it quickly became apparent that the affair was to 
be far more serious than the raid of the 10th. At day- 
break the enemy attacked, behind a dense barrage, at two 
places simultaneously. One party drove at the right of the 
104th's line; the other was directed, as before, against the 
hillside where our line joined up with that of the French. 
In squad columns and small combat groups, little deterred 
by the heavy fire which was rained on them, the gray in- 
fantry came on with the utmost steadiness. There was 
weight behind the attack; the gaps in the lines were 
quickly filled; and, under cover of a splendid artillery sup- 
port, it was not long before a few groups had effected a 
lodgment in portions of our advanced trenches, while the 
main force of the attack swung against the French. 

1 Detachments of the 25th, 36th, and 65th Regiments, brought into the sector 
for the express purpose of this attack. 



BOIS BRULfi AND SEICHEPREY 113 

Over on the right the JSght became a series of encounters 
between isolated groups and even individuals. It was only 
on the left that, early in the action, the situation gave any 
cause for concern. For a brief space the French gave way. 
Finding their advanced posts untenable under the intense 
minenwerfer fire, and hard-pressed by the German infan- 
try, they withdrew from certain forward positions of doubt- 
ful value, which the enemy promptly occupied. Our left 
flank became exposed; a counter-attack was called for, and 
the response by the 104th was immediate. With the bayo- 
net our men advanced steadily, though suffering consider- 
ably by the exceedingly well-placed enemy artillery fire, 
and pushed their attack home. Stubbornly the Germans 
resisted ; but, after a period of bitter, hand-to-hand fight- 
ing, they presently were driven out with heavy loss, and 
the situation on the French front quite restored. 

In two other places, shortly after noon, the enemy 
pushed into our forward positions. So numerous were the 
forces engaged and so sustained his attack that it was 
thought he might be intending a break through our lines, 
to the commanding heights in the rear. But, more prob- 
ably, they were correct in their estimation who saw in the 
Bois Brule affair merely a strong demonstration, the in- 
tention of which might have been to assist in pinning the 
local forces to their present ground and to prevent the 
dispatch of further forces from the Lorraine front to 
Flanders — where, in the second phase of the mighty Ger- 
man offensive, LudendorfiF's forces under Von Quast and 
Sixt Von Arnim were sending the British reeling back from 
Messines, Estaires, and Neuve-Chapelle. It was on April 11, 
be it remembered, that Sir Douglas Haig's order of the 
day contained the solemn warning, "With backs to the 
wall, and believing in the justice of our cause, each one 
of us must fight to the end. The safety of our homes, and 
the freedom of mankind, depend alike upon the conduct 
of each one of us at this critical moment." With sue- 



114 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

cess almost within his grasp, the German Commander-in- 
Chief must prevent at all hazards the arrival of any rein- 
forcements for his hard-pressed British adversary. It is 
probable that this local Bois Brule attack had little other 
purpose. But it gives a certain relief to even the compara- 
tively unimportant fight in the woods above Apremont, 
when one considers it not as an isolated raid, but as in- 
timately linked, even across leagues of distance, with the 
struggle of giants on the Flanders plains and marshes. 

And the fight was of real importance to the Twenty- 
Sixth, for considerable forces were engaged; incidents oc- 
curred which took the stoutest sort of fighting to turn to 
advantage, along with good leadership and quick thinking; 
and it sealed our alliance with the French forever. 

On the afternoon of April 12 reinforcements were sent 
in to assist the 2d Battalion and the Machine-Gun Com- 
pany, 104th Infantry, which had borne the weight of the 
fighting all day. These included 3d Battahon, 103d In- 
fantry, and Company "C," 103d Machine-Gun Battalion; 
nor was it any time at all before they were also engaged, 
and hotly. All through the afternoon and evening of the 
12th the struggle continued — the Germans holding stub- 
bornly to the sections of trench they had entered, only to 
be fiercely assailed by the Americans, who, in turn, would 
be checked by well-placed hostile artillery fire. It was 
a fight of sections and platoons, in a tangle of broken 
trenches, twisted wire, and thick underbrush, where or- 
ganized control was difficult and unified direction impossi- 
ble, where individual grit and fighting ability counted for 
everything. And in this rough-and-tumble work the Ger- 
mans were outclassed from the start by the hard-bitten, 
tough young giants from the West, who fought as joyously 
with their fists as with grenade or bayonet. The sole pris- 
oner to be taken by the Germans was a corporal, who, 
covering the withdrawal of his squad from a section of 
trench in accordance with orders, was cut off by staying 



BOIS BRULE AND SEICHEPREY 115 

too long in the face of the advancing enemy, fighting 
single-handed. By these methods was the situation re- 
stored. The enemy was pushed out of the first-hne posi- 
tions he had entered, less by the sweep of a counter-attack 
organized in accordance with the manuals than by fierce, 
impetuous hammer-blows dehvered by Httle groups of 
fighting men, led by subalterns and sergeants, all eager 
to come to grips with their foe. On the night of the 12th 
a renewed attempt to enter the lines of these Massachu- 
setts troops was made; but this, less resolutely pushed 
than its predecessors, was promptly smothered, while a 
final local counter-attack, by Company "G," 104th In- 
fantry, early the following morning, drove out any small 
remnants which had clung to their places through the 
night hours. 

The fighting spirit was there! That was what the 
Apremont-Bois Brule affair proved anew, with respect to 
the Twenty-Sixth Division. For the single prisoner lost 
the battalions engaged took more than forty. The Ger- 
mans who broke their way into our advanced positions 
were met, not as enemies whose reputation and strength 
were redoubtable, indeed, but as so much vermin to be 
exterminated. It was the Yankee, not the German, who 
showed the true fighting edge throughout those long three 
days of ding-dong wrestling. The enemy attack was ac- 
cepted, not as a menace, but as a challenge; and the result 
was what could have been expected. 

The satisfaction of the French was quickly manifested. 
Hardly had the guns cooled before the Corps Commander 
commended the American troops in general orders.^ A 

1 No. 1870-3 ') VIII Army, 32d Army Corps Staff 

General Orders r III Bureau, Headquarters 

No. 124 ) April 14, 1918 

On April 12, just past, the enemy, supported by powerful artillery, made an 
attack in force on the lines held by the left of the Twenty-Sixth American Divi- 
sion and the right of the Tenth Colonial Division. 

The struggle continued throughout the day and night of April 12 and 13. 

In the course of the engagement, thanks to the vigorous and repeated counter- 



118 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

fortnight later, when the 104th Infantry had gone into 
reserve positions, it was to receive an even higher honor. 
Assembled near Boucq, on Sunday, April 28, the regiment 
was thrilled to the heart with honest pride when General 
Passaga affixed the Croix de Guerre to the regimental 
colors, with the words, "I am proud to decorate the flag 
of a regiment which has shown such fortitude and courage; 
I am proud to decorate the flag of a nation which has come 
to our aid in the fight for liberty." 

Thus it was the colors of a unit of the Twenty-Sixth 
Division which was the first, in all the history of the Ameri- 
can Army, to receive a foreign decoration.^ 

To the regimental commander and 116 other officers and 
men were also awarded, on the same occasion, the coveted 
bronze cross with its red and green ribbon. And conspicu- 
ous, indeed, were the acts of gallantry which earned that 
honor, in a fight where gallantry and pluck were every- 
where.^ 

Scarcely a week was to elapse before the enemy again 
tested the mettle of the new troops opposed to him. That 
he was planning an attack somewhere in the vicinity was 
fairly evident. On April 17 the French on the right brushed 

attacks of the Americans and of our Colonials, the enemy, in spite of his superi- 
ority in numbers, was thrown back from several trench positions where he had 
gained a foothold, and left in our hands more than forty prisoners and a large 
number of dead. 

During this fight, carried on under a severe bombardment, the American 
troops gave proof not only of their splendid courage, which we know, but also of a 
brotherhood in arms which was absolute and ever present. 

With such men as these, the cause of liberty is sure to triumph. 

Headqiiarters, April 14, 1918 Passaga 

' The citation reads: "For greatest fighting spirit and self-sacrifice during 
action of April 10, 12, and 13, 1918. Suffering from very heavy bombardments, 
and attacked by very strong German forces, the [regiment] succeeded in prevent- 
ing their dangerous advance, and with greatest energy reconquered, at the point 
of the bayonet, the few ruined trenches which had to be abandoned at the first 
onset, at the same time making prisoners." 

2 Troops principally engaged at Bois Brule were: 2d Battalion, 3d Battalion, 
Machine-Gun Company, 104th Infantry; Company "C," 103d Machine-Gun 
Battalion; 3d Battalion, 103d Infantry; Batteries "D," "E," "F," 101st Field 
Artillery; Battery "F," 103d Field Artillery; 3 platoons 90-mm. guns of 101st 
Field Artillery; 101st Trench Mortar Battery. 



BOIS BRULfi AND SEICHEPREY 117 

back a raiding party. Reports of the watchers in the bal- 
loons, or in the observation posts hidden in the ruins of 
Beaumont or in the edge of Jury Wood, told of increased 
train movements along the Vigneulles line, of an apparent 
rehearsal of some attack formation by troops in the rear 
area, of artillery coming into the sector. A relief of the 
German division then in line was the opinion of many. 
A conviction that the enemy was going to show in this 
neighborhood a raiding activity similar to that which he 
had displayed elsewhere as preliminary to attacks in 
force, was implanted in the minds of other good author- 
ities. The suspicion grew with still a third group that a 
grand attack was to be launched for the purpose of taking 
Verdun, or the right of the Hne, in reverse. The feeling 
that the Germans were too deeply committed in the pro- 
digious enterprises against the British in Flanders and 
Picardy, to attempt anything at all in this part of the hne, 
prevailed comfortably with not a few. A demonstration 
— yes, but nothing serious. But one feature of the enemy 
activity was very noticeable — his artillery was conduct- 
ing an extensive registration fire. That meant that new 
batteries had come into the sector, and more than would 
be the case were it merely a question of reheving batteries 
already in position. Daily, at all hours, his guns would fire 
on communications, assembly places, observation points, 
cross-roads, battery positions, command posts. It was not 
the ordinary harassing fire. The troops had become ac- 
customed to sudden bursts of shelling dropped with un- 
canny accuracy on this or that "sensitive point" within 
our lines — a fire as intense as it was brief, as irregular as 
it was disconcerting. But the fire which began on April 15 
had a different quality. It was a shell here, another yonder, 
a pair of them "bracketing" a position, often overlooked 
by an aeroplane sailing high in the blue. And this, as the 
French said, "gave furiously to think." 

From the observers came a bit of news one afternoon 



118 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

which spread quickly — news which a couple of prisoners 
picked up by the French confirmed. This was the passage 
through the village of Mont Sec, away in rear of the 
enemy lines, of a column of infantry strange to the sector, 
whose presence boded important events, since it com- 
prised, so babbled the prisoners, one of the new Sturm- 
bataillone of which the Western Front was beginning to 
hear.^ That it was deemed necessary to pick and train 
especially qualified assault troops, for any unusual opera- 
tion, revealed a certain weakness in the internal German 
organization and morale. True, the German tendency 
always had been to create corps d'elite, but it was never- 
theless significant that the High Command felt that, for 
special strains, it could not wholly rely on the ordinary 
infantry. And that the cream of many battalions had been 
skimmed to provide these hardy, capable fellows meant 
that the average value of these units was lowered by just 
so much. However, the presence in the La Reine Sector 
of one of these chosen bodies could hardly mean other than 
that some project of importance was in the wind, taken in 
conjunction with the obvious increase in the enemy ar- 
tillery of all calibers. 

It appeared probable that the enemy attack, if deliv- 
ered, would lie against the right of the Division. Here lay 
his best chance of success, whether for a raid, or for a 
break-through toward the Beaumont-Flirey ridge, the 
key of the position. For long, improved plans of defense 
for this part of the sector, partly based on the recommenda- 
tion of the American commanders, had been under con- 
sideration by the Corps Staff. Provisional plans had already 

1 The typical Sturmbataillon of the period included the following elements: 

4 assault companies (StosstruppeJi, each 100 men). 

6 machine guns. 

1 company of bombers. 

1 company of flame-throwers. 

1 battery of accompanying field artillery. 
Motor-cars were attached for quick transportation. The battalion commander 
usually had the rank of captain. 



BOIS BRULfi AND SEICHEPREY' 119 

been put into effect. The commander of the Beaumont sub- 
sector had altered more than once the disposition of his 
infantry and machine guns, agreeably to the changing 
ideas of higher authority, in the resistance centers of 
Seicheprey and Remieres Wood. For here the defense 
presented grave diflSculties. 

The Seicheprey-Remieres Wood front had an extent, 
on the map, of something more than three thousand meters, 
which implies a distance of about two miles on the ground. 
It covered the crest and reverse slope of a low, east-west 
elevation, lying about fifteen hundred meters in advance of 
the zone of principal resistance on the ridge along the 
Metz-Saint-Dizier highway. A gradual slope on the north, 
or enemy side, extended down to the vale of the Rupt de 
Mad, while on either flank wide, shallow ravines, or 
*' draws," extended in from the enemy's lines. Formerly 
there had existed a fairly complete system of fire and sup- 
port trenches in advance of the village and the wood; but 
upon the adoption of the principles of organization for 
defense in depth, these forward lines, once held by a con- 
siderable garrison, were abandoned, both infantry and 
machine guns being disposed in deeper echelons. On the 
Seicheprey front, drawn back from the original front line 
into two points of resistance, considerably separated, 
there were retained but two companies — one in and about 
the village, the other in the woods, both backed by ma- 
chine-gun detachments. Their mission was one of surveil- 
lance, coupled with such resistance as would delay, if it 
did not break up, a hostile attack. Troops on this line 
could expect no reinforcements. Their duty was to hold to 
the last; to dislodge temporarily successful enemy assail- 
ants by local counter-attacks. The two other companies 
of the battalion in this sub-sector were echeloned one 
thousand yards in rear, in the forward trenches of the 
main position in front of Beaumont village. Another bat- 
talion was similarly disposed on the left, its zone being 



120 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

bounded by the line Xivray-Rambucourt. The remaining 
battahon was in reserve, in the villages of Mandres and 
Ansauville; Regimental Headquarters were in Beaumont. 

Communications were inadequate. Between the main 
position and the outpost line there extended a single 
country road, bordered by a single hoyau for circulation 
in both directions. Another trench led back from Remieres 
Wood; crossed the draw on the right flank; and connected 
with the left of the French sector, in Jury Woods. But as 
this was organized as a fire trench, its use for communi- 
cations was badly hampered, and its rear terminus lay 
outside the divisional sector. Between Seicheprey and 
Remieres Wood ran a single trench, very lightly held, in 
part only a corridor between walls of sandbags and ga- 
bions. Shell-proof shelters, when the Division took over the 
sector, may be said not to have existed. In Beaumont and 
Seicheprey a few fairly secure shelters had been constructed 
in the cellars of the houses; but these suflSced for only a 
small proportion of the garrisons; and in the trenches 
proper the shelters were of the most illusory description. 
The wire entanglements were in good condition; and some- 
thing had been done to strengthen the combat positions 
and the flanks, a progressive plan of works having been 
inaugurated for the sector by the engineers, soon after 
arrival, which was being developed nightly by large de- 
tails from the infantry. The ground lay open — bare fields 
of coarse, long grass, with marshy spots in all the hollows, 
with scarcely a tree save the characteristic poplars along 
the Metz highroad and the rough thickets of Remieres 
Wood. And every foot of it, as has been already noted, was 
under direct and easy observation by the enemy watchers 
on Mont Sec. 

The Connecticut regiment of infantry (102d), together 
with two companies of machine-gunners, was assigned to 
the Seicheprey-Remieres lines, when the Division took 
over the sector. Since March 31 it had floundered about in 



BOIS BRULfi AND SEICHEPREY 121 

the sticky mud of the Seicheprey trenches; there had been 
much harassing fire, especially gas, on the forward ele- 
ments, as also on Headquarters. An episode occurred which 
angered the regiment (and higher authorities, too, God 
wot!), as showing how simple it was for energetic enemy 
patrols to penetrate well within our thinly held and long- 
extended outpost line.^ It happened, on a night just after 
the fight in Bois Brule, that a ration wagon was pro- 
ceeding out past Xivray, toward the tiny hamlet of Mar- 
voisin, where the 102d Infantry maintained a platoon in 
night combat position. Two men were in charge of the 
wagon; and among their supplies they carried a sack of 
company mail. All was going quietly, when suddenly, only 
a hundred yards or so from the detail's destination, the 
wagon was halted by an enemy ambush, the mules promptly 
pistoled, and one man spirited away, along with the in- 
valuable mail, in less time than it takes to write about it. 
As silently as they had come did the Germans get away, 
eluding the pursuit which was immediately sent after them. 
Not a soul saw them, though they had laid their ambush 
nearly a half-mile inside our outpost line. The episode had 
value as an illustration of how easily the Division's front 
could be entered if conditions of weather were right; it had 
the effect of redoubling all precautions. Nor did the fol- 
lowing days lack for additional rumors of impending 
trouble; and the night of April 19, when a relief was on, 
the anxiety was intense, indeed. 

That night the 3d Battalion, 102d Infantry, was re- 
lieved in front and support trenches of the Beaumont sub- 
sector, by the 1st Battahon, 102d Infantry, under Major 
G. J. Rau. The latter troops came into the area for the 
first time — which takes on significance in view of what 

^ As a means of preventing the capture of either isolated sentinels or large out- 
posts. Corps Headquarters had prescribed that outpost groups should never ex- 
ceed twenty-five men, and that sentries should not be posted more than fifty feet 
away from the group. The result was that, inevitably, long distances separated 
these little combat groups, and the intervals were difficult to watch after dark. 



122 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

happened later — though they had already garrisoned 
the left of the regimental sector. The 2d Battalion was on 
the left at this time, with Companies "G" and "E" in 
hne, "F" and "H" in support. When the relief was com- 
pleted the incoming battalion found itself with " C" Com- 
pany in Remieres Wood, "D" Company in and about 
Seicheprey (where also the Battalion Headquarters was 
located), while "A" and "B" Companies occupied the 
support trenches in front of the "One-Bis position," as the 
main line of resistance was called, where their right (Com- 
pany "A") connected with the French left in Jury Wood. 
The outgoing battalion commander, Captain C. M. 
Thompson, and the company oflBcers remained in posi- 
tion, in accordance with the usual custom, to acquaint 
their successors with the terrain when daylight should 
come, and to turn over the permanent trench stores; but 
the command passed as soon as the relief was completed. 
The night was very still. No patrols or working parties 
were out because of the relief; but a singular quiet had 
settled over the hostile lines, in marked contrast with the 
aggressive activity of the days just previous. There was 
little rest, however, at Regimental Headquarters. Again 
and again were all lines of communication tested, all plans 
reviewed for the employment of the machine guns and in- 
fantry utilities; close touch was established with the en- 
gineers posted in Beaumont,^ and with the regiments to 
right and left. Not, indeed, till word came in, about one 
o'clock in the morning of April 20, that the relief was com- 
pleted, was there any slackening of the tension. 

But the relaxation was brief enough. At 3.05 o'clock in 
the morning of April 20 there was laid on every part of the 
forward zone, and on the artillery positions, such a bom- 
bardment as the Division had not yet even dreamed of. 
On the Seicheprey-Remieres trenches, the support posi- 
tions, and on Beaumont village, there crashed down a con- 

1 Company "A," 101st Engineers. 



BOIS BRULE AND SEICHEPREY 123 

centration from guns of all calibers up to 210 millimeters, 
which recalled to the French officers with the 102d In- 
fantry those fearsome days of Verdun in 1916. Implacably, 
with deadly accuracy and great intensity, the fire of 
destruction continued. Eight minutes after it commenced 
all wire communications out of Beaumont were cut, save 
a single thread to the artillery; runners became casualties 
almost as soon as they started with their messages. In the 
forward trenches the meager shelters were caved in or 
blown apart, in many cases burying their occupants; the 
volumes of gas which were released along with the high- 
explosive shells were severe on the laboring artillerymen, 
who sent over their normal protective barrages and counter- 
battery fires, in prompt response to the rocket signals 
from the front-line infantry. For two hours the bombard- 
ment continued with scarcely a lull in its savage intensity, 
with the result that the Remieres-Seicheprey outpost gar- 
risons were not only much reduced by casualties, but also 
broken up into isolated groups with only a slender com- 
munication, when any existed at all. Platoon command- 
ers who, at the first alarm, brought their men together in 
the prescribed, but as yet unfamiliar, combat positions, 
saw them killed or wounded in groups; others who dis- 
posed their little forces in the sHght shelter of shell holes 
ran the danger of losing control; direct hits played havoc 
with both machine guns and field pieces; the Regimental 
Headquarters, smothered in fire, was for the moment put 
completely out of action. 

To add to the confusion caused by the bombardment 
a heavy daybreak fog lay thickly in every hollow, min- 
gling with the smoke of the bursting shells and the dust, to 
screen the enemy's movements, and to obscure all rocket 
signals. Vainly the outposts peered toward the German 
lines; not a hint of the enemy's intended action was re- 
ceived until, about five o'clock, the forms of his infantry 
were seen plunging out of the mist and the battle haze. 



124 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

right in the wake of his devastating barrage. A torrent of 
fire was rolled over Seicheprey and Reniieres Wood, set- 
tling like a wall, enclosing them. And then, so close that 
they suffered from their own shelling, before the stunned 
defenders in Seicheprey could wholly rally, the gray-clad 
raiders descended. 

They came on in three columns. Up the wide draw to 
the west and south of the village came one party; another 
flanked Remieres Wood from the east; a third drove 
straight against our thin-held front. And resolute troops 
they were. The Sturmbataillon led the attack, supported 
on its flanks by two battalions of infantry already in the 
sector, accompanied by detachments of signalmen and 
pioneers. By the Germans' own statements not less than 
three thousand men participated in the attack, the onrush 
of whom was sustained by two American companies — 
less than four hundred rifles. Methodically and rapidly the 
enemy raiders worked. In a moment they had entered 
Seicheprey from flank and rear, where they picked up the 
medical officer and entire personnel of the battalion aid- 
station with other prisoners ; all along the line they picked 
up many individuals, survivors of luckless outpost groups. 
Immediately on gaining that section of the outpost trenches 
called Sibille Trench, west and north of the village, they 
set about organizing it for defense against counter-attack; 
in Seicheprey they set contact mines; their signalmen laid 
their telephone wires almost before the infantry was ready 
for them. 

But not for long was the enemy allowed to stay. His 
intention was, undoubtedly, to effect a permanent lodg- 
ment. A captured officer stated before he died that the 
German plan contemplated holding the captured trenches 
against an expected American counter-attack, then to 
renew their advance, and gain possession of the Beau- 
mont-Flirey ridge. Other versions indicated that at least 
the line of the Sibille Trench was to be held; and the very 



BOIS BRULfi AND SEICHEPREY 125 

complete preparation for its. organization bore out this 
assertion. An operation more extensive than a mere raid 
to make prisoners was in order, at all events; but, thanks 
to the grit and fighting ability of Connecticut militia 
troops, the plan was brought to naught. 

A defensive force of a sort was quickly got together by 
Major Rau at the first alarm. With the orderlies, clerks, 
and runners at BattaHon Headquarters, from the company 
kitchens, from the twenty prisoners inherited from the 
First Division, a resolute counter-attack was delivered, 
which, continuing through the streets of the village, drove 
out the enemy before he could realize on his initial gains. 
The fiercest hand-to-hand fighting occurred. It was with 
his cleaver that one cook accounted for his adversary; it 
was with the bayonet and the pistol that the Germans 
were driven back to the shelter of the cemetery and of 
Sibille Trench north of the town. Combat patrols to the 
flanks kept close touch with the retiring foe. By 6 o'clock 
the village proper was cleared. 

Meanwhile, in the tangles of Remieres Wood the raiders 
had achieved a similar first success. Smothered by the ar- 
tillery fire, the defenders were thrown into a momentary 
confusion of which the enemy took advantage. But here, 
too, as soon as a semblance of organized resistance could 
be set up, the enemy was checked and later driven out. 
But not for long after he had relaxed his hold on Seiche- 
prey did he fall back from the other important pivot of 
the forward position. 

Everywhere the struggle became a soldier's battle, 
where the fighting power of the individual counted for 
everything. And how well our men fought the Germans 
themselves have testified. In Remieres Wood, for instance, 
were found two men of a machine-gun crew, killed — one 
with his finger on the trigger, the other with a feed strip 
in his hand, all ammunition exhausted, but with a heap 
of dead Germans in front of them, stopped by the two in 



126 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

their attempt to rush the gun. On the left eight sole sur- 
vivors of a platoon of "E" Company, which became in- 
volved, themselves wounded or having been once buried 
in a smashed dugout, fought cheerfully throughout the 
day. In other centers combat groups were killed, fighting 
to the last man, at their posts. Surrounded, there was many 
a lad who, summoned to surrender, fought with clubbed 
and broken rifle, and when overpowered, still struggled 
with his captors — as was told by the Germans themselves 
months later. For every prisoner taken, the enemy paid 
in good measure. 

Of all this desperate work on the front not a word could 
be got back to Regimental Headquarters for some time. 
Not till 6.30 o'clock did the Commander get definite word 
that Seicheprey was attacked; and one can fancy the elec- 
trical effect of this first message, when the runner, wounded 
and spent, stumbled in with word that the enemy infantry 
was actually in the village. Officers and scouts sent for- 
ward from Beaumont could learn nothing owing to the 
intensity of the fire, while the dust and mist closed the eyes 
of the observers. What reports came in through the morn- 
ing were all of dark import, indeed. Remieres Wood was 
lost; Rau, in Seicheprey, was merely holding; the enemy 
had effected a lodgment between the two front-line bat- 
talions; the French had been attacked in Jury Wood 
itself; casualties were heavy; officers had been killed or 
taken prisoner; the enemy was attacking in force; four of 
the machine guns had been lost by direct hits from shell- 
fire. At one o'clock in the afternoon the situation looked 
dark enough. It appeared that the front line had crumbled 
away. 

Actually, however, long before this time, the situation 
had begun to be righted. But of this little could be sur- 
mised. The difficulty of directing the fight can be imag- 
ined, with Beaumont practically isolated, communica- 
tions cut, officers and runners able to get contact with the 



BOIS BRULfi AND SEICHEPREY 127 

front only by taking advantage of momentary lulls in the 
continuous bombardment that plastered all the communi- 
cating trenches. Coordination of the infantry's signaled 
demands for artillery support and the gunners' response, 
was for hours impossible, owing to delay in transmission 
from fog, smoke, and fire. Back at Brigade, Division, and 
Corps Headquarters, even greater uncertainty reigned. 
For, although information oflBcers from all three Staffs and 
from the artillery were sent at once to Beaumont and to 
Seicheprey to obtain information, their efforts were for 
hours in vain, the fierce intensity of the enemy fire on all 
communications making traveling slow and diflScult. 

But though the situation, early in the afternoon, began 
to clear a little, it appeared grave enough. The enemy was 
still holding Sibille Trench and part of Remieres Wood in 
force. He had moved up large numbers of troops close 
behind his own front. He began anew a fire for demoH- 
tion — this time on the wire and other accessory defenses 
of the main resistance line, effecting serious breaches. And 
this looked as if he was going to press his attack. Prepara- 
tions were at once made to meet it should it develop. The 
3d Battalion, 102d Infantry, was brought forward again 
from its reserve billets to Beaumont, to man the "One- 
Bis" trenches; while two companies of the 101st Infantry 
came from Raulecourt as reinforcements of the same line, 
along with the engineer company already in Beaumont. 
From the Division reserve (104th Infantry) two battal- 
ions were put at the disposal of General Traub, and moved 
forward within easy reach. By nightfall these arrange- 
ments had been completed. The regimental commander 
of the 102d Infantry was able to supervise personally the 
disposition of the troops; and was cheered by a friendly 
call from the Division's old friend Colonel Bertrand, of 
the neighboring 162d (French), who cantered over with 
his adjutant to get in closer touch, through the eager shell- 
ing of enemy sniping batteries, as happy as a boy to be 



128 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

in action, though annoyed by his fine mount's being both- 
ered by the gun-fire. 

By evening, however, it appeared evident that a further 
German attack was stayed, at least for the moment. Our 
artillery had landed on his reserves massed in Saint-Baus- 
sant with deadly effect. His own continued its punishing 
fire, but with slackened intensity; his infantry was making 
no forward movement. Along the front there was much 
sniping activit}^ but nothing else. 

With that negative information one was forced to be 
content, since no word had come back to Headquarters 
from the three sets of combat patrols which had been sent 
forward to gain contact and bring back information. The 
Corps had planned a counter-attack in some force should 
the enemy still be within our outpost line on the morning 
of the 21st, to check, before it started, any effort on his 
part to gain a further advantage. Late in the afternoon of 
the 20th the memorandum containing the outline of this 
project had come down to the 102d Infantry, four com- 
panies of which regiment were to make the attack in con- 
junction with two French companies on the right. The ob- 
jectives were to be Sibille Trench and Remieres Wood, if 
reports of patrols should show that any portion of our line 
was still in enemy hands. 

General Traub (commanding the 51st Infantry Bri- 
gade) was charged with the detailed preparation of the 
plan; but, actually, since the Corps Commander in person 
and his staff were in and out of Brigade Headquarters all 
day with volleys of orders, advice, recommendations, and 
instructions, a large part of the study of the situation and 
the framing of the proper orders was taken out of General 
Traub's hands by higher authority. Division Headquarters 
had little to do in the Seicheprey fight from beginning to 
end, so localized was it. Calls for extra ammunition, for 
new Chauchat automatics, and for rations, however, were 
promptly met as fast as they were received from the 102d 



BOIS BRULfi AND SEICHEPREY 129 

Infantry; and several times the supply trucks or side cars 
ran the gantlet of the enemy bombardment to fetch for- 
ward the necessary supplies. The Division Commander 
was in close personal touch, however; and the Chief of 
Staff, just assigned, was forward in Beaumont during a 
good part of the critical day, for observation of the situ- 
ation. 

All through the evening plans for the counter-attack 
were made, changed, amended. A battalion commander 
from the 102d Infantry was selected by General Traub on 
his own responsibility as most suitable to lead the attack. 
Toward 11.30 o'clock in the evening the brigade attack 
order was given him, with final instructions. Briefly, the 
order contemplated an artillery preparation of half an 
hour, to be followed by the advance of the four companies, 
with the French on the right, at 4.30 o'clock. The parallel 
of departure was fixed in the vicinity of the crossing of the 
Seicheprey-Beaumont road and the " One-Bis " trench lines, 
approximately; details of the attack were to be arranged 
by the commander of the party; and these he completed 
after conference with the commander of the 102d Infantry 
in Beaumont soon after midnight. The company com- 
manders were notified of the project, and given directions 
for the assembly. All appeared to be well in preparation, 
with one important exception. The Corps had expressly 
prescribed that the attack should be dependent on the 
reports of patrols as to whether elements of our front line 
were still occupied by the enemy; and all night long no 
reports came in. Three sets of patrols had gone out, earlier 
in the day, from Battalion and Regimental Headquarters; 
but such were the difficulties of getting about their re- 
ports were incredibly slow in getting back. A final patrol, 
divided into two parties, was ordered forward by General 
Traub, at 2 o'clock, with the idea that their work could be 
done and their reports returned in time to furnish a basis for 
the scheduled attack at 4.30 — an absolute impossibility. 



130 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

By this silence of the scouts the attack commander 
allowed himself to be unduly influenced. Displaying com- 
mendable energy at first, he presently, attaching too much 
importance to a delay in the arrival of his companies at 
tlie starting-place, and the absence of authentic news from 
the front, as well as by what he considered an incomplete 
equipment for his troops, sent back word to Regimental 
Headquarters expressing a doubt that he could make the 
attack at all. And finally, a short half -hour before his at- 
tack was scheduled to start, he took the extreme responsi- 
bility of disobeying explicit orders, and called the opera- 
tion off. In point of fact, the last groups of enemy raiders, 
exhausted and spent, had crept back to their own lines 
with the fall of darkness; but this was not known positively. 
Promptly on the appointed minute the French companies 
moved out from Jury Wood, covered by a patrol which 
the Seicheprey battalion sent to protect their left flank. 
Promptly the artillery dropped the prescribed barrier fire 
across the area it was expected our infantry would traverse 
in its advance. But all to no purpose. As soon as they 
saw that our troops had not started, the French halted. 
The whole operation, planned with such solicitude by all 
concerned, ended in a complete breakdown. The leader's 
excuse was that he believed General Traub would have 
changed his orders had he (the General) been cognizant 
of the changed conditions. Promptly court-martialed, 
however, for disobedience of orders, and convicted, the 
ofiicer (who had long been suspected by his intimates of 
not being quite sound mentally), ended a creditable army 
career in obscurity, carrying the burden of blame for a 
fiasco, which a better intelligence service, or a better 
estimate of the situation by highest authority, perhaps 
might have averted. 

Any review of the fight at Seicheprey is like to reach 
only one general conclusion. The balance of profit lay with 
the American troops. The moral advantage remained with 



BOIS BRULfi AND SEICHEPREY 131 

the Division. Unquestionably, the Germans won material 
successes. They took about 130 prisoners, including sev- 
eral officers; two infantry companies and a machine-gun 
company were reduced by more than fifty per cent in 
strength. Certain sections of our advanced line were pene- 
trated, after a devastating bombardment; the organized 
defense of the sector was thrown temporarily into con- 
fusion; the German planes were masters of the air, whether 
for directing artillery fire or for employing machine-gun 
fire themselves. As a raid, the operation succeeded hand- 
somely. 

Certain points of weakness developed also in the Ameri- 
can organization. For instance, a shortage of ammunition 
for certain batteries occurred rather early in the action — 
not so serious, however, that the volume of fire was ap- 
preciably affected.^ Patrolling to the front did not bring 
back promptly information which could immediately be 
made use of to advantage. Communication between in- 
fantry and artillery was uncertain and slow; the air service 
was of little use; other means of information were insuffi- 
cient to meet the emergency. 

But the moral advantage — which, in war, is the finally 
determining element — rested with the Americans. They 
sufiFered; they lost prisoners; but the losses they inflicted 
on the enemy were exceedingly heavy. Upwards of 150 
dead were left for our troops to bury; the German official 
report admitted upwards of 600 casualties; the enemy 
abandoned a large amount of valuable material on the 
field. The mission of the American troops — to fight to 
the death in place without reinforcement — was performed; 
the enemy was driven out of Seicheprey and Remieres 
Wood by bloody, hand-to-hand fighting. A Sturmbataillon, 
backed by other troops- of long experience, yielded before 
the courage, tenacity, and fighting spirit of some despised 

' The 51st Artillery Brigade fired approximately 25,000 rounds on the day of 
April 20-21, far in excess of its normal allowance. 



132 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE * 

New England militia. Stunned by a bombardment of ter- 
rific intensity, their defenses in ruins, with no hope of rein- 
forcement, with only an uncertain connection with their 
artillery, the Yankee infantry recovered its organization 
and fought successfully to a stand-up finish. Its fighting 
edge was merely tempered by the fire; the blows it dealt 
the enemy were the stronger, as they felt the enemy's 
strength the greater. Choked by gas, blinded by fog and 
smoke, the gunners, ambulance-drivers, runners, signal- 
men, and caisson-drivers went about their tasks with per- 
fect coolness and courage, under the heaviest bombard- 
ments, as only men can work to whom duty and pride are 
the sole considerations. The troops came out of Seicheprey 
bruised and bleeding; but their heads were held high. 

Interesting sidelights on the Seicheprey fight developed 
later. The first considerable engagement fought alone by 
American troops in France, the contest took on an unex- 
pected value in stimulating interest in America over sub- 
scriptions to the third popular loan for the expenses of the 
war, full accounts of the valor of the New England troops 
being sent home at once, through official channels. 

Another sidelight was that cast by the captors of some 
of the oflScers of the 102d Infantry, in conversation with 
our men. To them the Germans revealed complacently 
the efficiency of their intelligence service in the La Reine 
Sector — telling how their men, fluent in English and wear- 
ing American uniforms, had made their way into our lines 
for brief stays, mingled with our units, by asserting that 
they belonged to a neighboring regiment, and proved this 
by relating to our captured oflBcers many anecdotes of 
the American company kitchens and mess-line gossip, 
asking for this or that sergeant or cook by their nicknames, 
and so on. Incidents such as General Traub's having been 
shelled out of his Headquarters in Ansauville were com- 
mon talk; information regarding the American organiza- 
tion was complete and carefully charted, the only error 



BOIS BRULE AND SEICIIEPREY 133 

being in the number of automatic rifles allowed to an in- 
fantry company. It was as disconcerting as it was amazing. 
Wrong, however, was the German estimate of the number 
of American troops in France — they appeared to have 
no idea of what actually was being accomphshed in the 
matter of building and transporting an army. Sincere ap- 
parently was their respect for the prowess of the American 
fighting man; respectful indeed were their remarks con- 
cerning the power and accuracy of the American artillery. 
The German press might sneer as it would about the effort 
of the United States to assist her Allies; the men "up 
front" knew that their new adversaries, as tried out in 
Bois Brule and Seicheprey, while not yet expert soldiers, 
were dangerous in a stand-up fight. 



w 



CHAPTER IX 
DAY BY DAY IN TIJE LA REINE SECTOR 

HAT influences, other than fighting, were at work 



at this time, to shape the Division's character, and 
to spread its reputation? Like any other Hving thing with 
a soul and a spirit, a combat unit, such as the Twenty- 
Sixth, is always taking color from its surroundings; upon 
its inherited traits are grafted constantly the growths 
sprung from environment and circumstance. One thinks 
of a Division, not as a community, but as an individual. 

Perhaps we should consider in this connection how the 
system of promotions and replacements, put into opera- 
tion late in the winter, came to affect this unit of the Ex- 
peditionary Force. 

As originally published, orders with respect to filling 
vacancies prescribed that (a) those vacancies caused by 
casualties in combat should be filled one third by promo- 
tion, and two thirds by replacements, and (6) all other 
vacancies should be filled by replacements. The result 
was to block the promotion of any captain of a combat 
regiment unless all the majors were killed or wounded; 
until three of the lieutenant-colonels of infantry of a Divi- 
sion were battle casualties, no major could be moved up; 
in the non-commissioned grades a similar difficulty stood 
in the way of promoting a likely corporal. Naturally, va- 
cancies caused by death or wounds were fewer than those 
caused by other reasons; but to positions made vacant by 
the dispatch of officers and non-commissioned officers to 
the United States, to schools, to hospital for sickness or 
injury, or by transfer, no candidate from a lower grade 
could be promoted in any event. 

Thus a traditional and satisfactory reward for good con- 



DAY BY DAY IN LA REINE SECTOR 135 

duct was practically inhibited; an effective stimulus to ex- 
ceptional effort was taken away; ambition was deadened. 
Illustrative were the cases of two infantry captains in one 
regiment in the Division. Their respective battalion com- 
manders having been transferred in November, 1917, a 
few weeks after arrival in France, one to staff duty, another 
to the Provost Marshal's department, the two captains 
were each given charge of a battalion, and led their units 
with enthusiasm, competency, and devotion through the 
training period, the Chemin des Dames experience, the 
front-line work of the La Reine Sector, and the Aisne- 
Marne offensive of July, without promotion, although 
repeatedly recommended for advancement on the basis 
of meritorious conduct in the field. More than that, to 
one of these battalions were sent from the replacement 
depots no fewer than three majors, one after the other, 
whose complete inexperience in the field and utter incom- 
petence required their relief after the briefest period pos- 
sible. Of other replacement oflScers assigned to the Divi- 
sion under the operation of the system — to mention only 
those of high rank — one was relieved as the result of 
the findings of a board of inquiry; another was relieved 
because his sanity was in question; a third was trans- 
ferred to duty with a chain of army laundries; a fourth 
was so incompetent that only the loyalty of his adjutant 
and operations officer carried him through at all. And these 
were all officers of the Regular estabhshment, whose assign- 
ment to the command of regiments blocked absolutely the 
promotion of field officers who had carried the battalions 
through months of front-line fighting and a half-dozen 
movements by rail or road. It speaks highly, indeed, for 
the soldierly qualities of the officers thus passed over that 
in not a single case did they waver from their steady work 
for the common cause and for the reputation of their units. 
This feature of the replacement system was less objec- 
tionable, however, than the fact that an adequate number 



136 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

of substitutes was not furnished for the officers and non- 
commissioned officers who left the Division for other duty 
or as hospital cases. These men were lost to the Twenty- 
Sixth for good. Once a wounded man got back into the 
base hospitals, he never came back to his old command, 
save in rare instances. Attached, upon recover3% to a re- 
placement battalion, he was transferred far and near. 
Causing great disappointment to the individual, the rule 
worked badly also in that the morale of the whole Divi- 
sion was affected by the knowledge that it could not get 
its own old men back. It is difficult to understand, even 
at this distance, the advantages of a system which denied 
the natural desire to be, in the ease of any individual, 
closely and continually identified with his own company, 
regiment, or division. Combat regulations emphasized 
the necessity of maintaining the identity of all units, 
from the squad upwards, recognizing the immense value 
to discipline and fighting spirit that results from com- 
panionship and intimacy. But the replacement orders 
effected a complete reversal of this principle. It was hard 
to get the point of view of those who had the problem 
of providing replacements, not only for a single division, 
but for an enormous and most complex force. It was un- 
fortunately easy to raise the cry that, here again, was be- 
ing manifested a desire on the part of General Headquar- 
ters to break down the identity of a National Guard Di- 
vision. The rumor received, indeed, wide currency among 
the French, even at this early date, that the Twenty-Sixth 
was being badly treated in this matter of replacements 
and promotions for the further reason that the Division 
Commander was not au mieux at General Headquarters — 
so swift is gossip, even among troops in the field. 

One would wish to dismiss summarily the rumor of a 
certain animus against the Division at General Head- 
quarters. It is deeply to be regretted that such gossip ever 
gained credence, for its effect on all concerned was not 



<4: 



DAY BY DAY IN LA REINE SECTOR 137 

good. There should be no room for exploiting personal 
grievances, or personal grudges, within sound of the guns. 
Not that it is difficult to understand the attitude of either 
the Division or of General Headquarters — the one very 
jealous of its identity, very loyal to its Commander, feel- 
ing itself a httle distinct from other less experienced divi- 
sions, especially beloved by the French; the other unwill- 
ing to show favors, and hence perhaps inchned to enforce 
its orders with special stress on any Division which thought 
well of itself. It is possible, should personal diflPerences 
have existed between the Division Commander and high 
ranking officers at General Headquarters, that these should 
have been reflected in the mutual attitude of the Division 
and the Headquarters Staffs. From whatever source it 
sprang, however, notwithstanding the inherent unlikeli- 
hood of any rancor existing between a combat unit of good 
reputation and its exceedingly capable governing authori- 
ties, such a feeling appears to have existed, though quite 
without definition, during a considerable period of the 
Division's service. 

The latter weeks of April and most of the month of May 
passed without special incident. Twice the Division's sec- 
tor limits were enlarged (May 23 and 27) toward the right 
(east) until its right boundary followed the Noviant- 
Limey road and the eastern edge of Voisogne Wood; 
while on the left its boundaries were restricted to the line 
Broussey-Vargevaux Pond, both exclusive. The change 
was part of the general plan for the improvement of the 
sector's defense, which had been under contemplation 
ever since it had been shown that the plans existing when 
the Twenty-Sixth took over the sector were insufficient to 
prevent enemy incursions. It was the Division's task, now, 
to enlarge the work commenced by its predecessors; and 
comprehensive schemes for new wiring, dugouts, new 
trench hues in rear (along the Ansauville-Bernecourt- 



138 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

Raulecourt general line) were sited and begun, as well as 
cable trenches, and other elements of accessory defense. 
The "work maps" at Headquarters showed, as a result 
of the labors of the engineers and large infantry details, a 
daily extension of new construction. 

Commanders of troops were invited to submit schemes 
looking to improved tactical dispositions. The situation 
was given most thorough study by both the Division and 
the Corps Staffs; and, as a consequence, there were certain 
changes made in the direction of echelonment in greater 
depth and to insure a more flexible defensive line. Reliefs 
of front-line battalions occurred every fifth day, the men 
going to rest billets where baths and the steam delousing 
machines were available. In many directions it was pos- 
sible to set machinery in motion which made for the troops' 
increased efficiency and comfort. Sanitary inspectors, 
dietitians, and experts in such matters as record-keeping, 
paid visits to all units at the front and made helpful recom- 
mendations; the allowance of motor transport was en- 
larged, thus improving the service of distribution of ra- 
tions, forage, and other supplies. In the General Staff 
sections at Division Headquarters there was developed a 
quickened energy and a smoother coordination of effort, 
which was reflected all through the organization. For this 
result it appears that much credit should go to Major 
(later Lieutenant-Colonel) A. L. Pendleton, Jr., Assistant 
Chief of Staff, G-1, whose influence had already been in 
evidence at more than one crisis in the Division's affairs. 
The entry on the scene of the new Chief of Staff was not 
without effect, also, and in more ways than one. Lieu- 
tenant-Colonel C. M. Dowell, upon being attached to the 
102d Infantry as second in command, was succeeded as 
Chief of Staff, on April 18, as has already been noted, by 
Lieutenant-Colonel (later Colonel) D. K. Major, Jr. An 
infantry officer of the Regular establishment, a graduate 
of the Leavenworth schools, the newcomer brought to his 



DAY BY DAY IN LA REINE SECTOR 139 

duties an extensive knowledge of the military art and of 
the theory of General Staff work, together with a tremen- 
dous capacity for driving toil. A most efficient executive, 
this officer often achieved results by methods somewhat 
at variance with the principles ordinarily accepted as regu- 
lating the daily relations between a Chief of Staff and 
those about him. 

Since at this time the General Staff system received a 
remarkable accession of influence and authority in the 
Division's administration, and for the best, it may be not 
without value to review briefly, at this point of the narra- 
tive, some of the objects it was hoped to obtain by devel- 
oping to the full the principles of General Staff duties laid 
down in the Field Service Regulations. 

For one reason alone a General Staff for a field force was 
regarded as indispensable. Under the American system 
there had always existed a danger that our field forces 
might be encumbered by incompetent general officers. 
None too many of the titular brigade or division command- 
ers of the Regular Army had ever led such bodies of troops, 
even at peace strength, in peace-time maneuvers; with 
the handling of the large units of the 1917 organization, 
they had no more than the textbook acquaintance pos- 
sessed by any junior. Whatever their native abihty and 
long service in all ranks, the American generals in France 
were, in the main, without experience as field commanders. 
Nor could the Regular Army supply enough general 
officers for armies of the size contemplated in the Expedi- 
tionary Force, even though a great many senior field offi- 
cers received temporary advancement to the rank of brig- 
adier or major-general; even though it was assumed that 
all so promoted were competent to command brigades or 
divisions in the field. It was feared also that the war would 
produce a number of so-called "political generals," like 
those of the Civil War, under whom the new armies would 
be saddled with amiable but probably incompetent offi- 



140 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

cers in posts of high responsibihty. How to meet, then, this 
possible weakness in High Command? The answer was 
beheved to be found in the creation and thorough training 
of a large body of picked, energetic, General Staff officers. 
These surrounding the General could not only assist him, 
but also could direct him, should his native skill or good 
fortune ever desert him. A good staff could save the Gen- 
eral from obvious mistakes and the troops from the hard- 
ships and losses incident to bad leadership; with a good 
staff, the chances of making the most of a tactical advan- 
tage, or the best of a reverse, were largely increased. 

A danger in the system lay in the fact that the typical 
General Staff officer tended too much to regard the tacti- 
cal employment, supply, and administration of troops in 
combat as a map-problem instead of an affair in which 
flesh-and-blood, the weather, morale, and the condition 
of the ground bore all-important parts. Too many field 
orders were based on what a map indicated rather than 
on what the real country and the roads presented. Too 
many field orders directed operations which the text- 
books, staff manual, and map all would agree in prescrib- 
ing and approving, but which exhaustion of the troops, the 
death of a trusted leader, hunger, or fields deep in mud — ele- 
ments unknown to or disregarded by the staff officer draft- 
ing the order — rendered impossible of execution from the 
start. The Staff tended to abide by a formula; the line mis- 
trusted all knovv^ledge save that based on intimacy with 
present conditions. The Staff complained justly that the 
line exercised independent judgment, with resulting con- 
fusion; the line asserted that the Staff issued orders which 
were arrant nonsense — and here also there were facts to 
prove the assertion. In the Twenty-Sixth Division, how- 
ever, as has been noted, this danger of mutual misunder- 
standing was largely dispersed by the close friendships 
between officers of both branches, mutual trust, and a 
common effort to solve a difficulty. Division Headquarters 



DAY BY DAY IN LA REINE SECTOR 141 

had no reason, for instance, for dictating to the artillery 
or engineers; field orders affecting the infantry were based 
on accurate knowledge of what the infantry could do. 

And the soundness of the general system, whatever the 
local mistakes, is incontestable. That business-like meth- 
ods, sound knowledge of theory, wide vision, energy, and 
tact are elements in the conduct of troops in the field quite 
as important as courage, patience, and quick thinking, is 
recognized everywhere. To capitalize these qualities was 
the object of the General Staff training, all the way 
through. 

To train competent assistants and understudies for 
staff duties, there were detailed to Division Headquarters 
at this time, and later, a considerable number of junior 
oflScers from line organizations. It was the belief of the 
Division Commander that officers who had served in the 
field with troops in subordinate positions were best quali- 
fied to work, later, in staff positions. And this principle 
was pursued throughout the Division's tour of service. 
After each major engagement there were attached for 
longer or shorter periods to Headquarters, two or three 
Heutenants or captains who had done well in the strain 
of work with their platoons or batteries, in action. 

Important changes in officers of the Staff, between April 
and June, included the substitution of Major W. Krueger 
for Major A. A. Maybach, as Assistant Chief of Staff, 
Gr-3, who in turn was succeeded by Lieutenant- Colonel 
W. S. Bowen. Captain the Reverend M. J. O'Connor, for- 
merly chaplain of the 101st Infantry, became Divisional 
Chaplain. The work of the Division Adjutant's office was 
simplified by the appointment of a Personnel Adjutant, 
while similar officers (in charge of service records, pay, 
casualty and sick reports, and the like) were assigned to 
each Regimental Headquarters. The intelligence service 
was also put on a most satisfactory basis, the entire work 
of obtaining information of the enemy, from patrols to 



142 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

balloon observation, from listening-posts to examination 
of prisoners, being carefully organized from a central au- 
thority (Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2), by whom reports 
were collated, information analyzed, and daily bulletins 
issued. A similar duty, applying to operations, was per- 
formed by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, from close 
daily contact with the front line, daily reports, and fre- 
quent personal inspections. Every day, also, saw the Di- 
vision Commander well forward, often in the most ad- 
vanced positions, to secure first-hand information of the 
daily situation of his infantry, artillery, and machine- 
gunners. Improvement was made with respect to both 
the artillery and transport animals, though at all times — 
as commonly in the Expeditionary Force — it was neces- 
sary to contend against the twofold problem of inadequate 
numbers and indifferent condition. About the time the 
Division entered the La Heine (Boucq) Sector, several 
small issues of French draft stock were received; and then 
it was that the infection of French mange began to spread 
seriously. Successful efforts were made, however, to check 
the disease. A dipping vat was erected at Sanzey, in charge 
of the Mobile Veterinary Unit; and here all horses and 
mules were plunged in an antiseptic bath, at least four 
times. And this treatment, combined with efficient groom- 
ing and clipping and improved stabling, had the effect 
of practically stamping out the mange before the Division 
left the sector. The problem was complicated, however, 
by the difficulty of obtaining good, well-drained horse 
standings or sufficient forage. 

About this time also was organized the Division "show," 
to borrow a term from the British. The experience of the 
latter had taught that a good vaudeville or comedy troupe, 
presenting a lively stage entertainment, was a very valu- 
able asset in every division. And so the Twenty-Sixth, in 
accordance with orders from higher authority, was early 
in creating such an organization out of the talent available 



DAY BY DAY IN LA REINE SECTOR 143 

in its ranks. The "YD Show" grew and prospered, first 
under the direction of Captain A. L. Forde, later under 
Lieutenant J. P. King. Its first performance was held on 
June 27, in the municipal theater at Toul, the affair being 
enlivened by the enemy having chosen that evening for a 
bombing raid on the city. Again and again, the "show" 
proved a great help in bringing an hour of laughter to the 
troops, often in time of greatest strain. 



CHAPTER X 
THE AFFAIRS OF MAY AND JUNE 

MOST of May passed uneventfully, so far as encoun-. 
ters with the enemy were concerned. No activities 
on either side were marked in the daily operations reports, 
save occasional clashes of patrols. There was considerable 
activity in the air; on several occasions enemy planes re- 
leased small paper balloons which, falling to earth, were 
found to contain most unimpressive propaganda. Great 
efforts were made by our people to secure prisoners, the 
ambushes being laid for this purpose almost every night 
in such localities as Bois des Elfes (Wood of the Elves), 
which, like so many other sinister, black holes along the 
battle fronts, seemed to rejoice in the quaint inappropriate- 
ness of its charming name. 

But one should understand just what is meant by the 
technical term "quiet sector," which the La Reine (Boucq) 
Sector is officially credited with being. The phrase is em- 
ployed simply to designate those parts of the battle front 
where operations of importance are not being undertaken. 
"Quiet" does not, by any means, imply absence of hos- 
tile action. There were certain sectors in the Vosges where 
neither side was active for weeks, it is true; but the calm of 
those regions must not be taken as extending to fronts 
like the La Reine Sector. Here the "quiet" was, to say 
the least, relative. The casualty figures for April, May, 
and June, those months when the Twenty-Sixth occupied 
this part of the line, are illustrative: 

April May June 

Killed 148 167 89 

^Younded 504 151 259 

Gassed 250 226 875 

Missing 162 ^ ^ 

Total casualties 10G4 601 1226 



^ 



THE AFFAIRS OF MAY AND JUNE 145 

The laconic bulletins sent daily to the War Department 
by the Commander-in-Chief concerning the Division are 
also interesting as throwing light on life in a quiet sector. 
Following are examples from the communiques of June: 

June 1, 1918. Twenty-Sixth Division, May 31st to June 1st, 
noon to noon. General impression quiet. Total of hostile shells 
1060. Enemy apparently using a 15-centimeter heavy field 
howitzer. 

June 16, 1918. Twenty-Sixth Division, June 13th to June 14th, 
noon to noon; there was little activity of any description. The 
hostile batteries used about 1000 shells of which about 250 con- 
tained gas. The enemy planes were fairly active, a total of 21 be- 
ing seen. Of these 13 were within our territory. Our patrols were 
very active and on several occasions drew rifle and grenade fire 
from the hostile trenches. 

June 23, 1918. Twenty-Sixth Division, June 20th to June 
21st, noon to noon; hostile artillery still active but less so than 
during last few days. Intermittent shelling of the entire sector 
throughout afternoon and evening with heaviest fire concen- 
trated on right and center. On the left Xivray bombarded with 
high explosives and gas. Total number of shells used 1800. 

June 24, 1918. Twenty-Sixth Division, June 21st to June 
22d, noon to noon; the day was quiet except for a rather heavy 
harassing fire executed by the hostile batteries. A total of 1450 
rounds, mostly small caliber including a little gas, were used by 
the enemy. The fire was distributed over most of the Sector. 

June 26, 1918. Twenty -Sixth Division: Daily average 1800 
rounds. Maximum for one day 6000 rounds, fired on June 19th. 
Minimum for one day 300 rounds, fired on June 21st. 

Not till May 27 did any important event occur in the 
comparative monotony above described. 

It has been noted that the line held by the Division 
was extended easterly to include Jury Wood and Hazelle 
Wood near Flirey, where we relieved the French. The first 
troops to occupy the new sub-sector were the 101st In- 
fantry, with Headquarters in Bernecourt.^ And on the 
very night when these changes in disposition were being 

* The left of the sector in the vicinity of Apremont, as far as Broussey, was 
taken over by French Colonial troops at the same time. 



146 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

made, the enemy broke his long silence. Late in the after- 
noon of May 26 batteries of the 101st Field Artillery allo- 
cated to the new sub-sector were taken to their new posi- 
tions and quickly registered; and scarcely had the front- 
line infantry battalion ^ entered the outpost trenches that 
same night, relieving the French, even before the men had 
unslung their packs, when the Germans sent over a raid. 
A party about 125 strong, from the 100th Regiment, 
Fortieth Division, newly arrived from the Russian front, 
advanced against our lines in Humbert Plantation from 
a ravine opposite Flirey, at 2 a.m., May 27. They came on 
singing. Under excellent artillery protection they worked 
along in two groups, the one driving straight at our front, 
the other endeavoring to enter our trenches in flank and 
rear. But the raiders accomplished nothing beyond the 
infliction of slight losses (three killed; several wounded). 
And since, in exchange, they left twenty dead behind, as 
well as two wounded prisoners, it could hardly be said that 
the operation was a complete success from a German 
standpoint. The affair was over in a few minutes, the en- 
emy simply making a dash into our lines and a quick with- 
drawal. The most notable feature, perhaps, was the prompt 
and efficient support given by our artillery, which had 
been taken into the sub-sector so short a time before the 
enemy's attack developed. Remarkable, too, in a sense, 
was the heavy fire of both artillery and machine guns 
which the enemy laid down on the Humbert Plantation 
trenches continually for two days following the raid. It 
seemed in some of its phases like the "counter-prepara- 
tion " fire which is delivered on an adversary who is about 
to start an attack; and one wondered what the Germans 
suspected our troops were planning. 

What actually was in hand by way of an enterprise 
against the adversary was not developed at this time, 
nor at the place where he appears to have expected the 

1 I/lOl Infantry. 



THE AFFAIRS OF MAY AND JUNE 147 

Americans to come over. Early in the month, when all was 
quietest, word was whispered down to the regimental com- 
manders and their intelligence officers that minute recon- 
naissance should be made of the enemy defenses about 
Richecourt, along the stream of the Rupt de Mad. It was 
time our troops did something "on their own"; they must 
not be content to have repelled two stiff attacks and then 
merely stand watch over their defenses. They must not 
lose the spirit of enterprise and initiative, which alone 
makes fighting men. 

After days of reconnaissance both aerial and by patrols, 
study of photographs, efforts to gain complete knowledge 
of the Richecourt defenses, it was given out, under cover 
of the deepest secrecy, that a large raid was going to be 
launched against the unsuspecting garrison of that par- 
ticular hornets' nest. From the 101st Infantry were chosen 
three hundred volunteers under Major J. F. Hickey; in 
their support were detailed detachments of engineers, 
signal and medical troops; reconnaissance and observa- 
tion were assured by detachments from the 1st Aero Squad- 
ron, 94th Pursuit Squadron, and 2d Balloon Company. 
The usual mission was assigned — namely, to make 
prisoners and destroy defenses. 

Near Aulnois was laid out a replica of the section of 
enemy trenches it was proposed to raid, together with a 
plan of approaches; and here the raiding party was re- 
peatedly rehearsed. Every individual was shown his par- 
ticular duty; each squad and platoon was drilled by day 
and night, till both approaches and defense lines were per- 
fectly famihar. The engineers with their bengalore tor- 
pedoes for breaching the wire, the signalmen with wire 
reels and telephones, the infantry with grenades, incen- 
diary bombs, trench knives, clubs, and pistols — all knew 
the location of dugout, shelter, machine-gun emplacement, 
or command post, and what to do when they got to it. Ar- 
tillery, backed by the heavier guns of the Corps, arranged 



148 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

an elaborate fire of preparation, counter-battery, and 
neutralization, to be followed by a rolling barrage and 
"encaging fire " for the immediate protection of the raid- 
ers. The enemy in and about Lahayville, some eleven 
hundred yards to the northeast of Richecourt, down the 
valley, was to be deluged with gas as soon as the attack 
was fairly under way. The approach was to be made from 
Seicheprey in a northwest direction across the sub-sector 
occupied by the 102d Infantry, for some five hundred 
yards to Richecourt, where a bridge over the Rupt de Mad 
was to be destroyed. 

So far, so good. The preparations were approved by the 
Corps, w^ere made complete and painstaking. Everything 
necessary for the success of the raid had been worked out 
with the greatest forethought. Everything? Hardly that. 
For without secrecy the prospect of a raid's succeeding 
is nothing at all; and news of this Richecourt enterprise 
leaked far and wide and early. War correspondents heard 
of it and flocked to Beaumont, which had been designated 
as the place from which the raid was to be directed. Oper- 
ations officers and observers from Corps and Division 
crowded the dugout occupied by the 102d Infantry Head- 
quarters. There was a stir of troops all through the little 
villages close behind the front, like Mandres and Ansau- 
ville. In the early hours of the long twilight a German ob- 
servation plane, swooping down recklessly close, directly 
over the raiding party where it was assembled for the 
march, took a long look which must have told the observer 
all he wished to know. 

Exactly at eleven on the appointed night the infantry 
and supporting troops were on the parallel of departure, 
where it had been outlined with tape on the marshy grass- 
land west of Seicheprey. And exactly then, too, began the 
artillery preparation. In the starlit, windless night, the 
spectacle was wonderful, indeed — the horizon ringed with 
flame, the air alive with the shrill whine of the climbing 



THE AFFAIRS OF MAY AND JUNE 149 

shells. For three hours the bombardment lasted. Then, at 
two o'clock, the barrage was started, and away went the 
raiders close behind it. Exactly on schedule the rocket 
flared up signaHng "objective reached." The men method- 
ically proceeded about their work of bombing the bridge, 
the German dugouts, and seeking prisoners. With only 
one killed and two seriously wounded, the party coursed 
through the Richecourt trenches, meeting no resistance, 
and inflicting a loss on the enemy of at least forty killed 
and wounded. And the raiders got one prisoner — a lad 
of sixteen, the worst-scared boy on the whole Western 
Front that night, together with a machine gun and some 
other material of less value. Elated and excited, as only 
successful troops can be, the party returned — nor was 
it noticed that many were coughing in a way that boded 
ill. But a few hours suflSced to bring to light the other side 
of the picture. A complete success, so far as smooth opera- 
tion and accomplished mission were concerned, the "mil- 
lion-dollar raid," so called from the vast expenditure of 
artillery ammunition, contributed to the Division's edu- 
cation two points which cost rather dearly. The first was 
that the normal garrison of an outpost line like that at 
Richecourt, warned in advance of an impending raid, is 
drawn away before the attack is launched, so that the 
raiders can make at best only an insignificant haul of 
prisoners. There appears to be little doubt but what Ric- 
key's men were expected; the attempts at secrecy, when 
the raid was in preparation, came to naught. The second 
point was taught by the fact that hardly a man of the 
raiding party escaped the effects of the gas released on 
Lahayville, one thousand yards away, by our artillery. 
The distance was believed to be perfectly safe, in the 
judgment of experts; but some shght air current, perhaps 
the mere conformation of the ground, was sufficient to 
roll back the deadly gas on our own troops, who in the 
excitement did not perceive its presence. A searching in- 



150 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

vestigation followed this mishap which exonerated the ar- 
tillery; but this could not restore the scores of men who 
had suffered. 

For any of a dozen reasons, however, the enemy must 
not be allowed any repose. It was not enough to harass 
him with artillery fire, to annoy his outposts by daring 
patrols, or even to do him such damage as was accom- 
pHshed in the raid of May 30. He must be made to feel that 
the Americans were vigilant, aggressive, dangerous. Con- 
sequently, a new attack was sent against his lines within 
a week after the Richecourt affair. This time the secret 
was well kept. In Jury Wood, opposite a salient of the 
German line which girdled the wicked depths of Sonnard 
Wood, was installed at vast labor a battery of projectors 
in charge of the Gas and Flame Regiment — mysterious 
fellows, of whom one always expected the newest and the 
deadhest methods of warfare. Some ninety of these devices 
were tucked away in the underbrush, each ready to shoot 
many pounds of gas in the form of a projectile with a time 
fuse, all fired together, and intended to smother Sonnard 
Wood with its nests of field guns and assembly plaqes. For 
some nights, however, the weather conditions were unfavor- 
able; but just before dawn on June_6.our troops were drawn 
back from the forward lines in Jury Wood, under protection 
of a covering force, and the projectors were fired. Heavy, in- 
deed, was the enemy loss, for, as was learned later, the 
deadly gas fell full on an infantry battalion moving in. 
Just what the German plans were for that morning has 
never been ascertained. Some operation was intended — 
there had been unmistakable sounds of new work in the 
forward trenches; officers were seen on reconnaissance; in 
the recesses of ominous Sonnard Wood more than one un- 
accustomed movement had been detected. Only a short 
hour before our gas attack was sent over, a German com- 
bat patrol made a sudden descent on our lines in Remieres 
Wood, held by a company of the 102d Infantry, only a few 



THE AFFAIRS OF MAY AND JUNE 151 

yards from the edge of the zone exposed to the gas. They 
came with fiammenwerfer, but only got themselves killed 
for their pains. Only in one place did they get close enough 
to squirt a jet of the liquid fire from the reservoirs they 
carried on their backs, and even here no damage was done, 
the wretched man who carried the reservoir being quickly 
pistoled. But, as if in revenge, the enemy artillery awoke 
to renewed life. For three days the front and all communi- 
cations were subjected to most persistent attentions. The 
usual rumor ran about that a large attack was being pre- 
pared, and all plans were made to meet it; but nothing de- 
veloped. Again was manifested the tendency of the enemy 
to expend quantities of costly ammunition in what seemed 
purposeless enterprises, so often observed while the Divi- 
sion was in the La Reine (Boucq) Sector. Three days he 
fired peevishly, and then again a relative quiet descended. 
The chief damage he did, aside from inflicting a few cas- 
ualties, was to explode a regimental grenade and pyrotech- 
nic dump at Beaumont by a direct hit — which made an 
evening of not a little excitement even for the hardened 
dwellers in that chosen village — which, like the dust- 
heaps of Seicheprey, was invariably bombarded at all the 
usual bombarding hours. 

For another week life was peaceful. It was "a good w^ar." 
The weather continued warm and clear, day after day; 
living conditions in the trenches were vastly bettered — 
the Jury Wood sub-sector being especially well organized, 
although Hazelle Wood, adjoining it, was a favorite target 
for sudden, heavy bursts of harassing fire. The cooking and 
distribution of rations was greatly improved; mail began 
to come more regularly; the troops had not only become 
wonted to the life, but were thriving on it; some replace- 
ments had been also received. True, there was a steady 
toll taken by shell-fire or sniping — but this was accepted 
as part of the routine. Every day there were air-fights to 
watch, or the daring efforts of the airmen to pass the bar- 



152 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

rier fire of tbe "archies"; in which contests the honors ap- 
peared to be about even. June 16, however, the peace was 
broken by another German raid, very hke the one launched 
against Seicheprey two months before. 

For this objective he selected the twin villages of Xivray- 
Marvoisin, on the left of the divisional sector. His mission 
probably did not go beyond making prisoners, to accom- 
plish which purpose he sent over a force of some 500 
Landwehr and line troops backed by 80 men from a Sturm- 
bataillon, with the support of 40 pioneers and 20 flame- 
throwers. The main duty of the latter was to hide the ad- 
vance under cover of a smoke screen. 

The two villages, of which the Marvoisin hamlet stood 
advanced by some three hundred yards, very close to the 
enemy lines, and the trench system connecting them, were 
held by a battalion (III) of the 103d Infantry and the 103d 
Machine-Gun BattaHon — the former having a platoon in 
Xivray proper, with two companies near at hand in Bou- 
conville, outposts in Marvoisin, and platoons in various 
flanking local centers of resistance. 

The attack began with a twenty -minute artillery "prep- 
aration " laid, as usual, on the objective, communications, 
and support positions. This was as violent a fire as any the 
Division had experienced; and, with its character changed 
to a fire of destruction, it was continued long after the raid 
was over. The enemy was divided into three columns, and 
each of these was again subdivided into three smaller 
groups, a part of whom drove straight at Marvoisin from 
the front, while the remainder attempted to work into 
Xivray from the flanks, on east and west, all under cover 
of a heavy morning mist. 

But a sturdy resistance by the troops on the ground, to- 
gether with an immediate counter-attack by a platoon of 
the companies from Bouconville, broke down the enemy's 
effort almost at once. While his artillery fire, in w^hich 
heavy minenwerfer participated, did cause casualties, es- 



THE AFFAIRS OF MAY AND JUNE 153 

pecially near Marvoisin,^ his infantry accomplisiied prac- 
tically nothing. Plans for the defense of the position, 
worked out in great detail by Brigadier-General Cole, in 
command of the brigade, were as exactly followed as if at 
maneuver; the crews of the forward machine guns stuck 
manfully to their work through the heaviest fire. The Ger- 
man discomfiture was complete. Some sixty of their dead 
were counted in front of our wire, scores were carried away; 
and they left ten prisoners, three light machine guns, 
flame-throwers, and quantities of equipment in the hands 
of our troops. 

Again, as if to wreak revenge for their repulse, the Ger- 
mans laid down furious bursts of artillery fire over all the 
Division area throughout the day, and at intervals for 
three or four days later. As many as 48 shells a minute, of 
all calibers up to 210 millimeters, fell on Beaumont be- 
tween 6.30 and 9 o'clock and again at noon of June 16. 
Bernecourt suffered, where officers of the 101st Infantry 
were wounded; in Royaumeix, Chaplain W. Danker, 104th 
Infantry, was killed. Colonel G. H. Shelton slightly 
wounded, and three enlisted men killed by a single burst. 
Among the horse lines at Sanzey and Cornieville, the 
shells did damage, while at Boucq, where Division Head- 
quarters was established, the bombardment was so heavy 
on June 20, well directed by aeroplanes, that Headquarters 
was compelled to evacuate temporarily, going a mile 
farther back, to Trondes. Heavy retaliation fire was sent 
back by our own artillery; and gradually the activity 
spent itself. But while the enemy fire was at its height the 
back area was far from being the safe retreat which men 
*'up front" were prone to consider it. 

The last days of June, featureless save for the daily fire 
of our artillery and occasional air fights, were none the less 
thrilling. For hardly had the echoes of the Xivray-Mar- 

^ Losses in this affair included: 103d Infantry, 26 killed, 96 wounded, 47 
gassed; 103d Machine-Gun Battalion, 2 killed, 11 wounded. 



154 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

voisin fight abated, before a whisper of news ran round the 
lines that stirred the men Hke an alerte. There appeared 
in the sector groups of strange officers, other than the ob- 
servers who had been coming up regularly from the schools 
for periods of instruction. Extra stores of travel rations 
were collected ready for issue; revised inventories of per- 
manent trench stores were ordered in each sub-sector — 
materials for accessory defenses, rubber boots, signaling 
devices, munitions, trench rations, and the like. And from 
other evidences, plainly to be read, it appeared that the 
relief of the Division was finally at hand. 

Several changes in command had been effected during 
the weeks just past. Of these, the most important occurred 
in the artillery. The command of the brigade (51st F.A.) 
passed from Brigadier-General Lassiter to Brigadier- 
General D. W. Aultman on May 9; and in the 103d Regi- 
ment (155-mm. howitzers) Colonel E. T. Smith was suc- 
ceeded on June 15 by Colonel P. D. Glassford, soon to 
prove himself one of the most conspicuous and able offi- 
cers the Division ever possessed. It may be said at this 
point, indeed, that the artillery brigade had been singu- 
larly rich in its officer personnel from the very beginning. 
The battery commanders and the Brigade Staff were all 
exceptionally capable; while the spirit and skill of the en- 
listed men, together with their aptness in learning the 
technical operation of the French material, earned high- 
est praise. Never, it appears, did the artillery of the Divi- 
sion fail to surpass expectations — to do more than was re- 
quired of it. It was never necessary for the Division Staff 
to do more than indicate the mission, destination, or duty 
of the gunners. Performance was invariably prompt, effi- 
cient, and workmanlike. The brigade had no need of de- 
tailed orders, fussy supervision, constant inspection. Proud 
of its record, aware of its own efficiency, it worked on 
honor — and never once fell below its own highest stand- 
ards, which were those of the best troops anywhere. 



THE AFFAIRS OF MAY AND JUNE 155 

While its most showy work was to come later, the per- 
formance of the artillery in the La Reine (Boucq) Sector 
was noteworthy, indeed. The study and practice of the 
Chemin des Dames was translated daily into actual serv- 
ice of the most effective sort. Divided into two general 
groupings, the brigade's mission, briefly, was to act with 
the right and left infantry units, each in the defense of half 
the front. On every occasion, often within a few seconds 
after receiving, by rocket or telephone, the infantry's call 
for barrage, the guns replied with a will. On every raid, or 
to meet unforeseen emergencies, the artillery performed 
special firing missions with an entire success, due partly to 
the skill with which the firing data were handled, partly 
to the energy of the gunners and the fellows who handled 
ammunition. But, further than this regular duty of all 
divisional artillery in sector, the brigade took over the 
operation of four batteries of "position pieces" — guns of 
90- and 95-millimeter cahber, remaining permanently in the 
sector; and it furnished, moreover, several "gypsy pieces," 
or "roving guns," the command of which was the dream of 
many a young officer. Accompanied by a truck-load of 
ammunition, a "rover" would establish itself at night here 
and there in the sector, usually well forward, open fire 
from an unsuspected direction on selected targets, and then 
trundle away in the darkness before the enemy had time 
to locate the piece or seek to neutralize it. Another, and 
not unimportant, activity of the gunners was to support 
with their fire, on four different occasions, the operations 
of French divisions, in the Corps, to right or left. 

The spirit, skill, and disciphne which made the artillery 
so valuable were inherited intact from the original Massa- 
chusetts and Connecticut batteries which formed its nu- 
cleus. Upon this fine foundation such leaders as Lassiter, 
Sherburne, Goodwin, Herbert, and Twachtman built 
strongly and well, while Keville did likewise with the am- 
munition train. The brigade which General Aultman in- 



156 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

herited, early in May, was in all respects the equal of any 
American artillery in France. 

Changes had come also in the command of the 102d 
Machine-Gim Battalion. Major J. Perrins was succeeded 
on April 9 by Captain D. T. Gallup, who, in turn, was 
supplanted by Major (later Lieutenant-Colonel) J. D. 
Murphy, on April 18. Originally the machine-gun officer 
of the 101st Infantry, Major Murphy was to gain dis- 
tinction for courage and abihty, and to carry the responsi- 
bilities which come usually to the lot of officers many years 
his senior. The 101st Field Signal Battalion received as 
successive commanders Major S. W. Walmsley (April 29) 
and Major P. W. Evans (June 19). 

The Division had been in the line since the first week of 
February, except for about a week during the march from 
the Chemin des Dames. Leaves had been out of the ques- 
tion; rest and recreation, even, had been very sketchy. 
For all officers the strain had been unbroken. It is true 
that the men looked very fit; but they were tired after 
one hundred and thirty days of continuous service, all but 
a week of which had been spent exposed to enemy fire. 
They were exceedingly pleased with themselves; they de- 
served the congratulations given them by the French; they 
had won the respect of their German opponents, as cap- 
tured enemy officers themselves admitted. These war- 
seasoned fellows would not have known themselves for the 
lads who were still learning war six months earlier. But, 
none the less, when advance parties of a new division 
actually came into the sector, they received from all ranks 
of the Twenty-Sixth the heartiest of welcomes. 

The American newcomers were units of the Eighty- 
Second Division, fresh from preliminary training in the 
British area near Abbeville, behind Amiens, who had be- 
gun their movement on June 16. Without artillery, ma- 
chine guns, and one regiment of infantry, they also lacked 
all experience of fife in the enemy's presence; they also 



THE AFFAIRS OF MAY AND JUNE 157 

were without much necessary equipment. But as the 
Americans were supplemented by the 154th French Divi- 
sion (less one regiment), at least the full force necessary for 
the garrisoning of the sector was available. 

The relief began on the night of June 24. One by one the 
battahons and batteries gave place to their successors, in 
perfect order. So many times had the Division effected 
interior reliefs that the process had by now become simple 
enough, even on a large scale; and the changes were made 
easily. A novel feature was that a large proportion of the 
infantry was taken out of the sector in decauvilles, or cars 
of the narrow-gauge steam tramway which threaded all 
the rear area, from Ansauville back to Menil-la-Tour and 
Toul itself. A most satisfactory feature of the operation 
was that, although as many as 58,000 men were in motion 
at one time on the nights of the relief, apparently no hint 
of the movement reached the enemy, and thus no delay 
from German activity or other cause occurred to interrupt 
it. On June 28, at nine o'clock, the command passed. An 
hour later. Division Headquarters opened in Toul; and 
the troops were concentrated near by, in the general area 
Villey-Saint-Etienne - Francheville - Foug - Chaudneney - 
Velaine-en-Haye. 



L 



CHAPTER XI 
TO THE CHAIVIPAGNE-MARNE DEFENSIVE 

ESS than twelve hours after the rehef of the Division 
orders came for a move. They were not wholly un- 
expected. The unusual accumulation and issue of travel 
rations had set speculation going. The concentration of the 
troops in close proximity to a principal railway at Toul, 
and the obviously temporary billet and cantonment ac- 
commodations, made it plain that no extended stay was 
contemplated. Indeed, it was as soon as June 30 that the 
troops began entraining in and near Toul for what the 
orders announced was to be a "journey of twelve hours* 
duration." 

It was truly a secret move. No destination was even 
guessed at. Even the troop train commanders knew no 
more than that Troyes was the first "regulating station" 
or junction where the trains would be given their final 
time schedules and destinations. It was hoped that Troyes 
might at least reveal whether the train turned southward, 
which might mean Italy, or north, which meant, perhaps, 
a chance of joining the British. Visionaries proclaimed 
that Paris, with a street parade on the Fourth of July, was 
the goal. Only a few, whose memories of the war map of 
the Marne Valley were fresh, had a suspicion of what was 
really in store. 

For considerably more than the estimated twelve hours 
the troop trains trundled westward. It was perfect summer 
weather, with the sheen of yellow wheat in the sun along 
the valleys and larks high in the air. One seemed to be 
leaving war behind. And when finally the trains drew into 
Noisy-le-Sec, which the maps said was a Paris suburb, 
and when one actually saw motor-busses with Paris street 



CHAMPAGNE-MARNE DEFENSIVE 159 

names on their signs, there rose one happy sigh from head 
to rear of each battalion. One waits for orders from the 
R.T.O., or the regulating officer. They come presently 
and give strange names as destinations — Meaux, Tril- 
port. Where on earth are they? Again the map, and one 
has a kind of vision unfolded. For Meaux and Trilport are 
on a bend of the Marne, near where the little river Ourcq 
joins it from the north. And there along the Marne, in 
Chateau-Thierry and Dormans, only a dozen miles away, 
the mighty German VIII Army under Von Boehn is gath- 
ering itself for another tiger-spring which should secure 
him the crossings of the river. 

At dawn one descends from the train; the billeting 
parties are there to show the way, and the troops move 
out, to establish themselves by the night of July 2 in the 
area Tancrou-Germigny - Mareuil-les-Meaux - Quincy - 
Villemareuil-Changis. Division Headquarters opened in 
Nanteuil-les-Meaux. Not a Fourth-of-July celebration 
was in store, nor yet a jaunt to Italy. To anybody able 
to read a map, to anybody who had followed the daily 
sweep of the German hosts down from the heights of the 
Aisne since May 27, between Rheims and Compiegne, the 
work in store for the Division was evident enough. No 
longer the garrison of a Lorraine sector still learning war 
by raid, patrol, and local bombardment, but trusted with 
a part in the scene of greatest activity was now the Divi- 
sion's fortune. What its other American comrades had done 
it was expected to accomplish. The brilliant success of the 
First Division at Cantigny (May 9) ; the steady courage of 
the Third, on the Marne at Chateau-Thierry (June 4), 
by which the German was refused a foothold on the south- 
ern bank; the valorous charges of the Marines in Belleau 
Wood, the work of the 9th and 23d Infantry in the neigh- 
boring Vaux and Bouresches (June 11-13) — all these 
feats of arms were for the Twenty-Sixth to emulate, before 
the eyes of the world. Two of its fellow National Guard 



160 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

divisions were not far away, also in the "big show." The 
Forty-Second (Rainbow Division) was a unit in the Fourth 
French Army under Gouraud, holding the gate of Cham- 
pagne, while the Twenty-Eighth (Pennsylvania) was in the 
same neighborhood as the New England troops. 

By July 4 the Division began to move up to the line. Ad- 
vantage was taken of a temporary lull in the fighting on 
the sector of front just to the northwest of Chateau- 
Thierry, where the Second Division ^ had been heavily en- 
gaged, to effect the gradual relief of its weary, battered 
units. The artillery first went into position and began 
firing on July 8. The infantry followed, one regiment at 
a time, as the situation warranted risking a change in the 
front-line dispositions. The 52d Infantry Brigade took over 
from the gallant Marine Brigade the ground the latter had 
won and held so splendidly in Belleau Wood and in front 
of Torcy, as far to the left (northwest) as Bussiares; the 
51st Infantry Brigade reheved the 9th Infantry in the 
vicinity of Vaux, and the 23d Infantry at Bouresches. 
Division Headquarters moved up to Chamigny, then to 
Genevrois Farm, where also was the artillery, the infantry 
Brigade Headquarters being established at Domptin (51st) 
and La Loge Farm (52d). By July 9 the relief was com- 
pleted, and the Division was on the battle front. 

To the extent of line taken over from the Second Di\q- 
sion had been given the designation of "Pas'Fini Sector,'* 
and there was a ring of stubborn defiance in the name 
which promised well; "unfinished" the struggle still was. 
For though the French had given ground steadily before 
the German onslaughts, from Soissons to the Marne, 
though a renewal of the German attacks was expected to 
begin not later than July 15, there still remained alive the 
belief that the battle was very far from being decided in 
Ludendortf 's favor. Not yet had he broken the forces in the 
field. The French retreat, though extensive, had been made 

> 9th and 23d Infaotry; 5th and 6th Marines. 



CHAMPAGNE-IVIARNE DEFENSIVE 161 

in good order; more than once the advancing Germans had 
been checked by smashing counter-attacks; and confidence 
abounded that Foch, the master of war, had plans which 
would bring ultimate success. 

The German intentions were well known. Apparently 
the enemy was so confident of success that he took no 
pains to insure the effect of surprise. For five or six weeks, 
during most of June and the first of July, he attempted no 
important move, collecting his forces for one final on- 
slaught — the so-called ^' Friedensturm" — which was to 
bring about the Allies' final downfall. An "army of pur- 
suit" (IX Army, under Von Carlowitz) was brought from 
the Eastern Front and collected near Soissons, to follow 
up initial successes. The French line was to be broken by 
Von Boehn on the Marne, who should cut the great Paris- 
Nancy railway; the armies of Von Below (I) and Von 
Einem (III) were to effect another breach east of Rheims; 
and at the same time Von Hutier and Von der Marwitz 
were to separate for good the French and British on the 
front between Amiens and Montdidier. These tasks ac- 
complished, the combined forces would move toward 
Paris down the Marne Valley and from the north — a 
grandiose plan, indeed, to which the German successes of 
the past weeks gave a semblance of feasibility. How Foch, 
by a counter-stroke of supreme audacity, brought the plan 
to naught; how the Twenty-Sixth Division shared daily in 
the first week of that fighting between Aisne and Marne 
which definitely turned the tide of war, will be told in its 
place. First we have to look at the Division, crouched for 
the spring, along the line of Vaux, Bouresches, and Bel- 
leau Wood, just above Chateau-Thierry. 

It was a rolling, lovely land under the hot midsummer 
sun, a country of broad wheat-fields interspersed with 
extensive woods and coppices. Across the front ran a little 
railway, the embankment of which, together with the cut- 
tings at Vaux and Bouresches, was a tactical feature of 



162 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

interest. On the right the sector was dominated by Hill 
204, most of which was in German hands, while the posses- 
sion of Belleau Wood, cresting a hill with a steep scarp 
toward the enemy, gave us an advantageous position on 
the left. Certain farms like Thiolet, Triangle, or Paris, 
together with the villages of Lucy-le-Bocage and Coupru, 
afforded points for Battalion and Regimental Head- 
quarters, while the concealment of Bezu Woods was uti- 
lized for the kitchens and wagon trains. Guns were every- 
where. The veriest novice in war must have known that 
only some exceptionally important object could explain the 
presence in every wood and dug into every roadside, of 
so much artillery and then more artillery. For ten nights 
after the Division took its post the guns were steadily com- 
ing in, all through the dark hours. It speaks well for the 
care and skill of all concerned that apparently the enemy 
had no intimation of the concentration being prepared 
against him. 

Not that he was inactive. His infantry was quiet enough, 
but his gunners made life very hard for all hands at the 
front. There were no trenches, little wire, no shelters, even 
of the sketchiest sort; the men sought safety in shallow 
"fox-holes" scratched to a depth of a foot or two and 
lightly covered with brushwood. The infantry defense plan 
consisted of reciprocally flanking centers of resistance, 
together with the numerous machine guns which were laid 
to deliver a most intricate barrage across the whole front. 
As before, there were estabhshed an outpost hne and a 
principal resistance Une; but an interesting feature in the 
Pas Fini Sector was that the echelonment of all infantry 
and machine guns in extreme depth was especially insisted 
on, to insure flexibility and ease of maneuver. So marked 
was this that, behind the outpost line was traced a zone 
extending across the whole sector and one thousand meters 
broad, in which no troops at all were stationed. This was 
a secondary artillery barrage zone, for the protection of 



THE MARNE-CHAMPAGNE DEFENSIVE 163 

the principal resistance line, designed to break up any 
attack which should overrun the outposts. The latter had 
the usual mission — to fight to the last man without hope 
of reinforcement. The counter-attacks on successful enemy 
groups by platoons on the ground, designated for that 
purpose, supplied another feature of the general defensive 
plan. As has been said, the whole scheme of things was 
based on the supposition that the Division was occupying 
a position in readiness to ward off an expected attack in 
open warfare, but to take the initiative at the first possible 
moment. 

It hardly needed the reiterated reports of German pris- 
oners and deserters to tell us that the attack was to be 
renewed within a few days — the activity of the enemy 
artillery told that plainly. At all hours the troops of the 
outpost line (a battalion from each of the four infantry 
regiments, in line) were fired on by machine guns and the 
lighter field pieces. Our suspected battery positions also 
were visited frequently, and certain stretches of highway 
over which traflSc had to pass were never safe. It was a 
hard, grinding time. All food and water for troops at the 
front had to be carried up to them by ration details. Under 
cover of darkness these parties would creep forward from 
the kitchens and depots in Bezu Wood, carrying the heavy, 
sealed cans called marmites, each of which contained enough 
stew or coffee for perhaps a squad. But progress was slow 
in the darkness; and often it was checked altogether by 
rafales of machine-gun fire in such devilish stretches as the 
ravine leading up to Bouresches or that near Lucy-le- 
Bocage behind Belleau Wood. The condition of the food 
can be imagined, carried about in hot summer weather, 
churned by the rough journey into slush. A large number 
of casualties resulted from gas. The woods in which the 
forward companies were collected against observation 
were frequently dosed heavily with mustard, as also such 
traps as the villages along the forward area. The numerical 



164 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

strength of both infantry and machine-gun units was im- 
paired to a degree which aroused not a httle concern. 

It is not unhkely that the traditionally sinister character 
of Belleau Wood had a certain effect on the morale of the 
troops stationed there. Apart from the hourly peril of the 
place, with its constant visitations from shell-fire, gas, and 
machine-gun bursts, the woods in themselves were full of 
horror. Where the 5th and 6th Marines had battled val- 
iantly in June was in July a haunted place of dread. Shape- 
less fragments of what once were men hung in the jagged 
branches of the trees, blown there by shells; stiffened 
shapes were found by the new troops, lying still unburied 
where they had fallen before German machine-gun nests, 
in the rocky hollows. A grisly odor of death hung heavy 
in the summer air around the stone hunting lodge near the 
eastern skirts of the woods, and men there came to move 
and talk as when they know that ghosts are watching them. 

At Bouresches and Vaux there were not infrequent 
clashes between patrols, and other activities of a more 
serious character. The village of Bouresches itself was in 
American hands, but the railway station, some two hun- 
dred yards distant and separated by a narrow ravine from 
the town, had been turned into a miniature fortin by the 
enemy. Machine guns and trench mortars, most cleverly 
disposed in the little ravine, constantly annoyed the 
Bouresches garrison, and more than one attempt was made 
both by artillery concentrations and raiding parties, to 
clear the place out. But nothing was accomplished. Along 
the Belleau-Bussiares sub-sector on the left of the line, 
there occurred little or nothing in the way of local aggres- 
sive work for the fortnight following the arrival of the 
Division on this front. Orders were strict against the troops 
exposing themselves; all their strength was being reserved 
for the grand attack in preparation; but had it not been for 
a brisk little fight in Vaux, one would incline to think, for 
once, the infantry's fighting edge was a bit dulled from the 



THE MARNE-CHAMPAGNE DEFENSIVE 165 

continued harassment of the enemy fire, the strain of an- 
ticipation, scanty food, and temporary inability to retali- 
ate on a foe who appeared especially aggressive and well 
served by his aeroplanes. 

The incident at Vaux, however, revived all spirits. This 
stricken heap of stones, lying under the shoulder of Hill 
204, and commanded by high ground to the east, belonged 
in the charge of the 101st Infantry, on the extreme right 
of the sector. Only sentry posts were kept there by day, but 
at night platoons moved in, covering the town and the 
railway. On the night of July 13-14, the little garrison was 
subjected to a very heavy fire, both high-explosive and 
gas, lasting upwards of four hours. At dawn of the 14th 
the platoons started to go back to their regular day posi- 
tions; and observers, seeing groups coming down into 
Vaux from the high ground, believed the latter to be a 
platoon of the Americans. As a consequence, the groups — 
who happened to be Germans — were not disturbed, and 
proceeded to occupy both the village and the railway 
station with machine guns. Promptly, however, the Vaux 
detachment of the 101st Infantry, under Lieutenants W. 
Fitzgerald, E. J. Price, and J. Rose, advanced to dislodge 
the intruders, on orders from Regimental Headquarters. 
Aided by an effective box barrage of our artillery, which 
was dropped behind and around Vaux in order to cut off 
the German's way out, the Boston infantry proceeded to 
oust the enemy from the village most methodically. The 
railway station and an adjoining line of shell craters were 
the principal objectives, where the Germans had installed 
several machine guns, but the station was cleared very 
rapidly. Gaining by hook or crook a point of vantage close 
under the walls, clear of the machine-gun fire, a group 
from *'K" Company tossed grenades over the roofless 
walls, thus driving out the gun crews, who, as they ran, 
were fired on by automatic-rifle men. Private D. Ross 
captured, single-handed, a machine gun which had been 



166 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

set up in one of the village streets; small parties cleared 
out the enemy riflemen the length of the railway embank- 
ment and the shell holes; many were shot down as they re- 
treated to the cover of the woods; and the whole was con- 
ducted with very small losses and the capture of eighteen 
prisoners. Early in the evening a German artillery bom- 
bardment, which had all the characteristics of "prepara- 
tion fire," came down again on the lines about Vaux. On 
the edge of the woods a body of his infantry was discerned 
deploying for attack. But his demonstration — whatever 
its intention — was not pressed. Promptly taken under 
heavy fire from both the artillery and the rifles of our in- 
fantry, the German formation dispersed in some disorder. 

But the incident, like all movements or actions in war, 
must be considered only in connection with other activ- 
ities of the moment. No action is isolated, unrelated, with- 
out bearing on a general plan; there is no minor enterprise, 
no troop movement by any unit of a large force which does 
not receive its impetus and derive its character as merely 
a link in the great chain of events being forged by the 
master-smiths. To the 101st Infantry, snarling and snap- 
ping at the troublesome foe in front of it, the Vaux affair 
seemed at the time entirely localized; but actually this 
display of German energy, such as it was, must be con- 
sidered as intended to attain a definite object as part of 
the renew^ed attacks of Von Boehn on a large scale along 
the Marne, which were fully developed on the following 
day. 

July 15 Von Boehn commenced in earnest the long- 
awaited movement. That day the armies of Von Mudra 
and Von Einem flung themselves at Gouraud east of 
Rheims, in Champagne. That day, while the Germans 
fatally deepened their Marne salient between Fossoy and 
Clairizet, the American Third Division at Fossoy, at Vaux 
(on the Marne), and in Chateau-Thierry, forbade the foe 
to widen it; and farther east, the Germans never reached 



CHAMPAGNE-MARNE DEFENSIVE 167 

Gouraud's main battle zone. On the 16tli and 17th more 
ground was won south of the river, where now the Ger- 
mans had pushed forward eight divisions; but the impor- 
tant ridges stayed in French hands and the French artil- 
lery commanded the river crossings. Committed to follow 
up his advance to the south, the enemy had left his right 
flank dangerously exposed on the (Soissons-Chateau- 
Thierry) side of the deep salient. Over-extended, pinned 
to the ground he had won, he could not divert his reserves 
to meet danger from the west. The moment had come for 
the counter-stroke. 



CHAPTER XII 

THE AISNE-MARNE OFFENSIVE — FIRST PHASE 

AS the Division stands to its arms, through the days 
of the so-called " Champagne-Marne Defensive," 
let us look at its situation with respect to other troops be- 
side it. Minor changes in the positions of divisions occurred, 
owing to the relief of units on the line; but the order of 
battle on the western side of the Marne salient, after the 
Twenty-Sixth returned to the front, may be taken as not 
differing materially from that of July 15. 

Away to the left, at the hinge of the salient, to the west 
of Soissons, the Tenth French Army was holding in front 
of the Foret de I'Aigue, Compiegne, and Villers-Cotterets; 
its right rested on the line Crepy-en-Valois-Coyolles- 
Faverolles. From thence southerly to Saint-Gengolph and 
Vaux (inclusive) lay the Sixth French Army of Degoutte, 
in which were included, from left to right, the Second 
French Corps (33d and 2d Divisions, French), Seventh 
French Corps (47th and 164th Divisions, French), and 
First American Corps, with the 167th (French) on the left 
of its line and the Twenty-Sixth on the right. Next, cov- 
ering Chateau-Thierry and the Marne as far as Dormans, 
was the Thirty-Eighth French Corps, including, from left 
to right, the Thirty-Ninth French, Third American, 125th 
French Divisions. The Thirty-Ninth, which had led the 
first Verdun counter-attack February 26, 1916, and had 
advanced on the British right in the desperate doings on 
the Somme with magnificent dash and complete success, 
was immediately next to the Twenty-Sixth; and the latter, 
knowing itself to be brigaded on the battle front with some 
of the finest infantry in Europe, felt a thrill of pride in 
realizing that where it now held and where it was to attack 



fj 



1^ 


1^ 1 1 

« t- X ■ 

« /) uj 2 5 J 
^ ^ J ^ _i V) 





THE AISNE-MARNE OFFENSIVE 169 

were considered points so important as to be entrusted 
only to troops of tried excellence. 

On the left of the Division lay another unit of the First 
Corps — the 167th Division (French). Thorough arrange- 
ments for the exchange of information and joint action in- 
cluded the assignment of information ojQScers and agents 
at the respective Divisional Headquarters; ^ while officers 
from the Corps maintained touch between the Twenty- 
Sixth and superior Headquarters. Communication by wire 
and messengers was assured; the divisional message center 
was carefully organized to insure the prompt and intelli- 
gent handling of all orders and other messages having to 
do with operations. 

Important changes in command occurred during the 
days immediately preceding the Division's entrance into 
the general engagement. On July 10, Major J. L. Howard 
was transferred to the Division Staff as Divisional Ma- 
chine-Gun Officer, being succeeded in command of the 
lOlst Machine-Gun Battalion by Major M. G. Bulkeley, 
Jr. July 12 Colonel John H. Sherburne, who had com- 
manded the 101st Field Artillery with conspicuous success, 
was promoted to be Brigadier-General and transferred to 
duty with the 167th Artillery Brigade. He continued to 
perform duty with his old command, however, until July 
25. July 16, on the very eve of the attack, the 51st In- 
fantry Brigade underwent a change of leaders, as Brig- 
adier-General Traub was promoted to Major-General and 
transferred to the command of the Thirty-Fifth Division 
(Missouri National Guard), his place being taken by 
Colonel George H. Shelton, 104th Infantry, now promoted 
to be Brigadier-General. 

Nor did the imminence of a general engagement check 
the operation of the machinery by which officers and non- 
commissioned officers were taken out of units on the line 

^ To the 39th Division and the 167th Division were attached Captain R. 
Peters and Lieutenant J. P. King respectively. 



170 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

for the sake of supplying divisions in the United States. 
The cardinal principle of supply — that combat forces 
should have no care other than the accomplishment of 
their battle mission — was in this case oddly reversed. Few 
officers were sent from the replacement depots to fill va- 
cancies in the Twenty-Sixth; but the call on the Divi- 
sion's front-line battalions to help recruit training units 
was continual. There were moments when it required good 
discipline in regimental commanders to accept the wisdom 
of the theory that the good of the whole army, rather than 
that of his own unit, must be first considered under all 
circumstances. 

Sharply and suddenly the time of waiting ended. July 
16 there was received at Division Headquarters a mem- 
orandum from the Corps entitled: "Action to be taken by 
the First Corps in case of the withdrawal of the enemy.'* 
Immediately, the Division Commander called a conference 
of the brigadiers and others concerned; and later that day 
there were issued Instructions No. 74, outlining, in further- 
ance of the Corps' plan of action, the scope and purpose 
of any advance by the Division against the enemy's lines. 
What amounted to a warning that operations were im- 
pending was transmitted that evening to the infantry 
colonels: "No working parties will be sent out to-night." 
The eight words, under the circumstance, were eloquent, 
indeed. 

But secrecy was imperative. The great counter-stroke 
was to be delivered as a complete surprise to the confident 
but much-extended enemy. To students of the Second 
Battle of the Marne, now to begin, it has been difficult to 
understand how Von Boehn, or the German High Com- 
mand, permitted the risk involved in leaving the western 
side of the Chateau-Thierry salient exposed to Foch's 
blow. Between Chateau-Thierry and the vicinity of Sois- 
sons. Von Boehn had, on July 18, but eight divisions in 
line and six in reserve, surely a force slight enough for that 



THE AISNE-MARNE OFFENSIVE 171 

length of line. But it may be considered probable that 
he far underestimated Foch's available reserves; and the 
"army of pursuit" under Von Carlowitz was assembled 
in the interior of the salient, ready for use in any direction. 
If a hint of Foch's intentions was wafted across the lines, 
through some luckless prisoner, perhaps, the Allies' diflS- 
culties would be increased enormously; and so the issue of 
specific attack orders had to be delayed till the last pos- 
sible moment. Not till 22.15 o'clock ^ on July 17 was there 
received the all-important Corps order ^ for the Division's 
entrance into the battle. And the accompanying letter 
prescribed that **H" hour — the time for the forward 
movement to begin — was to be 4.35 o'clock on July 18.' 
Six hours in which to draft, issue, and have executed 
the orders for the Division's attack ! Six hours in which 
to notify the artillery, signalmen, machine-gunners, and 
trains, to dispose and form the infantry battahons for 
tlieir attack, to get the connection groups in position, to 
insure that every commander down to company and pla- 
toon leaders knew his task! Six hours, while a torrential 
rain and thunderstorm helped the persistent enemy guns 

' The military system of designating the hours of the day by the numbers 
0.00 to 24.00, instead of by the familiar a.m. and p.m. numbers, is here employed. 

2 Field Order No. 9, First Army Corps, dated July 17, 1918, 17.30 o'clock. 

' Headquarters First Army Corps, American E.F. 

July 17, 1918 
From: Commanding General, 1st Army Corps. 
To: Commanding General, 26th Division. 
Subject: J day and H hour. 

1. J Day is the 18th of July. 

2. H hour is 4.35 o'clock. 

3. No artillery fire will be permitted before 4.35 a.m., after which it is well 
understood that the advance will begin in order to capture the advanced 
posts of the enemy as stated in Field Order No. 9. 

4. This order will not be transmitted by phone to any one, but carried by offi- 
cers to the different echelons concerned. 

5. Watches will be very carefully synchronized this evening according to the 
time given by wireless at 8 o'clock. In case this time has not been received, 
you will take the hour from the officer presenting these instructions. 

By command of Major-General Liggett: 

Malin Craig 
Chief of Staff 



172 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

to make travel on the roads no easy task for the staff 
officers and messengers, who were sent flying to the Bri- 
gade Headquarters, and thence forward to the waiting 
battaHons. 

The general instructions outlining the strategic purpose 
of the counter-attack had made clear both the immediate 
object to be gained and the manner in which the advance 
against Von Boehn's right must proceed. To take his army 
in reverse; to cut his communications in the area between 
the Aisne and Marne, by simultaneous attacks oij both 
his right and left toward Fere-en-Tardenois — these were 
set out as representing the task in hand. But all elements 
of the line attacking from the west could not advance at the 
same time. The left, being farthest distant from the gen- 
eral objective, would have to move first, while the right, 
as pivot, must hold fast till the left had come level with it. 

Thus, the Twenty-Sixth Division must regulate its ad- 
vance on the 167th French, its neighbor on the left. And 
the 51st Infantry Brigade in turn, holding the sickle-shaped 
line between Vaux and Bouresches, had to stay its hand 
until the 52d, between Bouresches and Bussiares, had 
straightened out abreast of the Division's right. On July 
18, when the general attack was to be continued by the 
New Englanders and the 167th (the forward elements of 
the First Army Corps), the initial move forward of the 
Twenty-Sixth would naturally, therefore, be made by 
Cole's brigade of Maine and Massachusetts men. 

Aware that his brigade could be first called upon, Cole 
had issued the necessary instructions on July 17, and com- 
pleted his dispositions. It was hardly necessary for him to 
wait for the Division attack order. Indeed, as it was im- 
possible that this could be prepared and issued sooner 
than 12.30 a.m. of July 18, Cole did not delay a moment 
as soon as he heard the hour at which the attack would 
begin — 4.35 a.m. — but at once started his battalions 
toward their jumping-off positions. 



THE AISNE-]MARNE OFFENSIVE 173 

Because, however, the Division's field order presents 
completely, though summarily, the situation faced by the 
New Englanders that inspiring morning, it is here repro- 
duced in full: 

Headquarters i6th Division 
Secret American Expeditionary Forces Gr-3 

France No. 121 

Field Orders? 18ih July, '18 

No. 51 i 0.30 o'clock 

Maps : Extract from Chateau-Thierry, Sainte- ^ 

Aulde, Conde-en-Brie, Dulce-le-Cha- > Scale: 1:20,000 
teau ) 

1. The Vlth Army attacks between the Ourcq and the Ru d' 
Alland, in conjunction with the Xth Army to its left, with 
the object of taking the enemy in reverse between Chateau- 
Thierry and Rheims. 

2. The 1st Corps, on the right of the Vlth Army, attacks 
between Bois Croissant and Bouresches (exclusive). 

Order of Battle from right to left: 26th Division, 167th 
Division (French). 

3. Action of the 167th Division (French) : 

Intermediate Objective: The enemy outpost. 
First Objective: Woods S.E. of Haute Vesne. 

4. Action of the 26th Division: 

The 5 2d Infantry Brigade will attack on the line, 
Bouresches (exclusive) to the left of the division sector 
(inclusive) . 

The 51st Infantry Brigade will stand fast and await 
orders. It will be prepared to take part in the attack. 

5. Zone of action of the 26th Division: 

Left Limit: Torcy, Givry, Les Brusses Farm, Saint- 
Robert Farm (all to 26th Division). 

Right Limit: Vaux (R.R. Bridge), Vincelles (exclusive), 
Les Chesneaux (exclusive). 

6. Objective of the 26th Division. 

First Objective: Torcy-Belleau-Givry-Railroad from 
Givry to Bouresches (exclusive). 

7. All troops will be in position before daylight on J day. 

Parallel of departure: Present outpost line. 
Attack will take place on J day, at H hour, when the 
infantry will move forward. 
Every care will be taken to preserve the normal 



174 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

APPEARANCE OF THE SECTOR, AND THE ENEMY WILL BE 
PREVENTED AT ALL COSTS FROM TAKING PRISONERS. 

8. Troops. t 

(a) In addition to the 52d Infantry Brigade (less 1st 
Battalion, 104th Infantry (less Company D), and 
Company K, 104th Infantry), there are placed at 
the disposal of the Commanding General 52d In- 
fantry Brigade, 3 half companies 101st Engineers; 
101st Machine-Gun Battalion (two companies) ; de- 
tachment, 101st Field Signal Battalion; and detach- 
ment. Sanitary Troops. 

The Commanding General, 51st Infantry Brigade 
will assist by machine-gun fire the advance of the 
5 2d Infantry Brigade. 

(b) The 51st Artillery Brigade, and 3d Battalion, 181st 

Artillery (French) will assist the attack under the 
plan submitted by the Commanding General, 51st 
Artillery Brigade. 

At H hour, the barrage will be laid down along 
the front of the attack. No artillery firing will take 
place prior to H hour. 

(c) The 1st Battalion, 104th Infantry (less Co D), and 
Company K, 104th Infantry, are assigned to duty 
as Corps Reserve, under cover of woods north of 
Issonge Farm (one half kilometer south of the pyra- 
mid near La Voie du Chatel). It will be in position 
before daylight on J day. 

(d) The 12th Aero Squadron will make a reconnaissance at 
H-1 hour, to locate our advanced infantry positions. 

Signals: "I am the Infantry Airplane of the 26th 
Division " — one-star white rocket. 
Airplane will carry white streamer from right wing. 

9. Liaison with neighboring units. The Commanding Gen- 
eral, 52d Infantry Brigade, will maintain liaison with the 
167th Division (French) on his left by one platoon and one 
machine-gun section. 

The Commanding General, 51st Infantry Brigade, will 
maintain liaison with the 52d Infantry Brigade by a pla- 
toon and one machine-gun section. 

10. Axis of Liaison: Mery - Genevrois Farm -Paris Farm- 

Montgivrault-Belleau-Etrepilly-La Penonerie Farm. 

11. Message Center: Genevrois Farm. 
P. C: Mery 



THE AISNE-MARNE OFFENSI\"E 175 

12. Administrative Order will follow. 

By command of Major-General Edwards: 

Duncan K. Major, Jr. 

Chief of Staff 

Cole's order of battle from left to right was: 3d Battal- 
ion, 103d Infantry; 3d Battalion, 104th Infantry; 2d 
Battalion, 103d Infantry. One of his battalions (1/104, 
less Co. "D") and one company ("K," 104th Infantry) 
were held out as corps reserve, but he had a considerable 
addition to his machine-gun strength, and the engineers 
assigned to him were available for use as infantry. Behind 
him, in direct support, was the 101st Field Artillery, the 
batteries of the 1st Battalion being assigned to assist the 
attack of the 104th Infantry, those of the 2d Battalion 
having the same mission with respect to the 103d Infantry. 
I/lOl F.A. was in the vicinity of Paris Farm, astride the 
Paris-Metz highway, while 11/ 101 F.A. was astride the 
road running south of Champillon toward La Voie du 
Chatel and near the Maison Blanche. 

A glance at the ground which the attack was intended 
to secure will assist in understanding v/hat followed its 
launching. Opposite the 52d Brigade were the villages of 
Torcy and Belleau, some eight hundred yards apart. Be- 
hind them the ground dipped sharply into a wooded ravine, 
beyond which there was a sharp rise toward the broad, 
rounded crest of two hills, No. 190 behind Belleau, and 
No. 193 in the north. The pass between them, extending 
east, had the village of Givry at its nearer end, while Les 
Brusses Farm, on the slope of Hill 190, afforded the enemy 
an additional defensive point. At Bouresches railway 
station, just to the right of the zone of attack, there ex- 
isted a very strong enemy machine-gun position, as we 
have already seen; while the heavy woods on the rising 
slopes behind Belleau afforded other points of resistance. 

But the first phase of the attack of the 52d Brigade suc- 
ceeded handsomely. The left of the line (III/ 103) took 



176 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

Torcy in its first nisb,^ and was pressing farther. There 
was little or no artillery reaction from the enemy on the 
advance of this battalion, and for a while the French on 
the left were able to keep pace with it. But the center and 
right of the attack had trouble. The former (III/ 104) was 
seriously delayed in its assembly and start. In the tangles 
of Belleau Wood two of the companies lost their way and 
did not get to their positions until after daylight; the am- 
munition for the machine-gun company did not arrive on 
time; and consequently the battalion commander did not 
think himself justified in proceeding when "H" hour 
sounded. A severe fire dropped by the enemy artillery on 
the battalion in Belleau Wood, with the purpose of break- 
ing up the assembly for attack, succeeded admirably. For 
a considerable period the battalion waited, scattered about 
the wood. Not till 7.30 o'clock did it advance, behind a 
second artillery protective fire. But under a new com- 
mander (Major E. E. Lewis) it attained its objectives in 
Belleau and Givry about 8.30 o'clock, and was once more 
abreast of the left of the line.^ 

^ Following are the messages received at Division Headquarters reporting this 
phase of the progress of the fight, reproduced from the "Journal of Operations": 

(a) "July 18, 1918. 5.40 o'clock. Signal from Torcy that Torcy was entered 
and that there was very little resistance. Troops seen in Torcy. Reported by 
Lieutenant Woods, "D" Company, 103d Infantry, on the outpost line." 

(b) "July 18, 1918. 5.46 o'clock. From Smith [Headquarters 52d Infantry 
Brigade] to Bowen [Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3]. At 5.42 Lieut. Woods re- 
ported our infantry has passed through the town of Torcy; now on heights be- 
yond the town; encountered no resistance; that he saw a three-star rocket from 
Torcy [this means objective gained]. Above telephoned to Corps by W. P. H. at 
5.50 o'clock." 

2 The incident is told vividly in the messages transmitted to Division Head- 
quarters at the time: 

(a) "Pigeon Message: Time 6.05 o'clock. Location: at woods where III 
Battalion was to start from. 

" Did not reach starting-ofiF place until after attack had started. Machine-gun 
company did not arrive until 5.10. Their ammunition did not arrive. Infantry 
companies all late on account of lateness of arrival of ammunition and other 
supplies. When they began to arrive, it was broad daylight and fully exposed, 
and companies were being shelled by enemy. Battalions now scattered about 
woods, taking whatever cover they can find, as woods are being shelled heavily 
by high-explosive. Can get in touch with me through Major Lewis' P.C.Woods' 
P.C. 2d Battalion. (Signed) McDade, 104th Inf., 3d Bn." 



THE AISNE-MARNE OFFENSIVE 177 

The right of the attack (11/103) also met with diffi- 
culties. Like the center battalion, it was unable to reach 
its parallel of departure until 7.30, three hours late, and 
had to have its barrage repeated. About 9.30, how^ever, the 
battalion had captured the troublesome Bouresches rail- 
way station, and had established connection in the village 
with the left of the 51st Infantry Brigade. Beyond the 
station and railway embankment, however, the battalion 
ran into serious trouble. All day it was subjected to an 
enfilade machine-gun fire and could not advance; it dug 
in as best it could, in order to hold its ground. But at night- 
fall, under pressure of enemy artillery fire from Bouresches 
Wood, the battalion was forced to give up its gain and re- 
tire to its original starting-place in the face of an enemy 
counter-attack directed toward Bouresches and Belleau 
Wood, which was presently beaten off. It was relieved 
during the night by 1/103. For a while it appeared that 
this counter-thrust of the enemy's might have real weight 
behind it. A considerable massing of infantry was dis- 
cerned toward nightfall in the vicinity of Les Brusses 
Farm; the section of front next south of Bouresches was 
plentifully laced by the enemy artillery as if in prepara- 
tion for an attack. In the early hours of the night, as the 
battalion fell back from the ground it had won, there was 
considerable uncertainty in adjoining units as to the extent 

(b) "July 18, 1918: 6.45 o'clock. From Cole [C. G. 52d Infantry Brigade] to 
Bowen [Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3]. Have just received message that bat- 
talion directed to Belleau was not ready to start. Am starting them now. Have 
relieved one Major and put another in." 

(c) "July 18, 1918: 8.30 o'clock. From Moscow [Headquarters 52d Infantry 
Brigade] to Morgan [at Division Headquarters]. Have not heard anything as yet. 
Am sending out string of runners to gain information; telephone out of order. 
At 7.00 o'clock no word from Hosford [commanding right of the attack]. Mc- 
Dade had not started, but would start at 7.30, and information has come in that 
they had started at 7.30, and have no information since. Am trying to get it 
now." 

(d) "July 18, 1918: 8.45 o'clock. From Cole to Bowen. We have no direct 
message, but some American wounded; and a doctor at the aid station says that 
they tell him they come from Givry and that we are in Givry. This is not authen- 
tic yet." 



178 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

and severity of the apparent repulse which this unit had 
sustained, but this was cleared up by the reconnaissance 
and following report of the commanding officer, 51st In- 
fantry Brigade: 

From: Boston One Jidy is, 1918 

To: Bowen . 2S.20 o'clock 

They tried to get in (Bouresches). Some possibly did get in. 
If so they are now probably all dead. What is certain according 
to report that reached us is that we hold Bouresches intact. 

It is possible that the motive for this action of the en- 
emy was to be found in the fact that, early in the evening, 
he began to withdraw some of his artillery from the front 
of the adjacent division on the left, in which case he may 
have used the Bouresches attack as a screen. 

The impetuous rush of Cole's left was stayed by the 
inability of the French to make equally rapid progress. 
Meeting a heavy artillery fire in the vicinity of Licy- 
Clignon, the 167th was checked altogether after early suc- 
cesses; and later in the day it was to find difficultj in 
clearing Hill 193, north of Givry. The initial advance of 
Cole's men had carried them to the top of this hill,^ but it 
was necessary to recall them, as Hill 193 belonged in the 
French zone of advance. The result was that the enemy 
promptly reoccupied the hill, from which, throughout the 
remainder of the day and part of the day following, he 
poured an effective enfilade fire of machine guns on our 
battalions in the ravine and along the railway between 
Belleau and Bouresches, where the losses sustained by 
these means by the right battalion had a certain bearing 
on its withdrawal on the evening of the first day. But until 
the 167th got ahead, the Twenty-Sixth could only wait. 
The pivot cannot move till the flank progresses. A letter of 
instructions from Corps Headquarters, received early in 

* As told in the following Field Message: "July 18, 1918, 9.45 o'clock. From 
Smith (52d Infantry Brigade) to Strong (at Division Headquarters). Met the 
Boche on his line of resistance. Sharp fight tooii place, after which Boche turned 
tail and ran like hell up the hill back of Givry, pursued by our troops. I^ppe for 
more prisoners." 



THE AISNE-MARNE OFFENSIVE 179 

the afternoon, reveals so clearly the broad lines of the 
action intended without regard to the temporary or local 
situation, that it bears repeating: 

July 18, 1918 
13.45 o'clock 

From: Chief of Staff, 1st Corps. 

To: Chief of Staff, 26th Division. (To C.G., 26th Division.) 

The 167th Division, French, are attacking in an easterly 
direction at 1 p.m. in liaison with other forces to the north, with 
first objective Montiers-Givry exclusive; second objective 
Epaux Bezu, La Loge Farm. Your division will advance its left 
in conjunction with the 167th. As soon as the 167th moves from 
its first objective towards its second objective, the 52d Brigade 
will attack in an easterly direction, with general axis Grande 
Picardie Farm, La Sacerie Farm, maintaining liaison with the 
167th to your north. The 51st Brigade will hold itself in readi- 
ness to advance, keeping its left in touch wdth the 52d Brigade. 

Liggett 

As a matter of cold fact, however, the French at one 
o'clock of the 18th, so far from attacking in any direction, 
were waiting on the line they had reached early in the 
morning until the situation cleared on their own left. From 
Petret Wood the enemy had brought heavy machine-gun 
fire to bear on the flank of the 167th, as well as against the 
advance of the 164th Division which was next in Hne. The 
village of Courchamps was another center of resistance 
which the French had found too hard a nut to crack; and 
so, while Cole waited impatiently all through the afternoon 
and evening of the 18th for the French to come abreast of 
him, so that he could press on to his second objective, in 
accordance with the Corps orders, he was forced to hold 
his hand. Not till early evening did the French get ahead, 
maneuvering to outflank Montiers and to assault the re- 
doubtable Hill 193, which Cole's men had already scaled, 
only to be required later to relinquish. 

The night of the 18th was relatively quiet. Orders were 
received from the Corps ^ to resume the attack the next 

1 Field Orders No. 11, First Army Corps, July 18, 1918. 



180 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

morning, "particular attention being paid to regulating 
the advance of each unit by the progress of the unit on its 
left." At the request of the 167th Division, whose com- 
manding general paid a visit to Cole late in the afternoon 
for the purpose of asking the assistance of two battalions, 
III/ 104 again attacked Hill 193 about ten o'clock in the 
evening, patrols reaching the top without opposition: but 
again, because the French were unable to cooperate in 
securing the hill, our troops had to be recalled. The fol- 
lowing morning the French resumed their efforts. In the 
direction of Courchamps, Montiers, and Hill 193 they 
advanced, following a heavy artillery preparation; and 
before nine o'clock word was received from aeroplane 
reconnaissance that a steady stream of enemy infantry 
was retreating easterly from Bonnes. A curiously inter- 
esting confirmation of this news was gathered from an in- 
tercepted German wireless message. Farther to the left 
the 164th Division made some progress toward Petret 
Wood with its casemated machine-gun nests; and at inter- 
vals throughout the day came reports of heavy explosions 
and fires in the enemy's back areas, where he was evidently 
destroying ammunition and stores. Montiers was evacu- 
ated; a demonstration by some enemy tanks and infantry 
on the French front was not pressed to a conclusion; there 
was continual evidence from all observers that a consid- 
erable retirement was in progress. But the French advance 
battalions, far from hustling this withdrawal, showed a 
tendency to be content with a very slight forward move- 
ment on the trace of the retreating foe. It required the 
personal pressure of the French Division Commander on 
the colonel of his right regiment to stir that unit up to 
anything like an energetic attack on Hill 193; but allow- 
ance should be made for the fact that the division next in 
line on the left had experienced great difficulty in breaking 
the resistance in the formidable Petret Wood. 
Not yet was it sure that the Corps was being confronted 



THE AISNE-MARNE OFFENSIVE 181 

by rear-guards only. Throughout the day of July 19 there 
was strong artillery and machine-gun activity from the 
enemy lines; the extent of his conjectured withdrawal 
could not yet be determined. For the moment the Twenty- 
Sixth was obliged to wait where it was, with what patience 
was possible, attending developments on the left. The in- 
fantry spent the time consolidating its new positions, while 
the artillery executed special fires on observed targets, as 
called for by the observers, such as the bodies of German 
infantry seen massed and deploying near Les Brusses Farm 
and Halloudray Farm, or the convoys and artillery ve- 
hicles on the roads to the rear. 

July 20 saw the delay ended. Early in the morning the 
167th Division resumed its attack with vigor following a 
strong artillery preparation; and orders came from the 
Corps ^ at 1 P.M. for an advance, upon which there was 
issued from Division Headquarters Field Order No. 55 
at 2 P.M., directing an attack along the whole division front 
to begin at 3 o'clock. At last it was the turn of the 51st 
Infantry Brigade, the right of the line, to move forward; 
and a nice bit of maneuvering it was that the advance 
from its crooked hne entailed. The left regiment of the 
brigade (102d Infantry) followed an axis of attack straight 
east, but the right (101st Infantry), occupying a hne which 
faced northeast, had to pivot sharply on its own right so 
as to link up and move straight forward with its neighbor. 

For fifteen minutes prior to the attack the artillery de- 
livered a violent fire of preparation on the woods and ra- 
vines in advance of the infantry's front line; and as the 
latter moved forward, all batteries fired a barrage to a 
depth of three and a half kilometers. This fire was not 
the typical barrage, advancing in regular progression at a 
fixed rate, but rather a series of terrific concentrations on 
places which were probable machine-gun nests or other 
centers of resistance. From well-sited observation points, 

^ Field Order No. 15, First Army Corps, July 20, 1918, 11.20 o'clock. 



182 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

away forward, the artillery could follow every step of the 
infantry's advance along the entire front, could note its 
rate, could see where some special resistance was en- 
countered. And so the artillery support was perfect. It 
was no mere mechanical protective fire, regulated by a 
theoretically correct time-table, which aided the infantry 
that afternoon. Flexible, varying in intensity with the 
requirements of the moment, perfectly controlled by the 
observers, the fire of the gunners on July 20 was a wonder- 
ful example of a moving barrier accurately placed and in- 
telligently adapted. An incidental activity, a bit outside 
the work expected of artillerymen, was the capture, by the 
personnel of an observing station of the 101st Field Ar- 
tillery, of a party of thirteen German infantrymen. 

And how Shelton's brigade of Connecticut and Boston 
men did travel on the skirts of the barrage ! Released from 
a fortnight's waiting the infantry went forward with a 
rush, in spite of the enfilade from Hill 204 on the right 
which struck the 101st; ^ sturdily in the face of the enemy 
machine guns and trench mortars in Rochet Wood and 
Borne Agron Wood which sought to stay the 102d. Across 
open wheat-fields, with only a minimum of cover, the 
brigade advanced with fine impetuosity. On the left the 
52d Infantry Brigade, sorely battered by its work of the 
two days previous, ploughed pluckily along. Its right ^ was 
cut up by artillery; its left was enfiladed; but by nightfall 
the whole line was on the assigned objective and good con- 
nection established between the 103d Infantry and 102d 
Infantry on the inner flanks of the brigades. By seven 
o'clock in the evening the French had come up abreast of 
the Twenty-Sixth, reporting that the enemy had with- 
drawn so rapidly on their front that they had lost touch. 
Montiers and Petret Wood had fallen; Hill 193, that bas- 
tion of defense, was evacuated. Here, as elsewhere, the 

^ One company was withdrawn temporarily from the position it had gained 
because of minenwerfer fire, but reoccupied the grouud later. 
_ 2 Hanson's battalion, l/l03d Infantry. 



THE AISNE-MARNE OFFENSIVE 183 

Germans left rear-guard detachments, as small as single 
squads, to cover the retreat; and to the credit of these lit- 
tle groups be it said that all of them defended their posi- 
tions to the last. 

It had been a good day. The first line of the enemy de- 
fenses had been broken down; he was in full retreat; the 
Division was on its objective at the edge of the Etrepilly 
Plateau, ready for the next stage of the movement to cut 
the enemy lines of retreat. And how the work of the 
Twenty-Sixth, during the first three days of the offensive, 
impressed the Army Commander, General Degoutte, that 
general's own comments will testify: 

If one wants to judge the offensive spirit which animates the 
Americans and their tactical methods, one has only to follow in 
detail the operations of a division since the beginning of our 
counter-attack between Chateau-Thierry and Soissons. 

It was on the 18th, at 4 a.m., that the order to take the first 
line of German positions was received. The American division, 
whose movements we will relate, was at that time northwest 
of Chateau-Thierry, in the Bois de Belleau, at the pivot of the 
troops, and had taken the place of a division which took part in 
the operations of Belleau and Bouresches, and it wanted to dis- 
tinguish itself as well as those elite troops. But the divisions 
placed at the pivot have to advance slowly, according to the 
progress made by the wings. 

On the very first day it was necessary to moderate the ardor of 
the Americans, who would willingly have gone farther than the 
first objectives. Indeed, at the signal of the attack the American 
troops went with perfect discipline, in rear of the artillery bar- 
rage, to the Torcy-Belleau-Givry line and the railroad line up 
to the Bouresches station. They reached this line in one sweep 
almost without meeting any resistance, and, excited by their 
success, they wanted to go farther. 

However, it was necessary, before continuing the general 
advance, to take Montiers and Petret Wood, still strongly occu- 
pied by the Germans. There was hard fighting on the part of the 
French troops on the left to annihilate the resistance of the 
enemy. 

In order to relieve them, the Americans, on the evening of the 
20th, made an enveloping maneuver which was crowned with 



184 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

success. With splendid valiance they went in one sweep as far 
as Etrepilly Height, the Gonetrie Farm, and Halmardiere. 
American audacity! Notwithstanding the machine-gun barrage 
and the enemy's islands of resistance, they advanced for two 
kilometers, capturing three guns, a big minenwerfer, and numer- 
ous machine guns. Moreover, 200 prisoners were taken by the 
A TTipnccins. 

I could not have done better, in a similar occasion, with my 

best troops. 



CHAPTER XIII 

THE AISNE-MARNE OFFENSIVE — EPIEDS AND 
TRUGNY 

N^'OT from a survey of the local situation, nor even 
from a study of the fragmentary dispatches from 
other parts of the front which buzzed and cHcked into 
Headquarters that night, could the Division get more than 
a glimmer of the importance of the action in which it had 
just played so excellent a part. The New Englanders had 
gone steadily forward, winning all objectives by hard fight- 
ing, with losses no greater than the ransom which glory 
always pays. The American Commander-in-Chief had visi- 
ted Headquarters soon after the battle was joined on July 
18, had cross-questioned the Division Commander, and pro- 
nounced himself satisfied. One read bulletins of Alhed vic- 
tories to the north, near Soissons. But not yet could one 
understand the hour's significance. Nobody dreamed that 
the encounters of July 18-20 had marked a turning-point 
of the war — that with the forward rush on that brilliant 
morning, the initiative and the offensive had alike irrevoca- 
bly passed to Foch, the master who had dared so splendidly. 
But no less a triumph than that had definitely been won. 
To the left of the Sixth Army under Degoutte, the Tenth 
Army under Mangin had secured resounding successes. 
His left, debouching from the wooded country about Am- 
bleny, had never stopped till it was on the Montague de 
Paris, a couple of miles from Soissons, the vital point in 
the salient's supply and communication system; his center 
reached Berzy-le-Sec, cutting the salient's principal high- 
way; his right connected with Degoutte's force in the vi- 
cinity of Oulchy-la-Ville.^ The left of the Sixth Army in 

* American troops with Mangin, including the First and Second Divisions, 
were engaged on both July 18 and 19. 



186 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

two days advanced from Faverolles to Oulchy, not less 
than 13 kilometers; and, more important than the ground 
gained, there had been a heavy capture of prisoners and 
guns, while the enemy, caught unawares, was sent reeling 
back in disorder. The western side of the salient had been 
smashed in from end to end. 

Apparently, even Von Boehn did not grasp the impor- 
tance and extent of the Alhed victories on his left flank. 
Planted on the Marne's southern bank, where as many as 
eight divisions were committed, he hung on for thirty-six 
hours in spite of the growing menace to his principal lines 
of retreat and supply. Not till the night of July 20 did he 
begin his retirement from the river, under heavy pressure 
from the Fifth Reserve Army, under De Mitry, and the 
Ninth Army of Berthelot. Not till early in the morning of 
the 21st was Chateau-Thierry evacuated; and then was the 
moment for Degoutte, directly on the flank of the retiring 
Germans, crowding north on the few available roads, to 
deal a blow which should spell disaster. 

To effect this speed was all-important. At all costs one 
must quickly break through whatever screen of opposition 
Von Boehn might have created to guard his flank, and 
solidly secure the routes by which the withdrawal of the 
troops and guns in the neck of the salient must be made. 
Of these the chief were the Chateau-Thierry-Soissons 
highway, and then, some ten kilometers farther east, the 
road extending north from Jaulgonne, on the Marne, to 
Fere-en-Tardenois. And so hardly had the Twenty-Sixth 
and its French companion division caught their breath 
after the fighting of the late hours of July 20, before orders 
came from the Corps directing a resumption of the ad- 
vance the following morning.^ Forwarded to the brigade 
commanders by endorsement, the Corps order was sup- 
plemented by Field Order No. 56, directing, in accordance 

^ Field Orders No. 17, First Army Corps, July 20, 20.00 o'clock; received at 
Division Headquarters at 21.00 o'clock. 



' THE AISNE-MARNE OFFENSIVE 187 

with the Corps plan, an advance without reference to the 
progress of neighboring divisions. At all costs the troops 
must get forward promptly. On the theory that the enemy 
was in full retreat and that he must be closely followed up, 
the movement of the Division forward was arranged in the 
form of a march in which the 51st Infantry Brigade should 
lead accompanied by the 102d Field Artillery, the other 
troops remaining in position till further orders, except one 
battalion of the 103d Infantry and a machine-gun com- 
pany of the 52d Infantry Brigade, which were to move 
out as left flank guard of the 51st Brigade's column. In 
this the 102d Infantry was to act as advance guard ac- 
companied by the 102d Machine-Gun Battalion; it was to 
direct itself toward the hamlet of Trugny via Sacerie Wood 
and Sacerie Farm. One thousand yards in the rear the 
101st Infantry and 102d Field Artillery marched as the 
main body. Later orders from the Corps directed the ad- 
vance to be begun at 4 a.m. on July 21. 

Through the morning of the 21st the forward movement 
was pursued steadily, without opposition. The advance 
party (I/l02d Infantry) took some prisoners at the station 
near where the Soissons-Chateau-Thierry railway passes 
under a tunnel at Sacerie Farm; by noon the advance 
guard was on the great Soissons-Chateau-Thierry high- 
way. There was every evidence of a somewhat precipitate 
withdrawal on the part of the enemy, great quantities of 
ammunition being left behind, with other supplies. Most 
of his artillery and machine guns, however, he had been 
able to remove. For a couple of hours the troops rested and 
were reorganized. Then, at four in the afternoon, on re- 
ceipt of orders from Shelton, the 102d Infantry resumed 
its march toward Trugny, along the road by Sacerie Farm 
and Breteuil Farm, and through the copses of Breteuil 
Wood. Cautiously, with an advance party deployed as 
skirmishers, did the 102d now proceed, for reconnaissance 
by the regimental commander along the eastern edge of 



188 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

Breteuil Wood overlooking Tnigny and the village of 
Epieds had promptly drawn fire, and it became evident 
that what had started as a pursuit was now to be changed 
to an attack on a!» resolute rear-guard holding an exceed- 
ingly well-chosen position. 

The head of the advance had struck an obstacle which, 
apparently, had not been reckoned with. Not even the 
Brigade Commander believed that the line of Epieds- 
Trugny and Trugny W^ood was going to be held; and, 
farther to the rear, orders and more orders demanded that 
the advance be continued without delay or cessation, that 
it be pressed with vigor, that the troops reach the Jaul- 
gonne-Fere-en-Tardenois road by daylight of July 22.^ 
This objective was a matter of only nine kilometers (5 5/8 
miles) aw^ay on the far side of almost continuous wood- 
land, with two strongly defended villages in the path, and 
accessible only by narrow country roads. The order reached 
the advanced battalions after nightfall, when there was 
no possible chance for reconnaissance or for the prepara- 
tion of firing data by the artillery. But such physical con- 
siderations as these were of no importance; nor did it ap- 
pear worth attention that the Division's left flank was in 
the air, owing to the fact that the French, less advanced 
than the Twenty-Sixth, had been blocked by the German 
machine guns in La Goutterie Farm. Major considera- 
tions — to cut the enemy's line of retreat — must out- 
weigh all others. Division Headquarters meanwhile had 
moved up to Lucy-le-Bocage and, later in the day, to 
Grand Ru Farm, where it remained throughout the re- 
mainder of the Division's operation. 

Wliat actually happened on the night of July 21 and 
early in the morning of July 22 is interesting to compare 
with what was supposed to happen. The estimate of the 
situation by higher Headquarters was partly based on the 

1 Telephone message of Corps Commander, 16. 3G o'clock, and written Corps 
memorandum received at 18.30 o'clock, followed by Field Order No. 58, July 21, 
17.25 o'clock. 



THE AISNE-MARNE OFFENSI\^ 189 

reports of prisoners, who stated that only small rear-guard 
forces were opposing the Division and that a general re- 
treat was under way. To push vigorously ahead; to break 
down the temporary rear-guard opposition; to come to 
grips at once with the disorganized elements of the main 
body — these steps, prescribed by both common sense 
and the Field Service Regulations, were promptly tran- 
scribed in field orders and sent forward. And it was as- 
sumed, of course, that the orders would be promptly car- 
ried out, the first step being for the advance troops to get 
contact with the rear-guard, attack, and destroy it. A 
field message from the Brigade Commander condensed 
the orders to explicit directions. 

We have seen the 102d Infantry deploying past Sacerie 
Farm through Breteuil Wood, toward the hamlet of 
Trugny, late in the afternoon of July 21. We have seen how 
its scouts and skirmishers drew fire from the wide semi- 
circle of woods which backed this village and Epieds, set 
amid the wide fields of golden wheat in a shallow bowl a 
half-mile wide, where not a rat could get cover from ma- 
chine guns. Reconnaissance developed clearly that the 
villages were strongly held; darkness was coming on; the 
advance-guard commander elected to wait till daylight 
before beginning his attack. Behind him was the 101st 
Infantry, not far from Blanchard Farm and Lauconnois 
Farm, waiting for the main body's complement of artillery 
to come up. On his right patrols had made a tenuous con- 
nection with the French; on the left a battalion of the 103d 
Infantry, the flank guard of the column, had come up 
nearly abreast and was lying opposite Epieds, with many 
yards of perfectly open country to traverse before it could 
get near the town. The advance-guard command post, was 
in Breteuil Wood, some twelve hundred yards short of 
Trugny village. 

All the night of July 21 this advance guard waited in 
position with march outposts to its front and flanks. Back 



190 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

at Division Headquarters it was decided that the 101st 
Infantry should attack at daybreak of July 22 on the 
right, while the 102d Infantry took Trugny village. The 
52d Infantry Brigade, meanwhile, was to break through 
the enemy lines at Epieds. But orders from the Corps, ^ 
received just after midnight, directed that, owing to the 
contraction of the Corps front, the Twenty-Sixth should 
take it over, which was translated to mean that the 52d 
Infantry Brigade, on the left, should take over the front of 
the 167th Division (French) while the 51st Brigade cov- 
ered the front of the Twenty-Sixth. Immediately this 
order was got forward, but owing to the darkness and the 
congestion of the roads, the order did not reach Shelton till 
2 A.M.; it did not reach Cole till 5.30 a.m. And to increase 
the difficulty, the Corps Commander suspended the order 
as soon as he was advised that the advance elements of 
both brigades were already engaged in the morning's 
attack; howbeit some elements had already gone to the 
new positions, and the French (167th) had stood fast, not 
knowing of the suspension of the order. 

But all this had little bearing on what was actually in 
progress that July morning. At 11.20 p.m. on July 21, 
Shelton, in command of the 51st Infantry Brigade, sent 
the following message to the commander of the 102d 
Infantry which was still acting as advance guard. 

La Saccrie Farm, July 2l/l8 
Hour 23.20. No. 5 
To CO. 102 Inf. 

Colonel Herbert with three batteries 102 Field Artillery will 
support your attack. He will consult with you in respect to lo- 
cation of guns and targets. Logan has been ordered to move 
his regiment immediately and dispose it on your right. One bat- 
talion of Logan's regiment will be detached as brigade reserve. 
The 103d Infantry, 52d Brigade, is moving into place to your 
left. Establish liaison with Logan as soon as he arrives and re- 
port results to me. Develop enemy's position and his strength 
by strong patrols. At any sign of withdrawal or weakness, attack 

^ Field Order No. 19, Headquarters 1st Army Corps, July 21, 22.40 o'clock. 



THE AISNE-MARNE OFFENSIVE 191 f 

at once. If enemy's strength, in your judgment, forbids this now, 
I will fix upon H hour for a combined attack as soon as 101st 
Infantry has been reported in place. Send 3 runners to report to 
me at this P.C, who can find your P.C. Keep me fully informed 
of developments. The most vigorous action on the part of this 
brigade is now demanded. 

Shelton, C.G. 

So ran the brigadier's orders. In the middle of the night 
Colonel Herbert found the advance-guard commander in 
Breteuil Wood and endeavored to arrange for proper 
artillery support of the morning's advance — a difiicult 
task, since objectives and the exact position of the enemy 
were not yet defined. The troops in the wood suffered some 
from an enfilading artillery fire from the left rear, from 
German batteries which the French had not yet cleared 
from their path; but the advance was arranged, and at 
dawn as the 52d Brigade moved on Epieds, the 102d In- 
fantry advanced on Trugny, believing that the 101st In- 
fantry was already disposed on its right, to cover that 
flank in accordance with Shelton's orders. The action 
developed; and the following messages from the battalion 
commanders (Rau in advance, Thompson in support, 
Bissell in reserve), like Shelton's order, are eloquent, in- 
deed, when compared with the carefully drafted plans 
and the expectations of high authority. Vividly they il- 
lustrate the gap, which is so difficult to bridge, between 
assaulting units and the High Command. Advancing 
from Breteuil Wood and the farm of that name at day- 
break, Rau sent the following message at 6.45 o'clock by 
runner : 

Am held up on my right flank by hostile machine-gun fire in 
woods to northeast of Trugny. Need one-pounders or machine 
guns to knock them out. My right flank is apparently exposed. 
Hostile infantry has evidently pulled out leaving machine guns 
in possession of woods. 

Hardly had he finished this report of the situation before 



192 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

it altered for the worse. A second message brought by the 
same runner says: 

Hostile heavy artillery is bombarding us heavily. Hostile 
machine-gun fire on both flanks; nearest are firing from our right 
rear. Send something over there, or we will have to stop or pull 
out altogether. 

Suffered to approach and enter Trugny without much 
opposition, the advance battalion, 102d Infantry, unsup- 
ported on its flanks, received a fatal machine-gun fire, and 
was hammered at the same time by German heavy artil- 
lery. How severely it suffered may be gathered from a 
third message, sent a few minutes later: 

For Christ's sake, knock out the machine guns on our right. 
Heavy casualties. What troops should be on my right and left, 
and where are they.'' 

Behind Rau's battalion came the supports under 
Thompson. Involved in the attack from the early stages, 
this battalion was also in difficulties from the outset, as 
Thompson's message to the Regimental Commander 
shows, dated at 7.30 o'clock: 

Where is that reserve battalion? We need it bad. Send ma- 
chine guns quick. We can't clean up with what we have. 

And a fourth message, received about the same time (8.30) 
at Regimental Headquarters, from Bissell, commanding 
the reserve battalion, is illuminating when read in con- 
junction with the reports of the other battahon command- 
ers. It is dated 7.35 o'clock. 

Have sent Lieutenant Walker of 3d Battalion to flank them. 
Am afraid to use artillery; machine guns still active, however. 
Must have our right protected. Apparently no friendly troops on 
right. Coordinates of machine guns 63.9-87.G; 63.1-87.4. 
Friendly troops on left apparently falling back. Machine guns 
very active again; large number of casualties from them. 

Checked on his front, though his attack had been assisted 
by a company of the 101st Machine-Gun Battalion 
throughout; with his right unsupported, the advance- 



THE AISNE-MARNE OFFENSIVE 193 

guard commander reported the situation to the brigadier 
with a request for assistance. The latter had previously 
repeated his emphatic order to press the attack, beheving 
that the enemy screen was a thin one; but on receipt of 
full information regarding the check to the leading ele- 
ments, he lost no time in giving the advance-guard com- 
mander the help on his right which the latter had all along 
confidently expected and now was urgently demanding. 
To Logan he sent the following order at 10.35 o'clock: 

Headquarters 51st Infantry Brigade, July 22, 1918 
10.35 o'clock. Message No. 6 
To Commanding Officer, 101st Infantry 

Colonel Parker reports that his advance line held up by ma- 
chine-gun fire coming from about the right front of his line, or 
from your left front. Advance as rapidly as possible and take 
these in the flank. I have already informed you of the fact that 
prisoners report machine-gun ammunition almost exhausted. 
Remaining Germans in our front are reported also without food 
since retreat started. Push thing through. 

Sh ELTON, C.G. 

At the same time (10.55 o'clock), he sent to Parker the 
following message of reassurance and encouragement: 

Cannot use artillery preparation just now on line in your 
front. Position of leading elements too uncertain. Have directed 
101st Infantry to assist you in flanking them, and artillery will 
commence on areas immediately in rear at once. Under existing 
circumstances I believe this will enable you to make the final 
shove that will drive them out. It is highly important that they 
be driven out. Advance will probably be easy after that. I am 
also sending one platoon of artillery into Logan's sector in an 
attempt to bring direct fire upon machine-gun nests now in your 
front. 

Shelton, C.G. 

From the advance battalion, 102d Infantry, strong 
patrols had crept forward through the open wheat-fields 
and along a creek bottom; they had secured a foothold at 
Epieds before 6.30 o'clock, as a message from the patrol 



194 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE ' 

leader indicated.^ But in general, though small groups 
clung for a while to their initial gains, the morning attack 
presently broke down in the face of the enemy's heavy and 
skillful machine-gun fire from the nests in Epieds, from 
ethers hidden in the wheat, and in Trugny Wood on the 
right. Nor did the advance elements of the 52d Brigade 
on the left fare any better, the leading battalions losing 
heavily. On the right the Thirty-Ninth French Division 
reported that it was held solidly (at 10.30 a.m.) on a 
line running through Barbillon Forest, but expected to 
attack again at 12.45; on the left the 167th French Divi- 
sion could not progress past the stubborn resistance of 
the German garrison in La Goutterie Farm, which, like 
every point of their general line, fairly bristled with ma- 
chine guns. 

But again the Twenty-Sixth tried it, at four o'clock in 
the afternoon of the 22d. The 101st Infantry, getting into 
action on the right, attempted to penetrate Trugny Wood; 
the 102d Infantry, its strength sadly reduced, pushed once 
more against the village, after an artillery preparation. 
Detachments from the 101st Engineers aided in the at- 
tempt of the 51st Brigade; while the 52d Brigade, on the 
left, flung itself against Epieds. But nothing was accom- 
plished. Once more the enemy resistance proved too strong. 
During the night the 101st Infantry was forced to with- 
draw from the line it had reached; the losses elsewhere 

^ The message is here reproduced for its human as well as its military-histori- 
cal interest. The whole party was captured by the enemy shortly after the mes- 
sage was forwarded: 

Detachments Co. D., Co. A., 6.30 a.m. 

In south edge of Epieds 

1. Am here with 20 "A" men, Lts. Gates and Milspaugh, and about 25 "D" 
men with Lts. Bushy and Jewel. 

2. Co. "B" has converged away to my right. The Boches are in north edge 
of town, but retiring little by little. 

3. Cannot advance, as Boches are strong with machine guns ahead. Will wait 
here till 2d line reaches me. We need ammunition and medical aid. 

Daniel W. Strickland 
Capt. Co. "Z)" 



THE AISNE-MARNE OFFENSIVE 195 

were severe.^ A holding line was established at nightfall, 
composed of miscellaneous elements — engineers and 
pioneer platoons being mingled with the meager infantry 
forces; and a darkness came down which seemed dark, 
indeed, as the enemy artillery fire played on the woods 
where the two brigades and the forward batteries were 
lying. 2 

During the night a change of plan was decided on. It 
is true that Army and Corps orders of the moment en- 
joined a continuation of the push straight forward; the 
Division Commander was reminded of this both by Shel- 
ton and by the Chief of Staff. But with a full understanding 
of the situation, knowing the futility of a head-on attack 
under the circumstances, which would have attained, as 
a certainty, only a large loss of life. General Edwards de- 
termined to risk a variation from existing orders, believing 
that other methods would attain the desired result more 
surely and at smaller cost. Briefly, therefore, instead of 
sending the 51st Brigade straight against the Epieds- 
Trugny Wood positions, he decided to essay flanking meth- 
ods. Borrowing a little of the field assigned to the French 

1 A message from the commanding officer of the advance battalion, 102d 
Infantry, dated at 5 p.m. says: 

"On reconnaissance of ground, I find that Trugny has Boches there. The town 
of Epieds is loaded with guns. The patch of woods that was shelled by our artil- 
lery still has all of ten heavy machine guns. It is impossible to advance with the 
troops here. Rau has about 100 men left out of his battalion; I have less than 
200." 

2 Special Situation Report from C G. 52d Infantry Brigade (Cole) states : 
" The troops have been under a heavy shell-fire and machine-gun fire during 
most of the night. . . . More than 1000 shells were fired in the vicinity of my 
P.C. last night. . . . The brigade is greatly reduced in strength, probably not 
more than 2400 effectives. The men have now been marching and fighting for 
four days, part of the time at night, and no time have they been able to get any 
sleep." 

Message from Division Surgeon to Division Headquarters, dated 10.30 o'clock, 
July 23, states: "Casualties passing through advanced dressing-station for 24 
hours — 6 o'clock 22d July, 1918, to 6 o'clock 23d July, 1918: 

Wounded 565 

Gassed 368 

Sick and exhausted 293 

Total 1226 



196 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

on the riglit, he determined to thrust the 101st Infantry 
into Triigny Wood hke a wedge, farther to the south, 
turning the left flank of the enemy's line. In person, ver- 
bally, he gave the necessary instructions. The 101st In- 
fantry was ordered to push forward resolutely and per- 
sistently in the new direction. Fatigue of the men, diffi- 
culty of maneuver, heavy resistance were not to count. And 
the response on the regiment's part to the general's in- 
jimctions was taken as a good indication of the morrow's 
success. 

Confirmed in this decision by orders from the Corps * 
which demanded the penetration of the enemy's line by a 
regiment in each division, the Division Commander issued 
the necessary orders for such an attack, which was to be 
followed by an exploitation by the other regiments in line,^ 
and, following verbal by formal written orders, designated 
the 101st Infantry as the unit to carry out the operation. 

At 6 A.M., after a thorough artillery preparation, the 
101st Infantry moved forward. A detachment of two com- 
panies, 101st Engineers, operating as infantry, maneuvered 
on the left and center toward Epieds. For several hours 
the infantry essayed to make progress against the same 
solid resistance which had marked the conflicts of the 22d, 
but in the end the 101st was forced back to its original po- 
sition, being obliged to leave some of its wounded on the 
field. 

Earlier in the day the Corps, realizing that the Division 
must be strengthened in numbers if it was to c^rry the line 
forward, had assigned the 111th Infantry (of the 56th 
Brigade, Twenty-Eighth Division) as Division Reserve 
for July 23 only. It also directed that the Twenty-Sixth 
take over the entire Corps front, ^ pursuant to which the 
Division Commander caused orders to be issued by which 
the 51st Infantry Brigade should take over the Division's 

^ Field Orders No. 20, Headquarters First Army Corps. 
« Field Orders No. 59, July 22, 22.30 o'clock. 
J By Field Orders No. 21, First Army Corps, 12.30 o'clock, July 23, 1P18. 



THE AISNE-MARNE OFFENSIVE 197 

front, while the 52d Brigade, strengthened by two battal- 
ions of the 111th Infantry, should assemble preparatory 
to relieving the IGTth French Division.^ On the heels of 
these arrangements, however, came orders from the Corps 
at about 18.30 o'clock,^ directing an attack by both the 
Twenty-Sixth and the 167th, so previous orders had to be 
revoked. But about 6.30 o'clock in the evening a staff 
officer from the Corps brought word^ that the whole of the 
56th Brigade was placed at the disposal of the Division 
Commander, who was directed to place it at once in the 
line, in order to comply with current Army orders and 
drive the line forward. The new troops were to relieve the 
52(1 Brigade, which was to be promptly reorganized with 
a view to employing its units in carrying the advance for- 
ward. 

All efforts were made to bring the new troops (111th, 
112th Infantry) into position, the movement commencing 
late in the day of the 23d. It should be remembered that 
*'up front" the day's efforts had been disappointing. On 
the right the 101st Infantry had not been able to make good 
its advance into Trugny Wood, while the remainder of the 
forward infantry had effected no appreciable gains, gal- 
lant efforts by the 52d Brigade to get forward having re- 
sulted only in the attack being broken up and hurled back 
in some disorder. The German rear-guard resistance held 
sohdly. But the Division Commander drove hard. With 
fresh troops at his disposal, he employed all means avail- 
able to reorganize his advance immediately and launch 
a new blow against the German resistance. The 56th Bri- 
gade arrived without rations and having concluded a long 
march; the Brigade Commander was unfamiliar with the 
ground and the situation; one of his regiments was in 
Corps reserve. But he was directed to overcome all these 

1 Field Orders No. 60, July 23, 16.00 o'clock. 

2 Field Orders No. 22. First Army Corps, July 23. 1918. 19.00 o'cIoc£. 
• Letter No. 130, G-3, Headquarters, First Army Corps. 



198 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

obstacles, and was afforded all possible assistance at Divi- 
sion Headquarters, staff officers were assigned as guides, 
rations were furnished the new arrivals; the one considera- 
tion was to get the battalions in position for an advance 
at 4.05 o'clock the following morning, one battalion, 112th 
Infantry, being designated to pass through the 101st In- 
fantry in the right sub-sector, the remainder of the brigade 
being assigned to the relief of the 52d Brigade on the left. 
All night the new troops were pushed forward — a night 
of the greatest strain imaginable, coming as it did on top 
of the inconclusive fighting of the day and of the day 
previous. 

Dawn brought varied news. With the coming of day- 
light the Commanding General, 56th Brigade, reported 
that he had been unable to get his battalions into posi- 
tion at "H" hour and so must delay his attack. But from 
the French on the left, at almost the same moment, came 
news of a different color. Advancing after an artillery 
preparation elements of the 167th Division had found that 
the enemy had withdrawn from their front, and that the 
French cavalry patrols had gone forward on reconnais- 
sance and to reestablish contact. Immediately a change in 
the Division's plans were made. The morning's attack was 
declared off; messages to Shelton and Weigel ^ urged their 
brigades forward at once — they were to crowd ahead and 
get contact by every means possible. Throughout the day 
the forward movement was rushed, for early it became evi- 
dent that the enemy had withdrawn from Barbillon Forest, 
Trugny Wood, and from Epieds. To the 101st Machine- 
Gun Battalion (motorized) the Division Commander gave 
a mission such as would usually fall to divisional cavalry. 
With right of way over all other troops, the machine-gun- 
ners were to press through to the Jaulgonne road with 
directions to intercept or hamper the enemy's retreat. The 
sorely battered 52d Infantry Brigade, its fine work com- 

1 C.G., 56th Infantry Brigade. 



THE AISNE-]VL\RNE OFFENSIVE 199 

pleted for the present, was relieved and had withdrawn to 
the vicinity of Etrepilly, west of the Chateau-Thierry- 
Soissons highway by late afternoon ; but on the part of all 
the rest of the Division there was a surge forward, each 
combat element eager to close with the enemy, every man 
smarting under the check which the infantry had received 
in front of Epieds and in bloody Trugny Wood. By after- 
noon, with the 102d Infantry again in the lead, the col- 
umns of the 51st Infantry Brigade were on the edge of La 
Fere Forest, where its left rested five hundred yards to the 
east of La Logette Pond. Toward evening battalions of the 
56th Brigade were got into the advance-guard position; 
the artillery assigned to the brigade was in close support; 
and the 101st Machine-Gun Battalion (checked in its 
rapid advance) bivouacked close to Shelton's Headquarters 
in Grange Marie Farm. 

While it was known that a brigade of the Forty-Second 
Division was intended to arrive in the area that day (24th 
July) by motor- truck, and effect the relief of the 51st and 
56th Brigades, while arrangements were in hand to have 
the newcomers take up the pursuit at dawn on July 25,^ 
nevertheless the advance must be kept up without relax- 
ation. Steadily forward, therefore, had Shelton pushed his 
battalions until darkness was at hand, when the impossi- 
bility of reconnaissance and the necessity of taking up 
positions in readiness for deployment into approach forma- 
tions made a further advance in column for the moment 
impracticable. At nightfall, therefore, the infantry halted 
in La Fere Forest, awaiting detailed orders. From Divi- 
sion Headquarters, moreover, had been dispatched the 
following message, which gave Shelton the most specific 
instructions possible, and confirmed him not only in his 
action of halting in place in La Fere Wood, but also in 
the belief that the relief of his exhausted troops was at 
hand: 

1 Field Orders No. 63, 24 July, 1918, 1G.45 o'clock. 



200 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

Eq. 26th Div., 24 Juhj, 1918, 14.00 o'clock 
Message No. 3. 
To: Commanding General, 51st Infantry Brigade. 

1. The infantry of the 26th Division will be relieved during 
the night 24/25 July by a brigade of the 42d Division. This re- 
lief will be accomplished so as to enable the brigade of the 42d 
Division to take up the pursuit of the enemy at dawn, 25 July, 
1918. 

2. The 51st Brigade will remain in place under cover until 
further orders. 

3. You will immediately report in the most expeditious way 
the location of your units. Telephone connection with the Divi- 
sional P.C. should be obtained at the earliest practicable hour. 

By command of Major-General Edwards: 

Duncan K. Major, Jr. 
Chief of Staff 

With what feelings, therefore, must Shelton have re- 
ceived the subsequent orders ^ which, owing to the cou- 
riers' difficulty on the congested roads, did not reach him 
till midnight. The Division Chief of Staff, who had arrived 
at Grange Marie Farm about the same time as the orders, 
insisted that the following directions should be taken 
literally, as exactly expressing the Corps' desire: 

The 1st Corps is to be pushed forward to-night without cessa- 
tion. A supreme effort is tobe made to attack and take Sergy not 
later than 2 o'clock on the morning of July 25, and to push on 
without delay to the plateau beyond. 

The Sergy Plateau must be reached just prior to the break of 
day. Accomplishment of this will permit the Cavalry Corps to 
pass through and effectively break up a hard-pressed and re- 
treating enemy. A complete victory is at hand. 

The 26th Division (less 52d Brigade) and the 56th Brigade 
will push forward on Sergy and the plateau to the east of Sergy. 

To this project Shelton opposed objections with the 
blunt frankness of the commander on the ground w%o 
knows conditions. It w^as physically impossible even to 
get his battalions in formation to start the advance before 
dawn; the artillery plans had not been made; he had no 

1 Field Orders No. 64. 24 July, 1918, 20,30 o'clock. 



THE AISNE-MARNE OFFENSIVE 201 

instructions as to supply or evacuation; there was no 
cliance for reconnaissance; his troops were utterly ex- 
hausted. At the very hour that this order was dehvered, 
the German artillery was drenching La Fere Forest with 
gas and lacing the wood roads with high-explosive shell. 
And when the Chief of Staff insisted, Shelton, in the pres- 
ence of his regimental commanders, demanded an auto- 
graphed confirmation. 

What the Chief of Staff composed in answer to this 
request has a quaintly human interest. His message ran: 

Hq. 26th Division 
0.35 o'clock, 25 July, 1918 

From: C. of S. 

To: C. G. 51st Infantry Brigade. 

Subject : Farther Advance. 

1. You will make every preparation to attack at H hour 
25 July, 1918. H hour may be as early as 4.00 o'clock. 

2. Notice to attack will be announced from Division Head- 
quarters. 

D. K. Major, Jr. 
Chief of Staff 

The fact that this order was not signed "by Command" 
made it a semblance of an order, and nothing more. It 
evidenced that ready ingenuity, property of all good sol- 
diers, in reconciling on paper, at least, any disparity be- 
tween real conditions at the front and assumed conditions 
at the rear. "H" hour never was announced; though ofl5- 
cers from every unit in the brigade and from the artillery 
waited at Grange Marie Farm till three hours after the 
moment they were directed to be in Sergy. 

The day saw the 167th French Division make its way 
into Beuvardes, while their smart, well-horsed cavalry 
patrols got forward into La Fere Forest; away on the right 
the Thirty-Ninth French Division, emerging from Bar- 
billon Forest, were forced to spend time and strength in 
forcing a way through the village of Le Charmel. The in- 
fantry of the Forty-Second Division began to arrive; and 



202 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

during the late afternoon and evening the 51st Infantry- 
Brigade, and also the 56th, gave place to the newcomers 
on the line through La Fere Forest, Fary Farm, and thence 
to the Jaulgonne road. 

The fight was over, so far as the riflemen and machine- 
gunners were concerned. The new battalions got to their 
places, and command passed to the Commanding General, 
Forty-Second Division, at 19 o'clock, July 25. 

The fight was over, with eighteen kilometers of ground 
gained in the face of stubborn resistance. The American 
Commander-in-Chief had visited the Division and praised 
its work; the French Army Commander, after twitting 
the Division Commander with having ventured to deviate 
from Army orders, the while broadly smiling his approval 
of a move which accomplished a purpose and saved lives, 
singled out the Twenty-Sixth as exemplifying the best 
characteristics of the American troops; the local French 
municipal authorities, from whose doors the Division had 
helped avert the German flood, penned testimonials elo- 
quent of their gratitude. Perhaps, indeed, that which made 
the soldiers reaUze most vividly that they had helped to 
stem, not only a military, but a national peril, was the 
sight of the peasants creeping back to their wrecked vil- 
lages, eager and able to start life anew, thanks to les 
Americains, even before the troops had completed their 
march along the Httered roadways toward the rear. 



CHAPTER XIV 
THE AISNE-:MARNE offensive — AFTERWARDS 

THE artillery, ammunition train, engineers, and signal 
troops stayed on. In the wake of the infantry of two 
other divisions the gunners moved forward, forever firing, 
forever limbering up with their scarecrow teams, but with 
drivers and cannoneers who were always game, with staff 
and battery officers who toiled most tirelessly. Official 
military reports are interesting mainly to experts; but 
there is a story of devotion, discipline, and skill between 
the lines of General Aultman's every paragraph which 
has an appeal for every reader. The following extracts 
from Aultman's report relate vividly the work of the ar- 
tillery after the relief of the Division's infantry and ma- 
chine-gun units: 

On the night of July 25-26, 1918, the Infantry of the 26th 
Division and the 56th Brigade were relieved by the 8-4th Bri- 
gade of the 42d Division (Brig.-Gen, R, A. Brown, N.A.). At 
the same time the 83d Brigade, 42d Division (Brig.-Gen. M. J. 
Lenihan, N.A.), relieved the 167th Division (French), thus 
placing the 42d Division on the entire 1st Corps front. 

As a part of this plan, the Divisional Artillery of the 42d Divi- 
sion was to reenforce the 51st F.A. Brigade on the night of July 
25-26. The extension of the divisional front of the 42d Division, 
however, resulted in diverting the 42d Divisional Artillery to the 
support of the 83d Brigade, leaving the 51st F.A. Brigade in 
support of the 84th Infantry Brigade alone. 

The command passed from the 26th Division to the 42d Divi- 
sion upon the passage of the first units of the latter through the 
front line of the 26th Division, this actually taking place on the 
morning of July 26. . . . In the foregoing operations, while 
the command post of the brigade was frequently at a consider- 
able distance from Division Headquarters, liaison was main- 
tained therewith through conferences at Division Headquarters, 
and through visits of the Division Commander and the Chief of 
Staff to the forward Brigade P.C. 



204 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

On the afternoon of July 26, plans were made to support the 
attack on our right of the 39th French Division and the 3d 
American Division. The artillery preparation was made, and the 
infantry advance found that the enemy had withdrawn across 
the Ourcq. . . . After reconnaissance on the morning of July 
27, batteries were moved on the night of July 27-28 to posi- 
tions in the vicinity of Esperance Farm, Four-a-Verre, La Croix 
Blanche Farm, and Croix Rouge Farm, covering with their fire 
the plateau north and east of Sergy. . . . During the period 
from the morning of July 28 to the morning of August 1, 
with the exception of a slight forward move by two heavy artil- 
lery battalions, the brigade remained in position, and engaged 
in repeated artillery demonstrations in connection with infantry 
attacks on the heights to the north and east of Sergy. Its special 
mission during this time was neutralization of machine guns . . . 
which enfiladed any infantry attack to the north and east. 
The neutralization of these points was especially necessary in 
view of the slowness of the advance of the troops on our right 
by whom they could be taken in reverse, and in whose sector 
they lay. Heavj^ concentrations were also placed upon the vicin- 
ity of the Chateau de Nesle, Nesle, and the Ferme de Camp, 
which were reported to contain enemy organizations. 

At 9 o'clock, July 30, the 84th Brigade attacked the heights 
north of Sergy. Artillery preparation commenced at 8 o'clock, 
and was to continue throughout the operations. . . . Bois de 
Pelger and Bois de la Planchette were to be held under heavy 
fire prior to, during, and after the operation, in order to protect 
the right flank of the infantry attack. This programme was not 
adhered to, and the fire on these points was lifted in accordance 
with the verbal request of the infantry commander. The attack 
failed. 

On July 31 another attack was planned in conjunction with 
the troops on our right. The artillery plan was similar to that of 
the previous day. The preparation was to start at 16.30. At 16.20 
the infantry commander gave orders to stop all artillery fire. 
Five minutes later, the infantry brigade commander requested 
fire to be placed on all points except the Bois de Pelger and Bois 
de la Planchette. With this exception the programme was fired. 
At 18.10 a repetition of part of the programme was requested 
and given, and at 18.18 a request was made to concentrate on 
Bois de Pelger and Bois de la Planchette all possible fire and to 
continue the same until further order. It is understood that the 
attack did not progress, and fire was later ordered to cease. 



THE AISNE-IVIARNE OFFENSIVE 205 

On August 1 the brigade prepared an attack of the 84th 
Brigade, which was to advance on the heights north of Sergy in 
conjunction with the 32d Division on its right. The artillery pre- 
paration was fired throughout, and the advance was successful. 

As a result the enemy withdrew on the night of August 1-2, 
and on the night of August 2-3 all batteries were moved forward 
to positions in the valley of the Ourcq, the light artillery north 
of the stream, and the heavy artillery south of it. The brigade 
P.C. was moved to Sergy early on the morning of August 3, 
when it developed that the enemy's withdrawal was more ex- 
tensive than at first indicated. The brigade P.C. was at once 
moved to Nesle, and the entire brigade started forward in sup- 
port of the infantry. 

During this movement, the 8th Brigade of the 4th Division 
(Brig.-Gen. E. E. Booth, N.A.) passed through and relieved the 
84th Brigade of the 42d Division. 

At 14.15 o'clock August 3, telephonic orders were received 
(later confirmed by F.O. No. 26, 4th Division) for this brigade 
to occupy a position for the defense of the line marked by Hills 
204.8 and 210. Positions were immediately reconnoitered and 
batteries placed in position by nightfall, the light artillery east 
and west of Chery-Chartreuve, and the heavy artillery in the 
vicinity of Chartreuve Farm. Brigade P.C. was established at 
Dole. This order placed the brigade in a defensive position, and 
relieved it from any further mobile mission with the 4th Divi- 
sion. 

It later transpired that it was not intended to move the bri- 
gade into these positions, but to make the reconnaissance and 
prepare for occupation. The order was, however, explicit, and 
was obeyed without delay or question. The positions taken com- 
manded towns and heights north of the Vesle. 

At 14 o'clock on August 4, forward observers of the brigade 
noticed heavy movements of enemy troops in these areas. This 
was reported to the heavy artillery of the 67th Brigade ; but, as 
this regiment w^as not prepared to fire thereon, the 51st Brigade 
took the targets under fire. The final fire of the 51st F.A. Brigade 
was by the 3d Battalion of the 103d Field Artillery upon German 
organizations north of the Vesle. 

At 17 o'clock, August 4, verbal orders from the Command- 
ing General, 4th Division, confirmed by Field Orders No. 26, 
relieved the brigade from duty with the 4th Division, and di- 
rected it to proceed to rest billets. The movement commenced 
at midnight, August 4th. . . . 



206 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

The service of the ammunition throughout the operations was 
satisfactory. At only one time was there any shortage or prospec- 
tive shortage of ammunition, and in this sole instance the diffi- 
culty was remedied before the reserve at the batteries was en- 
croached upon. The 101st Ammunition Train, supplemented by 
the personnel of the 101st Trench Mortar Battery, functioned 
admirably throughout the entire period in the service of ammu- 
nition. . . . 

The spirit shown by the personnel of the brigade was emi- 
nently satisfactory, and typified the high character of the Ameri- 
can soldier. The batteries performed their duties with alertness 
and energy. Even after the members of the brigade saw their in- 
fantry withdrawn to rest, while they themselves were required 
to go on, they did so with unflagging spirit and untiring zeal. 
Due to this spirit, the batteries were never late in getting into 
positions, calls for fire were answered within the shortest possi- 
ble time; and even toward the end of the operations, when the 
change of position north from Sergy to Chery-Chartreuve was 
made, the zeal and energy of the officers and men were such that 
the batteries were in position before the main body of the in- 
fantry of the 4th Division arrived abreast of them. 

It is of record, though not included in the Brigade Com- 
mander's formal report, that not a single case of straggling 
occurred in the artillery throughout this long advance 
under difficult conditions. INIore than forty kilometers the 
regiments moved forward, daily firing; and they had been 
actively employed in the Pas Fini Sector for ten days 
before they started their advance. 

Bunnell's indispensable engineers, attached to the 
Corps, pounded along cheerfully at road-making in the 
forward zones day and night, until August 2; the 101st 
Field Signal Battalion also remained in, to sustain the gen- 
eral reputation of the American signal troops — an or- 
ganization whose work and methods are called by com- 
petent French critics one of the outstanding achievements 
of our military effort which foreign services could copy to 
advantage. The 101st Trench Mortar Battery, as has been 
seen, labored splendidly at unfamiliar tasks. 

But the infantry of the Division, immediately upon re- 



THE AISNE-MAENE OFFENSIVE 207 

lief, was taken out of the fight. By easy stages the regi- 
ments moved back, first to the vicinity of Trugny Wood 
where the bivouac, as can be imagined, was indeed a grue- 
some one; then to other areas which had been crossed 
during the advance, until, after three days' marching, the 
two brigades were encamped and billeted in the vicinity 
of La Ferte-sous-Jouarre, along the shady borders of the 
winding Marne, Division Headquarters being established 
at Mery-sur-Marne. Here a pause was made for recupera- 
tion. Inspections were in order; the various means were 
set in motion to reestablish smartness and alertness. And 
it was surprising to note how quickly the men were re- 
stored. A couple of good nights' sleep, a swim in the river, 
an afternoon's pass into La Ferte, and the work was done. 
The haggard soldiers who had stumbled down the roads 
leading out of dark La Fere Wood changed again to real 
men. 

Their numbers were considerably reduced. The few 
stragglers rejoined; most of the missing were found to have 
been fighting in the ranks of other organizations, separated 
from their own in the confusion of battle. But the losses 
had been severe when one realizes that the Division began 
the offensive with little more than two thirds of its author- 
ized strength. The figures are interesting (see p. 208). 

The twenty per cent battle losses of the Division in a 
week's fighting were at least severe enough to prove that 
it was present when the "show" was going on, and that 
it played a prominent part in the grim, splendid drama. 
Of the missing, the great majority wei-e later accounted for, 
as has been said; only a few were made prisoners — mainly 
in the town of Epieds. 

For a fortnight the Division stayed in reserve. Then, on 
August 11, orders were issued for another move by rail; 
and the newspaper correspondent who had come from 
the gossip centers at Chaumont and Paris expressed a 
willingness to wager that, for the present, the Division 



208 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

Casualties, Offensive co:\eviencing July 18, 1918 



Division Headquarters. . . . 

101st Machiue-Gun 

Battalion 

101st Infantry 

lO^d Infantry 

10:2d Machine-Gun 

Battalion 

103d Infantry 

104th Infantry 

103d Machine-Gun 

Battalion. . 

101st Field Artillery 

lO^d Field Artillery 

103d Field Artillery 

101st Trench Mortar 
Battery 

101st Engineers 

101st Field Signal 

Battalion 

101st Ammunition Train. . 

101st Sanitary Train 

61st F.A. Brigade Head- 
quarters 

Totals 



-a 




^"1 


-5^ 






"< 


c^.^ 


-s a 


cS^ 


cS^ 


^ 




1 


1 








8 


8 


26 




1 




54 


127 


111 


20 


232 


41 


139 


415 


35 


44 


17 


308 


13 


2 


70 


13 




13 


17C 


307 


290 


18 


335 


74 


115 


331 


151 


54 


55 


54 


18 


3 


83 


8 




10 


19 


7 


18 


6 


10 




23 


19 


13 


2 


3 


1 


13 


5 


42 




2 




1 




2 








8 


18 


47 


2 


26 


1 


5 




2 


2 


2 




2 


2 


2 
3 

1 




16 




594 


1245 


897 


169 


699 


502 



43 
585 
958 

111 

1200 

760 

122 
60 
61 

62 



102 

11 

6 

19 



4106 



This does not include the evacuation of sick and exhausted, about 1200. 

was "out of the war." Eighteen kilometers of ground 
gained in the face of stubborn opposition; a handsome 
yield of prisoners and guns; ^ a difficult maneuver well ac- 

1 The following captures were reported: 
248 prisoners. 

1 210-mm. howitzer. 

2 177-mm. minenwerfer. 
4 77-mm. minenwerfer. 

1 small minenwerfer. 
18 88-mm. field gun. 

2 77-mm. field guns. 

9 machine guns, complete. 
14 machine guns, incomplete. 
1 pontoon wagon train (for infantry foot-bridge), a large quantity 
of ammunition, consisting of shells of all calibers, and small-arms 
ammunition. 



THE AISNE-MARNE OFFENSI\^ 209 

complished; all objectives gained; its supply and evacu- 
ation service functioning admirably all the time; the pub- 
lic, pointed praise of the Army Commander — all this the 
Twenty-Sixth had to its credit, together with an honorable 
loss in action of some five thousand men. And for the mo- 
ment the Division could be well content to rest on its 
laurels, nobly won. 

From the smiling region about La Ferte, and from where 
the little Ourcq drops into the Marne, the Division trun- 
dled down to a country even lovelier — north of Chatillon- 
sur-Seine, south of Bar-sur-Seine, along the beautiful 
river valley, with Division Headquarters established (on 
August 13) at Mussy-sur-Seine. An area well organized 
by a very efficient group of zone-majors and town-majors, ^ 
with ample drill grounds, and the Second Corps schools 
of Chatillon at hand, the country afforded every facility 
(including good rifle ranges) for training. And promptly 
the Division set to work, some of the regiments under 
new leaders. The effort of the Division Commander to 
give two of his Staff the advantage of serving with troops 
had brought down a sharp rebuke from General Head- 
quarters. He had assigned his Chief of Staff to the command 
of the 104th Infantry on July 31, and the Division In- 
spector, Colonel H. P. Hobbs, had been sent to the 102d 
Infantry upon the relief of Colonel J. H. Parker on the 
same date, the latter destined to win, with a regiment in 
another division, the highest honors for personal gal- 
lantry in action. But promptly the Division Commander 
was reminded that he was without authority thus to as- 
sign officers of the General Staff or of the Inspector-Gen- 
eral's Department; and so the new regimental commanders 
were returned to their duties at Headquarters. To the 
102d Infantry came Colonel H. I. Bearss, an officer of the 
Marine Corps of established reputation; to the 104th In- 
fantry was assigned Colonel G. McCaskey, soon to be 

1 Of the Rents, Requisitions, and Claims Service. 



210 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

transferred, however, following the recommendation of 
a board of inquiry. To the 101st Field Artillery was as- 
signed Colonel A. T. Bishop, who remained in command 
for some three weeks. On August 13 Colonel M. E. Locke 
was transferred from the command of the 102d Field Artil- 
lery to duty at the schools. An effort is reported to have 
been made at this time to bring about the relief of General 
Cole (52d Infantry Brigade) and Colonel Logan (101st 
Infantry) on the grounds of deficiency in troop leader- 
ship; but such charges appeared to the Division Com- 
mander to be without foundation. 

Under the provisions of a Memorandum on training 
troops when out of the line,^ two days were allowed for 
rest and the cleaning of arms and equipment. Clothing 
was issued; the men were bathed; the vehicles, animals, 
and billets were systematically cleaned and policed. Fol- 
lowing this, a progressive programme of work was laid out 
for all units. The methods of open warfare dominated all 
study and drill. With the long period of position warfare 
now definitely concluded, the Division must look forward 
to a w^ar of movement. For obtaining practice in maneuver 
there were directed weekly terrain exercises, the problems 
to be set by the Corps, ^ or by Division Headquarters for the 
smaller units. And favored by beautiful weather the work 
made good progress. The exercises were arranged to re- 
ciuire the employment of all methods of communication, 
since it was in this respect that the Twenty-Sixth, like the 
other American divisions in the field, had found one of its 
greatest difficulties. By the employment of planes from 
the Chatillon aerodrome, good practice was obtained by 
the infantry in the methods of position-marking and sig- 
naling between an advanced line or a headquarters and a 
plane; a helpful demonstration of signaling devices and 
mechanical means of communication was given at the 

^ Memorandum for Corps and Division Commanders, G.H.Q., August 5. 
2 Fifth Corps. 



THE AISNE-IVIARNE OFFENSIVE 211 

Second Corps Schools; and in the second divisional ter- 
rain exercise elaborate tests were made of the Division's 
skill in maintaining and extending communication lines, 
under the eye of high ranking oflScers of the Corps and 
from the training section at General Headquarters, who 
gave careful critiques on the conclusion of the exercise. 

A large number of enlisted replacements were received 
at this time, many being transferred from other combat 
divisions in the area. Many hailed originally from the 
lower Mississippi Valley; and it was very interesting to 
note how quickly these Southerners were assimilated 
and caught the spirit of the Yankee Division. Drafted men, 
hastily trained, large numbers of these replacements were 
very deficient in military knowledge, some having never 
fired their rifles. But intensive training methods were at 
once applied. They all were given target practice, grenade 
and gas drills, with instruction in open-warfare formation, 
before the Division was called again to active duty. 

No leaves were possible. In the days immediately fol- 
lowing reHef from the Aisne-Marne work, a few officers 
who were plainly suffering from overstrain were allowed 
forty-eight-hour passes. But in the Chatillon area there 
was work for everybody, since it was very evident from 
the character and intensity of the prescribed training pro- 
gramme that the Division was about to return to active 
duty; and for this all ranks must be ready. 

The question of animal transport again became acute. 
The work of the Aisne-Marne drive had taken a heavy 
toll of the horses and mules, especially in the artillery and 
ammunition train. During the advance forage rations were 
so low that it was necessary to send all grain to the an- 
imals with the forward echelons, leaving those in rear to 
subsist on hay or by grazing. And so severe was the strain 
that, between August 13 and 22, eight hundred animals 
were evacuated by the Division Veterinary Corps, of 
which thirty died on the road in transit. Some issues of 



212 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

French draft stock were received, both staUions and mares, 
heavy, fine-looking animals; but under the strain of gun- 
fire and the conditions at the front they soon became 
exhausted in strength and had to be evacuated. In the 
Chatillon area forage again was so short that the quar- 
termaster authorized supply officers to purchase hay and 
grain direct from French civilians. 

A draft of twenty-three officers and seventy-two non- 
commissioned officers was selected at this time for return 
to the United States as instructors. 

Changes in command and in the Staff, other than those 
already listed, included the following: Brigadier-General 
D. W. Aultman was transferred on August 15 from the 
command of the artillery brigade to the 166th Field Ar- 
tillery Brigade,^ being succeeded by Colonel O. W. B. 
Farr, formerly commanding the howitzer regiment of the 
Third Division. On August 1 Captain A. L. Forde was 
assigned to command the Headquarters Troop, succeeding 
Captain B. L. Ashby; Major W. K. Mackall, Assistant 
Chief of Staff, G-2, was transferred away from the Divi- 
sion, as was Captain W. B. Morgan, Assistant to G-3. 

It was, in general, a period not only of brisk training, but 
also of reorganization and refitting. Through a pleasant suc- 
cession of sunny days, in a most charming country, the bat- 
talions recovered the strength which the stern days above 
Chateau-Thierry had taken away. Spirits soared again; first 
anniversaries began to be celebrated; ^ and the men felt 
ready for any new calls which might be made upon them. 

^ In Brigadier-General Aultman the Division lost one of its most distinguished 
officers. Of continuous service in the field artillery after 1894, he organized and 
trained the Cuban artillery between 1898 and 1906; he was a member of the 
military mission to Germany in 1914, returning in 1915. Following his service 
with the Twenty-Sixth Division, he filled various important corps and army 
artillery commands, becoming Chief of Artillery, Second Army. He was deco- 
rated with the Croix de Guerre with palm (twice), the Legion of Honor, and the 
Distinguished Service Medal. 

2 Notably that of the famous Military Police of the Division, a picked body of 
men from Massachusetts whose discipline, courage, and intelligence were of the 
grade attained by only the best troops in the American Expeditionary Force. 



T 



CHAPTER XV 

THE SAINT-MIHIEL OFFENSIVE 

HE Staff had just drafted plans for a terrain exercise 
to be held on August 27, when a warning order tele- 
phoned from Fifth Corps Headquarters directed the Di- 
vision to prepare immediately for a movement "to another 
area" by rail, motor transport to go over the road. And 
the very next day Headquarters closed at Mussy-sur- 
Seine, and the loading of the troop trains began. 

The purpose of the movement soon became evident 
enough. When the stations of Ligny-en-Barrois, Tronville, 
and Longeville-NanQois were announced in field orders 
as the detraining points; when it was given out that an 
advanced echelon of the Staff would be established at Bar- 
le-Duc, a glance at the map made it plain why the Division 
was being sent in that particular direction. A unit in the 
Fifth Corps of the just organized First American Army 
was the Division's new designation; and the first activity 
of that great force, under General Pershing's direction as 
a field commander, was plainly to be the reduction of the 
Saint-Mihiel salient, long before determined as the scene 
of independent American endeavor, and so quite generally 
understood. 

In the region between Bar-le-Duc and Souilly, about 
Commercy and Toul, an immense troop concentration was 
made all through the last part of August and early days 
of September. Every night all roads were crowded with 
endless motor trains of infantry or columns of artillery. 
Units of the Twenty-Sixth, on detraining, had to be 
marched immediately away, to clear the neighborhood of 
the railway for other troops; one encountered in the black- 
ness of the night along the dust-choked roads, or halted 



214 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

mysteriously in the streets of a village, soldiers belonging 
to American divisions which one did not even dream were 
in France. Stringent orders to take advantage of cover 
against aeroplane observation prevailed everywhere; 
troops could march only between the hours of eight at 
night and four in the morning; they camped in woods very 
generally instead of being billeted in villages; the whole 
countryside was alive with them as soon as darkness fell, 
where by day scarcely a sign betraj^ed the presence of the 
scores of thousands who crowded into the region round- 
about the edge of the Woevre Plain and on the Heights of 
the Meuse, between Pont-a-Mousson and the southeastern 
rim of the defenses of Verdun. 

Steadily the Division pushed northward. Under the 
traffic regulations of the Corps, it could use only the roads 
that paralleled the famous highway between Bar-le-Duc 
and Verdun — that Via Sacra, by which alone Verdun 
was kept connected with the outer world for months in 
1916, and which now was reserved for motor transport 
only. Frequent steep and long grades made the night 
marches exceedingly difficult for the artillery, badly 
horsed as it was; and all animal-drawn transport had hard 
going; but with the host of troops which were being pushed 
into the area it was necessary to employ every road al- 
lotted to the Division's use, whether it was good or bad. 

Northward (past Pierrefitte, Vavincourt, Chaumont) 
rolled the dusty columns of men and guns, the 52d Brigade 
leading.^ Past Souilly, the Army Headquarters town, they 
plodded and thence eastward one march more, till by Sep- 
tember 3 the Division found itself above the old religious 
shrine of Benoite Vaux, in the vicinity and east of Somme- 
dieue, in which village headquarters was established. 
The movement, ordered to be completed by September 4, 
had been delayed at the outset for fifteen hours by a train 

^ The 1st Battalion, 101st Infantry, was moved up in trucks in advance of 
the rest of the infantry, to expedite a relief. 



THE SAINT-MIHIEL OFFENSIVE 215 

wreck near Chatillon, and afterwards by the congestion 
on the roads; but it was of first importance in such a large 
troop movement that the Corps' march-table should be 
accurately kept; and the Division was up with its sched- 
ule in reaching the Sommedieue area. It had been a hard 
march ; but the troops had stood it well, though there was 
suffering among the none too sturdy animals. 

For a day or two a pause ensued. Reconnaissance was 
made of the sector between Haudiomont and Mont-sous- 
les-Cotes inclusive, at the extreme left, or northwesterly 
hinge, of the salient. To the left, beyond Haudiomont, 
began the defenses of Verdun, sweeping away in a great 
arc round the city. Directly in front, below the Heights of 
the Meuse, where the Allies' line ran, lay Bonzee, the im- 
portant village of Fresnes, with Etain out on the far- 
stretching Woevre plain, and on the distant eastern hori- 
zon the uplands toward Chambley and Briey. On the right 
jutted out from the plateau of the Heights the grim spur 
of Les Eparges, dominating the whole countryside. 

It was the best sector the Division had seen. The com- 
manding site of its trench lines, their excellent upkeep, 
the admirable camps back in the clean woods toward 
Sommedieue, even the warm, dry weather, gave promise 
of comfort to the men and every advantage in launching 
the intended attack. On the steep, pine-clad hillside, ad- 
joining Sommedieue on the east, the French had con- 
structed a very fine divisional headquarters; while an ex- 
tensive hospital system, abundant water, well-organized 
supply and administration facilities with railhead at Ance- 
mont and Rattantout, combined to insure that the troops' 
every need would be fulfilled or even anticipated. 

But hardly had the preliminary reconnaissance been 
made, looking to occupation of this part of the line, looking 
also toward an extensive advance out into the Plain, before 
plans were changed. It was evident that some great pro- 
ject had been in preparation. The day after the Division 



216 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

established itself in the vicinity of Sommedieiie, there 
crept out from among the pine-trees, along a spur track, 
a monster piece of railroad artillery of thirteen inches cal- 
iber which went leisurely into position; a battalion of tanks 
ambled into the cover of the woods in a ravine. The con- 
fidential staff maps from American Headquarters showed 
ambitious objectives indeed; in the areas farther to the 
rear, along the Meuse, there had been a continual in-pour- 
ing of troops of all arms. But different counsels prevailed. 
It was decided merely to effect a reduction of the salient 
to the line (approximately) of Fresnes-Dampvitoux- 
Pagny-sur-Mosellt; and in accordance with this purpose 
the mission and objective of the Twenty-Sixth were al- 
tered. The direction of its attack was not east, but south- 
east. The sector which the Division should hold was that 
which adjoined the Sommedieue line on the right; and 
there, on the nights of September 4-5, the relief was 
effected of the French Second Dismounted Cavalry Divi- 
sion. The latter moved to its own immediate right, as the 
Twenty-Sixth came in; and on the left of the Americans 
was posted the Fifteenth Colonial Division. 

The sector taken over extended approximately from 
what had been the village of Les Eparges southeasterly to 
Loclont Wood. On the left were the classic fighting grounds 
of Saint-Remy village and Eparges Wood, where the 
French had struggled desperately in 1915; on the right the 
Division's line, in front of the village of Mouilly and the 
sinister Ravin de France, was merged in the dense thickets 
of Saint-Remy Wood. It was a confused area of spurs and 
ravines, this plateau of the Heights of the Meuse from 
which the enemy was now to be driven. Threaded by roads 
of none too good construction, intricately defended by 
huge bands of barbed wire strung through the trees and 
thickets, and by many concreted machine-gun nests, the 
zone of attack was not easy to traverse. The woods were 
exceedingly dense, heavy underbrush having grown up to 



THE SAINT-MIHIEL OFFENSIVE 217 

fill the spaces between the trees blasted by four years of 
artillery fire. In rear of his lines the enemy had constructed 
elaborate shelters and battery positions, with typical Ger- 
man forest lodges for headquarters. The sector had for 
months been very quiet, and the always industrious ad- 
versary had had leisure to perfect his fight railways, water 
points, munition depots, even his cemeteries, which boasted 
elaborately carved stone memorials. He was well served 
in the matter of back-area organization, for directly in 
his rear lay the important rail center of Vigneulles, while 
along the base of the hills on the edge of the Woevre Plain, 
connected up with excellent roads, were the villages of 
Vieville, Billy, Thillot, Saint-Maurice, and Hannonville, 
with a second row a short distance in rear. On a spur of 
the Meuse Heights, above Vigneulles, was situated Hat- 
tonchatel, one of the most useful of his observatories over 
the Woevre Plain. 

At first Genicourt was designated as the Headquarters 
village; but this was almost immediately changed in favor 
of Rupt-en-Woevre, where Division Headquarters was 
opened on September 5. Command of the sector — "Rupt 
Sector" on the staff maps — passed to General Edwards 
three days later. 

The order of battle of the infantry regiments, from left 
to right, was: 104th, 103d, 101st, with 102d Infantry in 
close reserve behind the right of the line. Machine guns, 
engineers, and signalmen were all close at hand, camped 
about Mouilly, in Amblonville Wood, Cote de Senoux, 
and Soff Wood. Never had the Division been concentrated 
in so small an area. But it soon was very evident why so 
limited a space was available. Every night, and by day as 
well, taking advantage of the showery weather which made 
observation by the enemy impossible, a steady stream of 
artillery poured in to support the coming attack. The re- 
quirements of the situation, as reported by the Division 
Commander, were generously met; and when at length 



218 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

the infantry moved forward it was to the accompaniment 
of fire not only from the familiar divisional guns, but 
also from those of the following organizations: 13th and 
77th Field Artillery (4th Division) ; 9 batteries, 203d 
Artillery (French) ; 5th R.A.P, (220-millimeter howitzers) ; 
2 batteries, 73d Artillery (270-millimeter howitzers) ; 1 bat- 
tery, 176th Artillery (240-millimeter trench mortars). In 
the sodden, muddy glens and wooded hollows, right in the 
open along the roadside under a sketchy camouflage of 
leafy boughs, the guns were put in position — in places al- 
most hub to hub, while by decauville from Genicourt, by 
truck and wagon, there was carried in a store of shells in 
seemingly endless amounts. The whole area was alive with 
preparation. Not a copse, not a road-cutting, but what was 
in use to conceal men, guns, or material; the villages of 
Mouilly and Rupt were packed; the camps in the woods 
overflowed with troops. For a week the Division prepared 
itself for the duty expected of it, very little molested by the 
enemy in the trenches opposite, its main preoccupation 
being to contrive some sort of shelter from the almost 
steady rain. 

The story of the share taken by the Twenty-Sixth in 
the operation to reduce the Saint-Mihiel salient is less an 
account of heavy fighting than of a maneuver in which new 
situations, continually presented, were promptly and eflS- 
ciently met. It was an operation in which the Division 
Commander exercised personal direction at all times; in 
which large masses of troops were handled smoothly; in 
which the service of intelligence, flank communication, 
and the cooperation of all arms were all maintained un- 
broken and efficient, as well as communication with the 
Corps Headquarters in rear. It was an operation of the 
type which delights the staff oflScer — in which every 
movement goes according to schedule, in which, moreover, 
the unexpected is met and turned to advantage promptly, 
in which control is never lost. 



THE SAINT-MIHIEL OFFENSIVE 219 

The general plan contemplated a converging movement 
against the south and west sides of the salient, the position 
of the Twenty-Sixth being on almost the extreme left 
of the hne, with direction of attack southeast. On its right 
was the Second Dismounted Cavalry Division, on its left, 
the Fifteenth Colonial Division. Moving astride of an axial 
road, called the "Grande Tranchee de Calonne," in the 
direction of Hattonchatel and Vigneulles for the most part 
through dense woods, the Division had for its immediate 
mission to clear this part of the Heights of the Meuse, and 
by thus breaking the sahent at its western pillar to aid 
in effecting the German withdrawal from the whole area. 
The Fifteenth Colonial, in the meantime, was to obtain 
possession of Saint-Remy, Cote Amaranthe, and Combres, 
from which a hold could be assured on the crests above 
Herbeuville, Saint-Maurice, and Billy-sous-les-Cotes, thus 
compelling a German retirement to the Woevre Plain. 
On the right the Second Dismounted Cavalry Division 
had Creue as its ultimate objective, though the woods 
and rough slopes about Dompierre and Deuxnouds had 
first to be cleared methodically. In brief, the three divi- 
sions moving abreast had the duty of pushing the enemy 
off the Meuse Heights from the line Les Eparges-Mouilly- 
Ranzieres to the line Saint-Maurice-Hattonchatel-Creue, 
the general scope of the operation being outlined in Battle 
Instructions No. 1, Headquarters Fifth Army Corps, re- 
ceived at the Division on September 6. 

On the basis of the Corps' order for the actual beginning 
of the operation,^ the Division's attack order ^ was issued 
on September 11. The movement was to be made with 
three infantry regiments in line, each with one battahon 
forward, the other two being echeloned in support and 
reserve, except in the case of the 101st Infantry, which had 
two battalions in the attacking line and one in support. 

1 Field Order 17, Headquarters Fifth Army Corps. 

2 Field Order 77, Headquarters Twenty-Sixth Division. 



220 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

The Division reserve (I02d Infantry and 101st Macliine- 
Gun Battalion) was kept close at hand, well forward. To 
each front-line battalion were assigned a machine-gun 
company, Stokes mortar and 37-mm. platoons, a section 
of smoke and thermite troops of the 1st Gas Regiment, 
one half company of engineers, and one accompanying 
75-ram. field piece. The engineers were equipped with 
bengal ore torpedoes to assist in breaching the enemy wire, 
of which heavy bands extended all through the woods. The 
artillery preparation was to be very thorough. For seven 
hours it was to play on the German defenses, communica- 
tions, and assembly points, save for two intervals, one of 
five, one of ten minutes ; then it would lay a rolling bar- 
rage in front of the attacking infantry at zero hour, 8 a.m. 

With an intermediate objective along the Vaux-Saint- 
Remy road (where the infantry, inevitably disordered by 
its attack, would re-form), the Division's objective for the 
first day was the line of the Longeau Farm-Dompierre- 
au-Bois road, about six kilometers distant from the par- 
allel of departure. 

The night of September 11-12 was dark with rain. Under 
cover of the weather preparations had gone forward me- 
thodically to the very last moment. At the divisional com- 
bat post of command, established in a dripping dugout on 
a hillside above Rupt-en-Woevre, everything was in readi- 
ness long before the hour; even the venerable village cwre, 
w^ho had remained at his post all through the war, was 
welcomed along with the usual information ofiicers from 
the flanking divisions and from the Corps. The service of 
intelligence had been efficiently reorganized by a new 
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Captain (later Lieutenant- 
Colonel) H. R. Horsey; and from long before the actual 
start of the combat, informing messages regarding the 
enemy and the front-line situation were coming in from 
the divisional observation groups. 

The enemy was singularly passive. It would appear 



'***'"*""««^A 




THE SAINT-MIHIEL OFFENSIVE 221 

from even the oflScial German reports and bulletins that, 
while a large-scale attack on the Saint-Mihiel salient was 
regarded as in preparation, there was uncertainty as to 
the probable date and the point of the main attack. He 
held the southern face of the salient very lightly (two 
divisions occupying a front of twenty-two kilometers); 
another division (77th) was greatly reduced in strength; 
another (33d Reserve) had suffered so many recent deser- 
tions of its Alsace-Lorrainers that its reliability was seri- 
ously in question. Opposite the Twenty-Sixth lay the 60th 
and 82d Landwehr regiments of the Thirteenth Landwehr 
Division, who showed, as has been said, only a somewhat 
perfunctory interest in the preparations going on behind 
the American lines. It is possible that these had been better 
concealed, thanks to the rain and mist and wooded coun- 
try, than one had dared to hope; perhaps the enemy's 
heart was gone. But at all events, the first point noticed, 
after the attack started, was the feeble enemy reaction, 
especially of his artillery. 

At one o'clock on September 12 hell broke loose from 
our own guns. Methodically directed on trench hues, 
roads, assembly points, and places in the rear areas, the 
fire was uninterrupted for seven hours, save for two brief 
periods in which sound ranging was carried out. The 
pauses were followed, respectively, by five and ten minutes 
gas concentration on back areas. Five gaps in the enemy's 
wire were to be cut by the " 75s " and one by the 155-mm. 
mortars, which was done satisfactorily; while other open- 
ings were made by the engineers by bengalore torpedoes, 
and by the infantry using wire-cutters at the time of the 
actual attack. The 101st Trench Mortar Battery employed 
thermite shells, which scattered on bursting a white fire 
of terrific intensity. Trouble was had with the mounts of 
the mortars, a number of which broke under the strain 
of firing; but the battery dehvered nevertheless its full 
quota of rounds. At eight o'clock, behind a rolling barrage, 



222 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

the infantry went over. On the left, Cole's brigade had 
to overcome considerable opposition from machine guns 
almost from the start. The Senegalese battalions of the 
Fifteenth French Colonial Division made slow progress 
against the formidable slopes of Amaranthe Hill; and 
this — because it was necessary to maintain touch with 
the French — had the effect of further hampering Cole's 
advance; but nevertheless the 52d Brigade, on the north 
side of the axial Tranchee de Calonne, moved steadily 
ahead across country which afforded little cover, when it 
was not covered by dense woods threaded with wire. On 
the right the 101st Infantry advanced for about a kilo- 
meter with little opposition. On neither section of the 
front was there encountered any artillery reaction worthy 
the name. The mopping-up parties, of the second waves 
of attack, took prisoners at will, dazed by the artillery 
bombardment and eager to surrender. 

It was on the enemy's main resistance line that the 
right of the Twenty-Sixth first ran into anything like real 
opposition, which took the form of machine-gun fire from 
the concreted nests and from the so-called Kiel, Essen, 
and Stettin Trenches, and from Prusse Trench on the left. 
By degrees, however, flanking out the machine guns, the 
101st Infantry got forward to the day's intermediate ob- 
jective, the road between Vaux-les-Palameix and Saint- 
Remy, by 10.15 o'clock; but here a brief halt was made. 
The leading battalions had become considerably disor- 
ganized by the advance through the tangled woods and 
by the fighting; so the reserve battalion was ordered for- 
ward, and from the Division reserve, which had been kept 
close at hand behind the advance, the 1st Battalion, 102d 
Infantry, was ordered to pass through the line and con- 
tinue the attack. 

On the left the 52d Infantry Brigade also made good 
progress. It met a solid resistance from the machine guns 
in Le Chanot Wood; but once this was overcome, the two 



THE SAINT-MIHIEL OFFENSIVE 223 

regiments (104th on the left, 103d on the right) moved 
along without undue trouble. Its left jflank was in the air. 
True, the French had taken the village of Saint-Remy by 
11.30 o'clock; but they had great difficulty on Amaranthe 
Hill, and could not proceed at the same rate as the more 
fortunate Americans. Moving ahead, however, with com- 
bat patrols covering the left flank, the latter got to the 
first objective (the road between Longeau Farm and Dom- 
pierre-aux-Bois) about seven o'clock in the evening. 

In the afternoon a change in the plan of the general ad- 
vance had been determined upon. At 15.15 o'clock (quarter 
after three) there were received from the Corps orders ^ 
prescribing that the Twenty-Sixth should take over from 
the French division on its left the territory which the lat- 
ter had captured between Herbeuville and Dommartin, 
the French not advancing for the present beyond the line 
Hannonville-Longeau Farm. A more extensive programme 
had been laid out for this division (Fifteenth Colonial); 
but the severe opposition it had early encountered made 
it impossible to meet the requirements of the original plan, 
and therefore the Americans were called upon to assist 
in furthering the advance on the left. 

A practical method of effecting this purpose was deter- 
mined upon at a conference between General Hennocque, 
in command of the Second Dismounted Cavalry Division 
(on the right of the Twenty-Sixth), and General Edwards, 
at whose command post the French general called late in 
the afternoon. Realizing that the purpose of the two divi- 
sions operating together was to clear this portion of the 
Meuse Heights, the French commander proposed, since 
both the Twenty-Sixth and his own division had attained 
their prescribed objectives, that the two should swing their 
advance to the left, or north, and clear the high land in 
the direction of Saint-Maurice, whither the bulk of the 
enemy forces was apparently retreating. To this proposal 

^ Field Orders No. 19, Headquarters Fifth Army Corps, September 12, 1918. 



224 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

the Division Commander at once assented, the village of 
Thillot being selected as the objective for the Twenty- 
Sixth's advance. A message explaining the plan was at 
once carried forward by a staff officer to the commander of 
the 51st Infantry Brigade; another to Cole (52d Brigade) 
advised the latter of the new purpose; and the operation 
was on the point of being started when a telephoned mes- 
sage from Corps Headquarters, received at 19.30 o'clock, 
completely altered the situation. 

The Division was to continue its advance straight 
through, said the Corps, along the forest road of the 
Grande Tranchee de Calonne, to Hattonchatel and Vign- 
eulles. From the south the First Division was advancing, 
and the two forces were to meet at Vigneulles, thus pinch- 
ing out the western side of the salient. Thus ran the tele- 
phone message from the Corps Chief of Staff; and it suf- 
ficed to get action instantly. In a moment the Division 
Commander was in communication personally with the 
Headquarters of his most advanced brigade (51st), where 
now the regiment of the Division reserve (102d Infantry) 
was the leading unit. The movement to the left must be 
stopped; a new formation must be made; the advance to 
Vigneulles must be started w^ithout a second's delay. Per- 
sonally General Edwards sent forward his emphatic orders 
to Shelton; personally he set in motion all the machinery 
for the new movement, communicating his own energy to 
all concerned with such effectiveness that long before the 
written orders came from Corps Headquarters the move- 
ment had been begun. At 8.10 p.m. the Division Com- 
mander got word to Shelton (51st Brigade), through an 
aide at Brigade Headquarters; at 9 p.m. he was in tele- 
phone communication with Cole, on the left, directing the 
latter to move out by any roads available on the left and 
rear of the Vigneulles column, with the line Hattonchatel- 
Saint-Maurice (inclusive) as an objective. By 9.30 p.m. the 
advance troops of Shelton's brigade had started along the 



THE SAINT-MIHIEL OFFENSIVE 225 

Grande Tranchee de Calonne. Such, in brief, was the man- 
ner in which the march was inaugurated. It is interesting 
to note the httle elapsed time between the Corps' tele- 
phone call and the beginning of the 102d Infantry's move- 
ment; to mark the promptness and the cooperation of all 
concerned in carrying out the Corps Commander's order. 
A sudden situation, a change of orders, a wholly new dis- 
position of the Division's combat elements, were all met, 
put into operation, and completed within two hours. This 
with the telephones working irregularly, with roads almost 
impassable even for the staff cars and motor-cycles, with 
several of the staff officers (including the Chief) absent 
from Headquarters with the advanced infantry arranging 
for the previously ordered change of direction. 

By magic the Division Commander's word spread down 
to every battahon. It was to be a race between the Twenty- 
Sixth and their old friends of the First, with Vigneulles for 
the goal; to the Twenty-Sixth had been given the task of 
closing in the west side of the salient — the Division was 
depended on to clinch a great American victory. Quickly 
Shelton made his dispositions ; with no confusion the troops 
formed up and started, every man eager and ready. Lead- 
ing the advance was the 102d Infantry. Behind the regi- 
ment came the Machine-Gun Company of the 101st 
Infantry and the 102d Machine-Gun Battalion, closely 
followed by the remainder of the Division reserve (101st 
Machine-Gun Battalion). The latter could not use its 
motor cars, owing to the condition of the roads, so carried 
its guns by hand. A main body, comprising, according to 
the order ^ one battalion of the 101st Infantry, the 101st 
Field Artillery, and then the remaining battalions of the 
101st Infantry, was to follow the advance; but as it was 
impracticable for the moment to get the guns forward, 
the infantry went on without them. 

Along the littered highway, in route column, with ad- 

1 Field Order No. 78, September li. 1918. 



226 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

vance and flank guards, hurried the 102d. In the copses 
and hollows there might be clouds of snipers or groups of 
machine guns left to cover the enemy retreat. There was 
no time and no opportunity for reconnaissance; to right 
and left it was none too easy to maintain communication 
with the Second (French) Division and the 52d Brigade. 
But the word was "Get forward!" and forward the column 
moved, electrified by the Division Commander's pungent 
orders, needing no spur but the knowledge that it had an 
important task ahead and a race to win. 

By the time the column was well under way, the written 
order came in from Corps Headquarters: 

Headquarters Fifth Army Corps (G-3 No. 25-30) 

American Expeditionary Forces 

France, 12 September 1918 
(20.00 hours) 
From: Chief of Staff, 5th Army Corps. 
To: Commanding General, 26th Division. 

Subject : Closing of Gap between Western and Southern attacks. 

1. The 1st Division from the southern attack is moving on 
Vigneulles to join with you in closing the gap between the two 
attacks. 

2. The Corps Commander directs that you continue the ad- 
vance along the Grande Trancliee de Calonne so that by daylight 
to-morrow (September 13th) you will have established contact 
with the 1st Division and will have one regiment in Hatton- 
chatel. 

W. B. BuRTT, Brigadier-General 
THE/w Chief of Staff 

Rec'd 26 Div G-3 
12 Sep 1918 
23.20 o'clock 

On the right Hennocque's Second Division of Dis- 
mounted Cavalry (8th, 12th, 5th Regiments of Cuiras- 
siers) ploughed ahead toward Creue, Chaillon, and Lamor- 
ville. In rear the engineers were working madly to make 
a passage over the wrecked roads for the chafing artillery- 
men. 

Through the night, leaving patrols on every cross-road. 



THE SAINT-MIHIEL OFFENSIVE 227 

gathering in prisoners as it marched, the 102d Infantry- 
pushed along the Grande Tranehee. Ahead of the column 
rode Colonel Bearss, with his adjutant, the French infor- 
mation officer, regimental intelligence officer, Lieutenant- 
Colonel Alfonte (the Division signal officer), and three or 
four messengers. Just after two o'clock on September 13 
this party stormed into Hattonchatel, which had been set 
on fire by the enemy, captured then and there a loaded 
truck train and a machine-gun crew, too surprised to offer 
resistance. Into blazing Vigneulles, at the foot of the hill 
below Hattonchatel, marched the regiment before three 
o'clock. Strong patrols, with machine-gun sections, were 
immediately sent to the southward, toward Creue and 
Heudicourt; and it was in the latter village that contact 
was made later in the morning with elements of the First 
Division. The race was to the Twenty-Sixth. To the Corps 
Commander, who had said that General Pershing wanted 
the Division to be in Vigneulles by daylight, General Ed- 
wards had given an assurance that his men would be there 
at four o'clock at the latest; and his men had made good 
their leader's promise handsomely. 

Comments on this fine performance of the 102d Infantry 
by those high in command followed, generous in their ap- 
preciation. On September 18 the Fifth Army Corps, in 
general orders, published the following citation: 

1. During the recent operations for the reduction of the Saint- 
Mihiel salient, one regiment in particular of the Twenty-Sixth 
Division should be mentioned as having acquitted itself in a 
most inspiring manner. The 102d Infantry (Colonel Hiram I. 
Bearss commanding) was ordered late in the evening to march 
at once on Vigneulles, in order to close the remaining gap be- 
tween the two attacks. 

The regiment marched five miles in darkness through woods 
infested with the enemy, captured 280 prisoners, and completed 
its mission long before daylight. The main roads of the salient 
were cut off, and no more of the enemy could escape. 

This fine example of courage and soldierly acceptance of battle 



228 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

conditions is worthy of emulation. The Corps Commander con- 
gratulates them and looks forward with confidence to a continua- 
tion of their good work. 

By command of Major-General Cameron 

W. B. BuRTT, Brigadier-General Chief of Staff 

To the commanding officer of the 102d Machine-Gun 
Battalion the general in command of the 51st Infantry 
Brigade penned the following letter, which bears repro- 
duction not only as a generous appreciation by a superior 
of the assistant's work, but also as admirably summariz- 
ing that part of the Division's action in the Saint-Miliiel 
offensive which attracted most attention: 

Headquarters 5\st Infantry Brigade 

26ih Division, American Expeditionary Forces 

September 15, 1918 

Dear Major Murphy: The march of the leading elements 
of this brigade, consisting of the 102d Infantry and the 102d 
Machine-Gun Battalion, on the night of September 12-13, 1918, 
from our position at the close of the first day in the attack on the 
Saint-Mihiel salient, for more than nine kilometers along the 
Grande Tranchee de Calonne to Hattonchatel and Vigneulles, 
was of such unique and important character, and was performed 
in such efficient and spirited manner, that I desire to place on 
record my personal appreciation of this accomplishment. 

Our orders required the brigade to pursue the retreating enemy 
and to reach Vigneulles by daylight on the morning of the 13th 
and there gain contact with our forces advancing from the south, 
and thereby prevent the escape to the north of any bodies of 
the enemy still in the salient. To have attempted to push forward 
a line covering our whole sector would have meant, in view of 
the woods and difficulty of the terrain, to fail in the accomplish- 
ment of our mission. The only alternative was to push boldly 
forward on the only accessible road through unknown hostile 
country, losing for the time being liaison with the elements of 
our forces on our right and left, and exposing the advance ele- 
ments of this brigade to the possibility of being cut off and sur- 
rounded by the enemy. This alternative was chosen, and the 
102d Infantry and your Machine-Gun Battalion were selected 
to lead the advance. 

The results are known to you. You took up the march about 
21 o'clock on the night of the 12th. Before 2 o'clock the following 



THE SAINT-MIHIEL OFFENSIVE 229 

morning the leading elements of the column were in Vigneulles. 
Hattonchatel and Vigneulles were completely in our possession 
by 3 o'clock. Soon afterwards the mission of the brigade had 
been completely accomplished. The roads leading from the 
southwest had been blocked. The surrounding towns had been 
garrisoned, our patrols seeking contact with our forces from the 
south were in the plain below the heights, and later this contact 
was established. Many prisoners and a large supply of stores 
fell into our hands. 

I congratulate you and your battalion upon this success and 
upon the bravery and fine spirit manifest throughout its accom- 
plishment. 

Very sincerely yours 

George H. Shelton 
Brigadier-General, U.S.A., Commanding 

Early on the 13th it was possible to realize "what had 
been accomplished. From Vigneulles northwesterly the 
Twenty-Sixth had secured possession of the Meuse 
Heights as far as Combres. From Hattonchatel, occupied 
by the 101st Infantry about nine o'clock, one could look 
across the Woevre Plain, where many of the villages had 
been set on fire by the retreating enemy, and catch the 
flash of Allied guns harrying the foe's rear-guards. In the 
villages nestling in the ravines at the foot of the Heights, 
such as Hannonville or Vieville, a civilian population, 
freed from four years of slavery, welcomed our men as 
saviors. The 52d Infantry Brigade, stubbornly forcing a 
way through the woods on the north side of the Grande 
Tranchee, had debouched at dawn on the edge of the hills, 
and before noon had pushed patrols far out to JMarche- 
ville, Saint-Hilaire, Damvillers, and Butgneville, the Bri- 
gade Commander scouting forward with the foremost. 
Less spectacular than the work of the 51st Brigade, 
that done by the Maine and western Massachusetts 
regiments was exceedingly efficient and well conducted, 
while the men's aggressive spirit carried the brigade's 
advance so far that its final outpost line of September 13 
had to be considerably withdrawn to conform to the 



330 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

general plan. Especially notable was the work of the 
101st Engineers. To them should go the credit of effecting 
the rejjairs to the utterly wrecked roads in the Ravin de 
France in front of Mouilly, on the Grande Tranchee, and 
between Vaux and Saint-Remy which made it possible to 
get the artillery forward. Torn by German mines into 
yawning craters, blown apart by shell-fire till they were 
no longer recognizable as roads at all, these priceless bits 
of highway were yard by yard made passable for the guns, 
so that by 2 p.m. of the 12th the first of them got forward, 
and early next day the whole artillery brigade had moved 
forward to new positions along the edge of the Heights. 

The prisoners captured numbered about 2400. Com- 
pletely broken in morale, they surrendered in groups. Two 
of the divisional observers brought in thirty-nine; three 
field officers and thirty-two other officers joined the ir- 
regular procession which the Military Police shepherded 
back to Rupt-en-Woevre for preliminary examination. A 
regimental band was taken in Vigneulles. Of material 
there was a vast quantity captured. In their retreat the 
Germans left behind large stores of food, engineering and 
railway material, and whole depots of ammunition, as well 
as field pieces and machine guns. In Saint-Remy Wood, 
as well as in the villages, there were uncovered an endless 
amount of salvage of all descriptions, of which our men 
most promptly possessed themselves. It seemed too good 
to be true when real beer and mineral water came to fight; 
the transport oflBcers could not believe their good fortune 
when told that seventy horses and a large number of motor- 
trucks had also been secured. 

The price paid had been small. Casualties were not 
numerous. A deplorable incident, caused by a slip in the 
communication between higher Headquarters and the 
air service, contributed some thirty wounded to the list. 
Just beforS noon of the 13th a bombing plane passed over 
Vigneulles under orders to drop bombs on the Germans 



THE SAINT-MIHIEL OFFENSIVE 231 

who were believed to be still in occupation, with the con- 
sequence that the deadly missiles fell on a battalion of the 
102d Infantry. But, generally speaking, the absence of 
enemy artillery fire, and the fact that his machine guns 
did not oppose a really determined resistance, save at in- 
tervals, enabled the Division to accomplish its original 
purpose, and brilHantly to take advantage of new oppor- 
tunities with a minimum of losses. 

One cannot conclude any account of the action of Sep- 
tember 12-13 without mention of what the victory in the 
Saint-Mihiel sahent meant to the civilian population of the 
area freed by the American Army. One feels that oflBcial 
thanks could hardly be expressed more feelingly than in 
the following letter, written by the parish priest of the 
stricken village of Rupt, where Division Headquarters 
was established for the Saint-JVIihiel operation. To the 
Division Commander he writes: 

Rupt-en-Woevre, September 13, 1918 

Sir : Your gallant American Division has just set us free. 
Since September, 1914, the barbarians have held the Heights of 
the Meuse; have foully murdered three hostages from Mouilly; 
have shelled Rupt; and on July 23, 1915, forced its inhabitants 
to scatter to the four corners of France. 

I, who remain at my little listening-post upon the advice of 
my Bishop, feel certain, Sir, that I do but speak for Monseigneur 
Ginisty, Lord Bishop of Verdun, my parishioners of Rupt, 
Mouilly and Genicourt, and the people of this vicinity, in con- 
veying to you and your associates the heartfelt and unforget- 
table gratitude of all. 

Several of your comrades lie at rest in our truly Christian 
and French soil. 

Their ashes shall be cared for as if they were our own. We 
shall cover their graves with flowers, and shall kneel by them as 
their own families would do, with a prayer to God to reward 
with eternal glory these heroes fallen on the field of honor, and 
to bless the Twenty-Sixth Division and generous America. 

Be pleased, Sir, to accept the expression of my profound respect. 

A. Leclerc 
CurS of Rupt-en-Woevre 



CHAPTER XVI 

IN THE MEUSE-ARGONNE OFFENSIVE — IVIARCHE- 

VILLE 

WITHIN a few days after the conclusion of the 
Saint-Mihiel operation certain minor readjust- 
ments of the sector to be held by the Twenty-Sixth, on the 
edge of the Meuse Heights, were made by order of the 
Corps. ^ Between the Fifteenth Colonial (later the Thirty- 
Ninth) and the Second Dismounted Cavalry Divisions (all 
French) on left and right, the Twenty-Sixth settled down 
to the occupation of the military crest between Fresnes 
and Thillot-sous-les-Cotes. With the four infantry regi- 
ments in line, each echeloned in depth, a chain of outposts 
was also established in the Woevre Plain at Saulx, Wa- 
donville, and various commanding points between; the 
line was named the Troyon Sector, and to the regimental 
sub-sectors were given good Yankee titles like Augusta, 
Concord, Montpelier, and Providence. Considerable work 
was done toward organizing the principal resistance line 
on the Heights, wire being strung and strong points estab- 
lished. As much use as possible was made of the former 
German camps and dugouts scattered through the area; 
but living conditions, owing to the almost continuous bad 
weather, were difficult, and the health of the men, owing 
to the presence of influenza, began to give some concern. 
Notable in this regard was the personal interest of General 
Blondlat, the Corps Commander. Almost daily he would 
make the trip from distant Saint-Mihiel to the woods where 
the Americans were camped; closely he questioned the offi- 
cers as to food, clothing, the arrival of the mail, canteen 

^ The Second Colonial Corps (French) with Headquarters at Saint-Mihiel. 
The Division passed under its orders on September 14. 



THE MEUSE-ARGONNE OFFENSIVE 233 

facilities, arrangements made to get daily newspapers. 
Attentively he would listen, encouraging the freest discus- 
sion; and it is known that his reports and recommenda- 
tions to the First Army authorities were prompt and full. 

For a week or so the sector was quiet. There was daily 
harassing fire by the enemy artillery, for the Germans re- 
turned to positions in and about Riaville, Marcheville, 
Butgneville, and Saint-Hilaire, when it became evident 
that the American success was not to be followed beyond 
the edge of the hills. They sent over quantities of gas, 
which made much trouble for the garrisons in such places 
as Herbeuville, Hannonville, or Saulx. Patrolling was 
very active; and on two occasions somewhat elaborate 
local raids to make prisoners were undertaken against 
Saint-Hilaire and one on Warville Wood, by detachments 
of the 102d Infantry. But there was no long delay before 
another action of real importance was to fall to the share 
of the Yankee Division, as part of the general American 
offensive. 

September 22 a conference of Division Commanders, 
their Chiefs of Staff, and Chiefs of Artillery was held at 
General Blondlat's Headquarters, when the Corps Com- 
mander read to the gathering the plan he had received ^ 
of the Meuse-Argonne offensive of the First American 
Army, with the orders for the participation of the Second 
Colonial Corps in the first day's attack. 

The pertinent paragraph read: "The Second Colonial 
Corps will hold the front of Bois le Chauffour inclusive 
to Mesnil exclusive. The Second Colonial Corps will make 
a demonstration along its front, launching an artillery 
bombardment as well as making extensive raids at H 
hour." This was interpreted to mean that the raids on the 
front of each division should have such weight behind 
them as would mislead the enemy as to the actual point 
of the general attack through the Argonne Forest, north- 

^ G.O. No. 20, Headquarters First American Army, September 20, 1918. 



234 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

ward, toward the Montmedy-Mezieres railway. The pre- 
cise character of these raids provoked, however, some 
discussion. Only the support of divisional artillery could 
be expected, as the Corps had no guns available for this 
purpose; question was raised as to whether the raiding 
parties should go prepared for a stay in the occupied 
enemy positions, or should simply undertake to make 
prisoners and withdraw at once. But the spirit of the 
Army order was taken by the American Division as re- 
quu-ing a real penetration of at least the enemy outpost 
line and its occupation during the day; the withdrawal 
was not to be made until the onfall of darkness. It was 
in this literal, thoroughgoing manner that the Army order 
was taken as applying, at any rate, to the Twenty-Sixth. 
The French appear to have believed that less weighty 
demonstrations would answer the purpose; they chos^ 
objectives and made arrangements, with the Corps' ap- 
proval, which involved no great expenditure of forces. 
But because the possible points of attack opposite the 
Twenty-Sixth happened all to be naturally strong and 
strongly held, and because there was every desire on the 
part of the Division Commander to carry out to the letter 
what was conceived to be the real purpose of the demon- 
strations, the Division was committed from the outset to 
a considerable undertaking. 

An attack was to be made on Riaville, Marcheville, 
and the trench system (Haudinot Trench) connecting 
them. The troops detailed for the attack were formed in 
two groups, one of which, directed against Riaville (Group 
II) included: 

1 Battalion, 103d Infantry 
Machine-Gun Co., 103d Infantry 
Stokes Mortar Platoon, 103d Infantry 
37-mm. Platoon, 103d Infantry 
One half Company B, 101st Engineers 
Detachment 101st Field Signal Battalion 
Detachment 101st Sanitary Train 



THE MEUSE-ARGONNE OFFENSIVE 235 

The other column (Group I), directed against Marche- 
ville, was composed of: 

1 Battahon, 102d Infantry- 
Cos. A, B, 102d Machine-Gun Battalion 
Stokes Mortar Platoon, 102d Infantry 
S7-mm. Platoon, 102d Infantry 
One half Company F, 101st Engineers 
Detachment 101st Field Signal Battalion 
Detachment 101st Sanitary Train 

The whole force was placed under the command of 
Colonel H. I. Bearss, 102d Infantry. The general plan 
contemplated the capture of the towns and establishment 
of a defensive line on the far side of them, their occupation 
throughout the day, and withdrawal during the night of 
the 26th-27th. To support the attack batteries of the 
51st Field Artillery Brigade were brought down into the 
plain at the foot of the Meuse Heights. The full details 
of the plan could not be given to all subordinate com- 
manders in advance of the affair; and a further initial 
difficulty was presented by the fact that the battahon of 
the 102d Infantry selected for the attack had never occu- 
pied the forward positions, and was therefore (and owing 
to lack of reconnaissance) unfamiliar with the terrain. 

Artillery preparation began at 11.30 o'clock on the 
night of September 25, and continued until the infantry 
advanced at 5.30 o'clock on the 26th, Group I starting 
from Hill 230, northwest of Wadonville, Group II from a 
position southeast of Fresnes. The command post of the 
party's commander was directed to be in Saulx; but with 
characteristic impetuousness Colonel Bearss advanced 
with the first waves of the attack, taking with him a small 
connection patrol and the information officers from Bri- 
gade and Division Headquarters. 

A very heavy daybreak fog gave cover to the raiders; 
but this, with the addition of a heavy smoke screen and 
the haze of the shell bursts of the barrage, made it easy 



236 NEW ENGL.VND IN FIL\NCE 

for units to lose diroclion, and in several instances for 
men to come right up on a German machine gun before 
either side was aware of the other's proximity. A severe 
enemy artillery concentration, dropped on the columns 
just as tliey were forming up for the approach across 
the i^lain, had momentarily disordered the assembly; ma- 
chine guns, hidden in a small grove of trees south and 
west of Marcheville, slowed up the advance considerably; 
but before eleven o'clock the 102d's battalion had entered 
Marcheville, stopped the sniping and machine-gun fire 
by plucky hantl-to-hand fighting, antl took up a position 
as directed on the east side. The 103d, meanwhile, had 
been having great difficulty in progressing toward Ria- 
villc; elements which gained the edge of the town were 
driven back, so that this wing of the attack was stopped 
short early in the day. The Fi'cnch, on right and left, had 
simjily ach'anced, made prisoners, and retired, completing 
their activity by noon, with the result that the Marche- 
ville force was left with its flanks in the air and exposed 
to the fire of all the German artillery in the neighborhood. 
Up to noon, however, there had been only slight ar- 
tillery reaction; but shortly after the advanced line was 
established a German aviator flew twice over Marcheville, 
less than a hundred meters up. And within five minutes 
after he had made his observation an enemy concentra- 
tion of great violence opened on the town which was 
continued with only brief intervals throughout the day. 
INIarcheville, Saulx, and the communicating trenches 
were all "plastered" with perfect accuracy, severity, 
and intensity. Shells landing squarelj'' in the advanced 
trenches caused many casualties and forced a withdrawal 
of the holding force (reduced to about 200 effectives) to 
the shelter of a stone wall and a shallow trench near the 
chateau on the southern edge of the village; at one o'clock 
in the afternoon, under cover of this bombardment, a 
large force of enemy infantry reentered Marcheville 



THE MEUSE-ARGONNE OFFENSIVE 237 

without difficulty from the direction of Saint-Hilaire; 
the party with Colonel Bearss had to fight its way out 
to join the troops in the chateau grounds. For some hours, 
as three other German counter-attacks developed, there 
was heavy infantry fighting in and about the towm, a 
support company having been brought in to assist. Some 
prisoners were made; but no attempt was made to re- 
occupy the advanced positions, the battalion being fully 
engaged in clearing the streets of the town itself of the 
counter-attacking forces. It was a murderous kind of 
day. The enemy artillery played havoc with the lines of 
communication, whether wire or runner relays, the for- 
mer being destroyed beyond repair and the runners under- 
going so many casualties that the delivery of orders or 
information was delayed for hours. The heavy fog and 
haze which obscured the field all day made it very dif- 
ficult for the watchers on the heights to follow the course 
of events; for the same reason (poor visibility) the ar- 
tillery was hampered in its support of the raiding parties, 
while the latter, practically isolated throughout the long 
afternoon, could do little but cling to their initial successes 
under heavy German shelling. 

At 7.30 in the evening the order to retire was sent out 
to Marcheville from the Division's advanced command 
post above Hannonville. All the wounded, save a few 
cut off by the German counter-attack, were evacuated; 
and the retirement began at 9.45 o'clock in perfect order, 
by platoons, under cover of machine guns and infantry 
detachments stationed midway between Marcheville and 
Saulx. There was no interference with the withdrawal 
save artillery fire, and the movement was completed be- 
fore midnight. 

Losses were severe considering the character of the 
engagement. But the main object of the raid was accom- 
plished. To the enemy the attack appeared the beginning 
of an operation of consequence, following as it did the 



238 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

active raiding of the days preceding; and so thoroughly 
persuaded was he of the importance of the jNIarcheville- 
Riaville demonstration that he had strongly reinforced 
the garrison and strengthened the position. Since both 
troops and the attention of the German High Command 
were drawn away from the Argonne front partly by its 
means, the raid, considered as a diversion, was properly 
called a complete success, bought at however large a 
cost of killed and wounded. 

The German oflScial documents of the period throw 
considerable light on the success of the demonstrations 
of September 26 east of the Meuse, w^hich were no more 
than the climax of previous activities all directed to the 
one general end of deceiving the enemy. The following 
captured order is characteristic: 

West Group Center, September 25, 1918. Group Order. (Ex- 
tracts of the Division Order la No. 125/9 of September 22, 1918.) 
It is certain that the Franco-Americans will attack east of the 
Meuse on a large scale. Whether the attack will be extended tq 
the left river bank is not yet clear. The situation requires the 
greatest watchfulness. Under no circumstances should the enemy 
be able to surprise us. (Signed) Voletchy 

Wliat opinion the Corps Commander entertained re- 
garding the value of the day's work of troops of the 
Division is set forth in his letter to the American Com- 
mander-in-Chief : 

No. 29329. Headquarters, Second Colonial Corps Staff 

October 5, 1918 

From: General Blondlat, Commanding Second Colonial 

Corps. 
To: The Commander-in-Chief (through channels. General 

commanding Second Army). 
Subject: Proposition for Citation in Army Orders in favor of 

the 1st Battalion, 102d Regiment of Infantry, U.S. 
I have the honor to send you the report which I had the Gen- 
eral commanding the Twenty-Sixth United States Division 
make on the very hard and glorious combat in which this divi- 
sion engaged on September 26, 1918. 



THE MEUSE-ARGONNE OFFENSIVE 239 

The Second Colonial Corps had received orders to carry out 
extensive raids to attract and fix the attention of the enemy as 
follows: "General Orders No. 20, September 20, 1918, of the 
General commanding the First United States Army. The Second 
Colonial Corps will hold the front of Bois le Chauffour, inclusive, 
to Mesnil, exclusive. The Second Colonial Corps will make a 
demonstration along its front, launching artillery bombard- 
ment as well as making extensive raids at H hour." 

The dimenson and duration of the raid executed by the 
Twenty-Sixth United States Division certainly deceived the 
enemy as to our intentions; the losses suffered by the troops 
taking part in this operation were fairly severe but there is no 
doubt that those suffered by the Germans were much more serious. 

The spirit of sacrifice and magnificent courage displayed by the 
troops of the Twenty-Sixth United States Division on this occa- 
sion were certainly not in vain. They seem to me worthy of recom- 
pense and praise. Therefore I directed the General commanding 
the division to address propositions to me on this subject. 

I urgently request that the 1st Battalion of the 102d Infantry 
be cited in Army Orders on the following grounds : 

Picked troops who, trained by Colonel Hiram I, Bearss, who 
led the attack in the first line, carried out brilliantly and with 
splendid energy a particularly delicate operation; engaged bat- 
tle with a superb dash; won a victory after a violent combat 
over an enemy who was both stubborn and superior in num- 
bers, entrenched in concrete shelters, strongly supported by 
numerous machine guns and powerful artillery, and who made 
use of, in the course of the action, infamous methods of war- 
fare; heroically carried out their mission in capturing in hea\'y 
fighting a village where they maintained themselves all day in 
spite of four enemy counter-attacks, and thus furnished the fin- 
est example of courage, abnegation and self-sacrifice. 

I request further that the officers and men mentioned in 
General Edwards' report receive each and severally the rewards 
suggested for them by name. 

Blond LAT 

And that the American High Command most fully 
concurred in the foregoing high estimate was evidenced 
by the number of decorations awarded to the participants 
in the raid, including a citation of the whole Marche- 
ville infantry battalion, as will be told in its place. The 



240 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

Marcheville-Riaville episode was of minor importance 
when measured on the larger scale by which battles are 
differentiated from combats and engagements. But there 
was a certain intensity, a diflSculty, a deadliness about 
that day's encounter out on the Woevre Plain, far in ad- 
vance of the general line, which gives this two-battalion 
raid a considerable rehef. Certainly, in the records of the 
participating regiments, the day looms large, and the 
day's work of the supporting artillery was heartbreaking. 
The intensity and long duration of its fire was a revelation 
to the Corps authorities; the whole affair gave the French 
a new assurance of the deadly earnestness and hard- 
hitting ability of their new alHes; not that by this date 
any such assurance was needed. 

For a few days following the sector was relatively quiet. 
Considerable gas was dehvered on the Division's forward 
area and outpost zone, so much that even the horses were 
affected on the lines back in the woods along the Grande 
Tranchee. October 2 a raid by a detachment of the 101st 
Infantry was made on Warville Wood and Hauts Epines 
Wood, in conjunction with the French. The latter, how- 
ever, missing the appointed place of rendezvous, did not 
actively participate with the Am.ericans, who, by nice 
maneuvering, entered the enemy positions by surprise 
and returned with forty-nine prisoners. At Division 
Headquarters, which, directly after the Saint-Mihiel 
affair, had been moved back from Rupt by Corps' order 
to the village of Troyon, on the Verdun-Saint-Mihiel 
highway, there was much speculation as to the Division's 
next duty. For one felt sure it would be actively employed 
somewhere in the great Argonne offensive then in prog- 
ress. For the present, however, one could only wait, bend- 
ing much energy on making the troops as comfort- 
able as possible in view of the continuous bad weather. 
In accordance with the Corps' instructions, for instance, 
those battalions most in need of rest were drawn back 



THE MEUSE-ARGONNE OFFENSIVE 241 

from the forward zone to places where better shelter 
could be secured ; a withdrawal was also made of troops in 
the Woevre Plain, except a chain of outposts, on October 
2, for the purpose of leaving a barrage zone one thousand 
meters wide in front of the zone of principal resistance 
on the heights above Herbeuville, Hannonville, and 
Thillot-sous-les-Cotes. 

A good many changes of command were effected during 
the stay in the Troyon Sector. Colonel P. D. Glassford, 
promoted to be Brigadier-General, took command of the 
51st Field Artillery Brigade, Colonel Farr remaining 
attached in an advisory capacity, while Colonel J. A. 
Twachtman (formerly Major, 103d Field Artillery) was 
assigned to command that regiment. In the Staff, Lieu- 
tenant-Colonel W. S. Bowen was succeeded as G-3 by 
Lieutenant-Colonel C. M. Dowell; the command of the 
104th Infantry passed from Colonel G. McCaskey to 
Colonel B. F. Cheatham; Colonel J. A, Mack was assigned 
to lead the 102d Field Artillery. Other changes included 
the appointment of Major F. B. La Crosse to the 101st 
Field Signal Battalion (October 1), Major H. L. Bowen 
to the 103d Machine-Gun BattaHon (October 18), Major 
William Denton to the 101st Sanitary Train (October 1), 
Captain W. L. Morrison to Headquarters Troop (Sep- 
tember 28), Major Henry Wlieelock to the 101st Supply 
Train (replacing Major T. C. Baker, who went to the 
First Army). In the 102d Machine-Gun BattaHon Captain 
J. R. Sanborn succeeded Major (later Lieutenant-Colonel) 
J. D. Murphy, who went to Division Headquarters to be- 
come presently the Divisional Machine-Gun Officer. 

For a few days' interval, though the Division remained 
in the sector, there was a lull. But the air was heavy with 
expectation as to what new scene was being made ready 
once the curtain came down on the Rupt and Troyon 
Sectors, where the Twenty-Sixth had been continuously 
employed since the first days of September. 



CHAPTER XVII 

IN THE MEUSE-ARGONNE OFFENSIVE — VERDUN 

THE general situation, as the Division came to the 
Line again, this time on the sinister and glorious 
hills before Verdun, can be readily summarized. West 
of the Meuse the First American Army was facing north, 
directing itself toward the vital German line of com- 
munications and principal line of retreat — the Mont- 
medy-Mezieres railway. The French Seventeenth Corps, 
meanwhile, forming the extreme right of the First Amer- 
ican Army, was disposed on the east side of the Meuse 
in a segment of a circle, north and northeast of Verdun, 
on lines traced on the identical scene of the struggle of 
February, 1916. Its mission was to protect the flank of 
the main American advance in its earlier stages. To 
divert as many German forces as possible; to win such 
local successes as would facilitate the general advance, 
and might result in compelling the enemy to yield his 
all-important flanking positions on the edge of the high 
ground, where this northern end of the Meuse Heights 
breaks down to the plains; to prevent any counter- 
attack in flank; to launch limited attacks which would 
wear the enemy down — such, briefly, were the tasks 
which the Seventeenth Corps was called on to fulfill 
during the latter part of October and early November, 
as part of the general plan. And in all these tasks the 
Twenty-Sixth had its full share of responsibility and 
achievement. 

We have reviewed the w^ork which the Division per- 
formed on the first day of the Meuse-Argonne offensive 
— how, on September 26, it directed against the enemy 
lines at Riaville-Marcheville one of the local demonstra- 
tions which bhnded the German High Command as to 



THE MEUSE-ARGONNE OFFENSIVE 243 

the actual point of the main Meuse-Argonne attack. 
There remains now to trace its tour of duty on the awful 
Verdun front, where, for twenty-six consecutive days 
and nights, the New Englanders battled to loosen the 
enemy's hold on one of the most vital positions on the 
whole western line. One dislikes superlatives; but one 
may be permitted to believe that no harder tasks were 
assigned to any unit of the Expeditionary Force than the 
missions of the Twenty-Sixth between October 18 and 
November 11; and this opinion is ventured with a clear 
appreciation of what Cantigny, the Sergy Plateau, Fismes, 
Montfaucon, and the Belleau or Argonne thickets meant 
to the friends and brothers of the Twenty-Sixth in other 
American divisions. Of the importance of the Verdun 
charniere as a pivotal point of the enemy defenses, let 
the Germans themselves testify: 

Vth Army Staff 

la No. 10619 Secret Army Headquarters, Oct. 1, 1918 

According to information in our possession, the enemy is about 
to attack the Vth Army east of the Meuse and try to push 
toward Longuyon. The object of this attack is to cut the Lon- 
guyon-Sedan line, the most important artery of the Army of the 
West. Moreover, the enemy's intention is to render it impossible 
for us to exploit the Briey Basin, on which depends in large part 
our steel production. Thus the heaviest part of the task will once 
more fall on the Vth Army in the course of the combats in the 
coming weeks, and the safety of the Fatherland will be in its 
hands. It is on the unconquerable resistance of the Verdun front 
that depends the fate of a great part of the west front, perhaps 
even of our nation. The Fatherland must rest assured that every 
commander and every man realizes the greatness of his mission 
and that he will do his duty to the very end. If we do this the 
enemy's attack will, as heretofore, break against our firm will to 
hold. 

The Commander-in-Chief 

Von der Marwitz 
General of Cavalry and Adjutant-General 

A holy place to France, as Ypres will always be for 
England, the gray, melancholy, haunted hills that hedge 



244 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

Verdun on the north have been described so often as to 
require no detailed picture in these pages. A land of 
death; a mourning land, blasted by so many storms of 
fire that all vestige of human occupation had long since 
disappeared; a land once bowered in forests, where now 
the soil had been churned to knee-deep miry clay, whence 
even every stump and leaf had been blasted — one can 
record only impressions, only the weight that pressed on 
the troops who were called to enter that graveyard. The 
men were calloused by long experience of war; but they 
were sobered, indeed, as the witch-spells of Verdun laid 
hold of them. Imaginations were touched by a knowledge 
of the heroism and glory, which at Douaumont, Vaux, 
Mort Homme, Crow's Wood, Pepper Hill, or Haumont 
had splendidly flamed into flower. To feel that one was 
in the trench lines, made for all time historic by the legion- 
aries of Petain and Nivelle, was to feel a quickening glow 
of sober exultation none can forget. But coloring all other 
emotion was horror of the place — not hatred, not loath- 
ing, but the grip of a curious awe which clutched the heart. 

Let us look somewhat carefully at the actual situation 
on this front. It may be possible to make clear some 
matters which have not appeared in all the records, 
official or otherwise, of certain important phases of the 
so-called Meuse-Argonne offensive. 

By October 8 the Division, relieved by elements of the 
Second Dismounted Cavalry and Seventy-Ninth (Ameri- 
can) Divisions, had been withdrawn from the Troyon 
Sector. Designated for the moment as part of the army re- 
serve, it was concentrated in camps and billets in and 
southwest of Verdun where Headquarters was opened, in 
the citadel, on October 10. Presently the engineers and 
artillery rejoined; and reconnaissances were made by all 
commanding oflBcers of the terrain north of the city, occu- 
pied by elements of the Seventeenth Corps. The Corps 
order of battle, from left to right at this time, included the 



THE MEUSE-ARGONNE OFFENSIVE 245 

Thirty-Third Division; Twenty-Ninth Division (one 
brigade, the 58th); Eighteenth French Division; while on 
the extreme right lay the Twenty-Sixth French Division. 
Opposite the Corps were German-Austrian divisions as 
follows: 28th (rated first class and just brought in); 1st 
Austro-Hungarian (first class); 15th (one regiment in 
line, two in reserve); 33d (first class); 32d (third class). 
Organized in depth, in three zones of defense, with power- 
ful artillery and machine-gun resources and admirable air 
service, the enemy was opposing to all attacks a most ob- 
stinate resistance, quite in accordance with the army com- 
mander's exhortations. Attacks by the Seventeenth Corps 
with the slender forces available had resulted in only lim- 
ited successes, as was exemplified by the somewhat ex- 
tensive engagement of October 13. Orders from First Army 
Headquarters directed the kind of combat in which the 
Corps must engage in view of its prescribed mission. The 
results of that policy were already making themselves 
felt; the views of the Corps Commander as to a change of 
policy which would assure better results will be interesting 
to record in the proper place. 

For the moment the Corps was pursuing the traditional 
Verdun method of feeding into the line not whole divisions 
at a time, but only brigades or regiments, to effect the re- 
lief of exliausted units. Thus (as had already happened 
with the Thirty-Third and Twenty-Ninth Divisions), it 
was a brigade of the Twenty-Sixth (the 52d) which first 
entered the line on this historic ground, attached to the 
Seventeenth Corps under General Claudel. October 11 the 
104th Infantry relieved the 114th Infantry (Twenty- 
Ninth Division) in the vicinity of Cote d'Oie (Goose Hill) 
on the west side of the Meuse; October 13 the regiment be- 
came Corps reserve, going to the Brabant-Samogneux 
area. On the same date the 103d Infantry moved to Cote 
d'Oie, while Brigade Headquarters was established in the 
rubbish pile which once had been the village of Cumieres. 



246 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

The line occupied by the Corps at the time extended from 
a point south of Sivry, on the river, easterly to Molleville 
Farm Wood, thence southeasterly to include parts of 
Haumont Wood and Caures Wood. It was a place where, 
as had been said, a meter of ground gained was the equiva- 
lent of a kilometer gained elsewhere. On the tops of the 
gray, bare hills the enemy had observation posts; in the 
confusing ravines and wrecks of woodland he had a chain 
of machine-gun nests and intricate trench lines, perfected 
after months of work. In rear of the hills, hidden in a score 
of glens and hollows secure from observation, a large ar- 
tillery served him well. 

On October 16, before the Eighteenth French Division 
was entirely relieved, troops of the Twenty-Sixth were 
told off for an attack which was intended to complete the 
capture of Haumont Wood. Approximately a battalion 
of the 104th Infantry went in — Companies A, D, E, with 
one platoon from each of Companies G and H. Through 
a heavy rain, the composite force marched, in the night 
of October 15/16, some twenty kilometers, and deployed 
at dawn over unfamiliar ground, which was deep in mire, 
for the attack in which the troops were to receive the sup- 
port of sixteen French tanks. But they could not make 
good their advance. Receiving no assistance from the 
tanks, which, quickly bogged in the mire, were abandoned 
by their crews, the infantry made no progress against the 
enemy's machine-gun defense. Under cover of a well-sus- 
tained barrage, here and there a section or a combat group 
got forward over the chaos of shell craters, wire, and mud ; 
but their efforts, however marked by feats of personal 
pluck, were all in vain. Only some losses, which could be 
ill afforded, remained to show for this particular attack 
against a single point in the enemy's lines. Again was dem- 
onstrated the futihty of the attempts to which the Corps 
was committed — of which nobody was more keenly aware 
than General Claudel. 



MEU3L - AliCrONML 0TFLH51VI, 

Scale. J:I53,000 (Approximate l.v ■) 

-SE-CTOB. liOOKBATLir-S A ~- 7^ 

Like. Occur\t.i> Zh'^ CjviMOH Oct. I&T! ^^BaHB 
Lmt OctuT>it.» Zti* DiviiiOH Hov.ri-'j; ^■■■^" 







V£.T£DUN 



THE MEUSE-ARGONNE OFFENSIVE 247 

On October 18 the Division Commander and the ad- 
vanced echelon of Division Headquarters ^ were estab- 
lished at the advanced command post in Bras, called 
"P.C. Neptune." Here, between what had been the villages 
of Bras and Charny (on the west side of the Meuse), 
bridges had formerly existed over the river and the Meuse 
Canal, connected by a single embankment; and now, the 
bridges destroyed or replaced by the light footbridges of 
the engineers, the embankments had been ingeniously 
made to serve the purpose of a command post, dugouts 
having been burrowed under it beneath a canopy of camou- 
flage. Under daily shell-fire, and affording a most illusory 
safety, "P.C. Neptune" possessed the great advantage 
of bringing a Division Commander well forward, where 
his personal touch could be constantly exerted to control 
and direct his men. By October 19 the Division was in po- 
sition, having completed the relief of the Eighteenth 
French. The 51st Infantry Brigade was on the left of the 
line this time, in the Bois de Chenes (Oak Wood) and in 
front of Ormont Wood, Headquarters being near a road 
fork, north of Vacherauville,^ on the Vacherauville- 
Samogneux road which followed the Meuse Canal northerly 
from Bras. The 52d Brigade, on the right, occupied a 
tangle of trenches to the north and northeast of the famous 
Pepper Hill (Cote de Poivre). Difficult to designate, in a 
land where the ordinary local geographical points had all 
disappeared, the exact positions of the troops are nearly 
impossible to identify in ordinary narrative. It may be 
said, however, that the line ran in a general way south- 
easterly from the Brabant Wood through Haumont Wood 
and Caures Wood to the northeast of Anglemont Farm, 
but so confused was the terrain, so full of minor reentrants 
and salients was the line, that only approximate locations 
can here be given. The artillery, after a rest of two days 

1 Chief of Staff, Assistant Chiefs of Stafif G-2, G-3, Machine-Gun Officer, 
Signal OfBcer, Message Center. 
^ Maison des Cotelettes. 



248 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

(October 12-13), completed the relief of the French gun- 
ners on October 16, The rear echelon of Division Head- 
quarters, with the railhead, remained at Verdun; Corps 
Headquarters was at Regret, just to the southwest of the 
city on the Bar-le-Duc road. In Vacherauville, a mile above 
Bras, was the Headquarters of the Twenty-Ninth Divi- 
sion, which prolonged the line of the Twenty-Sixth to the 
left. 

It was at this time — to leave for a moment the narra- 
tive for the Division's field activities — that the Yankees 
adopted the divisional insignia which, worn on the left 
shoulder of every officer and man, was to take on, in their 
feeling for it, the characteristics of a badge of honor. Gen- 
eral Headquarters had prescribed these personal insignia 
for army troops, corps troops, and all divisions, the 
Twenty-Sixth receiving the following communication : 

E.A.E.F., October 20, 1918 
Commanding General, 
26th Division 
N. M-G74. Each division will adopt and procure immediately 
some distinctive cloth design which will be worn by every officer 
and man of the division on the left arm, the upj^er part to be 
attached to the shoulder seam. Report will be made to these 
Headquarters by telegram as to designs adopted in order that 
there may be no duplication. Approval of design will be made 
by telegram from these Headquarters. 

Davis 

In conformity, therefore, witli these directions, a design 
consisting of a YD monogram in blue cloth, of the color 
of the French army uniform, on a diamond of olive drab, 
was submitted for approval on October 23. The color of 
the letters was later changed to dark blue, and, thus modi- 
fied, the design was authorized, and its wearing made com- 
pulsory after November 29, in orders from Headquarters 
First Army.^ 

Reverting now to operations, with the Division in posi- 

1 G.O. No. 33, Headquarters First Army, November 9, 1918, 



THE MEUSE-ARGONNE OFFENSIVE 249 

tion, it is appropriate to take account of the happenings of 
the moment which colored the situation so far as the 
Twenty-Sixth was concerned. The health of the command 
at this time was seriously impaired by the influenza epi- 
demic which overran all Europe. Daily the men evacuated 
for sickness reached large numbers, so that the effective 
strength of the units was seriously impaired. On October 14 
Brigadier-General Shelton was forced to relinquish com- 
mand of the 51st Infantry Brigade, through illness, at 
a time when his presence could hardly be spared. About 
the same date Captain Nathaniel Simpkins, one of the 
Division Commander's most valued personal aides, was 
also stricken to die on the 22d in the hospital at Sou illy. 
From every regiment, battalion and company officers 
dropped out who were absolutely indispensable. The dis- 
ease was aided by very bad weather conditions — contin- 
ual rain, cold autumn river mists, and also by the appall- 
ing state of the ground where the troops were forced to 
live and seek shelter. Flooded dugouts, hillsides which 
were merely quagmires, broken roads, great difficulty 
in providing or procuring suflGcient hot food, continually 
v.et clothes and blankets, all tended to sap the strength 
of the battalions posted in the gas-drenched hollows or 
on slopes w^hich were whipped at all hours by snipers and 
artillery. 

It was at this time, moreover, that there fell on the Di- 
vision a blow which, for the moment, stunned it. From 
General Headquarters, on October 22, an order came re- 
lieving General Edwards of command. The man who had 
organized and trained the Division; the leader who had 
won the affection of every officer and man by his daily 
solicitude for their wants ; who had been followed with con- 
fidence through months of service on the firing-line and 
battle-field ; who was needed by his Division now as never 
before, on the eve of an engagement, was caught up by the 
machinery regulating the return of officers to the United 



250 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

States, and was ordered home, like any captain or lieu- 
tenant, to assist in the training of new levies. 

The separation of General Edwards from his command, 
under the circumstances, appeared to many as the cul- 
minating incident in a long campaign. Hotly defended by 
his friends in America, the original leader of the Twenty- 
Sixth became the storm center of one of the first attacks 
against the methods of some of the notable figures at 
American Headquarters. It is true that there came with 
the order relieving him from command a personal letter 
from the Chief of Staff of the Expeditionary Force, assur- 
ing General Edwards that he was not to take the order as 
in any sense reflecting upon his ability or reputation; that 
he was to be given a commensurate command at home in 
charge of a training area; that his return to the United 
States was merely in line with the general pohcy by which 
experienced oflScers of all grades were being sent home as 
instructors. One may accept all that as accurately express- 
ing the sentiments of those high in authority; one may dis- 
miss the personal controversy as briefly as possible, on the 
ground that the rights or wrongs of any individual were 
unimportant in a drama as vast as that enacted by the 
American Expeditionary Force. But the Division Com- 
mander's relief on October 22 possessed a wider implica- 
tion. One has to consider the effect upon his oflScers and 
men, of General Edwards's abrupt rehef. 

Comment has already been made on the difficulties 
caused in batteries and battahons by taking away experi- 
enced officers as instructors, often on the eve of an action. 
Inevitable under the conditions the continuous drain did, 
however, take from units officers whose loss could be ill 
afforded. And now, as a platoon or companj^ had been 
shorn of its strength at critical moments, so did the whole 
Division suffer. Not fifty men, but fifteen thousand men, 
felt the shock of the loss; and the blow descended, as has 
been pointed out, at a moment when the troops needed 



THE MEUSE-ARGONNE OFFENSIVE 251 

every possible encouragement and support if they were 
to accomplish in the best manner the tasks which were in 
store. One felt that full knowledge of conditions obtaining 
at the moment would have made impossible the issuance 
of an order which deprived a combat division, engaged 
with the enemy, of one of its principal reliances. Once 
more one witnessed the apparent bhndness of those who, 
conducting the game of war, neglect to consider the psy- 
chology of the pawns on the chessboard. 

Relieved on October 22 the Division Commander was 
allowed to retain command until his successor should re- 
port for duty. And this concession was at least something 
gained, because a Corps operation was in preparation for 
October 23 which required the active participation of the 
Twenty-Sixth. 

Opposite the left of the Division's line a wooded ridge 
extended from northwest to southeast, the possession of 
which would exploit a success already won by the Twenty- 
Ninth Division on its front. Could this Division enlarge 
its gains to its right, supported by an advance of the 
Twenty-Sixth's left, commanding ground would be won 
from the enemy, who would be deprived of an observation 
point and of a position which was important in his general 
defensive scheme, on the ridge northeast of Molleville 
Farm covered by Houppy Wood, Molleville Wood, and 
Belleu Wood. To accomplish this purpose the Twenty- 
Ninth Division arranged to attack with two battalions, in 
a direction due east, while two battalions of the Twenty- 
Sixth launched a convergent attack in a northeasterly 
direction ^ with the support of machine guns and the usual 
infantry utilities. This operation, which came to be known 
in the Division as the "Battle of H in Houppy," because 
of a somewhat unusual map reference in the original Field 
Order, was the first of a series in which the 51st Infantry 
Brigade was engaged without intermission until October 

1 Field Order No. 92, Headquarters 26th Division. 



252 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

27. A series of futile assaults gallantly delivered against 
positions of great strength, these operations may best be 
treated as constituting a single affair; for the costly at- 
tacks on the redoubtable Hill 360 and Ormont Wood, 
which closed the operation, were rendered imperative by 
the preliminary work of October 23 against Belleu W^ood 
on the Etrayes Ridge. 

The brigade order for this attack most vividly explains 
the situation. Even amid the unfamiliar names and figures 
which represent only the coordinates of points on a staff 
map, one may sense what was being required, one may 
visualize the high, frowning ridges, seamed and scarred 
and blasted, see the ragged woods with their nests of ma- 
chine guns, minemverfers, and heavy wire, realize the diffi- 
culty of an advance over a country of steep slopes, con- 
fusing ravines, and deep mud, in the face of a determined 
resistance by troops told off to hold these woods and ridges 
to the end. In the following order of Colonel H. I. Bearss 
(commanding the 51st Brigade while General Shelton was 
ill), one reads in the last paragraph an appeal to troops who 
had been told that this was to be their last battle under 
the eye of General Edwards: 

Headquarters 51st Infantry Brigade 

26th Division, American E.F. 

France, Oct. 21, 1918 

Field Orders 

No. 25. 
Maps: Samogneux ) i/iooOO 
Verdun-4 ) 

l^'i'^r^ 1/20,000. 

Bradeville ) 

1. The 51st Infantry Brigade attacks in conjunction with the 
29th Division on its left on D day at H hour. The object of the 
attack by this brigade is to obtain possession of the Houppy Bois, 
that portion of Molleville Bois now held by the enemy, and Hill 
34)6 as far as Bois Belleu exclusive. 

2. General Plan of Attack. The 51st Infantry Brigade attacks 
from the Ravine de Molleville in a general northeasterly direc- 



■^''WlVlfe 





Mill. ^' - ;.;•: ^->'^ V,' * 



?^^^ 






THE MEUSE-ARGONNE OFFENSIVE 253 

tion while the 29th Division attacks in an easterly direction 
along the ridge 375-361. 

3. Plan of Attack of the 51st Infantry Brigade. The attack of 
the 51st Inf. Brigade consists of a converging movement from a 
line between 25.5-81.6 to 25.5-81.84 in tbe Ravine de Molleville 
to gain possession of the ridge limited by the Cotes 361-346 (both 
exclusive). See sketch attached to F.O. No. 92, 26th Division. 

4. Objectives of Attack. The attack will be divided into two 
phases. The attack of the intermediate objective marked by a 
general line on the eastern edges of Houppy Bois as far as 27.31- 
81.45, thence a line running southwesterly to 27.22-81.00. A halt 
of one hour will be made on this line to reform organizations. 
The attack, from this objective to the normal objective between 
Pilon d'Etrayes, inclusive (Cote 361) and Bois Belieu exclusive, 
will then be resumed. 

When the normal objective has been reached, preparations 
will be made immediately for seizing Belieu Bois. This will be 
accomplished at H plus 5 hours 15 minutes by the reserve 
battalion which will pass through the right attacking battalion 
on the normal objective. 

5. The Means to be employed by the 51st Infantry Brigade 

(a) Colonel H. I. Bearss, Commanding 51st Infantry 
Brigade 
101st Infantry, Colonel E. L. Logan, Commanding 
101st and 102d Machine-Gun Battahons and 
M.G. Co., 101st Infantry 
37-mm. platoon, 102d Infantry 

Stokes Mortar platoon, 102d Infantry 
Company F, 1st Gas Regiment, Capt. Feeley, 

Commanding 
Detachment 101st Field Signal Battalion 
Detachment 101st Sanitary Train 
281st Aero Squadron 
Balloon No. 25 
(6) 51st Field Artillery Brigade 

6. Plan for use of Attacking Troops 

(a) Infantry 

The infantry attack will consist of a converging attack by the 
two battalions as indicated in the sketch attached to F.O. No. 92, 
26th Division. The 29th Division will withdraw at H minus 1 
hour, 45 minutes from the line now held to a north and south line 
running through Molleville Farm at 25.5-81.7. 

The 1st Battalion, 101st Infantry, will form for the attack on 



254 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

this line at Molleville Farm facing east at H minus one hour and 
will attack the enemy at H hour in conjunction with the 29th 
Division on its left. It will advance in an easterly direction until 
reaching the intermediate objective. 

When the 1st Battalion, 101st Infantry, has reached the nose 
north of letter H in Houppy Bois at 26.63-81,59, the 3d Bat- 
talion, 101st Infantry, will pivot on its right flank from its posi- 
tion in Molleville Bois, and the two battalions will continue the 
attack to the intermediate objective. CO. 3d Battalion, 101st 
Infantry, is responsible for the prompt execution of this move- 
ment and it must be executed so that no delay will be caused to 
the 1st Battalion. The liaison combat group from its position at 
26.35-81.10 is responsible for the closest liaison between the two 
battalions which must be maintained at all times. 

Battalions will be formed in depth with two companies in the 
firing line and two in support. One 37 mm. platoon, one Stokes 
Mortar platoon, one machine-gun company and one section Gas 
and Flame troops will be attached to each battalion. 

The attention of all regimental, battalion, company, platoon 
and squad leaders is called to Instructions No. 106, 26th Divi- 
sion. Particular attention will be paid to paragraphs 1 and 2. 
Each man will be equipped with two bandoliers of ammunition in 
addition to that carried in the cartridge belt. This operation, 
which is carried out largely through woods, requires every effort 
to keep the command well in hand and can best be accomplished 
by the use of small columns. 

Rate of advance of Infantry. 100 meters in 10 minutes. The 
1st Bn., 101st Infantry, leaves the parallel of departure at H 
hour. The 3d Bn., 101st Infantry, leaves its parallel of departure 
when the 1st Bn. has reached the nose of Houppy Bois as out- 
lined above. Intermediate objective reached at H plus two hours, 
30 minutes. Departure from intermediate objective at H plus 

3 hours, 30 minutes. The normal objective reached at H plus 

4 hours, 30 minutes. Attack of the zone of eventual exploitation 
at H plus 5 hours, 15 minutes. 

7. Plan of Liaison. Telephone, radio, T.P.S., pigeons and 
runners will be employed. 

(a) The 1st Bn., 101st Infantry, upon reaching the nose 
in the Houppy Bois will fire one yellow rocket. Upon 
reaching its intermediate objective it will fire two 
yellow rockets, in addition to displaying their panels. 
The 3d Bn., 101st Infantry, upon reaching the inter- 
mediate objective, will fire one caterpillar rocket. 



THE MEUSE-ARGONNE OFFENSIVE 255 

Upon reaching the normal objective, each battalion 
will fire two caterpillar rockets in quick succession. 
The 2d Bn., 101st Infantry, upon completing the 
exploitation of Belieu Bois will fire one yellow rocket 
and one caterpillar rocket in quick succession. 

8. Axis of Liaison: Bras, Worms, Haumont, 26.3-80.4. 
Regimental Commanders are responsible that telephones from 

the head of the Axis of Liaison, 26.3-80.4, are run forward to 
the Battalion Commanders at least one hour before H hour and 
they will be responsible that telephone communication between 
them and their battalion commanders is maintained throughout 
the action. 

9. Synchronization of Watches. Watches will be synchronized 
by the Division Signal Officer. 

(a) Regimental Commanders will arrange for the prompt 
establishment of a regimental ammunition dump 
and will fill it promptly. 

(6) The necessary arrangements will be made for the 
pioneers to go forward on the night following the 
attack and to string wire in front of our positions. 

(c) Evacuation of wounded will be according to Division 
plans. 

{d) Organization commanders will take the necessary 
steps to insure a constant supply of pyrotechnics 
and ammunition to the assaulting troops. 

10. Every officer, non-commissioned officer and man of this 
brigade is depended upon to uphold the glorious traditions of 
the 26th Division. Hell with all its flying artillery can't stop 
this brigade when once engaged in action. 

11. Posts of Command. 

Division P.C. No change 

51st F.A. Brigade P.C. No change 
51st Inf. Brigade P.C. After 17.00 o'clock Oct. 21st 

—26.5-79.7 
By order of Colonel Bearss, U.S.M.C. 
JuDSON Hannigan, Captain 
Acting Adjutant 

The result of the day's effort from the military point of 
view is summarized in the report prepared at the time by 
an officer of the Staff. Here again it is not difficult to sense 
the meaning of those hours of struggle in the woods and 



256 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

mire, following the first advance from Molleville Farm in 
the heavy morning mist. Says the report: 

The first day of the present effort to obtain possession of the 
commanding heights in the easterly part of the region between 
Bois de Consenvoye and Flabas ended to our advantage. At 
19.15 o'clock of October 23 it was announced that the division 
had reached its normal and exploitation objectives (the latter 
being the Bois Belleu). The work of consolidating the new posi- 
tions and rectifying the line was ordered to be begun at once, so 
as to insure us the possession of the Bois Belleu, Bois des Chenes, 
and the ground between, while patrols were directed to maintain 
close contact with the enemy in the Bois d'Ormont. 

But the Germans came back strongly and at once. Under the 
pressure of a heavy counter-attack, supported by an intense 
flanking artillery fire, the battalion of the 101st Infantry which 
had gone through Bois Belleu was forced to relinquish its gains, 
so that morning (October 24) found that part of our newly won 
ground still in the hands of the enemy, — an enemy who, as was 
learned from prisoners and deserters, had just been reinforced 
and partially relieved by fresh troops of the One Hundred and 
Ninety-Second Division, — a class one organization. 

Our attack was, however, promptly renewed. Supported most 
efficiently by the preparation, encaging, and smoke screen con- 
centrations of the divisional and corps artillery, and by machine 
gun battalions, the 2d Battalion, 101st Infantrjs advanced 
against Bois Belleu at 15 o'clock, October 24, while the 102d In- 
fantry (less 1st Battalion) attacked a line in which the principal 
objective was Hill 360, starting at 16.30. Once more a violent 
resistance was encountered. By the most varied means, ranging 
from machine-gun nests hidden in trees and the work of skillful 
snipers to bombardment by minenwerfers regulated by aeroplane 
observation, the enemy contested every inch of our advance. 
This was pushed steadily, nevertheless, until darkness made a 
halt and a new consolidation necessary. We had penetrated 
Bois Belleu to a depth of 500 meters, and, further to the south, 
had advanced to the lower slopes of Hill 360. 

But the first successes had to be secured. As happened 
many times in previous engagements, an attacking party 
would win a position with its advance prepared and sup- 
ported by heavy artillery concentrations, only to find 
diflSculty in maintaining its ground against counter-at- 



THE IVIEUSE-ARGONNE OFFENSIVE 257 

tacks of a foe determined to contest possession of the 
ground to the utmost. So in the case of Belleu Wood.^ 
Hardly had the lOlst's battalions secured a hold on that 
bloody patch of bushes and stumps before heavy artillery 
fire and a series of rushes by German infantry forced them 
back to the western edge. As the report has it: 

Night brought a new enemy reaction. Against the heavily 
tried battalion of the 101st no less than four furious counter- 
attacks were directed in quick succession. Three were resisted 
successfully, but the fourth pushed our troops back again be- 
yond the western edge of the Bois Belleu, only to have them re- 
form and return to the attack at 2.30 o'clock. This time they 
succeeded in establishing a line well in advance of their original 
parallel of departure, while the 3d Battalion, 101st Infantry, 
moved up and extended the new line westerly. Two companies 
of the brigade reserve (1st Battalion, 101st Infantry) were sent 
in to support the 2d, which had suffered considerably. 

Once more the 51st Infantry Brigade went forward, in an 
attempt to consolidate its first gains. At 11.30 o'clock on October 
25th, the 2d and 3d Battalions, 102d Infantry, after a violent 
artillery preparation, moved out to the capture of Hill 360, 
which adjoined the Belleu Wood ridge on the southeast. But 
hardly had the infantry started, their intentions and objective 
having been made quite plain to the enemy from the direction 
and character of the artillery fire, before the enemy clamped 
down a really awful storm of gas and high explosive under which 
the assaulting waves simply melted away. The meager hold 
which had been secured on the lower slopes of the formidable 
Hill 360 had to be abandoned, and the shattered battalions 
reeled back to their lines, spent and exhausted, though a few 
separated sections clung to their gains throughout the night. 
Noon of the 26th found our lines no further advanced than they 
were on the afternoon of October 23d. The German defense, 
most skillfully compounded of machine-gun and artillery fire, 
admirably directed by aeroplanes, had proved for the moment 
impregnable. 

Interesting comments on the character of the tasks which 
the Division was called on to perform at this time are con- 
tained in the two letters following. The first, sent by the 
* Spelled Belieu Wood on some maps. 



258 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

Brigade Commander, Shelton, who returned to duty Octo- 
ber 24, tells the story of those attacks by small units on 
limited objectives which resulted in failure. They picture 
the condition and strength of his once fine brigade, now 
that sickness and the casualties of battle had taken their 
full toll. The letter reads: 

Headquarters 5\st Infantry Brigade 

26th Division, American E.F . 

France. October 27, 1918 

From: Commanding General, 51st Infantry Brigade. 
To: Commanding General, 26th Division. 

Subject: Present situation. 

1. Herewith is sketch showing from best information now 
obtainable the lines held by this brigade and the attached troops, 
and the dispositions of these troops. 

2. This sketch shows Belieu Bois held entirely by the 101st 
Infantry. The remainder of the line shows practically no advance 
except by covering patrols from the line as held before the attack 
started, October 24th. In the center, various parts of the objec- 
tive were attained at different times, but by such small groups 
that, lacking at the time available supporting troops, the parts of 
the objective taken could not be held in the face of the enemy's 
resistance, artillery, machine guns, grenades. On the right, every 
attempt to take Hill 360 proved unavailing even with the sup- 
porting troops of the 104th Infantry thrown in on the night 
October 27/28. The resistance here was from machine-gun nests 
believed to be in concrete emplacements which our artillery fire 
yesterday failed wholly in destroying. In my judgment these 
positions cannot be taken except after very heavy and continued 
destructive artillery preparation by the heaviest calibres. 

3. Referring to the Belieu Bois, the information furnished by 
the 101st Infantry is definite and a sketch furnished shows it 
wholly in our possession. The efforts of the left of the 102d 
Infantry, however, to establish liaison by patrols indicates, in 
the judgment of the officers leading these patrols, that the lines 
of the 101st Infantry are not as far east as reported. According 
to the statements of these patrols the eastern line held by the 
101st Infantry is approximately along ordinate 28.0 or perhaps 
even farther to the west. The Commanding Officer, 101st Infan- 
try, is now personally investigating this disagreement on the 
ground and will report showing lines as found by him as soon as 
he returns. 



THE MEUSE-ARGONNE OFFENSIVE 259 

4. Directions have been given for the most accurate check on 
the effective strength that can be made under present conditions 
and report will be submitted this afternoon in accordance with 
instructions from the Chief of Staff, 26th Division. The esti- 
mated effective strength of battalions according to last and best 
data is as follows : 

1015/ Infantry 
1st Battalion — 4 oflScers, 175 men 
2d Battalion — 3 officers, 100 men 
3d Battalion — 3 officers, 150 men 

102d Infantry 
1st Battalion — officers, 178 men 
2d Battalion — 2 officers, 100 men 
3d Battalion — 3 officers, 100 men 

The 1st Battalion, 102d Infantry, is commanded by the Regi- 
mental Adjutant, the only officer with it. At least two of the 
officers reported still present are suffering from injuries but are 
still holding on. It is reported that few non-commissioned offi- 
cers and particularly sergeants are left. Every effort is being 
made to collect stragglers and detached elements, and wherever 
possible these have been thrown into the line, including run- 
ners, orderlies, and others on special duty. It is difficult with 
the shortage of officers to enforce action of any kind now, be- 
cause through exhaustion the remaining men have in every 
instance to be aroused by the employment of physical force 
before they can be made to understand that action is required. 

5. The foregoing estimate of effective strength does not in- 
clude, of course, runners, litter bearers, and some others present 
with the command but not available for counting with the effec- 
tive fighting strength. Information is not sufficient to enable me 
to make an accurate estimate of casualties. The dressing station 
near this P.C. reports that from noon, October 24th, to this writ- 
ing, 722 wounded have been received from this brigade. Latest 
information from the front lines indicates that not all of the 
wounded have yet been evacuated. Discounting the exaggera- 
tions always attending first reports, there is still evidence to 
indicate that the percentage of killed is probably heavy. Not- 
withstanding the efforts made by the units engaged themselves 
and by the military police, comparatively few stragglers have so 
far been located. 

6. The results expected from this attack have not been at- 



260 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

tained in full and at this writing it is not certain that they have 
been attained in any considerable degree. But the efforts made 
by the troops of this brigade for their attainment and the spirit 
of sacrifice shown seem commendable to me. 

Geo. H, Shelton 
Brigadier-General, U.S.A. 
Commanding 

So much for the views of the local troop commander — 
a man not prone to exaggerated statement. Let us compare 
his views with those of General Claudel, the Corps Com- 
mander, who, on October 22, thought it his duty to set 
the situation on the Verdun front squarely before the au- 
thorities at First Army Headquarters, in the hope of mak- 
ing them realize conditions. 

1st American Army 

17th Army Corps 

Staff Hq.. 22d October, 1918 

Sd Bureau 

No. 678 S/3 
Secret 

General Claudel, Commanding the 17th Army Corps to the 
Commanding General, 1st American Army. 
In reply to your letter of October 21st, relative to the comple- 
mentary operations to be carried out on the right banks of the 
Meuse, I have the honor to inform you as follows : 

1. Capture of the line of resistance. 

The operation prescribed in my memorandum 650 S/3 of 
October 18th, must give us the northern half of the part ha- 
chured in brown ^ on the map attached to your memorandum. 
If this operation succeeds, an operation (already flanned and 
studied out by the 26th D.I.U.S.) will be undertaken for the 
object of giving us complete possession of the Bois d'Ormont. 

The part hachured in brown on your map would thus be won 
in its general line. 

I think that at this time the front which has been reached will 
be coherent enough to be able to be stabilized. 

2. Capture of the line of advanced posts. 

The line to be captured (bistre line on the map) indicates the 
^ Reference here and elsewhere is to colored lines on map accompanyiDg 
memorandum of First American Army of October 21st. 



THE MEUSE-ARGONNE OFFENSIVE 261 

entire zone of resistance established by the enemy on the reverse 
slope, and included between the green and bistre lines. 

This zone is all the more solid as it is the last organization of 
the enemy on the Hants de Meuse and the one which commands 
the valley of the Theinte. 

It is to be expected therefore that the enemy will defend it 
stubbornly. 

What will be our forces to attack it? 

Three divisions (79th D.I.U.S./ 26th D.I.U.S., 26th D.I.F). 
Of these three divisions the 26th D.I.U.S. will already have 
carried out the attack of October 23d on the Bois d'Etraye and 
the attack on the Bois d'Ormont. 

Another division, the 26th D.I.F., which carried out the attack 
of October 8th, and which, for two weeks in a sector continually 
shelled and fought over, is no longer in a condition to carry out 
a deep operation. 

Furthermore, its relief must be considered, and, to my knowl- 
edge, nothing is yet planned regarding its relief. 

Facing these three divisions, one of which will be weakened, 
and the other very tired, the enemy has four divisions at its dis- 
posal - supported by an artillery which seems at least equal to ours. 
Moreover, the line which is fixed for me is none other than the 
First exploitation objective of my plan of engagement No. 532 
S/3 of October 4th. 

I had requested five divisions to attain it ^ with the object 
of exploiting immediately the surprise. Three were given me 
which carried out the attack of October 8th. 

Under these conditions the question may be asked if what 
three divisions reinforced with six crack (elite) battalions (Sene- 
galese battalions) against an enemy surprised tactically, could 
not do, whether three divisions of which two at least are worn out 
by a prolonged stay in a battle sector, will be capable of doing it 
against an enemy who has been reinforced and is on his guard? 
The 17th French Army Corps is on the right bank of the 
Meuse, in the final phase of an engagement, in close contact with 
the enemy. In my opinion, it would be a mistake to think that, 
once on the defensive, there may be hope to win by means of 
small operations all the terrain which you desire to make a zone 
of advanced posts. 

1 After relief of the 29th D.I.U.S. 
^ Which the enemy seems bent upon reinforcing. 

» Memorandum No. 520 S/3, of the 17th French Army Corps, dated Octo- 
ber 2£id. 



262 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

Only by means of attacks prepared and carried out with pow- 
erful forces will the enemy be forced to yield this important 
terrain; and to accomplish it, successive reliefs of units, as were 
carried out on analogous fronts (the Aisne front for example), 
would be necessary as a matter of course. 

3, Conclusion: 

To sum up : If the idea is to economize the forces on the right 
bank, tJic green line may be held to for the purposes of stabilization. 

In order to attain the bistre line, considerable forces in infantry 
and ammunition must be provided for. 

With sufficient resources of men and guns Claudel could 
attack on the wide front and effect so deep a penetration 
that he could force the evacuation of the Verdun charniere. 
Situated as he was, with no expectation of reinforcement, 
or even of relief for his dwindling divisions, he could hold 
fast and harass the enemy with artillery fire, awaiting the 
moment when an American advance west of the Meuse 
w^ould compel the enemy to withdraw from Verdun. And 
this was in Claudel's mind. But neither course was open 
to him. His orders stood, and he was forced to continue 
the series of local attacks by small units which day by day 
took heavy toll in losses, though accomplishing a tangi- 
ble success in occupying the attention of considerable 
German forces, and possibly this latter fact was enough 
to justify the course pursued. 

With the episode of General Edwards's relief and the 
costly efforts of the 51st Infantry Brigade, October 23-27, 
ends the first period of the Division's duty at Verdun — 
days which also saw the expenditure of the Twenty -Ninth 
Division and its relief by the Seventy-Ninth.^ 

On October 24 the new Division Commander reported 
for duty — Brigadier-General Frank E. Bamford, who had 

^ Parting messages from the Division's first commander to bis men are con- 
tained in the following communications. His farewell general order reads: 

1. In compliance with Paragraph 8, Special Orders No. 293, General Head- 
quarters, American Expeditionary Forces, the undersigned relinquishes com- 
mand of the Twenty-Sixth Division. 



THE MEUSE-ARGONNE OFFENSIVE 263 

commanded an infantry brigade of the First Division. On 
the same date General Edwards took his leave, and the 
Division started upon a new phase of its career. Taking to 
heart the last message of its original leader, the officers 
and men resolved loyally to "carry on," outfacing the loss 
of strength which pressed on the Division dangerously, 
indeed. 

2. He thanks the Division for its loyalty to him and for what it has accom- 
plished in the common cause. He bespeaks for his successor in command the 
same loyalty and devotion, and he leaves the Division in full confidence that its 
same fine work will continue to the end. 

C. R. Edwards 
Major-General Commanding 

To the 51st Brigade of Artillery, was addressed the following: 

1. To the artillery of the Twenty-Sixth Division is due my expression of ad- 
miration for its efficiency and fighting qualities, and for its indefatigable support 
of our fine infantry. Artillery can desire no higher tribute than the conscious fact 
that it has gained the confidence, reliance, and thanks of the infantry. 

2. During more than eight months of fighting service the spirit of loyalty dis- 
played by every officer and man of the Fifty -First Field Artillery Brigade toward 
his duty, toward the Yankee Division and toward the Division Commander, has 
been fine. 

3. The record of the Fifty- First Artillery Brigade in the second battle of the 
Marne is glorious. It went with, supported, and protected the infantry in its 
advance of 18j kilometers by Chateau-Thierry, and afterwards, in succession, 
two other divisions in the advance from the Marne to the Vesle for a period of 
eighteen days, between July 18 and August 4, with a gain of over 40 kilometers. 
It is a record of which the entire division and our country justly may be proud. 

I congratulate and thank the artillery brigade of the Yankee Division. 

C. R. Edwards 
Major-General Commanding 



CHAPTER XVIII 
BEFORE THE ARMISTICE AND AFTER 

JUST as one groups the earlier activities of the Division 
at Verdun around the series of attacks of October 23- 
27, so one can center its later work about the operations 
between November 7 and November 11. The first set of 
operations was an endeavor to wrest from the enemy local 
positions of commanding importance; the second series 
sought to hustle the German withdrawal, which American 
successes west of the Meuse had rendered inevitable. 

Following the action in Belleu Wood and on the slopes 
of Hill 360, a change was made in the Division's sector and 
direction of advance. The Seventy-Ninth Division, on its 
left, took over that portion of the Twenty-Sixth's Hne 
which included Ormont Wood; and the latter, with its 
front somewhat reduced, now had opposite its lines the 
villages of Ville-devant-Chaumont and Flabas, with the 
roughly wooded region known as "Bois de Ville" (Town 
Wood), as the principal geographical locations. 

It was a time when the closest watch had to be kept on 
the enemy — not lest he attempt any attack, but lest he 
withdraw his forces unperceived under cover of a screen 
of rear-guards. On the left the Seventy-Ninth Division 
and the Fifteenth French Division kept up a pressure 
through local attacks and the exploitation of local suc- 
cesses, while to the Twenty-Sixth was given the duty of 
making energetic local raids on portions of the German 
lines for the purpose of making prisoners. Of these there 
were secured a considerable number almost every day — 
wretched fellows whose spirit was quite gone, whose gen- 
eral condition was deplorable. It seemed as if the entire 
German strength lay now in the personnel of the machine- 
gun and artillery branches; certainly the infantry was poor 



BEFORE THE ARMISTICE AND AFTER 265 

enough. There was a steady fire from the German guns on 
especially favored areas within our lines, such as Haumont 
Ravine, Bras, Charny, and the location of Division Head- 
quarters; the forward trench lines were still sprayed by 
machine-gun fire at any sign of life; but the German in- 
fantry had no fight left in it. A curious episode was the 
effort of a group of thirty-seven Germans (including an 
officer), who about this time engaged two of the enlisted 
men of the 102d Infantry in an attempted parley regard- 
ing their surrender. They were afraid to desert; they were 
afraid of the American artillery; they were eager to voice 
their unwillingness to kill or be killed, now — as they 
insisted — that the war was over. The report of the Ameri- 
can soldiers of the incident resulted, of course, in added 
precautions being taken against fraternization; but the 
incident was not without significance as reflecting the 
spirit of the enemy's former fighting men. 

At length, almost without warning, the break came. 
About noon, on November 8, a party of eighty Germans 
wearing their packs was seen marching out of Flabas to- 
ward the rear with no effort at concealment; and at the 
same time word came from the Corps of other evidences 
of a general retirement. At once strong patrols were pushed 
forward from all four regiments to keep in touch. The two 
battalions of the 52d Infantry Brigade, which had been 
loaned to the Seventy-Ninth Division's right brigade on 
November 6, were recalled, and a new advanced line was 
established late in the afternoon on the eastern edge of 
the Heights overlooking the Azannes-Damvillers road and 
the low ground, to which the enemy had sulkily retreated. 

All preparations were made to follow up this initial ad- 
vance with the coming of daylight. But early on Novem- 
ber 9 came orders with information that the direction of 
advance had been changed to the southeast, which brought 
as the next objective for the Twenty-Sixth the curious 
isolated hills called the "Ornes Twins" and the village of 



266 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

Azannes. The advanced battalions stayed where they were 
for the moment; then, as the support battahons formed 
up in the new direction, the former would fall in behind. 
On the right the Tenth French Division would give over 
to the Twenty-Sixth the region known as "La Wavrille," 
to afford more room for the maneuver. 

The advance, therefore, was undertaken. A fierce en- 
filade fire of machine guns on the left from Ville-devant- 
Chaumont checked the 104th Infantry; on the right the 
101st Infantry got forward some small elements toward 
Saint-Andre Farm, but could not make good its initial 
gains. In the center the 102d and 103d Infantry had no 
better success. The following day, November 10, a sec- 
ond push accomphshed considerably more, for the 103d 
Infantry, with a fine access of vigor, took Town Wood, 
and the 104th Infantry smartly flanked the enemy out of 
Ville-devant-Chaumont, as the Seventy-Ninth Division, 
farther to the left, succeeded in getting a firm hold on 
Hill 324, a commanding height from which the line of 
the Twenty-Sixth could be enfiladed. On the right, how- 
ever, the 101st Infantry accomplished little; and a wide 
gap was opened during the afternoon between this flank 
and the French in the region of La Wavrille, of which 
the enemy was too weak to take advantage before it 
was closed by the dispatch of machine guns and a platoon 
of infantry, as a connecting group, posted just west of 
Bezonvaux. Between the inner flank of the 102d and 
101st Infantry, where connection was also lost for a 
while, another dangerous gap was opened up. It was a 
disquieting day. As a result of honest effort there was 
little to show in the way of ground gained save in the 
center and on the left. Owing to its complete exhaustion 
the 101st Infantry was withdrawn to Cote de Talou 
under cover of darkness; and the meager ranks of the 
102d Infantry were extended to the right to take over the 
line held by the Boston regiment. 



BEFORE THE ARMISTICE AND AFTER 267 

Reasons why the results of these two days were not 
commensurate with the dogged, plucky efforts of the 
troops, are not far to seek. They are curiously intertwined 
with questions of infantry psychology. A compelling rea- 
son is to be found in the shocking depletion in the nu- 
merical strength of the infantry. Battalions, ordered to 
extend over a normal width of front, did not have men 
enough to cover half that line. Intervals between flanks 
became unduly wide for the same reason, which also 
made exceedingly difficult the organization of proper- 
sized patrols, connecting groups, and similar tactical de- 
tachments. The ranks of headquarters runners, signal- 
men, automatic rifle teams, non-commissioned officers, 
as w^ell as company and battalion officers, were so 
thinned that the usual machinery by w^hich any given 
unit functioned was in many cases vastly reduced in value 
when it w^as not crippled or missing altogether. In several 
cases lieutenants came away from Verdun in command of 
battalions, or sergeants leading theii.' companies. The 
strongest representations were continually made by the 
infantry commanders, especially with respect to the short- 
age of officers. But no replacements were received by the 
Division while in this sector until November 8 or 9; and 
the draft which then arrived — about one thousand en- 
listed men — came too late to contribute anything ma- 
terial to the fighting strength of the 51st Infantry Brigade, 
to which the new men were assigned.^ 

^ In any consideration of a combat unit's numerical strength one must include 
its animal transport. The following extracts from the report of the Division 
Remount OfBcer are not without interest as showing, from another angle, the 
reduced condition of the Twenty-Sixth at this period: 

" The plan of keeping animals in forward echelons was again tried in the Ver- 
dun Sector, but was met with the severest kind of animal losses from exposure, 
shell-fire, and gas. As a result the greater part of the artillery animals were taken 
back to the more or less sheltered rear echelons, while the animals of the infan- 
try and other divisional units were stabled in the somewhat demolished but 
nevertheless sheltered casernes of Verdun. Mules for the rolling kitchens, ration 
carts, water carts, and a number of mules for machine guns, had necessarily to 
\)e kept up fairly close to the lines, and it was these animals that shared the 



268 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

Not only were the regiments weak in numerical strength, 
but the troops were also weak physically. The long period 
of exposure, little sleep, and continual rain; the ravages 
of influenza and bronchial disorders; the daily exposure 

brunt of shelling and exposure. The plan, however, was adopted to alternate 
these animals, so that after one had served several days at the front it was 
brought back to a rear echelon, rested and cared for, while another took its 
place. 

" Up behind the lines picketing of animals in small groups of three, four, and six 
was employed as protection from shell-fire. There was an instance, however, in 
a certain machine-gun company, where this was not done, and twelve fine mules 
tied together on one picket line were completely wiped out by a shell landing 
directly beside them. . . . 

" The situation now became extremely grave. No stone was left unturned in an 
endeavor to procure animal replacements at this time, but the demand was so 
far greater than the supply that the task was well-nigh hopeless. The fact that 
was always brought forward, when a desperate appeal was made for animals, 
was that there were twelve or more divisions who were even worse off than the 
Twenty-Sixth, certain artillery brigades not being able to move at all. Conse- 
quently what animals were being received at the army depots were being sent to 
them. 

" At last, about October 17, a shipment of French stock en route from Bordeaux 
was switched at Saint Dizier to the Twenty-Sixth Division to be unloaded at 
Baleycourt. This shipment of 144 animals left Bordeaux made up of 96 artillery 
horses, 32 cavalry horses, and 16 mules. One of the horses died e?i route, and 3S 
horses and 4 mules were evacuated at the veterinary hospital at Treveray, being 
in far too poor condition for service at the front. Out of the 101 animals that 
arrived at Baleycourt, 48 had to be evacuated immediately for debilitation and 
mange, so that only 44 horses and 9 mules were left to be issued to the Division. 
From this number only 10 of the horses could be considered draft animals, while 
only 5 of the mules could be considered for heavy draft purposes. The little light- 
boned horses and mules, the latter doubtless Spanish, were issued to the machine- 
gun battalions for use in the machine-gun carts. Later the majority of these 
horses broke down on the march back from the front. The little mules, on the 
other hand, as usual went through everything, and at the end were still ready for 
more. 

" The above shipment is just one illustration of the diflSculties of securing ani- 
mals at this time for a division at the front. In defense of this shipment it must 
be said that just previous, on account of the desperate animal situation, tele- 
graphic instructions had been issued to all remount depots to send forward all 
animals that were even in fair condition. 

" Another order, issued from General Headquarters at this time, stripped all 
wagon companies attached to depots in the S.O.S. to half strength. As a result 
of this the Division was fortunate to receive 200 draft mules from one of these 
companies. These W'ere all excellent animals of American stock, and literally 
saved the day for the infantry supply companies. Shortly afterwards there was 
one other shipment from Bordeaux, mostly horses in poor shape, besides one or 
two small or miscellaneous issues of animals, obtained only after the greatest 
effort." 



BEFORE THE ARMISTICE AND AFTER 269 

to artillery and machine-gun fire, and to gas concentra- 
tion—all contributed to sap the men's vitaHty. Their 
appearance was eloquent of their wretchedness — gaunt, 
with faces heavily shadowed, the eyes sunk or gleaming 
with fever, the figure bent, the mentality dulled. One can 
fancy the concern of the infantry commanders on the 
spot, who knew the character of the tasks required, and 
the difficulties of the terrain. 

But it is possible to assign a reason, other and more com- 
pelling than physical exhaustion, in accounting for the 
infantry's momentary depression. It is a truism in the 
art of handling troops in the field that the loss of leaders 
trusted by their men impHes inevitably the loss of some- 
thing beside. It will be recalled that General Edwards 
was relieved from command October 22, his successor 
arriving on October 24. The very day after the command 
passed, on October 25, the new general reheved Colonel 
E. L. Logan, 101st Infantry, of whom he had no personal 
knowledge, on the charge of inertia. On November 6 he 
reheved Colonel F. M. Hume, 103d Infantry, on the 
charge of allowing his men to fraternize with the enemy. 
On November 9 Brigadier-General C. H. Cole was re- 
heved of the command of the 52d Infantry Brigade, on 
similar charges. Viewing this action solely from the angle 
of its effect on the troops, it should be understood that 
these officers had earned the loyalty of both officers and 
men. They had led their men in action; they had shared 
every hardship; they were depended upon by hundreds; 
they were obeyed without question. They were of great 
value in the places they occupied. All three had been 
privates, sergeants, and junior oflBcers in the original units 
composing their commands. Secondly, the men who had 
followed Cole, Logan, and Hume in action believed that 
charges reflecting on their soldierly behavior were base- 
less. And be it said that none of the charges against 
Cole, Logan, and Hume were sustained. Cole's case did 



270 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

not even go to a board of inquiry, though he at once de- 
manded one.^ Reinstated with their regiments in February, 
after sojourns at the "reclassification" centers of Blois 
and Gondrecourt, where Logan acted as successful counsel 
for many oflScers under charges affecting their eflficiency, 
both Hume and Logan, Hke Cole (who returned to his 
command early in December), appeared at the time to 
many to have been objects of a clumsily conducted, per- 
sonal spite campaign. One hesitates to give credence to 
such reports; but one is constrained to tell all the parts of 
any story should one undertake to tell the whole of it. 

What of the general situation, as the Division, with its 
companions of the Corps, ^ struggles to shake the hold of 
the enemy on the hills of Verdun .f* 

The length of the Western Front the Allies are victori- 
ous; every day, whether in Flanders, Picardy, or in Cham- 
pagne, they send the German reehng back in confusion. 
The First American Army, west of the Meuse, is also 
winning its objectives. Emerging at last from the Argonne 
Woods, rolling over the greatly reduced enemy by sheer 
weight of numbers, securing local successes more through 
the inherent fighting quality of the individual soldier than 
by skill in troop leadership on the part of the higher com- 
mand, the Americans had begun that race northward 

1 The order reinstating Brigadier-General Cole is here appended: 

France, November 30, 1918 
From: Adjutant-General, American Expeditionary Forces. 
To: Brigadier-General Charles H. Cole, Center of Information, A. P.O. 714, 

American Expeditionary Forces. 
Subject: Relief from Fifty-Second Infantry Brigade. 

1. I am directed by the Commander-in-Chief to inform yo"u that upon his 
personal examination of the papers reporting the facts incident to your relief 
from command of the Fifty -Second Brigade, he is of the opinion that the facts did 
not warrant your relief, and he has therefore directed that yon be reinstated to 
your former brigade. 

2. Accordingly, orders will be issued in the near future. 

By command of General Pershing 

Robert C. Davis 

Adjutant-General 

2 The Second Colonial Corps had taken over the Verdun front from the Seven- 
teenth Corps; but General Claudel remained in command. 



BEFORE THE ARMISTICE AND AFTER 271 

which was to end in the vicinity of Sedan. Slowed for a 
while by grave deficiencies in the operation of supply and 
transport services, and by an overtaxing of the capabilities 
of the road system; checked now and again, though green 
infantry, called by necessity to do the work of veterans, 
handsomely responded; suffering, furthermore, from the 
lack of initiative of certain infantry units, and from faulty 
employment of the artillery's resources, still the army 
surged ahead. Escaping disaster, it obtained a victory. 

For days — ever since the first of November, and even 
earlier — the end was felt to be near by friend and foe 
alike. Knowing themselves beaten, there was nothing the 
German soldiers so ardently desired as to cease fighting. 
Superior Headquarters very properly forbade the troops 
to believe that peace was in the air; officers and men must 
continue their efforts, must employ every ounce of energy, 
must fight their hardest, for war continues until hostil- 
ities cease officially. Down to the smallest units stringent 
orders were enforced against fraternization ; detailed warn- 
ings were sent out that any rumor of an armistice was 
nothing but German trickery. The following radio mes- 
sage was picked up by the Division's wireless operator at 
Headquarters early in the morning of November 7 : 

From Eiffel Tower Radio Station 
Translation November 7, 1918, 2.35 o'clock 

To the German High Command from Marshal Foch : 

If the German plenipotentiaries desire to meet Marshal Foch 
for the purpose of requesting from him an armistice, they will 
present themselves to the French outposts following the Chimay- 
Fournies-La Capelle-Guise road. Orders will be issued to receive 
them, and to conduct them to the place designated for the meet- 
ing. 

The message was sent from the French official station 
on the Eiffel Tower; it had every mark of authenticity. 
But — no, the message was not to be credited; it was 
probably a German forgery; there must be no relaxation 
of vigilance, effort, or of the will to fight. Prisoners came 



272 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

in daily, all with the same tale of weariness, disorganiza- 
tion, disintegration. All the more reason for dealing blows 
such as would complete the German disaster; and the 
huge naval fourteen-inch guns, pushed up on the railway 
behind Charny close to Division Headquarters, roared out 
destruction in voices that shook the countryside. 

A fine object lesson was set in the last four days of the 
war. One must understand that in war there are no com- 
promises. Either one fights or one is at peace; either one 
obeys or one disobeys. The soldier is given a course to fol- 
low; he pursues it till ordered to stop by proper authority. 
Very hard for new troops to grasp — that idea. Impossible 
for any one to understand the necessity of its unvarying, 
absolute enforcement until one has been in action. The 
German had asked for a cessation of hostilities; he had 
sent his representatives to receive the victors' terms. 
Beaten to his knees, he had no choice but to accept those 
terms. His troops asked nothing more than to be allowed 
to lay down their arms at once. These facts were evident; 
the world was aware of them; not a soldier but knew that 
the fighting was practically over. But military good sense 
and military habit only know that one fights or that one 
does not; they know that no change can come to pass in 
the world where soldiers dwell save that which is ordered 
by proper authority. And, therefore, implacable as a ma- 
chine, the Allied forces, unmoved by fact as by rumor, 
continued its hammer-blows on the beaten, retiring enemy. 
Not till Foch spoke could the armies pause; not till Claudel 
spoke, echoing his master, could the troops at Verdun 
slow down by an ounce of strength or an inch of stride. It 
was splendid, that lesson. 

The Division played the game through to the very end. 
We have seen how the infantry struggled forward on No- 
vember 10. Keen to follow to the limit all the possibihties 
of the military situation, just as if the campaign was in 
full swing instead of at its conclusion, the Chief of Staff in 



BEFORE THE ARMISTICE AND AFTER 273 

his field order for operations on that date named points 
far within the enemy Hnes as sites for a new divisional 
Headquarters and other administrative centers, the ob- 
jectives being farther distant still. On November 10, at 
21 o'clock (9 P.M.), was pubhshed Field Order No. 105, 
which, oblivious of all rumor that the armistice would be 
signed on the 11th, directed a new attack in the direction 
of Les Jumelles d'Ornes, Hill 265, and Maucourt, all de- 
tails of the advance being as methodically worked out 
and carefully prescribed as though a Leavenworth map 
problem was being solved. Should one wonder at the 
necessity for thus playing the game to the extreme of the 
Hmit, that will betray mere ignorance of military meth- 
ods, military necessity, and the military mind. Hostilities 
were not to cease till word came from Marshal Foch him- 
self. But that message could not be taken to mean that, 
the cessation of hostilities being imminent, efforts could 
be relaxed; and, therefore, late on the night of Novem- 
ber 10 the orders went forward for an attack on the 11th. 
What followed is of interest. One must not believe that 
Division Headquarters published the order for the attack 
on Armistice Day in any spirit of light-heartedness. It was 
with a secret hope that the order might be modified that 
it was sent forward; the thought of the infantry deploy- 
ing and advancing under fire, on what would probably be 
the last morning of the war, was not easy to bear. How 
greatly this feeling was intensified can be imagined when 
the radio received the following message at 5.45 o'clock 
November 11: 

From F L (Eiffel Tower) 

Marshal Foch to Commander-in-Chief. 

1. Hostihties will stop on the entire front beginning Novem- 
ber 11, at 11 o'clock, French time. 

2. The Allied troops shall not pass the line reached upon that 
date and at that hour until further orders, 

(Signed) Marshal Foch. 



274 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

At once the order directing the cessation of hostilities on 
the Division's front ^ was written and hurried out. But 
the order for the attack to continue up to the designated 
hour stood unchanged. Still must the artillery send over 
its fire of destruction and preparation on Les Jumelles 
d'Ornes, Gremilly, Hill ^65, and Mau court; still must it 
drop its roHing barrage in advance of the infantry at "H" 
hour; still must the meager battalions advance on the 
skirts of the curtain of fire to meet the usual resistance of 
the enemy's artillery and machine guns. 

But very soon after came news which changed the whole 
complexion of affairs. By motor from Corps Headquarters 
there arrived the Division's information officer, post- 
haste, with word that, in the opinion of the Corps Com- 
mander, the attack order of the morning could be modified. 
Pressed to state whether this modification meant that the 
infantry need not advance, the officer gave it as the Corps 
Commander's express wish that only artillery fire should 
be sent over and the advance of the infantry suspended. 

Instantly then, by every available resource of the mes- 
sage center, word was hurried to the brigadiers to hold up 
their infantry, in the following message written by the 
Chief of Staff: 

From: Chief of Staff 

To: C. G. 51st and 52d Inf. Brig, and CO. 51st Art. Brig. 

The operations set for 9.30 o'clock are modified as follows: 
The artillery preparation will be carried out as per schedule 
stopping promptly at 11 o'clock. 

The infantry will not advance to the attack. 

D. K. Major, Jr. 

A sigh of relief went the rounds of Headquarters. One 
would play the game through to the bitter limit — yes; 
but it was permitted to be happy that the rigor of the game 
had been a little modified. 

1 Field Order 106, November 11, 1918. 



BEFORE THE ARMISTICE AND AFTER 275 

The information officer, his message delivered, returns 
to Corps Headquarters and reports. The trip required a 
short half-hour by motor-car. He says that he has trans- 
mitted in person to the Division's Chief of Staff the in- 
structions of the Corps Commander that the attack order 
might be modified to the extent of withholding the ad- 
vance of the infantry. 

And upon that, to his amazement, the Corps Staff in- 
forms him that there has been another change — that, 
after all, the original attack order should stand, that the 
mfantry should participate. 

What was the reason for this volte-face? From what 
source was derived the reason for the Corps' last-minute 
change of plan.? There can be no doubt that, up to seven 
o'clock on the morning of November 11, the Corps in- 
tended to avoid casualties to the infantry of its divisions 
by authorizing their remaining in place. But, less than one 
hour later, one finds that, for some reason, the Corps com- 
pletely reversed itself, and in a matter of the first impor- 
tance. 

It will be an interesting task for a commentator on 
the conduct of the First American Army on November 
11 to determine the authority under which the Second 
Colonial Corps ^ enforced the order, which an hour before 
it had suspended, for the attack by the infantry between 
the hours of 9 and 11 which was like to cost America the 
lives of many, with the attainment of no corresponding 
military advantage. 

Immediately after the news of this change was tele- 
phoned to Division Headquarters a second message ^ was 
sent forward to the brigade commanders at the hours 
indicated : 

^ The Staff of the Second Colonial Corps replaced that of the XVII Corps 
(French) about November 6 ; but General Claudel retained command through- 
out the operations. 

* Written by the Chief of Staff and telephoned by officer in charge of message 
center. 



276 NEW ENGLAND IN FILiNCE 

November 11, 1918 Rtisk 

Priority 
51st Inf. Brig. 9.15 
52d Inf. Brig. 9.16 
51st F.A. Brig. 9.18 
From: Chief of Staff 
To: C.G.'s 51st and 52d Inf. Brig, and 51st Art. Brig. 

Orders from Regret Corps direct that the infantry will advance 
to the attack as per F.O. 105, 2Gth Div., at 9.30. The attack will 
stop at 11, when hostilities will cease. 

Relayed to the battalion commanders, it found some 
of the forward elements already under w^ay, while others 
(w^ho had received the order to stand fast) were under the 
necessity of assembling and forming up for the advance. 
The hne which finally moved out, therefore, was an irreg- 
ular one, the coordination of the advance by all elements 
being impossible under the circumstances. And by this 
time also word had flashed forward that eleven o'clock was 
to see the end of all things. 

But full results were attained. On the left the 104th In- 
fantry completed the capture of Ville-devant-Chaumont; 
in the center the front was advanced to the railroad ; a line 
from Saint-Andre Farm to a point just west of Bezonvaux 
marked the limit of attainment of the right of the Division 
(102d Infantry). 

Eleven o'clock! For two hours past the artillery had 
been endeavoring to loose off all its ammunition in the 
general direction of Metz. As the time to cease firing 
approached, battery commanders contrived all manner of 
devices by which every oflScer and man should share in 
firing the last shots of the war — they fastened lengths of 
wire to the lanyards so that whole gun crews could lay 
hold together; they fired with their w^atches in hand, so 
as not to overpass the hour, but to give full measure till 
the moment struck. Eleven o'clock, and the sodden in- 
fantry halted, dumbly, as if in a dream. There was no 
rejoicing, no noisy jubilation; the men were stupid with 



BEFORE THE ARMISTICE AND AFTER 277 

fatigue and the reaction which follows a too prolonged 
tension of the nerves. Eleven o'clock — an end of being 
killed ! That was the thought in the hearts of the men up 
front, however vocable might be the generals in their 
professional regret, at luncheon, that the punishment of 
the enemy could not continue a week longer. In Verdun 
a colorful, frantic parade of poilus, British engineers, and 
Americans, headed by the 101st Engineer band — the 
Stars and Stripes flung to the breeze by the French 
from the cathedral towers — a vivid speech by the heroic 
General Marchand. At Division Headquarters every- 
thing oddly quiet, the officers and men coming, as it were, 
out of a curious dream, incapable of rejoicing, perhaps with 
hearts so full they dared not trust themselves to speak. 
At evening bonfires all along the line — big, roaring blazes, 
fit to warm the bones of whole companies; a dazzling dis- 
play, both in Boche-land and for miles along our side, of 
flares, rockets, artillery charges. Very lights, CA^erything 
that would burn. Sentinels patrol the front to prevent any 
fraternization, for which the treacherous enemy appears 
only too eager. Boche officers appear with a white flag — 
a parlementaire, to show, in accordance with the terms of 
the armistice, where their mine-fields are located, and to 
render them harmless. The front line is accurately marked 
on the maps; measures of security are retained in full oper- 
ation; organization commanders see to it that their men 
are kept strictly in hand. Immediate measures are taken 
to warm, feed, and shelter the men and horses. 

For a day or two the Division waited for orders. It was 
designated at once as one of the first American organiza- 
tions to receive the honor of going to the Rhine as part of 
the Army of Occupation. Orders were in preparation; but 
presently, following the reports of inspectors, and the re- 
gretful acknowledgment of the Division Commander that 
the reduced physical condition of both troops and animals 
made a march to the German area impracticable, the des- 



278 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

tination was changed, and tlie opportunity of sharing the 
honors of the Army of Occupation passed forever. 

The Corps Commander called, on the day after the 
armistice was signed, to express his appreciation of the 
Division's loyal efforts to carry out his orders — orders 
imposed on him by the authorities of the First American 
Army.^ Now, regretting the necessity of attempting opera- 
tions on the Verdun front of the sort which had been as- 
signed to his command, aware of the futility of attacking 
fortresses like Hill 360 with any forces other than very 
large ones, the Corps Commander desired to condole 
with the Division Commander on the losses he had in- 
curred, by emphasizing the enormous diflBculties, the su- 
preme importance to the enemy of the Verdun front. Com- 
pared with the tasks set for the Seventeenth and Second 
Colonial Corps, those assigned to the units west of the 
Meuse were simple. And sincere was his regret that he 
had been obliged to fritter away, in small operations, the 
Thirty-Third, Twenty-Ninth, Seventy-Ninth, and Twenty- 
Sixth Divisions, as well as the Eighteenth, Twenty-Sixth, 
and Tenth French. With the weight of all seven, he was 
confident that he could have rolled the Germans off the 
Verdun hills in a single powerful stroke. 

^ Already, at the conclusion of the first Verdun operation, General Claude! 
had voiced his thanks and encouragement, as follows: 

Headquarters, Seventeenth Army Corps 
Staff, 1st Bureau 

October 24, 1918 
From: General Claudel, commanding the Seventeenth Army Corps. 
To: The Commanding General, Twenty-Sixth Division. 

General: The reputation of your division preceded it here far ahead. 

To all its titles of glory gained in fierce struggles, and only recently at the signal 
of Hattonchatel, it has added on the 23d of October a page which perhaps is more 
modest, but still does it great honor. 

In a few hours, as at a maneuver, it has gained all the objectives assigned it in 
the diflBcult sector of the Woods of Houppy, Etrayes and Belleau. 

This operation is evidence, indeed, of superior instruction, mobility and will. 

I do not know how to thank you sufficiently for your assistance, dear General, 
and it is my great desire to express to you all our grateful admiration for your 
splendid division which thus has added its name to all of those who have fought 
to hiirl the enemy back from the outskirts of Verdun. 



BEFORE THE ARMISTICE AND AFTER 279 

A leave party of six hundred was made up immediately 
from the infantry battahons most in need of refreshment. 
Brought out of the Hne half dazed, filthy, ragged, wet, and 
exhausted, the men were bathed, reclothed, and rested for 
a day before sending them along to the Grenoble area — 
the first men of the Division to receive a surcease from 
duty, drill, and the front line since February 8 on the 
Chemin des Dames. 

But soon came the end of work and life on the line for 
all the rest. By November 14 there had straggled into the 
area another division. This was the Sixth — a division 
which had been for weeks past continually in reserve or 
support, making long marches day after day, with so ht- 
tle transport that, lacking mules, the men were between 
the shafts dragging the machine-gun carts. To these new- 
comers, therefore, the New Englanders gave place. On that 
day the command passed. For twenty-six days the Divi- 
sion had occupied the Neptune Sector and fought to en- 
large its bounds, the longest period of service, be it said, 
which any division rendered during the Meuse-Argonne 
offensive of the First American Army. Only five and one 
half kilometers of ground were gained; but what that 
ground was, let any testify who fought before Verdun, 
the historic field of blood, and tears, and imperishable 
glory, where, with every task accomplished, in the face 
of supreme difficulty, the Twenty-Sixth ended an incom- 
parable fightmg career. 



CHAPTER XIX 

RECONSTRUCTION — THE MONTIGNY-LE-ROI 

AREA 

BY comfortable marches, arranged with the intention 
that no unit should be required to cover more than 
twenty kilometers in one day, the Division moved along 
southward. For two or three nights it billeted in the region 
it had traversed on the way up to the Saint-Mihiel action; 
it crossed the Bar-le-Duc-Commercy line, entered the area 
between Gondrecourt and Neufchateau, and thence moved 
southward again until, on November 23, Division Head- 
quarters was opened in Montigny-le-Roi, a village north 
of Langres between Chaumont and Bourbonne-les-Bains. 
Some difficulty arose from the fact that the Twenty-Ninth 
and Eighty-First Divisions were also moving south at the 
same time as the Twenty-Sixth, while other troops, both 
French and American, were crossing the line of march of 
the Division to join the Armies of Occupation on the Rhine. 
It happened occasionally, therefore, that more than one 
unit would arrive in a town on the same afternoon, each 
expecting to be billeted there and possessing competent 
authority to do so — a confusion which required much 
telephoning to the troop movement bureau at Army Head- 
quarters in Souilly with requests for an immediate solution 
of the difficulties; sometimes also the bureau adjusted mat- 
ters. More often the unit commanders concerned made 
haste to occupy the nearest village which at the moment 
stood vacant — being more solicitous to shelter and rest 
their men than to abide by march tables, graphs, and 
billeting assignments which, as a result of the unforeseen 
chances of every march, had not worked out according 
to the Staff's calculations. On the whole, however, the 



THE MONTIGNY-LE-ROI AREA 281 

troops came along without undue discomfort, while the 
daily "hike" over good roads, under a bright wintry sky, 
acted as a veritable tonic. The march was mostly hard 
on the supply departments and the couriers, who had to 
travel long distances to connect up with the various or- 
ganization Headquarters for the dehvery of rations and 
orders. 

Two incidents principally marked the week's journey. 
The first was the transfer of some forty battalion and 
company officers to the Thirty-Second Division for duty 
in the Coblenz area. These were picked out from regiments 
on the march, incontinently, and sent off much bewildered 
at their involuntary change of allegiance. 

The second incident occurred November 18, when Head- 
ciuarters was at Benoite-Vaux. On this date Brigadier- 
General Bamford was reheved, after a command lasting 
less than a month. One looks for traces of this officer's 
personal influence and direction on the Division's actions, 
movements, or hfe, but finds httle or nothing to record 
except his orders relieving the brigade and regimental 
commanders, to which allusion has already been made. 
General Bamford kept touch with conditions "up front," 
going in person to the forward lines very frequently, and 
set an excellent example of military bearing. But, gen- 
erally speaking, his exercise of command was merely that 
of a titular head, of an interim executive. In no sense did 
he ever lead, inspire, or guide the men under him. By 
the officers he was regarded as the commander who gave 
his authorization to whatever the Chief of Staff suggested 
as being desirable or necessary. It was to the latter, all 
through the Bamford regime, that officers looked for or- 
ders; anything resembling a personal touch between the 
Division Commander and his brigade or regimental com- 
manders was far to seek. 

In his stead there came to the Division a commanding 
general who, within an hour of his assumption of command, 



282 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

made his presence, authority, good-will, and ideals of dis- 
cipline plainly felt. This was Major-General Harry C. Hale. 
Graduated from West Point in 1883, a colonel of infantry 
in the Regular establishment in 1915, General Hale had 
enjoyed a more than usually varied duty — against the 
Indians, with volunteer troops, in the Philippines, in 
China, as aide-de-camp to General Wesley Merritt, and 
as adjutant-general of two important departments. Ap- 
pointed Brigadier and Major-General in 1917, General 
Hale was placed in command of Camp Zachary Taylor at 
Louisville, Kentucky, and subsequently commanded the 
Eighty-Fourth Division. This command he had all through 
the period of training and also in France, until the Eighty- 
Fourth was broken up to furnish replacements, army 
troops, and various detachments; upon which, after a 
brief stay at Langres, he was assigned to the Twenty- 
Sixth. His position was for the moment a little diflBcult. 
Himself without experience as a field commander in France, 
he had veteran fighting troops under him; he was an entire 
stranger to his Staff. And how General Hale, by energy, 
kindliness, the exaction of a firm discipline on every officer 
and man, and by "playing the game" hard and squarely, 
put new interest, vigor, and spirit into weary troops, 
would furnish interesting material to any student of the 
psychology both of armies and of individual soldiers. 

In the Montigny area the Division came under the orders 
of the Fifth Corps (Major-General C. P. Summerall). At 
once was begun a course of training "for eventualities.'* 
Ofiicers and men were impressed with the fact that an 
armistice does not mean a peace — that hostilities might 
recommence — that the Division might be called upon to 
perform duty in Germany. There was to be no assumption 
on the part of anybody that its work was over. This was 
healthy. It is not quite sure that everybody believed it; 
but at any rate, proceeding on the principle that "next 
to making war, there was no occupation for the soldier 




MAJOR-GENERAL HARRY C. HALE 



THE MONTIGNY-LE-ROI AREA 283 

better than preparing for war," the days were quickly 
filled with drills, brisk physical exercise, and military 
study for all ranks — with the result that, sooner than 
one could dream, every regiment recovered tone and 
spirits. It was the old story of work's tonic effect. It made 
no difference that there seemed to be no definite object 
in the work. That officers and men were kept busy at 
something, all day, every day, was enough to accomplish 
the desired result. 

To his Staff, as to every battalion, the new Division 
Commander reiterated the one thought: That the one 
purpose he desired to accompHsh was to restore the whole 
Division to its old-time snap, smartness, and contentment, 
to recover its health and spirits, to bring it home — when 
the time came — in perfect condition. 

To this end other factors were soon to contribute very 
materially. Leaves for officers and men were now ar- 
ranged by regular schedule, it being intended that every- 
body should receive ten days' 'permission. This could 
be spent by the enlisted men in the area in the south of 
France, not far from Aix-les-Bains, set aside and care- 
fully organized for the purpose — the hotels, theaters, 
and all other tourist accommodations being leased by the 
American authorities for the benefit of troops on leave, 
while their entertainment was confided to a large ex- 
tent to the Y.M.C.A. and other welfare associations. 
Officers went very generally to points on the Riviera, Nice 
and Cannes being the principal centers. Paris at this 
time was universally barred as a place in which to spend 
one's leave, the public misbehavior of a few having sufficed 
to exclude all others; but other interesting cities were 
available beside the Nice area, and some officers took this 
opportunity to get to such famous scenes of the war as 
Rheims, or even to revisit Verdun. And leave worked 
wonders. The men, who went on permission in parties 
of six hundred at a time, made excellent records for good 



284 NEW ENGLAND IN FRx\NCE 

behavior; they all came back freshened and brightened 
— after scores of the quaintest adventures.^ 

Another very important feature in the rejuvenation of 
the Division at this time was the return to its embrace 
of many of its sons from hospital or from service with 
other units. No longer were these soldiers tossed about 
from replacement battalion to casual camp and back 
again, heartsick and lonely. It was to their home that 
they were sent now — back to their "buddies," back to 
their company and kin. And their happiness was touching; 
and the satisfaction of the typical worried unit commander 
over the return of his lads to his care was boundless. 
The rejoicing in all ranks gave an indication clear enough 
that finally, after months of following a wrong trail, the 
powers had hit on the proper method of handling men 
released from hospital. 

Early in December the prisoners lost at Seicheprey, 
in Epieds, and elsewhere were returned to the Division. 
They had no particular complaint of harsh treatment by 
their German captors; but they all agreed in deploring 
the wretched lot of the British, and especially that of the 
Russians, in the various camps. 

A change appeared to come into the attitude of higher 
authority toward the Division. Compliments from the 
Corps Commander were frequent on various points in 
the discipline, appearance, and condition of regiments or 
trains. And at Christmas time, the Twenty-Sixth was 
honored by being designated both as the Division with 
whom President Wilson should eat Christmas dinner, 

* The Corps Commander wrote a letter to the Commanding General of the 
Division, in which he comments on the "high standards of conduct and soldierly 
pride manifested by members of the Twenty-Sixth Division during their pres- 
ence in the Auvergne leave area. Their behavior was such as to attract the favor- 
able notice of the commanding officer of that area, and he was so highly im- 
pressed that he has communicated his sentiments in a complimentary letter with 
reference thereto. The members of this leave detachment reflected credit upon 
the Division, the Corps, and the American Army, and have established a stand- 
ard worthy of emulation by all who succeed them." 



THE MONTIGNY-LE-ROI AREA 285 

and as that which should furnish the Presidential guard 
of honor when Mr. Wilson visited General Headquarters 
at Chaumont.^ It had been intimated at an earlier date 
that the presidential party would review the Division 
by driving through the area over a designated route 
along which the various regiments should be drawn up. 
Full preparations were made for this ceremony, and 
also for a more conventional division review; positions 
were staked out; units were practiced in the required for- 
mations; preliminary march orders were issued. But this 
plan was changed later to a review by the President of 
detachments from all near-by divisions at Humes, north 
of Langres, to be held on the morning of December 25. 
To this review the Twenty-Sixth sent a provisional bat- 

^ The 2(1 Battalion, 102d Infantry; and band, 101st Infantry. The orders 
were as follows: 

Headquarters First Army 
American Expeditionary Forces, France 
20 Dec. '18 
From: Chief of StafP, 1st Army, A.E.F. 
To: Commanding General, 26th Division, A.E.F. 

Subject: Visit of President of the United States. 

1. The Army Commander desires me to inform you that, on the recommenda- 
tion of the Commander-in-Chief, the President has selected the 26th Division 
as being the division he will visit on Christmas Day. This selection was made 
on the ground that the 26th Division had the longest period of service in France. 

2. The Army Commander desires that you be present at the Presidential review 
at Humes, which is to start at 10.30 a.m. on December 25, 1918, so that you may 
conduct the President from the review ground to such town or towTis in your area 
as he may desire to visit. The Army Commander desires me to say that all organ- 
izations in the area should be prepared for this visit, billets properly policed and 
men lined up outside of same awaiting the arrival of the President. He also desires 
that the non-commissioned officers in charge of quarters be ready and on the 
alert to precede the President and the Commander-in-Chief into such billets as 
they may desire to inspect. 

3. The President has expressed a desire to eat Christmas dinner with the men, 
and to that end it is directed that you select some organization which the Presi- 
dent and his party can visit at dinner time and eat the soldiers' dinner with the 
men. In the party it is estimated that there will be somewhere in the neighborhood 
of 40 persons. 

H. A. Drttm 
Official: Chief of Staff 

Laurence Halstead 
Colonel, General Staff 
A.C. of S., G-3 



286 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

talion of infantry, composed of what were deemed the 
four best-drilled companies of the four regiments — 
"B," 101st; "K," 102d; "F," 103d; "L," 104th. From the 
101st Field Signal Battalion was sent one company; from 
the 101st Engineers went Company "F"; from the 102d 
Machine-Gun Battalion went Companies "A," "B," 
*'C," "D," the troops being transported in trucks to and 
from the reviewing field. Immediately after this ceremony 
the President drove to Montigny-le-Roi, inspected some 
billets, and later took Christmas dinner with officers from 
Division Headquarters and all units of the Division, in a 
hospital building on the edge of the village, where great 
efforts had been made to receive the Division's distin- 
guished guest with full honor/' The general impression 
made by the troops on this occasion may best be sum- 
marized by the telegram of the Commander-in-Chief to 
General Hale: 

G.E.Q., Dec. 26, 1918 
C.G., Twenty-Sixth Division 

I desire to congratulate the Division on the excellent work of 
the battalion which represented it as the guard of honor at Chau- 
mont, on the fine appearance and discipline manifested by the 
men during the visit of the President of the United States to the 
billets of the Division, and on the splendid appearance made by 
the detachments representing the Division in the review for the 
President at Humes, France, December 25, 1918. 

Pershing 

By the first of January, rumors as to the early return 
of the Division to the United States became rife. A 
searching inspection by fifteen ofiicers from General 
Headquarters, which occurred just after New Year's, 
gave point to the gossip; the fact that the Division was 
known to have won a very high rating on this occasion 
did not dim the general hope and expectation. Nothing 
oflScial, however, was allowed to leak out in the line of 
positive information. January schedules for drill in- 
spections, terrain exercises and maneuvers were prepared 



THE MONTIGNY-LE-ROI AREA 287 

with the usual painstaking care; the daily routine was not 
changed by a hair's breadth; the attention to duty was 
not relaxed. Not a hint was let fall, officially, of what 
was actually in store. The news, when it did arrive, 
came as a complete surprise. 

Division Headquarters was profoundly quiet one after- 
noon. In the entrance hall of the narrow house an officer 
cautioned silence to all who came and went; in the upper 
rooms the typewriters had ceased their chatter; outside 
the couriers had coaxed their roaring motor-cycles to 
something like decency. For in the office of the Chief 
of Staff, the Corps Commander was lecturing on the 
tactics of the Meuse-Argonne advance. And when General 
C. P. Summerall talks of war, not a soul but cranes to 
hear every word. Intent, eagerly interested, a tightly 
wedged crowd of field and staff officers, just in from a 
divisional terrain exercise, was learning anew some price- 
less lessons. And suddenly a curious rustle, a flutter, a 
quietly suppressed exclamation, broke the silence from 
the upper regions. A wide-eyed sergeant from the mes- 
sage center clattered halfway down the stairs — remem- 
bered his drill — and, finishing on tiptoes, whispered 
with respectful violence to the sentinel captain in the hall, 
who stifled a hallelujah. From the telegraph office came a 
slip, and the captain pondered whether he would risk 
having charges preferred and shout the news it contained 
through the door to the Corps Commander's audience. 
Two days before all officers had been charged explicitly 
that they were not to accept or discuss any rumor of a 
homeward move at all — they were to bend all their en- 
ergies on preparing for warlike eventualities. But now! 
The message center had received the glad tidings; in a 
moment the couriers and orderlies would know it; already 
it was hard to suppress the cheers that rose unbidden 
ftom the upstairs region; yet one must wait, before get- 
ting the news to the Chief of Staff, until the Corps Com- 



288 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

mander had finished his exposition of the accepted theory 
of the employment of machine guns during the initial 
stages of the infantry attack! 

One may be permitted to guess that perhaps the sen- 
tinel captain did whisper the tidings to one or two of his 
associates near the door. It is possible that the audience 
picked echoes of the news out of the very air, with nothing 
said at all. But certain it is that not for an instant did the 
attention relax even by a hair; not an eye wavered in its 
stony glare at the distinguished lecturer; not an ear but 
remained pricked in proper deference. One fancies that 
it was the demeanor of those officers during that hour 
of schooling which led the Corps Commander to extol 
the surpassing disciphne of the Twenty-Sixth. 

This was the bit of news that clicked in over the wire 
January 8, 1919: 

Bar-sur-Aube, Jan. 8, 1919 
C.G. 26th Div. 

Following telegram from G.H.Q. is repeated for your informa- 
tion and necessary action quote no 3048 G-3 commanding 
general S.O.S. has been directed this date to prepare 26th Divi- 
sion for return to United States and orders will issue from Com- 
manding General S.O.S. for the movement of Division by rail 
to the Le Mans area for preparation period all orders for disposi- 
tion of material animals and surplus equipment will issue from 
Commanding General S.O.S. period first elements will arrive in 
Le Mans area January 20th or as soon thereafter as practicable 
end quote acknowledge. 

Drum 

Busy, indeed, were the days that followed. To go back 
a little, we should recall that the artillery did not ac- 
company the Division on its march down from Verdun 
to the Montigny area. Barely capable of fetching its 
guns along, owing to the depleted state of its animal 
transport, the brigade halted in the vicinity of Ligny-en- 
Barrois to take account of stock. Here it remained for 
some three weeks, turned in all its animals save those 
required for the ration and baggage wagons, as well as a 



THE MONTIGNY-LE-ROI AREA 289 

great part of its general artillery equipment. Toward the 
end of December it rejoined the Division; but parked 
its guns under guard at the detraining point (La Ferte- 
sur-Amance), and ceased to exist as a brigade equipped 
for field service. It is a curious illustration of how things 
are and must be done in an army, that, because a con- 
signment of tractors for the howitzers had arrived for the 
51st F.A. Brigade at Marseilles, a detail was required 
to go and fetch them to where the brigade was stationed, 
even though the Fifty-First would never use them. 

A colorful interlude in the preparations for the home- 
ward movement occurred on January 15, a brief and 
brilliant half -hour, when the French bestowed, as it were, 
a final Godspeed on the Division which for so many 
months had ranked high in their affections. With only 
the briefest warning arrangements were made to receive 
at Mandres-les-Nogent both the American Commander- 
in-Chief and the famous defender of Verdun, the second 
soldier in France after the peerless Foch, Marshal Petain, 
who was to decorate with the Croix de Guerre the colors 
of the regiment and the battalion which had done so 
valiantly at Marcheville on September 26, the 102d 
Infantry. On a gray, misty afternoon the battalion was 
paraded, the cross was aflSxed to the colors by the Mar- 
shal in person with all the appropriate and stirring cere- 
mony prescribed for that occasion; and then, turning to 
General Pershing, Petain affixed to his breast also the 
little bronze cross with its green and red ribbon. It was a 
brief affair; but how deeply the honor and its method of 
presentation touched the hearts of the regiment and of 
the whole Division, all those can testify who shared in the 
emotions of the moment. 

One should record also, at this place, before the Divi- 
sion boards the trains for the west, that changes in com- 
mand continued all through the months of November 
and December. To the command of the 52d Infantry 



290 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

Brigade, following General Cole's relief, there was as- 
signed General Shelton, whose place (in the 51st In- 
fantry Brigade) was taken by Brigadier-General L. L. 
Durfee on November 23. As Cole returned, however, 
early in December, General Durfee was transferred 
away again, almost before he had settled into his new 
command. Major P. W. Loughridge was assigned to the 
Staff as Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, in place of Lieu- 
tenant-Colonel J. L. Howard, formerly Divisional Ma- 
chine-Gun Officer, who had been doing duty as G-3, but 
who now returned to the United States. A large number 
of other officers came at this time from replacement cen- 
ters, to fill vacancies in command. The ruling then in 
force, that no promotions could be made or approved sub- 
sequent to the armistice, had summarily ended the hopes 
of many field and company officers who had brought their 
units through all the fighting. Colonel H. I. Bearss, 102d 
Infantry, was relieved for physical disability and succeeded 
by Colonel D. Potts: Colonel F. M. Hume's place with 
the 103d Infantry was taken by Colonel P. W. Arnold, 
whose death by accident, as the Division was moving 
toward the embarkation area, was much lamented. Com- 
mand of the 101st Machine-Gun Battalion fell to Major 
L. H. Watres on December 27; the Division Surgeon, 
Colonel R. S. Porter, was transferred at his own request, 
and was succeeded by Lieutenant- Colonel T. L. Jenkins. 
In the 102d Machine-Gun Battalion, Major W. R. Car- 
penter took command on December 20; Major A. R. 
Crafts took over the 101st Field Signal Battalion on 
January 11; Lieutenant-Colonel F. E. Jones assumed 
command of the 101st Sanitary Train on December 10; 
Lieutenant T. J. Byrne was assigned to take the Head- 
quarters Troop on January 5. 

There was great activity in cleaning all ordnance 
equipment, counting and sorting ammunition, applying 
cosmoline and the like to pistols, machine guns, and 



THE MONTIGNY-LE-ROI AREA 291 

other metal liable to rust. Harness, saddles, instruments 
— every bit of armament, in short, save the rifles and the 
men's own packs and helmets — were turned in. It was a 
Division lightly equipped, indeed, but rated high for the 
good condition of the equipment it got rid of, which got 
orders to move on January 17, and took up its march 
to the troop trains January 21, this time headed definitely 
toward home. 

The movement to the embarkation area, which lay 
between Le Mans and Tours, in the Department of Le 
Sarthe, was made, uneventfully, in a leisurely manner, 
under the direction of the Commanding General of the 
Service of Supply, the last units arriving in the spacious 
new area on February 4, where Headquarters had been 
opened in the trim Httle town of Ecommoy. 



CHAPTER XX 

HOMEWARD — THE LAST DAYS 

THERE were two problems which immediately pre- 
sented themselves to the Division Commander, once 
the troops were settled down in the Le Mans area. The 
first was : How shall we keep the men well in hand and en- 
tirely contented? The second problem, really a corollary 
of the first, had to do with the profitable occupation of the 
soldier's leisure hours — hours no longer required for the 
military drill and exercise which fit men for combat. 

Home was almost in sight; but unavoidable delays in 
operating the ocean transport schedule would have the ef- 
fect of making the men restless. With all the pressure of 
actual war-time necessity relaxed, in spite of all efforts to 
maintain good habits of military bearing and discipline, 
these would tend inevitably to decline from the Division's 
high standards. The restless and unruly would get to 
straying — falling into the prevalent vice of the whole 
Expeditionary Force; the good men would get rusty from 
lack of employment. 

Some wise and far-seeing orders framed at General Head- 
quarters took care of part of the problem. Under their 
provisions there were granted generous leaves to large 
contingents of good-conduct men, to visit Paris, London, 
and other historic cities or centers which it was most de- 
sirable American soldiers should see. Here the leave par- 
ties were admirably handled, being provided with capable 
guides from the welfare agencies; and everything possible 
was done to insure that the men should derive lasting 
benefit from their experience. To other regular leave areas, 
such as those established on the slopes of the Pyrenees, 
in Savoy, or near Saint-Malo, many more enlisted men 
were sent for ten-day periods. 



HOMEWARD — THE LAST DAYS 293 

But what deserves special mention is the grandiose 
scheme for the education of American troops in France, 
which, originated largely by civilian leaders of one of the 
welfare societies, was pushed vigorously, beginning in De- 
cember, 1918, by the army authorities. It was a scheme 
so typically American as to be a classic of its kind. And 
that it was diverted from the rocks of disaster, that what 
one may venture to term its delightful madness produced 
tangible results of any kind, is largely due to the good 
faith with which the recipients of its benefits went in to 
claim them. The plan was partly based on the army regu- 
lation prescribing the estabhshment of post schools wher- 
ever practicable, supervised by the chaplains, where the 
men could be taught the various elementary grammar- 
school subjects. This was the excellently solid foundation; 
but on it was reared a superstructure with pinnacles which 
towered high and ghttered gayly, but which (in the eyes 
of the bilious) appeared not a little flimsy. Before the 
Division came to the embarkation area a beginning was 
made. In all units classes were organized in reading, writ- 
ing, arithmetic, and history. For the illiterate, the for- 
eigner whose English w^as imperfect, and for the man of 
little schooling, a great deal of advantageous work was 
planned; and so far a considerable good was undoubtedly 
accomplished. The Division Commander inclined wisely 
to have special stress laid on teaching the illiterates; there 
were marked degrees of difference in the enthusiasm with 
which unit commanders embraced the plan; and great 
divergences existed in the relative skill and enterprise 
of the school officers in charge of the teaching. It was ex- 
ceedingly difficult to get proper school supplies, textbooks, 
and the simplest apparatus. The men detailed to attend 
school did not exhibit an absolutely uniform joy upon re- 
ceipt of their orders; there were some who reincarnated 
the cheerful dunces of all the schoolrooms of history. The 
expenditure of effort was enormous; but perhaps, when 



294 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

one hears of a half-dozen men who were taught to write a 
letter home for the first time in their lives, the time, cost, 
and final inevitable scrapping of the whole elementary- 
school machinery were justified. 

This is less easy of proof when one considers the loftier 
reaches of the A.E.F. educational plans. It was proposed 
that selected officers and men, of at least high-school 
training, should be given the advantages of short courses 
at certain French centers of learning like Rennes, Lyons, 
Montpellier, Toulouse, Grenoble, and the Sorbonne; or 
of similar courses at the English universities. Another 
group, in furtherance of still another splendid scheme, 
were to be sent to Beaune, where the widely heralded 
A.E.F. "University" was inaugurated in February. Ex- 
actly what it was proposed to accomplish by these plans 
for attendance at advanced university courses, with no 
preparation, with most vaguely defined objectives, is a 
little difficult to tell. One may presume that the origina- 
tors of the plan had in mind the idea that our men would 
get a taste of foreign culture, a look through foreign eyes, 
an echo of foreign languages, an impression of foreign 
civilization. It was doubtless hoped that some would be 
enough attracted to commence serious study and longer 
courses instead of hurrying home. Here was apparently 
a way, moreover, by which a large number of good officers 
and men could be kept profitably occupied and interested 
during the time of waiting for their ship to sail; and per- 
haps it was this very practical if unofficial consideration 
which gave ballast to that which, considered as anything 
remotely resembling a real educational plan, appeared 
merely fantastic. In elaborating and carrying out this plan, 
the Young Men 's Christian Association was very active. To 
the Beaune center of scholastic contemplation and aca- 
demic research not a great many students applied from the 
Twenty-Sixth Division. Inaugurated only a short time 
prior to the departure of the New Englanders for home, 



HOMEWARD — THE LAST DAYS 295 

its advantages did not seem to outweigh those of the Divi- 
sion's various home towns; the few "YD " men who sought 
culture in the heart of Burgundy were mainly those not 
closely identified with the Division's original membership. 

Another means of keeping the men contented had its 
origin outside of the Division, and was applied with that 
singular earnestness and elaboration of machinery which 
marked so many aspects of the American adventure in 
army-making. One began to receive, about this time, im- 
passioned circulars from General Headquarters on the 
necessity- of maintaining the morale of our troops; their 
recreations, amusements, and sports must be carefully 
supervised, made very real and helpful, adding (when pos- 
sible) that touch of refinement and home culture which 
only carefully chosen feminine society can impart. One 
must devise all sorts of gamesr establish circulating li- 
braries, moving-picture shows, dances, concerts, vaude- 
ville entertainments; there must be "morale officers" as 
already there were "school officers." Battery commanders 
and platoon leaders who once had been leaders in battle 
should now become football coaches or leaders of com- 
munity singing. There were not any more soldiers to be 
made, no more martial spirit to inculcate, no more need 
of whetting the fighting edge of the human material; there 
were only some thousands of hearty, well-fed youths to 
keep happy — so that their last memories of army fife 
would be haloed in a rosy, golden glow. "Welfare work" 
was to be made the be-all and end-all of life in the embar- 
kation area. 

To these orders of higher authority, therefore, the Di- 
vision officers applied themselves. The Division Machine- 
Gun Officer's duties now were limited to arranging with 
the authorities of the Embarkation Area ^ and with the 
Y.M.C.A. headquarters in Le Mans for suitable apparatus 

^ The former Commanding General and Staff of the 3d Corps, with the Staff, 
military police, and detachments of the former 83d Division. 



296 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

for athletic contests and moving-picture shows; the Mu- 
nitions Officer had the task of escorting sixteen young ladies 
from the Y.M.C.A. about the area every afternoon and 
evening, to dances arranged for the enlisted men, a staff 
reconnaissance car and an artillery staff car being assigned 
for the use of these welfare workers. OflScers of the Gen- 
eral Staff sections were given all sorts of odd details, from 
supervising the official photographing of localities where 
the Division was in action, to checking up citations for 
decorations; at Headquarters only the office of the Di- 
vision Adjutant continued to function as usual and with 
unabated speed — and here was much work to do, for 
the final records of each man in the Division were now by 
way of being completed. It really was difficult to find work 
enough for all hands. One should remember that the ar- 
tillery had no guns, gear, or horses; the three battalions 
of machine-gunners had no machine guns; the splendid 
military police were superseded in their duties by the area 
police; services such as the ammunition, sanitary and sup- 
ply trains, ordnance, gas, or remount, all were left with 
no employment at all, or at least found their daily duties 
enormously reduced. The 101st Engineers, however, that 
ever-ready outfit which represented the very best of the 
Division, were working as usual. Attached to the Embar- 
kation Area temporarily, they cheerfully hammered away 
on the roads, filling in the holes and renewing the surface 
which the heavy trucks continually wore away. The In- 
spector and the Judge-Advocate were also occupied; but 
there ■\;^^ere scores of officers and hundreds of enlisted men 
whose daily tasks were few and light enough. There was 
ingenuity required not only to keep them happy, but also 
to keep them out of mischief. 

It was proposed at first by the Area Headquarters to 
give the men a course of target practice, going to the ranges 
at Mayet and near Saint-Biez by battalions. But this 
order was very soon rescinded. It was found really im- 



HOMEWARD — THE LAST DAYS 297 

practicable to carry it out in the time allowed. The ranges 
were in need of extensive repairs; materials for targets 
and target apparatus were all lacking; the continuous 
winter rains had turned the ground of the ranges into cold 
marshes, where it would be most undesirable for the men 
to camp out, in view of the fact that they must now be 
kept in good physical condition. And so, once again, re- 
course must be had to methods and schemes not exactly 
military to insure that the troops remain hardy and hearty. 
One potent contribution to this end — and a means 
refreshingly soldierly — was the review of the Division 
which was made by the Commander-in-Chief on February 
19, on a field near Mayet. For days there were held a series 
of preparatory drills and rehearsals, for the Hmited area 
of the reviewing field made accuracy of formation and 
smoothness of movement indispensable; elaborate prepar- 
ation had to be worked out for the transportation to and 
from the field of distant units and for their subsistence; 
the organization of the ground itself, which was a shallow 
hollow set about with pine woods, required the greatest 
care of the staff oflficers concerned. But, as matters turned 
out, all went well. In a drizzle of misty rain the great array 
of troops was curiously somber and impressive, the bright 
color of the flags, the bluish sheen of the oiled steel helmets, 
and the gleam of the bayonets topping the mass, being in high 
and picturesque rehef . The Commander-in-Chief, mounted 
on a white horse, was not content with the usual formal 
ride around the troops; he threaded his way in and out, be- 
tween the platoons, asking questions, making comments, 
his eye everywhere. And the summary of his impressions 
of the Division is best conveyed in the following letter: 

American Expeditionary Forces 
Office of the Commander-in-Chief 

March 21, 1919 

My dear General Hale : 

It gives me a great deal of pleasure to congratulate you, and 
through you all the officers and men of the Twenty-Sixth Divi- 



298 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

sion, on their splendid appearance at the inspection and review 
which was held near Ecommoy on February 19. The spirit and 
soldierly bearing of all ranks pleased me very much, and was what 
one would have expected of a division with such a long and excel- 
lent record in France. 

Arriving in the autumn of 1917, the division went through 
the prescribed course of instruction until early in 1918, when, 
brigaded with the French, it entered the line for a month and a 
half's further training north of Soissons, in the Chemin des Dames 
Sector. It was withdrawn for rest when the German offensive of 
March 21 necessitated its immediate return to the line in the 
La Reine and Boucq Sectors, north of Toul. Here it had two 
important engagements — one in the Apremont Forest, where 
it repulsed with loss a heavy German raid, and at Seicheprey, 
where casualties on both sides amounted to approximately 2000 
men. 

On July 18 the Division was thrown into the battle between 
the Aisne and the Marne, advancing in seven days more than 
17 kilometers against determined enemy opposition, and captur- 
ing the towns of Epieds, Trugny, Torcy, Belleau and Givry. 

It next took part in the American offensive of September at 
Saint-Mihiel. Operating under the Fifth Corps in the Rupt and 
Troyon Sectors, north of Saint-Mihiel, it captured Bois-des- 
Eparges, Hattonchatel, and Vigneulles. 

Later, during the Meuse-Argonne offensive, it attacked north- 
east of Verdun, and aided in the storming of Etrayes Ridge, cap- 
turing Bois de Belleu and the Bois d'Ormont, one of the most 
formidable heights in that region. The Division was in this 
sector when the armistice called a halt to active operations. 

Each soldier should be proud of the share which the Twenty- 
Sixth Division has had in adding glory to the fighting record of 
our armies, and I want every man to know of my own apprecia- 
tion, and that of his fellows throughout the American Expedi- 
tionary Forces, for the splendid work which has been done. 

Very sincerely yours 

John J. Pershing 

Tlie general impression which the Division made during 
its stay in the Le Mans area was exceedingly good. From 
Embarkation Headquarters came nothing but expressions 
of pleasure at the workmanlike, self-sufficient manner in 
which the troops took care of themselves. Here was effi.- 



HOMEWARD — THE LAST DAYS 299 

cient staff work, which required no guidance or assist- 
ance; here was a strict disciphne; here was a notable spirit 
of pride and the desire to play the game handsomely. 
From the leave areas, from Paris, from General Head- 
quarters, came varied bits of testimony reflecting satis- 
faction — now with the behavior of the men, now with 
the efficient work of the adjutants or the inspectors. It 
was "a good war," just then — a time when the Division 
felt a contentment which came not so much from wel- 
fare work as from the consciousness that it was made up 
of good and well-tried soldiers. 

Within the Division was originated an acti\aty which 
had a very definite bearing on the continuation of this 
spirit of contentment. The Division Commander, be- 
heving firmly in the value of competitive sports, organized 
on March 10-12 a divisional tournament, held at Ecom- 
moy, to which all units sent entries. 

There was a series of military events — such as platoon 
and company drills, a road march of ten kilometers, gas 
mask races, tent pitching, and rifle sighting; while to these 
contests were added field and track events including tug- 
of-war, short distance dashes, jumping, soccer, football, 
and boxing. The final meet had been preceded by a long 
series of elimination contests in each battahon, so that 
the teams and individuals who met at Ecommoy repre- 
sented the best that the Division had to offer, and a great 
success this meet surely was. Blessed with beautiful 
weather, favored by the attendance of General Sum- 
merall and other high ranking officers, the competitions 
were keenly contested and in a good sporting spirit. 
Without a delay or hitch in the management throughout, 
the tournament accomplished its purpose exactly. To the 
104th Infantry was awarded the great silver challenge 
cup which the Division Commander had presented as 
the prize for the organization winning the most points; 
and fairly, indeed, as the result of hard training and game 



SOO NEW ENGLAND IN FILVNCE 

fighting, did Colonel Cheatham's boys win the coveted 
trophy. 

By now the end was close at hand. In all units there had 
been made a careful check of the personnel; embarkation 
passenger lists were compiled; the inspectors made a final 
round. It was ordered that no unit could proceed until 
every trace of vermin was gone, so the greatest efforts were 
made to eliminate from person, clothing, and blankets 
every trace of the head or body louse which was such a tor- 
ment to the soldier; no venereal case could go home; no 
unit could be given a clearance from its billets until every- 
thing was policed and left in an absolutely clean and or- 
derly condition. It should be noted that, under the above 
provisions, not a single man was left behind, and only one 
company was held back for one day to complete putting 
its house in order. 

For a moment a pause was made while the Division 
presented to the Embarkation Area the recreation hut, in 
the city of Le Mans, which bore its name and insignia. 
Erected through contributions of residents of York Har- 
bor, Maine, who sent Miss Grace Thompson to France to 
arrange for its building, the "York Harbor YD Hut" was 
built by details from the 101st Engineers in some thirty 
working hours. Consisting of a canteen, recreation and 
assembly room with a stage and big fireplace, kitchen, 
five sleeping-rooms, officers', and women's quarters, the 
"Hut" was tastefully designed and painted to suggest an 
old-fashioned New England dwelling. And the dedication 
ceremonies, held on March 17, made a graceful good-bye 
from the Division to the Americans still to go home. 

There had been changes of command up to a very 
few weeks before leaving France. On February 7, Brig- 
adier-General Sherburne returned to his well-beloved ar- 
tillerymen, relieving General Glassford who had done so 
finely with them; February 22, Major John R. Sanborn 
took command of the 102d Machine-Gun Battalion, sue- 



HOMEWARD — THE LAST DAYS 301 

ceeding Major W. R. Carpenter; February 28, Major 
S. F. Westbrook took command of the 101st Maehine-Gun 
Battalion. And other changes were made, springing from 
their return to duty with the Division of Colonel Edward 
L. Logan and Colonel Frank M. Hume (February 11). 
Another hearty welcome met Colonel R. K. Hale, formerly 
second in command of the 101st Artillery, who returned 
to the Division, on the eve of sailing, as Chief of Staff. He 
succeeded Colonel D. K. Major, Jr., transferred to duty 
with the Service of Supply. Colonel J. H. Allen, M.C., 
was assigned to the Division at this time as Surgeon. 

Of the actual voyage home there are no incidents to 
record which have a permanent interest. Proceeding to 
Brest, where the troops were passed rapidly through final 
inspections, the transports were boarded in good order. 
Conditions at the camp in Brest, which had caused a great 
uproar to be raised in the American newspapers, were found 
to be actually very good. The men were not too crowded, 
and were comfortable. Here were issued new shoes, cloth- 
ing, and blankets to those requiring them ; minute exami- 
nations were made to ascertain the presence of any com- 
municable disease; but the delays were exceedingly brief. 
The first contingents, embarking on the Mount Vernon, 
Agamemnon, and America, got off within only a few hours 
of each other; the rest followed at the briefest possible in- 
tervals. Sailing on the afternoon of March 26, the first 
homeward-bound transport, the Mount Vernon,'^ arrived 
in Boston on the morning of April 4, to meet the vociferous, 
moving welcome of all New England. And every day, for 
a week or more, succeeding transports brought home in 
safety the various regiments, trains, and battalions, until 
the whole Division was again concentrated at Camp 
Devens, Massachusetts. The 101st Trench Mortar Bat- 

^ On board the Mount Vernon were Division Commander, Staff, Division 
Headquarters; Military Police; Headquarters Troop; Headquarters 52d In- 
fantry Brigade; 101st Engineers (less Co. C); 101st Engineers Train; 104th 
Infantry. 



802 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

tery (S officers, 184 enlisted men) had preceded the rest 
of tlie Division toward the ports of embarkation by some 
weeks. Together with other similar miits it was designated 
as part of one of the earliest contingents of combat troops 
to return to the United States; but it embarked at Saint- 
Nazaire on March 30 and arrived in Hoboken, New Jersey, 
on April 12, immediately proceeding to Camp Devens.^ 

The events of the days which followed the Division's 
arrival can all be grouped around three principal happen- 
ings: the review at Camp Devens on April 22, the parade 
in Boston on April 25, and the discharge of the officers and 
men on April 28-30. 

One could not chronicle, in twice these pages, all the 
manifestations of joy, of loving pride, and of affection, 
which were planned by the New England towns for their 
*'boys." 2 Touching as were the eager desires of the fam- 
ihes, friends, and homes of the men to give them an im- 
mediate welcome, they could not for the moment be satis- 
fied. Of first importance it was to keep the men at hand, 
ready for discharge; it was only as the result of the most 
urgent representations by the most important persons in 
New England that the War Department was brought to 
sanction even the divisional parade in Boston. Necessarily 
insensible to any call but that of utility, the Department 
was obliged to ignore the sentiments which filled the hearts 
both of the returned soldiers and the communities; the 
strictest orders forbade the participation in local parades, 
welcoming receptions, or any similar demonstration, of 
any officer or man in the Division.^ Daily there came to 
Headquarters committees from cities and civic organiza- 

* General C. H. Cole and a small party had been sent ahead of the Division 
to assist in preparations for homecoming. 

^ Approximately 51 per cent of the officers and men who went overseas with 
the Division returned with it. Battle casualties totaled as follows: Killed, 2168; 
wounded, 13,000; prisoners of war, 451. Replacements furnished to the Division 
numbered 14,411. 

^ Individual passes, good for forty-eight hours, were issued; but on condition 
that the soldier should not join any public or official demonstration. 



HOMEWARD — THE LAST DAYS 303 

tions, seeking to arrange some such celebration, bappy in 
representing the happiness of their community; but each 
time they had to be refused. Not till the men were dis- 
charged from the service could they receive the welcome 
of their home towns; and with this answer the delegations 
had to be content. 

It was partly with the purpose of meeting this desire of 
all New England to welcome its own, that the Division 
Commander extended his invitation to the Governors of 
the New England States to review the Division on the 
afternoon of April 22 at Camp Devens. And a notable 
event in the varied history of the Twenty-Sixth this review 
did, indeed, prove to be. On an afternoon of flawless spring 
weather, in the presence of a crowd which was estimated 
to include not less than 300,000 persons, the troops, in full 
field equipment, to the music of a massed band of 300 
pieces, behind their regimental colors which that day were 
decorated with the battle streamers bearing the names of 
major engagements, swept down the Camp Devens parade 
ground in perfect order, faultless rhythm, and steady 
cadence, which thrilled the vast crowd to the very marrow. 
Before the review there was held the ceremony of award- 
ing decorations — Medal of Honor, Distinguished Service 
Cross, and Croix de Guerre — to some forty -five oflBcers 
and men; and in this ceremony the Division's former 
commander, Major-General Edwards, was called upon by 
Major-General Hale to award the crosses to those whose 
gallant deeds had been performed while General Edwards 
was still in command. 

Three days later came the long-anticipated street parade 
of the Division in Boston. And for the last time it was pos- 
sible to demonstrate the workmanlike methods of those 
officers who had, for many months, been charged with the 
duty of moving, subsisting, equipping, and billeting the 
troops. With no confusion the various units were brought 
into town, lodged, fed, formed for the parade, and retu^ied 



304 NEW ENGLAND IN FRANCE 

to camp. In a fine spirit of cooperation every officer and 
man of the whole Division worked to show himself and his 
unit, from squad to regiment, to the best advantage. And 
Boston, who seemed that day to have taken to herself the 
whole population of New England, roared an approval and 
a welcome from the miles of towering reviewing-stands, 
from windows, curbstones, from every vantage-point, 
which never can be forgotten by those present. It should 
be remarked that the people did not view the Boston parade 
of the Twenty-Sixth as a spectacle, as an interesting, pic- 
turesque march of veteran troops. It was in a far different 
spirit that the crowds were cheering. They were welcoming 
home their own boys — their own blood, their kinsmen. 
They hailed the return not only of the soldiers of the 
United States, but also — and with shriller joy — the 
soldiers of their own home regiments. This is worth record- 
ing, one believes, on the last pages, as on the first, of this 
history of American citizen-soldiers in the European War. 
It is a record of the expression of that love for its own ter- 
ritorial, localized military unit which has always linked 
closely together the American community and the Ameri- 
can soldier. 

Last of all came the days of actual discharge from service. 
Again the patient personnel adjutants made out their end- 
less rolls and records; again the officers and men were 
physically examined; on the 28th and 29th of the month, 
they received their pay and their papers, and moved away 
— once more civilians. 

"SECURE FROM CHANGE" 

Virtue treads paths that end not in the grave; 
No bar of endless night exiles the brave; 

And to the saner mind 
We rather seem the dead that stayed behind. 
Blow, trumpets, all your exultations blow! 
For never shall their aureoled presence lack: 
I see them muster in a gleaming row, 
With ever youthful brows that nobler show; 



HOMEWARD — THE LAST DAYS 305 

We find in our dull road the shining track; 

In every nobler mood 
We feel the orient of their spirit glow. 
Part of our life's unalterable good. 
Of all our saintlier aspiration; 

They come transfigured back 
Secure from change in their high-hearted ways, 
Beautiful evermore, and with the rays 
Of morn on their white shields of expectation! 

So sang a New England poet of the returned soldiers 
from another war. One deprecates, in our American 
fashion, the tendency to catch and reflect the luster of 
exalted emotion in our own prosaic daily hves; one can 
vision the embarrassment of the average Yankee Division 
soldier, should he be told that he was a hero and must 
act accordingly. But true it is that these lads brought home 
with them, all unawares, perhaps, from months in the 
front hne of battle, from suffering as from honorable 
achievement, from their plain duties conscientiously per- 
formed, a certain new value, a quickened sense of a man's 
responsibility to and for his fellows, which the years to 
come will see worked deeply into the very pattern and web 
of the fabric of our national ideals and hfe. 



THE END 



INDEX 



Absence without leave, from training 
camp, 57; from Embarkation Area, 
293. 

Accommodations. iSee Billet. 

Administration, General Staff section 
in Division Staff, 64. 

Adrian barracks, 41. 

Agamemnon, return on, 301. 

Aisne-Marne offensive, order of battle 
on western side of salient, 168; in- 
terdivisional communication, 169; 
preparation, 170; enemy's exposed 
position, 170; plan of attack on 
western side of salient, divisional 
orders, 171-75, 179; order of battle 
of 52d Brigade, 175; field of Divi- 
sion's advance, 175; first day (July 
18), advance of 52d Brigade, 175-78, 
183; check to French on Division's 
left, 178-81, 183; evidence of enemy's 
retirement, 180; artillery support, 
181; third day, advance of 51st 
Brigade, 181-84; comment of Army 
Commander, 183; general results of 
western offensive (20th), 185; ene- 
my's retirement on southern front, 
186; advance from western front 
(21st) to intercept line of retreat, 
186-88; check at Epieds-Trugny 
lines, 188, 189; plan of attack on 
Epieds-Trugny, contradictory or- 
ders, 190, 191 ; failure of attack (22d), 
191-95; casualties, 195 n., 208, 209; 
attempt to flank the line (23d), 195- 
98 ; withdrawal of enemy from Epieds- 
Trugny, pursuit, 198, 199; relief of 
infantry of Division, 199, 200, 202, 
203; orders for impossible further 
pursuit, how avoided, 200, 201 ; serv- 
ices of Division, 202, 208, 298; serv- 
ice of Division's artillery after 
relief of infantry, 203-06; attack 
around Sergy, 204, 205; movement 
of infantry after relief, recuperation, 
207; captures by Division, 208 n.; 
movement to rest area, 209. See 
also Champagne-Marne. 

Aix-les-Bains, as leave area, 283. 

Aizy, Headquarters of 102d Infantry, 
73. 



Albright, Major O. S., command, 60. 

Alfonte, Lt.-Col. W. A., Saint-MiMel 
offensive, 227. 

Allen, Col. J. H., Division Surgeon, 301. 

Amaranthe Hill, in Saint-Mihiel offen- 
sive, 219, 223. 

Amaury du Boisrouvray, Major, serv- 
ices at training camp, 48 n. 

Amblonville Wood, on Saint-Mihiel 
front, 217. 

America, return on, 301. 

Amiens, German drive for, 98. 

Ammunition Train. See One-Hundred- 
First. 

Amusements. See Recreation. 

Anglemont Farm, in Verdun lines, 247. 

Animal transport. <See Transport. 

Apremont, in La Reine Sector, 101, 
110. 

Armistice, approach, measures to pre- 
vent forestalling, 271, 272; advance 
on day, 272-74; final artillery shots, 
276; celebration on Verdun front, 
276 ; first leave, 279 ; relief of Division, 
279. 

Army of Occupation, Division loses 
opportunity, 277; transfer of officers 
to, 281. 

Arnold, Capt. D. G., command, 18. 

Arnold, Col. P. W., command, death, 
290. 

Artillery, strength of Division, 15; 
schools, 55; counter-preparation fire, 
146; German waste, 151, 153; roving 
guns, 155. See also Fifty-First Field 
Artillery; Ordnance. 

Ashby, Capt. B. L., command, 60; 
transferred, 212. 

Ashworth, Major A, command, 60. 

Aultman, Brig.-Gen. D. W., com- 
mands artillery, 154; report on 
artillery in Marne offensive, 203-06; 
transferred, 212; career, decorations, 
212 n. See also Fifty-First Field 
Artillery. 

Baccarat Sector, Forty-Second Di\-i- 

sion at, 99. 
Bacquencourt, Major de, as instructor, 

71. 



308 



INDEX 



Bailey, Capt. K. B., of Staff, 25 n. 

Baker, N. D., visit to the Division, 102. 

Baker, Major T. C, command, 60; 
transferred, 241. 

Bamford, Brig.-Gen. F. E., com- 
mands Division, 262; relieves offi- 
cers, 269; relieved, 281; character as 
Division Commander, 281. 

Barbillon Forest, in Marne offensive, 
198, 201. 

Barrage, first American, 79; plan on 
Marne front, 162. 

Bayonet, school for teaching, 51. 

Bazoillcs, billet, 34 n.; hospital, 42; 
officers' school, 51. 

Beacham, Lt.-Col. (Col.) J. W., Jr., 
Quartermaster, 16 n. ; transferred, 61. 

Bearss, Col. H. I., commands 102d 
Infantry, 209; in Saint-Mihiel offen- 
sive, 227 ; Marcheville attack, 235-38 ; 
commendation, 239; commands bri- 
gade, order for Belleu fight, 252-55; 
relieved, 290. 

Beaumont, on La Reine Sector, 101 ; in 
Seicheprey fight, 119, 120, 122, 129. 

Beaune, A.E.F. University, 294. 

Belieu Wood. See Belleu. 

Belleau in Marne offensive, 174-76, 
in n. 

Belleau Wood, Marines' fight, 159; in 
lines of Twenty-Sixth, 160, 162; 
sinister aspect, 164; in Marne offen- 
sive, 176. 

Belleu Wood, on Verdun front, 251; 
orders for operation against, 252-55; 
attacks and counter-attacks (Oct. 
23-26), 255-57; Shel ton's report 
(27th), 258-60; effective strength of 
brigade after, 259 ; Corps Command- 
er's appreciation, 278 n. 

Below, Gen. von, Picardy drive, 87, 
96 n.; before Rheims, 161. 

Benoist d'Azy, Lt. C./de, services at 
training camp, 48 nl 

Benoite-Vaux, Division Headquarters, 
relief of Bamford, 281. 

Bernccourt, in La Reine Sector, 245; 
German bombardment, 153. 

Bertrand, Col. (Gen.), services at 
training camp, 48-50; battle record 
of regiment, 49 n.; and Seicheprey 
fight, 127. 

Berzy-le-Sec, in Marne offensive, 185. 

Beuvardes, in Marne offensive, 201. 

Bevans, Lt.-Col. J. L., Surgeon, 16 n., 
18. 

Bezonvaux, on Verdun front, 266, 276. 

Bezu Woods, in Marne salient lines, 
162. 



Big Berthas, 97. 

Billets, at Lorraine training camp, 34 
n. ; problems, 41; after La Reine 
tour, 157; on Marne front, 159; 
problem on march after armistice, 
280. 

Billy-sous-les-C6tes, in Saint-Mihiel 
offensive, 217, 219. 

Bishop, Col. A. T., command, 210. 

Bishop, Lt. R., and German raid, 79, 
SO. 

Bissell, Capt. H. B., in Marne offensive, 
191, 192. 

Blanchard Farm, in Marne offensive, 
189. 

Blondat, Gen., corps command on 
Meuse front, 232; and plans for 
Meuse-Argonne offensive, 233; com- 
mendation of Marcheville demon- 
stration, 238, 239. 

Boehn, Gen. von, Picardy drive, 96 n. ; 
on Marne front, 159, 161; Marne 
offensive, 166, 170; Foch's attack 
on, 186. 

Booth, Brig.-Gen. E. E., in Marne 
offensive, 205. 

Borne Agron Wood, in Marne offensive, 
182. 

Boston, Division Headquarters, 12 n. ; 
reception of returning troops, 301; 
parade, 303. 

Bouconville, in La Reine Sector, 146. 

Boucq, headquarters at La Reine Sec- 
tor, jil05; bombarded, 153. 

Boucq Sector. See La Reine Sector. 

Bouresches, Second Division at, 159; 
in Marne salient lines, 160, 164; in 
Marne offensive, 173, 175, 177, 178. 

Bowen, Major H. L., command, 241. 

Bowen, Lt.-Col. W. S., Assistant Chief 
of Staff, 141; transferred, 241. 

Boxford, Mass., training camp, 12 n. 

Brabant-Samogneux Area, on Verdun 
front, 245. 

Brabant Wood, in Verdun lines, 247. 

Braisne, entraining at, 86. 

Bras, divisional post of command on 
Verdun front, 247, 265. 

Brechaincourt, billet, 34 n. 

Brest, Division at, condition, 301. 

Breteuil Farm, in Marne offensive, 187. 

Breteuil Wood, in Marne offensive, 
188, 189, 191. 

Brigades. See Fifty-First Field Artil- 
lery; Fifty-First Infantry; Second 
Infantry. 

Brittany, artillery training camp, 35. 

Broussey-Vargevaux Pond, and La 
Reine Sector, 137. 



INDEX 



309 



Brown, Lt. (Major), J. W., first patrol, 
75, 76; decorated, 76. 

Brown, Brig.-Gen. R. A., in Marne 
offensive, 203. 

Brule, Bois. See Burned Wood. 

Bulkeley, Major M. G., command, 169. 

Bunnell, Col. G. W., commands en- 
gineers, 16 n., 17, 22. See also One- 
Hundred-First Engineers. 

Bar-sur-Seine, Division's rest area, 
209. 

Burned Wood (Bois Brul6), m La 
Reine Sector, 101; 104th Infantry m, 
105; position, 110; first German 
raid, 111; second fight, 112-15; pur- 
pose of attack, 113; results, 115; 
commendation by Corps Comman- 
der, 115 n.; decoration of colors, 116; 
troops engaged, 116 n. 

Bushy, Lt., in Marne offensive, 194 n. 

Bussiares, in Marne salient lines, 160. 

Butgneville, on Meuse front, 233. 

Byrne, Lt. T. J., command, 290. 

Cameron, Major-General, citation of 

102d Infantry, 227. 
Camiers, machine-gun school, 55. 
Camp des Romans, Germans at, 100. 
Camp Devens, Division at, 301; ban 
on celebrations, 302; review, 303; 
discharge, 304. 
Camps, state training, 12 n.; in Eng- 
land, 32-33; Neuf chateau, 34. -Sec 
also Training. 
Cantigny, fight, 159. 
Carlowitz, Gen. von, at Soissons, 161. 
Carpenter, Major W. R., command, 

290; transferred, 301. 
Cass, Major L. W., of Staff, 25 n.; 

transferred, 61. 
Casualties, first death from hostile fire, 
74; at Chemin des Dames, 84; at 
Seicheprey fight, 131; at La Reine 
Sector, 144; in Marne offensive, 
195 n., 207, 208; in Saint-Mihiel 
offensive, 230; in Belleu Wood fight, 
259; of Division, 302 n. 
Caures Wood, Verdun lines, 246, 247. 
Cavalry. See under names of states. 
Certilleux, billet, 34 n. 
Chaillon, in Saint-Mihiel offensive, 

226. 
Chamigny, Division Headquarters, 

160. 
Champagne-Marne defensive, move- 
ment of Division to front, 158, 159; 
prospect, other American divisions 
on front, 159; relief of Second Divi- 
sion, line held, 160, 164; situation at 



time of Di\'ision's arrival. Pas Fini 
Sector, 160; German plans, 161; 
aspect of Division's fines, 161; 
artillery concentration, 162; enemy 
artillery activity, 162, 163; infantry 
defensive-offensive plan, 162; hard- 
ships, horrors, 163, 164; patrol 
clashes, 164; Vaux fight, 165, 166; 
final German offensive, 166; corps 
and army relations of Division, 168. 
See also Aisne-Marne. 
Changes in personnel. -See Officers. 
Character, record of volunteer soldiers, 
1; of National Guard, 3-6; spirit of 
volunteers, 6; local pride, 7, 8, 304; 
of elected militia officers, 9; basic 
conditions on organization of Divi- 
sion, 10; unity of Division, 18, 53, 
58, 211; and regulars, 36; impres- 
sions on the French, 37-39; military 
faults, 40; impressions on and of 
French troops, 71, 72; individual ac- 
tion, dangers, 89; results of service, 
305. <See aZso Discipline; Morale. 
Charny, in Verdun lines, 265. 
Chartreuve Farm, in Marne offensive, 

205. 
Chase, Major H. G., Signal Officer, 

16 n., 17; transferred, 60. 
Chateau-Thierry, Third Division at, 
159, 166; evacuated by Germans, 186. 
Chatillon-sur-Seine, Division's rest 

area, 209; school, 209. 
Chaudneney, billet, 157. 
Chaudon, Col., battle record of regi- 
ment, 50 n. 
Chauffour Wood, in Meuse-Argonne 

offensive, 233. 
Cheatham, Col. B. F., command, 241. 
Cheippe, Lt. L., services at training 

camp, 48 n. 
Chemin des Dames, Division trans- 
ferred to, for front-line training, 63, 
67; terrain, 65-67; as quiet sector, 
67; entraining for, 67-69; experience 
of first relief, 69; gradual enlarging 
of responsibiUty, 70; practical in- 
struction by French, 70, 71; mutual 
impressions, 71, 72; extent of line 
held, 72; initial dates, 73, 74; prog- 
ress, 74; first patrol, 74-76; first 
German raid, 76, 77; first raid on 
enemy, 78; second German raid, pris- 
oners lost, 79, 80; unsuccessful raid 
on enemy, 80; first German gas at- 
tack, 81-83; relief, results of tour, 
83, 85; casualties, 87; compliments 
of French commander, 84 n. ; depar- 
ture, entraining under fire, 86, 87. 



310 



INDEX 



Ch&nes, Bois des, on Verdun front, 
attack, 247, 256. 

Chery-Chartreuve, in Marne offensive, 
205. 

Christmas, Pres. Wilson's %dsit, 284-86. 

Circourt, billet, 34 n. 

Claudel, Gen., command on Verdun 
front, 245, 270 n., 275 n.\ and kind of 
combat prescribed, 246, 260, 278; ap- 
preciation of Division's work, 278; 
on Belleu Wood fight, 278 n. 

Clothing, search for, before sailing, 25; 
deficiency in French training camp, 
42. Sec also Supply. 

Coetquidan, artillery training camp, 
35. 

Cole, Brig.-Gen. C. H., commands 
brigade, 17; career and personality, 
21; and Xivray-Marvoisin raid, 153; 
preparation for Marne offensive, 
172, 175; in Marne offensive, 177 n., 
190, 195 71.; effort to relief of com- 
mand, 210; in Saint-Mihiel offensive, 
229; relieved and reinstated, 269; 
return, 302 n. See also Fifty-Second 
Infantry Brigade. 

Cole, Major G. E., of Staff, 25 n. 

Colonel's position and personal respon- 
sibility, 22-24. 

Combres, in Saint-Mihiel offensive, 
219, 229. 

Commander-in-Chief. See Pershing. 

Communication, telephone system of 
training camp, 41; at La Reine Sec- 
tor, 107, 120; during Seicheprey 
fight, 123, 126, 129, 131; interdivi- 
sional, in Marne offensive, 169; need 
of training, 210. See also Intelli- 
gence; Liaison; One-Hundred-First 
Field Signal Battalion. 

Connecticut Ambulance Company, in 
Twenty-Sixth Division, 18. 

Connecticut Cavalry, in Twenty-Sixth 
Division, 17. 

Connecticut Field Artillery, in Twenty- 
Sixth Division, 17. 

Connecticut Field Hospital, in Twenty- 
Sixth Division, 18. 

Connecticut Field Signal Troops, in 
Depot Brigade, 13 n. 

Connecticut troops. See preceding 
titles, and First; Second. 

Counter-preparation fire, 146. 

Coupru, in Marne salient lines, 162. 

Courchamps, in Marne offensive, 179, 
180. 

Couvrelles, Division Headquarters, 
67, 69. 

Crafts, Major A. R., command, 290. 



Creue, in Saint-Mihiel offensive, 219, 
226, 227. 

Creue Wood, in German Saint-Mihiel 
lines, 102. 

Croissant Wood, in Marne offensive, 
173. 

Croix de Guerre. See Decorations. 

Croix Rouge Farm, in Marne offen- 
sive, 204. 

Cumieres, Brigade Headquarters, 245. 

Damages, at training camp, 38; on the 
march, 90. 

Damvillers, in Saint-Mihiel offensive, 
229. 

Danker, Chaplain W., killed, 153. 

Davis, Lt. G. H., first raid, 78. 

Decorations, first, 76; after entraining 
under fire, 87; of colors of 104th 
Infantry, 116; of colors of 102d In- 
fantry, 289; after review at Camp 
Devens, 303. 

Defense plan on Champagne-Mame 
front, 162. 

Degoutte, Gen., command on Marne 
salient, 168; on Division in Marne 
offensive, 183, 202. 

Denton, Major William, command, 
241. 

Depot Brigade, 13. 

Details, interference with training, 42. 

Detraining. See Transport. 

Deuxnouds, in Saint-Mihiel offensive, 
219. 

Discipline, training, 40; absence with- 
out leave, 57, 293; on march, strag- 
gling, 89. iSee also Character; 
Morale. 

Division Commander. See Bamford; 
Edwards; Hale, H. C. 

Division Headquarters, at Boston, 12 
n. ; at Lorraine training camp, 34 n. ; 
overseas, 30 n.; at Chemin des 
Dames, 67, 69; at Reynel, 93; at La 
Reine Sector, 105; bombarded, 153; 
at Toul, 157; on Marne salient 
front, 159, 160; during Marne offen- 
sive, 188; casualties in Marne offen- 
sive, 208; in rest area, 209; during 
Saint-Mihiel offensive, 214, 217; 
during Meuse-Argonne operations, 
240, 244; at Montigny-le-Roi, 280; 
in Embarkation Area, 291; return, 
301 n. See also Division Commander; 
Division Staff; Post of command. 

Division Staff, as organized, 16 n.; 
additions before overseas, 25 n.; 
character, 25 n. ; changes, 61, 138, 
141, 169, 212, 220, 241, 290, P^ . 



INDEX 



311 



reorganization, General Staff sec- 
tions, results, 64, 139-41; and line 
officers, 91; illustration of need of 
trained, 104; improvements, 138, 
141; and line command, 209; un- 
usual duties at Embarkation Area, 
296. See also General Staff. 

Divisions of A.E.F., numerical designa- 
tion, 2 n. ; territorial basis, 3. See also 
divisions by number. 

Dole, in Marne offensive, 205. 

Dommartin, in Saint-Mihiel offensive, 
223. 

Dompierre-au-Bois, in Saint-Mihiel 
offensive, 219. 

Domptin, Brigade Headquarters, 160. 

Dowell, Lt.-Col. C. M., Judge Advo- 
cate, 16 n.; Chief of Staff, 61; trans- 
ferred, 138; Assistant Chief of Staff, 
241. 

Drum, Brig.-Gen. H. A., instructions 
on visit of Pres. Wilson, 285 n. 

Durfee, Brig.-Gen. L. L., command, 
290. 

Ecommoy, Division Headquarters, 291. 
Education, grandiose scheme, 293; 
elementary, for illiterates, 293; 
higher, 294. 
Edwards, Major-Gen. C. R., assumes 
command of Division, 16; relation- 
ship with troops, 16; career and per- 
sonality, 19; measures to increase 
strength of Division, 26; teaching 
and example at training camp, 52, 
58; tour of instruction, 55; and repul- 
sion of first German raid, admonished 
by General Headquarters, 78; during 
training road-march, 90 ; commands 
La Reine Sector, 105, 142; and 
Seicheprey fight, 129; relations with 
General Headquarters, 136, 209, 250; 
orders for Marne offensive, 173- 
75, 200; and check before Trugny, 
195; and line command for Staff, 
209; and change in plan of Saint- 
Mihiel attack, 223, 224; post of 
command on Verdun front, 247; 
relieved of command, 249-51; fare- 
well general orders, 262; takes leave, 
263; farewell to artillery, 263 n.; 
awards decorations, 303. See also 
Division Headquarters; Division 
Staff ; and references under Twenty- 
Sixth American Di-vision. 
Eighteenth French Division, on Ver- 
dun front, 245, 278; relieved, 246, 
247. 
Eighth Massachusetts Infantry, in 



Depot Brigade, 13 n.; in Twenty- 
Sixth Division, 17, 18. 
Eighty-First American Division, move- 
ment to rest area, 280. 
Eighty-Second American Division, oc- 
cupies La Reine Sector, 156. 

Eighty-Third American Division, in 
charge of Embarkation Area, 295 n. 

Einem, Gen. von, attack at Rheims, 
166. 

Eleventh French Corps, at Chemin des 
Dames, 67. 

Elves, Wood of the, in La Reine Sector, 
144. 

Embarkation Area, movement to, 291; 
problem of morale at, 292; leaves, 
292; educational scheme, 293-95; 
recreation, 295, 297; review by Per- 
shing, 297; character of Division's 
stay, 298; tournament, 299; final in- 
spection, clean bill, 300; YD Hut, 
300. 

Engineer Train. See One-Hundred- 
First. 

Engineers, American, in Picardy drive, 
98. See also One-Hundred-First. 

England, Division in, 31-33. 

Entraining. See Transport. 

Epaux Bezu, in Marne offensive, 179. 

Epieds, in Marne offensive, 188-98. 

Equipment, search for, before sailing, 
25. >See also Supply. 

Esperance Farm, in Marne offensive, 
204. 

Esprit de corps. See Character. 

Essen Trench, in Saint-Mihiel offen- 
sive, 222. 

Estey, Major H. B., transferred, 60; 
decorated, 87. 

Etrepilly Plateau, in Marne offensive, 
174, 183, 184. 

Evans, Major P. W., command, 156. 

Farr, Col. O. W. B., command, 212; 

relieved, 241. 
Fary Farm, in Marne offensive, 202. 
Feeley, Capt., in Belleu Wood fight, 

253. 
Ferme de Camp, in Marne offensive, 

204. 
Fifteenth French Colonial Division, in 

Saint-Mihiel offensive, 216, 219, 222, 

223; on Meuse front, 232. 
Fifth French Reserve Army, in Marne 

offensive, 186. 
Fifth Massachusetts Infantry, in De- 
pot Brigade, 13 n. ; in Twenty-Sixth 

Division, 16. 
Fifty-First Field Artillery Brigade, 



S12 



mDEX 



state training camp, 12 n.; composi- 
tion, 17; commanders, 17, 22, 154, 
212, 241, 300; overseas, 30 n.; train- 
ing camp in France, 35; programme 
of training, 40; supplies, 44; trans- 
port prolilem, 45, 46; French Mili- 
tary Mission with, 48 n.; loses offi- 
cers transferred as instructors, 61 ; 
transfer to Chemin des Dames Sec- 
tor, 63, 64, 68, 69; instruction at 
Chemin des Dames, 71; position 
there, 73; first barrage, 79; position 
in La Reine Sector, 105; in Burned 
Wood fight, 111; general character, 
services at La Reine Sector, 154-56; 
gj'psy pieces, 155; position on Marne 
salient front, 160; in Marne offen- 
sive, 174, 175, 181, 182, 187, 190, 
191 ; services in offensive after relief 
of Division's infantry, 203-06; casu- 
alties in offensive, 208; on Saint- 
Mihiel line, 218; in Saint-Mihiel 
offensive, 221, 225, 226, 230; in 
Riaville-Marcheville demonstration, 
235, 240; on Verdun front, 247; in 
Belleu Wood fight, 253; Edwards's 
parting message, 263 n.; final shots 
of the War, 276; rejoins Division in 
Montigny Area, 288. See also refer- 
ences under Twenty-Sixth American 
Division. 

Fifty-First Infantry Brigade, State 
Headquarters, 12 n. ; composition, 
16; commanders, 16, 21, 169, 249, 
290; overseas, 30 n.; billet at Lor- 
raine training camp, 34 n.; position 
on Marne salient front, 160, 162; in 
plan of Marne offensive, 172-74; in 
the offensive, 181, 182; advance 
against enemy's line of retreat (July 
21), 187, 188; check before Trugny, 
188, 189; attack on Epieds-Trugny 
(22-23) 190-97; in pursuit, 198,199; 
and orders for further impossible 
pursuit, 200, 201 ; position on Verdun 
front, 247; in Belleu Wood fight, 
251-60; effective strength after at- 
tack, 259. See also One-Hundred- 
First Infantry ; One-Hundred-Second 
Infantry; Shelton; Traub; and refer- 
ences under Twenty-Sixth American 
Division. 

Fifty-Second Infantry Brigade, state 
training camp, 12 n. ; composition, 
17; commanders, 17, 21, 269, 290; 
billet at Lorraine training camp, 
34 n.; Headquarters at Chemin des 
Dames, 73; position on Marne 
salient front, 160; in plan of Marne 



offensive, 172-74; order of battle; 
175; first and second days of attack 
(July 18-19), 175-81; third day, 182; 
in advance against enemy's line of 
retreat, 187; attack on Epieds (22), 
190, 191, 194, 197; relieved, 199; in 
Saint-Mihiel offensive, 222, 229; on 
Verdun front, 245, 247; in pursuit 
265. See also Cole, C. H.; One-Hun- 
dred Third Infantry; Onc-Hundrcd- 
Fourth Infantrj'; and references 
under Twenty-Sixth American Di- 
vision. 

Fifty-Sixth Infantry Brigade, in Marne 
offensive, 196-99. See also Twenty- 
Eighth American Division. 

First American Army, organized, 213; 
tactics on Verdun front criticized, 
245, 246, 258, 260-62, 278; character 
of success west of the Meuse, 270; 
and attack on Armistice Day, 275. 
See also Meuse-Argonne; Saint- 
Mihiel. 

First American Corps, original units, 
36; position on Marne salient, 168; 
orders for Marne offensive, 171 n.; 
Twenty-Sixth a later unit, 213, 282. 

First American Division, overseas, 30; 
as pioneer, 36; transfer to, from 101st 
Supply Train, 45; sector on Saint- 
Mihiel salient, 99, 101 n.; and Pi- 
cardy drive, 99; relief by Twenty- 
Sixth, 102-05; Cantiguy, 159; in 
Marne offensive, 185 n.; in Saint- 
Mihiel offensive, 224, 227. See also 
Regulars. 

First Connecticut Infantry, in Depot 
Brigade, 13 n.; in Twenty-Sixth 
Division, 16. 

First events, overseas as a division, 29; 
shot against enemy by militia divi- 
sion, 73; position in front line of 
militia troops, 73; death from hostile 
fire, 74; prisoner, 74; patrol and en- 
counter, 74-76; decoration, 76; Ger- 
man raid, 76, 77; barrage, 79; com- 
plete control of sector, 102; decora- 
tion of American colors, 116. 

First Gas Regiment, in Saint-Mihiel 
offensive, 220; in Belleu Wood fight, 
253. 

First Maine Heavy Field Artillery in 
Depot Brigade, 13 n.; in Twenty- 
Sixth Division, 17. 

First Massachusetts Engineers, in 
Twenty-Sixth Division, 17. 

First Massachusetts Field Artillery, 
in Twenty-Sixth Division, 17. 

First Massachusetts Field Signal Bat- 



INDEX 



313 



talion, in Twenty-Sixth Division, 
17. 

First New Hampshire Infantry, in 
Depot Brigade, 13 n.; in Twenty- 
Sixth Division, 17. 

First Separate Company Connecticut 
Infantry, in Depot Brigade, 13 n. 

First Separate Company Massachu- 
setts Infantry, in Depot Brigade, 
13 n. 

First Vermont Infantry, in Depot 
Brigade, 13 n.; in Twenty-Sixth Di- 
vision, 16-18. 

Fitzgerald, Lt. W., Vaux fight, 165. 

Fiabas, on Verdun front, 264. 

Flanders, German drive, 113. 

Flirey, in La Reine Sector, 101. 

Foch, Marshal, generalissimo, 98; mass 
of maneuver, 99. 

Fontaine bleau, artillery school, 55. 

Food, on march to occupy La Reine 
Sector, 104; conditions on Marne 
salient front, 163. See also Supply. 

Forde, Capt. A. L., YD Show, 143; 
command, 212. 

Forty-Second (Rainbow) American 
Division, origin, 3; race to get over- 
seas, 25, 28; as pioneer, 36; artillery 
training camp, 36; transport trou- 
bles at training camp, 45; proposed 
maneuver with Twenty-Sixth, 93; 
at Baccarat Sector, 99; on Rheims 
front, 160; relief of Twenty-Sixth 
in Marne offensive, 199-203; attack 
on Sergy, 204, 205; relief, 205. See 
also National Guard. 

Foug, billet, 157. 

Four-a-Verre, in Marne offensive, 204. 

Fourth American Division, in Marne 
offensive, 205; artillery in Saint- 
Mihiel offensive, 218. See also Regu- 
lars. 

Framingham, Mass., training camp, 
12 n. 

Francheville, billet, 157. 

French Military Mission, at training 
camp, 47; members, 48 n. 

French people, impression of American 
troops on, 36-39. 

French troops, and Americans, mutual 
impressions, 39, 71, 72, 84 n. 

Fresnes, in Meuse front lines, 232, 235. 

Friedensturm, 161. 

Frothingham, Louis, in France, 103 n. 

Fuel, at training camp, 38, 41. 

Gallup, Capt. D. T., command, trans- 
ferred, 156. 
Gas, first attack on Division, 81-83; 



in Richecourt raid, 149; attack on 
Sonnard Wood, 150; in Saint-Mihiel 
offensive, 220; on Meuse front, 240. 

Gatchell, Major W. G., command, 17; 
transferred, 60. 

General Headquarters, admonishments 
of Edwards, 77, 209; and National 
Guard divisions, 53, 54, 136, 250; 
and the Division, 250, 270, 284. 

General Staff, sections in Division 
Staff, 64, 139-41; College, 55-57. 

Genevrois Farm, Division Headquar- 
ters, 160; in Marne offensive, 174. 

Genicourt, Division Headquarters, 217. 

Givry, in Marne offensive, 173, 175, 
176, 177 n. 

Glass, Capt. J., of Staff, 25 n. 

Glassford, Col. (Brig.-Gen.) P. D-, 
commands, 154, 241 ; relieved, 300. 

Gondrecourt, schools, 52, 54. 

Gonetrie Farm, in Marne offensive, 184„ 

Goodwin, Col. R. E., as artillery com' 
mander, 155. 

Goose Hill, on Verdun front, 245. 

Gouraud, Gen., Rheims front, attack 
on, 160, 166. 

Goutterie Farm, in Marne offensive, 
188. 

Grand, Division in camp near, 93. 

Grand Ru Farm, in Marne offensive. 
188. 

Grande Picardie Farm, in Marne 
offensive, 179. 

Grande Tranchde de Colonne, in 
Saint-Mihiel offensive, 219, 224. 

Grange Marie Farm, in Marne offen- 
sive, 199. 

Greene, Capt. R. A., command, 17. 

Greenlaw, Brig.-Gen. Albert, and active 
service, 22 n. 

Grenoble Area, leave at, 279. 

Gypsy pieces, 155. 

H in Houppy, battle of. See Belleu 

Wood. 
Haig, Sir Douglas, and German 

Flanders drive, 113. 
Hale, Major-Gen. H. C, commands 

Twenty-SLxth, 282; career, 282; 

character as Division Commander, 

282, 283; and educational scheme, 

293; return, 301 n. 
Hale, Lt.-Col. R. K., transferred, 60; 

Chief of Staff, 301. 
Halloudray Farm, in Marne offensive, 

181. 
Halmardiere, in Marne offensive, 184. 
Hannigan, Capt. Judson, Brigade 

Adjutant, 255. 



314 



INDEX 



Hannonville, in Saint-Mihiel offensive, 
217, 223, 229, 233. 

Hanson, Major R. L., in Marne offen- 
sive, 182 n. 

Harbold, Major R. P., of Staff, 25 n. 

Harreville, billet, 34 n. 

Hattonchatel, in Saint-Mihiel offen- 
sive, 217, 219, 224, 226, 227, 229. 

Haudinot Trench, attack on, 234. 

Hauniont Ravine, in Verdun lines, 
265. 

Haumont Wood, in Verdun lines, 246, 
247; attack, 246. 

Haute Vesne, in Marne offensive, 173. 

Hants Epines Wood, raid on, 240. 

Hayes, Col. W. C, command, 17; 
transferred, 60. 

Hazelle Wood, in La Reine Sector, 151. 

Headquarters. See Division; General. 

Headquarters Troop, composition, 16; 
commanders, 16, 60, 212, 241, 290; 
return, 301 n. 

Health. <See Physical condition. 

Hennocque, Gen., in Saint-Mihiel 
offensive, 223. 

Herbert, Lt.-Col. (Col.) J. F. J., as 
artillery commander, 155; in Marne 
offensive, 190, 191. 

Herbeuville, in Saint-Mihiel offensive, 
219; in Meuse front lines, 233. 

Heudicourt, in Saint-Mihiel offensive, 
227. 

Hill 190, in Marne offensive, 175. 

Hill 193, in Marne offensive, 175, 178, 
179, 180, 182. 

Hill 204, in Marne offensive, 162, 182. 

Hill 204.8, in Marne offensive, 205. 

Hill 210, in Marne offensive, 205. 

Hill 230, in Meuse front lines, 235. 

Hill 324, on Verdun front, occupied, 
266. 

Hill 346, on Verdun front, attack, 252. 

Hill 360, on Verdun front, attack, 252, 
256, 257. 

Hobbs, Lt.-Col. (Col.) H. P., Inspec- 
tor, 16 n.; and line command, 209. 

Hopkins, Lt. E. G., decorated, 87. 

Horsey, Capt. (Lt.-Col.) H. R., as in- 
telligence officer, 220. 

Hosford, Major E. A., in Marne offen- 
sive, 177 n. 

Hospital, at Bazoilles, 42. 

Houppy Wood, on Verdun front, 251. 
See also Belleu Wood. 

Hours, military system, 171 n. 

Howard, Major (Lt.-Col.) J. L.J com- 
mand, 17; transfers, 169, 290. 

Howe, Lt.-Col. T., transferred, 60. 

Hume, Col. F. M., command, 17; 



relieved and reinstated, 269, 270, 

301. 
Hutier, Gen. von, Picardy drive, 96 n., 

98; on Amiens-Montdidier front, 161. 
Hyatt, Capt. J, W., of Staff, 16 n. 

Impressions created in France by first 
American troops, 36-39, 72. 

Infantry, strength in Division, 15. 
See also Fifty-First Infantry Brig- 
ade; Fifty-Second Infantry Brigade; 
and references under them. 

Infiltration, method of attack, 97. 

Influenza, epidemic, 232, 249. 

Insignia, of officers of National Guard 
antecedence, 14; adoption of, by 
Division, 248. 

Inspection, Pershing's, of training 
camp, 54; by Pres. Wilson, 286; on 
leaving Embarkation Area, 300. 

Inspector-Instructors of National 
Guard, 4. 

Instructors, transfers as, effect on 
Division, 61, 93, 170, 212. 

Intelligence, General Staff section in 
Division Staff, 64; German, of I^ 
Reine Sector, 107-09, 132; improve- 
ment, 141; in Saint-Mihiel offensive. 
220. See also Communication; Liai- 
son. 

Isbell, Col. E. L., command, 16; trans- 
ferred, 60. 

Jenkins, Lt.-Col., T. L., Division Sur- 
geon, 290. 

Jewell, Lt. W. A., in Marne offensive, 
194 n. 

Jones, Lt.-Col. F. E., command, 290. ' 

Jury Wood, in La Reine Sector, 101; 
gas attack on enemy from, 150. 

Juvigny, Headquarters of 52d Infantry 
Brigade, 73. 

Keville, Lt.-Col. W. J., command, 18; 

as commander, 155. 
Kiel Trench, in Saint-Mihiel offensive, 

222. 
King, Lt. J. P., of Staff, 25 n.; YD 

Show, 143 ; liaison officer, 169 n. 
Koechlin-Schwartz, Col., at General 

Staff College, 56. 
Koob, Lt. W. L., first raid, 78. 
Krueger, Major W., Assistant Chief 

of Staff, transferred, 141. 

La Croix Blanche Farm, in Marne 

offensive, 204. 
La Crosse, Major F. B., command, 

241. 



mDEX 



315 



La Fere Forest, in Marne offensive,199. 

Lagerquist, Capt. O. G., of Staff, 25 n. 

Lahayville, in German Saint-Mihiel 
lines, 101. 

La Loge Farm, Brigade Headquarters, 
160; in Marne offensive, 179. 

La Logette Pond, in Marne offensive, 
199. 

Lamb, Lt.-Col. E. E., transferred, 60. 

Lamorville, in Saint-Mihiel offensive, 
226. 

Landaville, billet, 34 n. 

Langres, General Staff College, 55-57. 

La Penonerie Farm, in Marne offen- 
sive, 174. 

La Reine Sector, reason for Division 
taking over, 99; history of Saint- 
Mihiel salient, 99-101; character, 
opposing lines, 101, 102; length of 
Division's front, 102; occupation, 
problem of relie\nng First Division, 
102-05; French corps command over, 
103, 105; command assumed, Head- 
quarters and position of units, 105; 
stores and equipment, 105; American 
prisoners, 106, 125; activity, 106, 
144, 145, 151 ; communication, 
enemy's knowledge, 107-09, 132; 
Burned Wood position, 110; Burned 
Wood (Bois Brule) fight, 111-15; 
German preparations before Seiche- 
prey, 116-19; American position 
there, 119-22; enemy's capture of 
mail, 131; Seicheprey fight, 122-30; 
results of fight, 130-33; enlarged, 
137, 145; new construction, 137; 
improved tactical dispositions, 138; 
system of front-line reliefs, 138; im- 
provements in Division during tour, 
138-43; casualties, 144, 153 n.; Ger- 
man raid on new sub-sector, 146; 
plan and training to attack at Riche- 
court, 147; pubHcity of plan, 148; 
Richecourt raid, 149; surprise gas 
attack on Sonnard Wood, 150; Ger- 
man raid on Remieres W^ood, 150; 
German policy of bombardment, 
151, 153; enemy's raid on Xivray- 
Marvoisin, 152; enemy's general 
bombardment, 153; evidences of 
approaching relief, 154; artillery at, 
155; results of tour, 156; relief, 156, 
157. 

Lassiter, Brig. -Gen. William, com- 
mands artillery brigade, 16 n., 17; 
career, 22; joins Division, 22 n., at 
Chemin des Dames, 64; transferred, 
154; as commander, 155. See also 
Fifty-First Field Artillery Brigade. 



Lauconnois Farm, in Marne offensive, 
189. 

La Wavrille, on Verdun front, 266. 

Leaves, none during La Reine tour, 
156; none after Marne offensive, 
211; first, after armistice, 279; gen- 
eral, conduct during, 283, 284 n. ; 
from Embarkation Area, 292. 

Le Chanot Wood, in Saint-Mihiel 
offensive, 222. 

Le Charmel, in Marne offensive, 201. 

Leclerc, Cure A., letter to the Division, 
231. 

Le Mans, YD recreation hut, 300. 

Le Mans Area. See Embarkation Area. 

Le Meitour, Capt., services at train- 
ing camp, 48 n. 

Lenihan, Brig.-Gen. M. J., in Marne 
offensive, 203. 

Les Brusses Farm, in Marne offensive, 
173, 175, 177, 181. 

Les Chesneaux, in Marne offensive, 173. 

Les Eparges, in Saint-Mihiel line, 216. 

Letzing, Serg. John, first patrol, 76; 
decorated, 76. 

Lewis, Major E. E., in Marne offen- 
sive, 176. 

Liaison, in Marne offensive, 174; in 
Belleu Wood fight, 254. 

Liberty Loan, Seicheprey fight and 
third, 132. 

Liffol-le-Grand, billet, 34 n. 

Liggett, Major-Gen. Hunter, orders 
for Marne offensive, 171 n.; in the 
offensive, 179. 

Locke, Col. M. E., command, 17, 22 
n. ; transferred, 210. 

Loclont Wood, on Saint-Mihiel line, 216. 

Logan, Col. E. L., command, 16; in 
Marne offensive, 190, 193; effort 
to relieve of command, 210; in 
Belleu Wood fight, 258; relieved and 
reinstated, 269, 270, 301. See also 
One-Hundred-First Infantry. 

Loge Farm, in Marne offensive, 179. 

Longeau Farm, in Saint-Mihiel offen- 
sive, 220, 223. 

Lorraine, training camp, 34. 

Loughridge, Major P. W., Assistant 
Chief of Staff, 290. 

Lucy-le-Bocage, in Marne salient 
lines, 162; in Marne offensive, 188. 

Ludendorff, Gen. von, Picardy drive, 
97. 

McCain, Brig.-Gen. H. P., on transfer 
of coast artillery men, 26 n. 

McCaskey, Col. G., command, trans- 
ferred, 209, 241. 



316 



INDEX 



McDade, Capt. W. A., in Mame offen- 
sive, 176 n., 177 n. 

Machine guns, strength of Division, 
15; training scliool, 55; change in 
Division's organization, 105. See 
also One-Hundred-First; One-Hun- 
dred-Second; One-Hundred-Third. 

Mack, Col. J. A., command, 240. 

Mackall, Major W. K., transferred, 
212. 

Mail, capture by enemy, 121. 

Maine troops. See First; Second. 

Maison Blanche, inMarne offensive, 175. 

Maison des Cotelettes, Brigade Head- 
quarters, 247 n. 

Major, Lt.-Col. (Col.) D. K., Jr., Chief 
of Staff, character, 138; and impos- 
sible orders in Mame offensive, 200, 
201; and line command, 209; trans- 
ferred, 301. 

Malick, Capt., services at training 
camp, 48 n. 

Mandres-les-Nogent, ceremony at, 289. 

Mange, fight with, 142. 

Mangin, Gen., in Marne offensive, 185. 

March. iSee Road march; Transport. 

Marchand, Gen., division at Saint- 
Mihiel salient, 110; speech on armis- 
tice, 277. 

Marcheville, in Saint-Mihiel offensive, 
229; in German lines, 233; plan to 
attack, 234; troops sent against, 235; 
occupation, retirement of French 
support, 236; counter-attacks, 237; 
retirement, 237; success of demon- 
stration, 238; citation and decora- 
tions, 238, 239, 289; intensity, 240. 

Mareuil-les-Meaux, billet, 159. 

Marines, Belleau Wood fight, 159, 164; 
on Marne front, 100 7i.\ relief, 160. 
See also Second American Division. 

Marmites, 163. 

Marne River. See Aisne-Marne ; Cham- 
pagne-Marne. 

Marvoisin. See Xivray-Marvoisin. 

Marwitz, Gen. von der, Picardy drive, 
96 n.; at Amiens-Montdidier front, 
161; on importance of Verdun front, 
243. 

Mass of maneuver, Foch's tactics, 99. 

Massachusetts, legislative commis- 
sion's visit, 102; club-room at Paris, 
103. 

Massachusetts Ambulance Companies, 
in Twenty-Sixth Division, 18. 

Massachusetts Cavalry, in Twenty- 
Sixth Division, 16, 17. 

Massachusetts Coast Artillery, in 
Twenty-Sixth Division, 18. 



Massachusetts Field Hospitals, in 
Twenty-Sixth Division, 18. 

Massachusetts troops. See preceding 
titles and by numbers from First to 
Ninth. 

Mattarel, Col. de, battle record of 
regiment, 50 n. 

Maud'huy, Gen., tactical command of 
Twenty-Sixth, 67; general orders on 
departure of Division, 84 n. 

Maybach, Major A. A., Assistant Chief 
of Staff, 16 n.; transferred, 141. 

Menil-la-Tour, railhead of La Reine 
Sector, 105. 

Mery, in Marne offensive, 174. 

MesnU, in Meuse-Argonne offensive, 
233. 

Messelin, Lt., services at training 
camp, 48 n. 

Meuse-Argonne offensive, Division's 
sector (Troyon) after Saint-Mihiel 
offensive, 232; weather and sickness, 
232, 240, 249; first raids, 233; plan 
purpose, and character of east-side 
operation, 233, 239; troops for Ria- 
ville-Marcheville demonstration, 234, 
235; plan for this demonstration 
(Sept. 26), 235; carried out, counter 
attacks, 235-37; success in deceiv- 
ing enemy, 234, 238; commendations, 
decorations, 238, 239, 289; intensity 
of operation, 240; minor raids, 240; 
period of quiet on sector, barrage 
zone, 240; general situation on Divi- 
sion's return to front, 242; task on 
Verdun front, importance, 242, 243, 
278; aspect of Verdun front, 244; 
Division's withdrawal from Troj'on 
Sector, as army reserve, 244; situa- 
tion on Verdun front, enemy's lines, 
244-46; prescribed character of 
combat, futility. Corps Commander 
on, 245, 246, 258, 260-62, 278; Divi- 
sion on Verdun front lines (Neptune 
Sector), 245, 247, 264; corps com- 
mand, 245, 270 n., 275 n. ; attack on 
Haumont Wood (Oct. 16), 246; 
divisional post of command, 247; 
Edwards relieved of command, 249- 
51 ; orders for Belleu Wood fight, 
252-55; results of attack, 255-57; 
Shelton's report, 258-60; watch to 
prevent enemy's withdrawal, 264; 
raids for prisoners, enemy's loss of 
morale, 264; enemy's retirement 
(Nov. 8), 265; pursuit, checks, 266; 
weakness and depression of Division, 
267-70; condition of animal trans- 
port, 267 n., 268 n.; character of 



INDEX 



317 



American success west of the Meuse, 
270; attack on day of armistice, 
change in orders, 273-76; front after 
armistice, 276 \ relief of Division, 279 ; 
its services, 279, 298. 

Meuse Heights, character, 216; plan 
of attack on, 219; occupation, 229; 
Division's sector on, 232. 

Mexican Border service, effect on 
National Guard, 5, 9. 

Military police. See One-Hundred- 
First Train Headquarters. 

Militia. Sec National Guard. 

Milspaugh, Lt., in Marne offensive, 
194 n. 

Missy, Headquarters of 101st Engi- 
neers, 73. 

MoUeville, Ravine de, in Verdun lines, 
252, 253. 

MoUeville Farm Wood, in Verdun 
lines, 246, 251 ; attack, 252, 254. 

Montagne de Paris, in Marne offen- 
sive, 185. 

Montdidier, importance in German 
Picardy drive, 98. 

Montgivrault, in Marne offensive, 
174. 

Montiers, in Marne offensive, 179, 180, 
182, 183. 

Montigny-le-Roi Area, movement to, 
280. See also Reconstruction. 

Mont-les-Neufchat€au, bUlet, 34 n. 

Morale, in camp in England, 33; in 
French training camp, 46; influence 
of wrong system of promotions, 134; 
influence of loss of old men, 136; 
rumored antipathy of General Head- 
quarters, 136; effect of relief of 
Edwards, 250; failing of enemy's, 
264; loss during Verdun operations, 
269; recovery, 282, 283; conduct 
during leave, 284 n.; at Embarkation 
Area, 292. See also Character; Dis- 
cipline; Physical condition; Recrea- 
tion. 

Morgan, Capt. W. B., transferred, 212. 

Morrison, Capt. W. L., command, 241. 

Mort Mare Wood, in German Saint- 
Mihiel hnes, 102. 

Mouilly, on Saint-Mihiel front, 216-18. 

Mount Vernon, return on, 301. 

Mudra, Gen. von, attack at Rheims, 
166. 

Munitions. See Ordnance; Supply. 

Murphy, Major (Lt.-Col.) J. D., com- 
mand, 156; in Saint-Mihiel offensive, 
228; transferred, 241. 

Mussy-sur-Seine, Division Headquar- 
tere, 209. 



Nanteuil-les-Meaux, Division Head- 
quarters, 159. 

National Guard, divisions of A.E.F. 
from, 3 n. ; character as organization, 
3-6; effect of Mexican Border serv- 
ice, 5, 9; spirit, 6; local support and 
pride, 7, 8, 302, 304; military knowl- 
edge, 8; call into federal service, 9; 
results of elected officers, 9; status 
as, lost, 14; retention of origin desig- 
nation, 14; breaking up of units, 15, 
18, 26 n. ; units in Twenty-Sixth, 
16-18; stamp on Twenty-Sixth, 24; 
divisions and regulars, 36, 37; atti- 
tude of regular officers, rumor of 
side-tracking of divisions in France, 
53, 54; conspicuous divisions, 54 n.; 
rumors of antagonism of General 
Headquarters, 136, 270, 284. 

Needham, Lt.-Col., at General Staff 
College, 56. 

Neptune Sector, 247. See also Meuse- 
Argonne. 

Nesle, in Marne offensive, 204. 

Neuf chateau, training camp at, 34; 
signal school, 55. 

New England Coast Artillery, in 
Twenty-Sixth Division, 17, 26. 

New England troops. See National 
Guard, and references under Twenty- 
Sixth American Division. 

New Hampshire Field Artillery, in 
Twenty-Sixth Division, 17. 

New Hampshire Field Hospital, in 
Twenty-Sixth Division, 18. 

New Hampshire Field Signal Troops, 
in Depot Brigade, 13 n. 

New Hampshire Machine-Gun Troop, 
in Twenty-Sixth Division, 17. 

New Hampshire troops. See preceding 
titles, and First. 

New Haven, Conn., training camp, 12 n. 

Ney, Capt. L. E., services at training 
camp, 48 n. 

Niantic, Conn., training camp, 12 n. 

Ninth French Army, in Marne offen- 
sive, 186. 

Ninth Infantry, on Marne salient front, 
159, 160 n.; relief, 160. 

Ninth Massachusetts Infantry, in 
Twenty-Sixth Division, 16. 

Noncourt, billet, 34 n. 

Nonsard Wood, in German Saint- 
Mihiel lines, 102. 

Noviant-Limey road, in La Reine 
Sector, 137. 

Oak Wood, in Verdun lines, 247. 
Gates, Lt., in Marne offensive, 194 n. 



318 



INDEX 



O'Connor, Rev. M. J., Division 
Chaplain, 141. 

Officers of Division, character of 
elected militia, 9; insignia of those of 
militia antecedence, 14; original com- 
manders in Division, 16-18; career 
and personality of higher, 18-22; 
position of colonels, 22-24; schools, 
61-57; development, 58; changes, 
59-62, 138, 141, 154, 156, 169, 209, 
212, 241, 249, 289, 300; transfer as 
instructors, effect on Division, 61, 
93, 170, 212; bad system of promo- 
tions, 134; character of replacement, 
135; relieved by Bamford, rein- 
stated, 269, 270; transfer to Army 
of Occupation, 281; no promotions 
after armistice, 290. See also Divi- 
sion Commander; Division Staff. 

Officers' Reserve Corps, officers for 
Twenty-Sixth Division, 27. 

Oie, Cote d', on Meuse front, 245. 

One-Hundred-Eleventh Infantry, in 
Marne offensive, 196, 197. See also 
Twenty-Eighth American Division. 

One-Hundred-Fifty-Fourth French Di- 
\dsion, at La Reine Sector, 157. 

One-Hundred-First Ammunition Train, 
state training camp, 12 n. ; comman- 
der and composition, 18; overseas, 
30 n.; in Marne offensive, 203, 206; 
casualties in offensives, 208. 

One-Hundred-First Engineer Train, 
composition and commander, 18; 
return, 301 n. 

One-Hundred-First Engineers, state 
training camp, 12 n.; commander 
and composition, 17, 22; overseas, 
30 n.; billet at Lorraine training 
camp, 34 n. ; Headquarters at Chemin 
des Dames, 73; at La Reine Sector, 
105, 122, 127; in Marne offensive, 
174, 196, 203, 206; casualties in the 
offensive, 208; in Saint-Mihiel offen- 
sive, 220, 230; in Riaville-Marche- 
ville attack, 234, 235; company in 
review by Pres. Wilson, 286; at Em- 
barkation Area, 296; build YD Hut, 
300; return, 301 n. 

One-Hundred-First Field Artillery, 
composition, 17; commanders, 17, 
210; overseas, 30 n.; first shot against 
enemy, 73 ; in Bois Brul6 fight, 111 w., 
116 n. See also Fifty-First Field Ar- 
tillery Brigade. 

One-Hundred-First Field Signal Bat- 
talion, state training camp, 12 n., 
composition, 17; commanders, 17, 
60, 156, 241, 290; overseas, 30 n.; 



at La Reine Sector, 105; in Marne 
offensive, 174, 203, 206; casualties in 
offensive, 208; in Riaville-Marche- 
ville attack, 234, 235; in Belleu Wood 
fight, 253; company in review by 
Pres. Wilson, 286. See also Commu- 
nication. 

One-Hundred-First Infantry, state 
training camp, 12 n.; composition, 
16; commander, 16, 269, 270, 301; 
overseas, 30 n.; billet at Lorraine 
training camp, 34 n. ; line at Chemin 
des Dames, 73; first militia regiment 
on front line, 73; first raid on Ger- 
mans, 78, first German gas attack, 
81; position at La Reine Sector, 105, 
145; in Seicheprey fight, 127; Ger- 
man raid on, 146; Vaux fight, 165, 
166; in Marne offensive, 181, 182, 
187, 189, 190; Epieds-Trugny at- 
tack, 190-97; casualties in Marne 
offensive, 208; in movement to Saint- 
Mihiel front, 214 n.; position at 
Rupt Sector, 217; in Saint-Mihiel 
offensive, 219, 222, 225, 229; raid on 
Warville Wood, 240; Belleu Wood 
fight, 253-60; in pursuit, withdrawn, 
266; company in review by Pres. 
Wilson, 286. See also Fifty-First 
Infantry Brigade. 

One-Hundred-First Machine-Gun Bat- 
talion, state training camp, 12 n. ; 
composition, 17; commanders, 17, 
169, 290, 301; overseas, 30 n. ; posts 
at Chemin des Dames, 73; first box 
barrage, 79; change in organization, 
105; in Marne offensive, 174, 192, 
198, 199; casualties in offensive, 208; 
in Saint-Mihiel offensive, 220, 225; 
in Belleu Wood fight, 253. 

One-Hundred-First Sanitary Train, 
composition, 18; commanders, 18, 
241, 290; overseas, 30 n.; billet at 
Lorraine training camp, 34 n.; cas- 
ualties in Marne offensive, 208; in 
Riaville-Marcheville attack, 234, 
235; in Belleu Wood fight, 253. 

One-Hundred-First Supply Train, com- 
position, IS; commanders, 18, 60, 
241; overseas, 30 n. ; billet at Lor- 
raine training camp, 34 ?i. ; problems 
at training camp, 45; transfers to 
First Division, 45. *See also Supply; 
Transport. 

One-Hundred-First Train Headquar- 
ters and Military Police, composi- 
tion, 17; commander, 17; overseas, 
30n. ; bilbt at Lorraine training 
camp, 34 ri.; efficiency, 74, 212 n.; 



INDEX 



319 



return, 301 n. See also Transport. 

One-Hundred-First Trench Mortar 
Battery, commander and composi- 
tion, 17; in Bois Brul6 fight, 116 n.; 
in Marne offensive, 206; casualties 
in offensive, 208; in Saint-Mihiel 
offensive, 221; return, 301. 

One-Hundred-Fourth Infantry, com- 
position, 17; commanders, 17, 60, 
209, 241; overseas, 30 n.; billet at 
Lorraine training camp, 34 n.; line 
at Chemin des Dames, 73; position 
in La Reine Sector, 205, 210; Bois 
Brule fights, 111-15; commendation, 
115 n., 116 n.; colors decorated, 116; 
troops in fight, 116 n.; in Seicheprey 
fight, 127; in Marne offensive, 175, 
176, 180; casualties in offensive, 208; 
position at Rupt Sector, 217; in 
Saint-Mihiel offensive, 223; position 
on Meuse front, 245; attack on 
Haumont Wood, 246; in final pursuit, 
266; in final attack, 276; company in 
review by Pres. Wilson, 286; wins 
prize in tournament, 299; return, 
301 n. See also Fifty-Second Infan- 
try Brigade. 

One-Hundred-Second Field Artillery, 
composition, 17; commanders, 17, 
241; overseas, 30 n. See also Fifty- 
First Field Artillery Brigade. 

One-Hundred-Second Infantry, state 
training camp, 12 n.; composition, 16; 
commanders, 16, 60, 209, 290; over- 
seas, 30 n. ; billet at Lorraine train- 
ing camp, 34 n. ; line at Chemin des 
Dames, 73; first German raid on, 79, 
80; first raid on enemy, 80; gas at- 
tack on, 81; position at La Reine 
Sector, 105; enemy's preparations on 
Seicheprey front, 116-19; position 
there, 119-22; enemy's ambush and 
capture of mail, 121; Seicheprey 
fight, 122-32; raided in Remiferes 
Wood, 150; in Marne offensive, 181, 
187, 189, 190; Epieds-Trugny at- 
tack, 190-95; in pursuit, 199; 
casualties in Marne offensive, 208; 
position at Rupt Sector, 217; in 
Saint-Mihiel offensive, 220, 222, 
224-28; raids on Meuse front, 233; 
in Marcheville attack, 235-37, 240; 
commendations, 238, 239; Belleu 
Wood fight, 253, 256, 257, 259; in 
final pursuit, 266; in final attack, 
276; company in review by Pres. 
Wilson, 286; colors decorated, 289. 
See also Fifty-First Infantry Bri- 
gade. 



One-Hundred-Second Machine-Gun 
Battalion, state training camp, 12 n.; 
composition, 17; commanders, 17, 
156, 241, 290, 300; overseas, 30 n.; 
billet at Lorraine training camp, 34 
n. ; in Marne offensive, 187; casual- 
ties in offensive, 208; in Saint-Mihiel 
offensive, 225, 228; in Belleu Wood 
fight, 253; companies in review by 
Pres. Wilson, 286. 

One-Hundred-Seventy-Sixth Field Ar- 
tillery, in vSaint-Mihiel offensive, 218. 

One-Hundred-Sixty-Fourth French Di- 
vision, position on Marne salient, 
168; in Marne offensive, 179, 180. 

One-Hundred-Sixty-Second Infantry 
(French), services at training camp 
of Division, 48-50; battle record, 
49 n. 

One-Hundred-Sixty-Seventh Field Ar- 
tillery Brigade, commander, 169. 

One-Hundred-Sixty-Seventh French 
Division, position on Marne salient, 
168; in plan of Marne offensive, 
173; in the offensive, 176, 178-82, 
188, 190, 197, 201; relieved, 203. 

One-Hundred-Third Field Artillery, 
composition, 17; commanders, 17, 
154, 241; in Bois Brule fight. 111 n., 
116 n. See also Fifty-First Field Ar- 
tillery Brigade. 

One-Hundred-Third Infantry, com- 
position, 17; commanders, 17, 269, 
270, 290; overseas, 30 n.; billet at 
Lorraine training camp, 34 n. ; line at 
Chemin des Dames, 73; position at 
La Reine Sector, 105; in Bois Brule 
fight, 114, 116 n.; raided at Xivray- 
Marvoisin, 152; in Marne offensive, 
175, 177, 178, 187, 189; casualties in 
offensive, 208; position at Rupt Sec- 
tor, 217; in Saint-Mihiel offensive, 
223; in Riaville attack, 234, 236; in 
final pursuit, 266; company in re- 
view by Pres. Wilson, 286. See also 
Fifty-Second Infantry Brigade. 

One-Hundred-Third Machine-Gun Bat- 
talion, state training camp, 12 n.; 
composition, 17; commanders, 17, 
60, 241; overseas, 30 n.; billet at 
Lorraine training camp, 34 n.; in 
Bois Brul6 fight, 114, 116 n.; raided 
at Xivray-Marvoisin, 152; casual- 
ties in Marne offensive, 208. 

One-Hundred-Twelfth Infantry, in 
Marne offensive, 197, 198. See also 
Twenty-Eighth American Di%nsion. 

Operations, General Staff seotjon in 
Division Staff, 64. 



320 



INDEX 



Ordnance and munitions, problem at 
French training camp, 43; the "75," 
44 n. See also Artillery; Supply. 

Organization of Division, important 
elements, 2; condition of National 
Guard units, 3-6; spirit of men, 6; 
local pride and support, 7, 8; mili- 
tary knowledge of units, 8; character 
of militia officers, 9; basic conditions 
of the raw material, 10; beginning 
of training, 12; physical tests, 12 
location of camps, 12 n.; Depot 
Brigade, 13; period of anxiety, 13 
formal drafting into federal service 
14; schemes of strength of Division 
14; fitting of militia units into 
scheme, 15, 18, 26 n.; Commanding 
General, 16; units and first command- 
ers, 16-18; Staff as organized, 16 n. ; 
unity, IS; career and personality of 
higher officers, 18-22; position of 
colonels, 22-24; militia stamp, 24; 
measures to reach prescribed 
strength, 26; effort for clothing and 
equipment, shortage before sailing, 
25, 28. See also Overseas; Training. 

Origin of Twenty-Sixth Division. <See 
Organization. 

Ormont Wood, in Verdun lines, attack, 
247, 252, 264. 

Ornes Twins, hills, 265. 

Oulchy-la-Ville, in Marne offensive, 
185. 

Ourcq River, 51st F.A. Brigade at, 
205. 

Outposts, tactics, 119, 163. 

Overseas, contest with Rainbow Divi- 
sion, 26, 28; secret departure, 27; 
securing of means, 29; priority, 29; 
schedule of sailings and arrivals, 
30 n.; incident of voyage, 31; im- 
pressions and lessons in England, 
31-33. 

Paper work, problem in training camp, 

42. 
Parade at Boston, 303. 
Paris, Massachusetts club-room, 103; 

no leave to, 283. 
Paris Farm, in Marne salient lines, 

162; in Marne offensive, 174, 175. 
Parker, Col. J. H., command, 60; in 

Marne offensive, 193; transferred, 

209. 
Pas Fini Sector. See Champagne- 

Marne. 
Passaga, Gen., command over the "Dixi- 

sion, 105; general orders on Bois 

Brul6 fight, 115 n., 116 n.\ decorates 



colors of 104th Infantry, 116; cita- 
tions, 116 n. 

Passes, at Camp Devens, 302 n. See 
also Leaves. 

Patrol, first, 74-76. 

Pelger Wood, in Marne offensive, 204. 

Pendleton, Capt. (Major, Lt.-Col.) A. 
L., Jr., of Staff, 25 n., 61; and secur- 
ing of transportation for overseas, 28; 
as Staff officer, 138. 

Pepper Hill, in Verdun lines, 247. 

Perrins, Major John, Jr., command, 
17; transferred, 156. 

Pershing, Gen. J. J., inspection of train- 
ing camp, 54; on American troops 
and Picardy drive, 99 n.; commu- 
niques on Division at La Reine Sec- 
tor, 145; and Marne offensive, 185, 
202; commands First American 
Army, 213; reinstatement of Cole, 
270 71.; on visit of Pres. Wilson, 286; 
decorated, 289; review of Division, 
297; commendation of Division's 
services, 297, 298. <See also General 
Headquarters. 

Petain, Marshal, decorates colors of 
102d Infantry, 289. 

Peters, Capt. R., as liaison officer, 169. 

Petret Wood, in Marne offensive, 179, 
180, 182, 183. 

Phillips, Major E. E., Ordnance Officer, 
16 n. 

Physical condition, of raw material, 
10; tests at state training camp, 12; 
condition at French training camp, 
38, 42; after Marne offensive, 201, 
207; influenza, 232, 249; weakness 
during Verdun operations, 268; final 
inspection at Embarkation Area, 
300. See also Morale. 

Picardy, German offensive, 87, 96-99. 

Pilon d'Etrayes, on Verdun front, at- 
tack, 253. 

Planchette, Bois de la, in Marne offen- 
sive, 204. 

Poivre, Cote de, in Verdun lines, 247. 

Porter, Col. R. S., transferred, 290. 

Post of command, divisional, in Marne 
offensive, 174; in Saint-Mihiel offen- 
sive, 220; at Verdun front, 247. See 
also Division Headquarters. 

Potts, Col. D., command, 290. 

Price, Lt. E. J., Vaux fight, 165. 

Prince, Morton, in France, 103 n. 

Prisoners, first Germans taken, 74: 
first loss to enemy, 80; American 
culprits at La Reine Sector, 106, 
125; efforts to secure, 144; taken in 
Marne offensive, 208 n.; in Saint- 



INDEX 



321 



Mihiel offensive, 230; return to 

Division, 284. 
Promotions, bad system, 134; none 

after armistice, 290. 
Propaganda, enemy's, 144. 

Quast, Gen. von, Flanders drive, 113. 
Quiney, billet, 159. 

Quonset Point, R.I., training camp, 
12 n. 

Raids, first German, on Division's 
line, 76, 77; first, on Germans, 78. 

Railhead, of Lorraine training camp, 
34 n., 41 ; for Chemin des Dames, 67; 
of La Reine Sector, 105; of Verdun 
front, 248. 

Railroads, decauvilles, 157. See also 
Railhead; Transport. 

Rainbow Division. See Forty-Second. 

Rambucourt, in La Reine Sector, 101, 
105. 

Rations. See Food. 

Rau, Major G. J., in Seicheprey fight, 
121, 125; in Marne offensive, 191, 
192, 195 n. 

Ravin de France, on Saint-Mihiel 
front, 216. 

Rebeuville, billet, 34 n. 

Reconstruction, relief on Verdun front, 
279; movement to Montigny-le-Roi 
Area, 280; Hale succeeds as Division 
Commander, 281, 282; training, 
physical and spiritual recovery, 282, 
283; leaves, 283; return of casuals 
and other replaced men, 284; return 
of prisoners, 284; Pres. Wilson's 
visit, 284-86; order to return home, 
286-88; arrival of Artillery Brigade 
at area, 288; decoration of colors 
of 102d Infantry, 289; departure for 
Embarkation Area, 291. 

Recreation, lack in training camp, 43; 
YD Show, 142; at Embarkation 
Area, 295; tournament, 295; YD 
Hut, 300. See also Leaves; Welfare. 

Red Cross, begins to function, 57. 

Regiments, system of numbering, 3 n.; 
position of commanders, 22-24. 

Regret, Corps Headquarters, 248. 

Regulars, characteristics, and those of 
militia divisions, 36; relations with 
them, 37; officers and militia troops, 
63. See also American divisions by 
numbers First to Sixth. 

Relief, problems, 103-05; of front-line 
battalions, system on La Reine Sec- 
tor, 138; at La Reine Sector, 156, 
157; in Marne offensive, 199, 201, 



205; at Troyon Sector, 244; after 
armistice, 279. 

Remieres Wood, in La Reine Sector, 
101, 105; raided, 150. See also 
Seicheprey. 

Replacements, lack of early, 62; for 
transfers as instructors, 94, 170, 212; 
character of officers, 135; inadequate, 
136, 170; wounded men not returned 
to Division, 136; after Marne offen- 
sive, 211; return of replaced men of 
Division, 284. 

Rest area, after Marne offensive, 209; 
training there, 210-12. See also 
Reconstruction. 

Return, rumors, 286; arrival of or- 
ders, 287, 288; turning-in of equip- 
ment, 290; movement to Embarka- 
tion Area, 291 ; at Brest, 301 ; voyage, 
301; at Camp Devens, 301; ban on 
celebrations, 302; percentage of 
those who went overseas with Divi- 
sion, 302 n. ; passes, 302 n. ; review at 
Camp, 303; parade at Boston, 303; 
discharge, 303; effect of service on 
men, 305. See also Embarkation 
Area. 

Review, by Pres. Wilson, 285; by 
Pershing, 297; at Camp Devens, 
303. 

Reynel, Division Headquarters, 93. 

Rhode Island Ambulance Company, in 
Twenty-Sixth Division, 18. 

Rhode Island Cavalry, in Twenty- 
Sixth Division, 17, 18. 

Rhode Island Field Artillery, in Twenty- 
Sixth Division, 17. 

Riaville, on Meuse front, 233; attack, 
234, 236. 

Richecourt, in German Saint-Mihiel 
lines, 101; plan and training to at- 
tack, 147; publicity of plan, 148; 
artillery preparation, 148; attack, 
effect of gas on attackers, 149. 

Rifle, as chief weapon, 39, 51. 

Rimaucourt, training area, 96. 

Riviera, as officers' leave area, 283. 

Road march, after Chemin des Dames, 
86; intended maneuver, abandoned, 
86, 93, detraining, 88; officers on 
foot, 88; straggling, 89; problems, 90; 
Division Commander during, 90; 
and staff-line differences, 91; end, 
93; expected rest, disappointment, 
93, 96. 

Roads. See Transport. 

Rochet Wood, in Marne offensive, 
182. 

Roiampont, billet, 34 n. 



J22 



INDEX 



Rose, Lt. J.. Vaux fight, 165. 

Ross, D., exploit at Vaux, 165. 

Rouceux, billet, 34 n. 

Rouvres-le-Chctive, billet, 34 n. 

Rovaumeix, German bombardment, 
153. 

Rupt de Mad, in La Reine Sector, 101. 

Rupt-en-Woevre, Division Headquar- 
ters, 217, 220; concentration at, 218. 

Rupt Sector, 217. 

Sacerie Farm, in Marne oflFensive, 179, 
187. 

Sacerie Wood, in Marne offensive, 187. 

Saint-Andre Farm, on Verdun front, 
266; occupation, 276. 

Saint-Baussant, in German Saint- 
Mihiel lines, 101. 

St.-Croix, Capt. de, services at train- 
ing camp, 48 n. 

Saint-Hilaire, in Saint-Mihiel offen- 
sive, 229; in German lines, 233; raid, 
233. 

Saint-Malo, leave area, 292. 

Saint-Maurice, in Saint-Mihiel offen- 
sive, 217, 219. 

Saint-Mihiel salient, origin and im- 
portance, 99; early efforts to reduce, 
100; as quiet sector, 100; movement 
of Division to front, 213-15; Divi- 
sion's corps, 213; Division's orig- 
inal sector, 215; preparations, 215; 
change in plan of attack, 216; Divi- 
sion's second (Rupt) sector, aspect, 
216; enemy's lines and back area, 
216; Division Headquarters, 217; 
position of Di-vision's units, 217; 
artillery concentration, 217; charac- 
ter of operation, 218; plan for north- 
western front attack. Division's at- 
tack order, 219; first objective, 220; 
readiness for attack, intelligence, 
220; enemy's uncertainty and feeble 
reaction, 220; artillery preparation, 
221; advance to first objective, 222, 
223; proposed movement to left, 
223; night advance to Hattonchatel- 
Vigneulles, 224-29; results of Divi- 
sion's advance, 229; work of en- 
gineers, 230; prisoners and salvage, 
230 ; casualties, 230 ; gratitude of civil- 
ians, 231 ; Division's sector after oper- 
ation, 232; services of Division, 298. 
See also Meuse-Argonne. 

Saint-Remy Wood, on Saint-Mihiel 
line, 216, 219; in Saint-Mihiel offen- 
sive, 222. 

Saint-Robert Farm, in Maine offen- 
sive, 173. 



Sanborn, Capt. (Major) J. R.; com- 
mands, 241, 300. 

Sanitary Train. See One-Hundred- 
First. 

Saulx, in Meuse front lines, 232, 233. 

Saumur, artillery school, 55. 

Schools, for officers during training, 
51, 52, 54; Army General Staff Col- 
lege, 55-57; Second Corps, 209, 211. 
See also Education. 

Scorer, Capt. C. E., of Staff, 25 n. 

Sec, Mont, in German Saint-Mihiel 
lines, 102. 

Second American Division, as pioneer, 
26; sector on Saint-Mihiel salient, 
101 n. ; relief on Marne salient front 
by Twenty-Sixth, 160; in Marne 
offensive, 185 n. See also Marines; 
Regulars. 

Second Connecticut Infantry, in 
Twenty-Sixth Division, 16. 

Second Corps Schools, 209, 211. 

Second French Colonial Corps, Twenty- 
Sixth in, 232 ; on Verdun front, 270 n., 
275 n. See also Meuse-Argonne. 

Second French Dismounted Cavalry 
Division, in Saint-Mihiel offensive, 
216, 219, 224, 226; in corps with 
Twenty-Sixth, on Meuse front, 232, 
244. 

Second Maine Infantry, in Twenty 
Sixth Division, 17. 

Second Massachusetts Field Artillery, 
in Twenty-Sixth Division, 17. 

Second Massachusetts Infantry, in 
Twenty-Sixth Division, 17. 

Seicheprey, in La Reine Sector, posi- 
tion of troops, 101, 106, 119-22; Ger- 
man preparations to attack, 116-19; 
artillery preparation effect, 122-24; 
attack and counter-attack, 124-26; 
lack of communication, 123, 126, 
129, 131; conditions in afternoon, 
American preparation for counter- 
advance, 127-29; failure of patrol 
reports, 129; breakdown of counter- 
advance, court-martial of command- 
er, 130; results of fight, weaknesses 
developed, 130-33; effect on Lib- 
erty Loan, 132. • 

Senoux, Cote de, on Saint-Mihiel 
front, 217. 

Sergy, in Marne offensive, 200, 204, 
205. 

Seventeenth French Corps, on Verdun 
front, 244; Divisions attached to, 
245; Headquarters, 248; relieved, 
270 n., 275 n. See also Meuse-Ar- 
gonne. 



INDEX 



323 



"Seventy-five" French gun, described, 

44 n. 
Seventy-Ninth American Di\'ision, 
on Meuse front, 244; on Verdun 
front, 261, 262, 264, 278; in pursuit, 
266. 
Seventy-Seventh Field Artillery, in 

Saint-Mihiel offensive, 218. 
Seventy-Sixth American Division, early 

transfers to Twenty-Sixth, 26. 
Seventy-Third Field Artillery, in Saint- 
Mihiel offensive, 218. 
Shelton, Lt.-Col. (Col., Brig.-Gen.) 
G. H., Chief of Staff, 16 n.; career 
and personality, 20; commands 
104th Infantry, 60; wounded, 153; 
commands 51st Brigade, 169; in 
Marne offensive, 190, 193; in pur- 
suit, 198-201 ; in Saint-Mihiel offen- 
sive, 224, 225; on the night advance 
to VigneuUes, 228; relinquishes 
command, 249; return to duty, 258; 
report on Belleu Wood fight, 258-60; 
commands 52d Brigade, 290. 
Sherburne, Col. (Brig.-Gen.) J. H., com- 
mand, 17; as artillery commander, 
155; transferred, 169; return to 
artillery command, 300. 
Sibille Trench, in Seicheprey fight, 

124, 125, 127. 
Signalmen, School, 55. See also One- 
Hundred-Fu-st Field Signal Battal- 
ion. 
Simonds, Lt.-Col. (Brig.-Gen.) G. S., 

Adjutant, 16 n.; transferred, 61. 
Simons, Capt. Aiken, of Staff, 25 n. 
Simpkins, Lt. (Capt.) N. S., of Staff, 

16 n.; death, 249. 
Sivry, in Verdun lines, 246. 
Sixt von Amim, Gen., Flanders drive, 

113. 
Sixth American Division, relieves 
Twenty-Sixth, 279. iSee also Regu- 
lars. 
Sixth French Army, position and units 

on Marne salient, 168. 
Sixth Massachusetts Infantry, in 
Depot Brigade, 13 n.; in Twenty- 
Sixth Division, 16-18. 
Sixty-Seventh Field Artillery Brigade, 

training camp, 36. 
Smith, Col. E. T., command, 17; trans- 
ferred, 154. 
Soff Wood, on Saint-Mihiel front, 217. 
Soissons, railhead for Chemin des 

Dames Sector, 67. 
Sommedieue, Division Headquarters, 

214. 
Sonnard Wood, in German Saint- 



Mihiel lines, 101; gas attack on, 
150. 

Souilly, Army Headquarters, 214. 

Spada, Second Division near, 101 tk 

Spaulding, R. R., first man killed, 74. 

Sports. See Recreation. 

Staff. iSee Division Staff; General 
Staff. 

Stettin Trench, in Saint-Mihiel offen- 
sive, 222. 

Stevens, Major (Lt.-Col.) C. A., of 
Staff, 25 n.; Adjutant, 61. 

Straggling on march, 89, 92. 

Strength of Division, scheme, 14; 
measures to reach prescribed, 26. 
See also Casualties; Replacements. 

Strickland, Capt. D. W., in Marne 
offensive, 194 n. 

Sturmbataillon, elements, 118 n. 

Summerall, Major-Gen. C. P., and 
Twenty-Sixth, 282, 284, 288, 299; 
on conduct during leave, 284 n. 

Supply, effort for, before sailing, 25, 
27; problem in French training camp, 
41, 43; problem of organization, 43; 
General Staff section in Divisioa 
Staff, 64. See also Food; One-Hun- 
dred-First Supply Train; Transport. 
Sweetser, Brig.-Gen. E. L., Depot 

Brigade, 13. 
Sweetser, Col. W. M., command, 17, 
18. 

Tactics, officers' school, 52. 

Talou, Cote de, on Verdun front, 266. 

Tancrou-Germigny, billet, 159. 

Tandy, Capt. E. H., of Staff, 25 n. 

Telephone. See Communication. 

Tenth French Army, position on 
Marne salient, 168; in Marne offen- 
sive, 185. 

Tenth French Colonial Division, posi- 
tion adjoining La Reine Sector, 110, 
145 n.; Bois Brule fight, 112; on 
Verdun front, 278. 

Thillot-sous-les-Cotes, in Saint-Mihiel 
offensive, 217, 224; in Meuse front 
lines, 232. 

Thiolet Farm, on Marne salient lines, 
162. 

Third American Division, Chateau- 
Thierry fight, 159; in Marne salient 
lines, 166, 168; in Marne offensive, 
204. See also Regulars. 

Thirteenth Field Artillery, in Saint- 
Mihiel offensive, 218. 
Thirty-Eighth French Corps, position 

on Marne salient, 168. 
Thirty-Ninth French Division, Kosi- 



J24 



INDEX 



tioii on Marne salient, 168 ; in Marne 
offensive, 201, 204; in corps witti 
Twenty-Sixth, 232. 

Thirty-Second American Division, in 
Marne offensive, 205. See also 
National Guard. 

Thirty-Second French Corps, Division 
in, 103, 105. 

Thirty-Third American Division, on 
Verdun front, 245, 278. See also 
National Guard. 

Thompson, Capt. C. M., in Seicheprey 
fight, 122; in Marne offensive, 191, 
192. 

Torey, on Marne salient front, 160; in 
Marne offensive, 173, 175, 176, 176 ?i. 

Toul, Division Headquarters, 157. 

Toulouse, Capt. J., services at training 
camp, 48 n. 

Tournament, at Embarkation Area, 
299. 

Town Wood, on Verdun front, 264; 
captured, 266. 

Training, first state camps, process 
there, 12; rumor of southern camp, 
27; English camps, 32-33; camp in 
Lorraine, 34; problems in France, 
35; artillery camp in Brittany, 35; 
impressions on French, 36-39, 72; 
damages, 38; basis, trench and open 
warfare, 39; rifle as weapon, 39, 51; 
correction of faults of character, 
40; programme, 40; programme for 
artillery, 40 ; pioneer problems of sup- 
ply, sanitation, and billeting, 41-46; 
interference of details, 42; problems 
of health and weather, 42; problem 
of transport, 43-46; effect of diffi- 
culties on morale, 46; work of French 
Military Mission, 47; services of Col. 
Bertrand's regiment, 48-50; general 
versus specialist, 50; officers' schools, 
51, 52, 54; teaching and example of 
Division Commander, 52, 58; and 
rumor of side-tracking of militia 
divisions, 53-54; inspection by 
Pershing, 54 ; officers' tour of instruc- 
tion, 55, 57; General Staff College, 
55-57 ; progress, 57 ; absence without 
leave, 57; spirit and improvement of 
oflScers, 58; divisional conscious- 
ness, 58; model trenches, 58; 
changes among officers during, 59- 
62; General Staff sections in Divi- 
sion Staff, 64; in rest area after 
Marne offensive, 210, 211; after 
armistice, 282. See also Chemin des 
Dames; Organization; Road march. 

Transport, problem of French training 



camp, 41, 43-46; entraining for 
Chemin des Dames, 67-69; develop- 
ment of ability to entrain, 68; en- 
training under fire behind Chemin 
des Dames, 86, 87; detraining as an 
experience, 88; conditions during 
occupation of La Reine Sector, 142; 
travel in decauvilles, 157; problem 
after Marne offensive, 211; reduced 
condition of animal, during Meuse- 
Argonne offensive, 267 n., 268 n. 
See also Supply ; Railhead ; and trains 
under One-Hundred-First. 

Traub, Brig-Gen. (Major-Gen.) P. E., 
commands brigade, 16; career and 
personality, 21; and movement to 
Chemin des Dames, 64; in road 
march on foot, 88 n. ; and Seicheprey 
fight, 128; transferred, 169. 

Trench mortars in Division 15. See 
also One-Hundred-First. 

Trenches, model, system at training 
camp, 58. 

Triangle Farm, in Marne salient lines, 
162. 

Trondes, Division Headquarters, 153. 

Trouchand, Col., battle record of 
regiment, 50 n. 

Troyon, Division Headquarters, 240. 

Troyon Sector, 232; withdrawal from, 
244. See also Meuse-Argonne. 

Trugny, in Marne offensive, 187-98. 

Twachtman, Major (Col.) J. A., as ar- 
tillery commander, 155; commands 
regiment, 241. 

Twelfth Aero Squadron, in Marne 
offensive, 174. 

Twenty-Eighth American Di\'ision, 
on Marne front, 160; brigade in 
Marne offensive, 196-99. See also 
National Guard. 

Twenty-Ninth American Division, on 
Verdun front, 248, 278; relief, 262; 
movement to rest area, 280. See also 
National Guard. 

Twenty-Sixth American Division, val- 
ue of contemporaneous account, 1: 
interesting record: 1. See also Aisne- 
Marne; Armistice; Army of Occupa- 
tion ; Billets ; Casualties ; Champagne- 
Marne; Character; Chemin des 
Dames ; Communication ; Decora- 
tions, Division Commander; Division 
Headquarters; Division Staff; Em- 
barkation Area; First events; Insig- 
nia; La Reine Sector; Meuse-Ar- 
gonne; Morale; National Guard; OflS- 
cers; Organization; Overseas; Physi- 
cal condition; Prisoners; Recqgstruc- 



INDEX 



325 



tion; Recreation; Replacements; Re- 
turn; Road march; Saint-Mihiel ; 
Supply; Training; Transport. 

Twenty-Sixth French Division, on 
Verdun front, 245, 261, 278. 

Twenty-Third Infantry, on Marne 
front, 159, 160 n.; relief, 160. 

Two - Hundred - Eighty - First Aero 
Squadron, in Belleu Wood fight, 253. 

Two-Hundred-Third French Artillery, 
in Saint-Mihiel offensive, 218. 

Vacherauville, in Verdun lines, 247, 
248. 

Vailly, Headquarters of 101st Infantry, 
73. 

Vaudesson, Headquarters of 103d In- 
fantry, 73. 

Vaux, on Marne salient front, 160; 
fight, 164-66; in Marne offensive, 
173. 

Vaux-les-Palameix, in Saint-Mihiel 
offensive, 220, 222. 

Vauxaillon, Headquarters of 104th 
Infantry, 73. 

Velaine-en-Haye, billet, 157. 

Verdun, highway from Bar-le-Duc, 214; 
Division on front, 242; aspect of 
front, 243; as railhead, 248; cele- 
bration of armistice, 277. See aho 
M euse-Ar go nne . 

Vermont troops. See First. 

Vioville, in Saint-Mihiel offensive, 217, 
229. 

Vigneulles, in Saint-Mihiel offensive, 
217, 219, 224, 227. 

Villars, billet, 34 n. 

Ville-devant-Chaumont, on Verdun 
front, 264, 266; occupied, 266, 276. 

Villemareuil-Changis, billet, 159. 

Villey-Saint-Etienne, billet, 157. 

Villouxel, billet, 34 n. 

Vincelles, in Marne offensive, 173. 

Voisogne Wood, and La Reine Sector, 
137. 



Voletchy, Gen.j on Marcheville attack, 

238. 
Volunteer soldiers, character. See 

National Guard. 

Wadonville, in Meuse front lines, 232, 
235. 

Walker, Lt. William, in Marne offen- 
sive, 192. 

Waller, Lt. S. R., command, 18.. 

Walmsley, Major S. W., command, 
transferred, 156. 

Warville Wood, raid, 233, 240. 

Watres, Major L. H., command, 290. 

Weigel, Brig.-Gen. William, in Marne 
offensive, 198. 

Weisel, Major E. T., of Staff, 25 n. 

Welfare work, beginning, 67; Massa- 
chusetts club-room at Paris, 103; See 
also Education; Recreation. 

Westbrook, Major S. F., command, 301. 

Westfield, Mass., training camp, 12 n. 

Westphalen Le Maltre, Capt., services 
at training camp, 48 n. 

Wheelock, Capt. (Major) H. H., of 
Staff, 25 n.; line command, 241. 

Williams, Lt.-Col. F. P., of Staff, 25 n. 

Wilson, Woodrow, visit to Division, 
284-86. 

Wolcott, Capt. Oliver, command, 16; 
of Staff, 60. 

Woods, Lt., in Marne offensive, 176 n. 

Xivray-Marv'oisin, villages in La Reine 
Sector, 101, 105; raid, 152. 

YD Show, 142. 

Yankee Division insignia, 248. 

York Harbor YD Hut, 300. 

Young Men's Christian Association, 

and educational scheme, 294; and 

amusements, 295. 

Zone of action, in Marne offensive, 
173. 



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